New York Law Review

Tag: zoning variance

  • 113 Hillside Ave. Corp. v. Zaino, 27 N.Y.2d 258 (1970): Self-Created Hardship and Zoning Variances

    113 Hillside Ave. Corp. v. Zaino, 27 N.Y.2d 258 (1970)

    A zoning board may deny an area variance when the substandard condition of a lot results from the owner’s own decision to subdivide property in a way that creates nonconforming plots, especially when granting the variance would adversely affect the neighborhood.

    Summary

    113 Hillside Avenue Corporation sought variances to build on a substandard lot created by its own subdivision. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision to grant the variances, holding that the zoning board’s denial was proper. The court emphasized that self-created hardship is a valid reason to deny a variance, especially when granting it would negatively impact the character of the surrounding area. The court distinguished this case from situations where the hardship was not self-imposed and the neighborhood already contained numerous substandard lots. The decision reinforces the principle that property owners cannot create their own zoning problems and then expect to be excused from compliance.

    Facts

    113 Hillside Avenue Corporation owned a vacant lot (Lot 14) in a residential zone with minimum area, frontage, and yard depth requirements. The lot exceeded the area requirement but failed to meet the frontage and yard depth requirements due to its “pot handle” shape. The corporation’s vendor had subdivided a larger conforming parcel into three lots, selling two lots (including the substandard Lot 14) to the corporation and one to a third party. The corporation built on and sold the other lot it purchased (Lot 15), which conformed to zoning requirements. After selling Lot 15, the village revoked the building permit for Lot 14.

    Procedural History

    The corporation initially sought a declaratory judgment that the permit revocation was improper, but the Appellate Division found the permit invalid because the application didn’t meet ordinance requirements. The corporation then applied for variances, which were initially granted by the lower court but reversed and remanded by the Appellate Division for reconsideration in light of Matter of Fulling v. Palumbo. After a new hearing, the Board of Appeals denied the variances, which was again annulled by the lower court and reversed by the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a zoning board’s denial of an area variance is proper when the substandard condition of the lot resulted from the owner’s own subdivision and granting the variance would adversely affect the neighborhood.

    Holding

    No, because the substandard condition was self-created by the property owner’s subdivision of a larger parcel, and granting the variance would negatively impact the character of the neighborhood.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court held that zoning boards can deny area variances when the substandard condition stems from the owner’s decision to subdivide the property, creating nonconforming plots. It emphasized that Matter of Fulling v. Palumbo did not alter this principle. The court cited Contino v. Incorporated Vil. of Hempstead, where it reversed the Appellate Division based on a dissenting opinion that highlighted the unreasonableness of granting variances for self-created substandard plots. The court found that granting the variances would adversely affect the neighborhood, as there were no similar substandard lots in the area. Distinguishing this case from Fulling, the court noted that in Fulling, the surrounding lots were already substandard, so granting the variance would not alter the character of the area. The court stated that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the hardship deprived it of any reasonable use of the property, amounting to a taking. The court clarified that while financial hardship was controlling in Fulling, it does not automatically require a variance, especially when the hardship is self-created. The court emphasized a municipality’s “legitimate interest in maintaining and preserving the character of a particular area”. In conclusion, the court found ample basis for the zoning board’s determination to deny the variances.

  • Matter of Crossroads Recreation, Inc. v. Broz, 4 N.Y.2d 396 (1958): Establishing “Unnecessary Hardship” for Zoning Variances

    Matter of Crossroads Recreation, Inc. v. Broz, 4 N.Y.2d 396 (1958)

    A zoning variance based on unnecessary hardship requires proof that the property suffers a unique disadvantage due to the zoning regulation, and that the hardship is not merely a general condition in the neighborhood.

    Summary

    This case concerns a property owner’s application for a zoning variance to use a barn for antique storage in a residential zone. Neighboring residents challenged the variance. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that the Zoning Board of Appeals had sufficient evidence to grant the variance. The court emphasized that the barn’s unique characteristics made conforming to the existing zoning impractical and that the proposed use was reasonable and would not negatively impact the neighborhood’s character. The court deferred to the board’s discretionary authority, finding no evidence of arbitrary or unlawful action.

    Facts

    The intervenors-appellants owned a three-story barn in an R-2 residential district. They had used the barn for antique storage for four years without objection before purchasing the property in 1964. The zoning ordinance permitted single-family residences, farms, nurseries, and greenhouses in the R-2 district, but not commercial antique storage. The barn was a lawful structure under the ordinance. The owners sought a variance to continue using it for antique storage, which was opposed by nearby residents (petitioners-respondents).

    Procedural History

    The Zoning Board of Appeals granted the variance. The Supreme Court annulled the Zoning Board’s determination. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s judgment. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Zoning Board of Appeals properly exercised its discretion in granting a variance to allow the use of a barn for antique storage in a residential zone, based on a finding of “unnecessary hardship.”

    Holding

    Yes, because the proof presented was sufficient to warrant the granting of the variance in the proper exercise of the board’s discretionary authority, as the barn’s unique size and impracticality for residential conversion constituted an unnecessary hardship, and the proposed use was reasonable and would not depreciate property values.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that it would not substitute its judgment for the board’s unless the decision was arbitrary or contrary to law, citing People ex rel. Hudson-Harlem Co. v. Walker, 282 N.Y. 400. The court found it impractical to convert the barn into a single-family dwelling due to its size and height. It also noted that residents were initially unaware of the barn’s use for antique storage and did not complain for five years, suggesting the use did not disturb the neighborhood.

    The court distinguished this case from Matter of Otto v. Steinhilber, 282 N.Y. 71, where a variance was denied for a commercial roller skating rink in a residential zone. Unlike Otto, this case involved a unique physical circumstance: an existing barn unsuitable for permitted uses. The court emphasized that the board reasonably balanced the community’s welfare with the owner’s hardship. The court stated: “That the plight of the owner is due to unique circumstances and not to the general conditions in the neighborhood.”

    The court also found the board’s conditions attached to the variance ensured preservation of the neighborhood’s character and observed the spirit of the ordinance, secured public safety and welfare, and achieved substantial justice.

    The dissent by Judges Scileppi and Jasen, which is not elaborated upon in this opinion, voted to affirm the lower court’s decision.

  • Matter of Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Board of Standards & Appeals, 16 N.Y.2d 665 (1965): Remand for Zoning Board Reconsideration Based on New Evidence

    Matter of Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Board of Standards & Appeals, 16 N.Y.2d 665 (1965)

    A court may remand a zoning board decision for reconsideration when additional evidence surfaces that could bear on allegations of discrimination or arbitrariness by the board, especially when the board indicates it would not object to a reconsideration.

    Summary

    Humble Oil sought a variance and building permits, which were denied by the Zoning Board. Humble Oil then presented additional evidence to the Special Term arguing discrimination and arbitrariness. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and Special Term decisions, remitting the case to Special Term with instructions to remand the matter to the Zoning Board of Appeals. The court reasoned that the additional evidence presented to the Special Term warranted reconsideration by the Board, especially since the Board indicated it wouldn’t oppose it, to ensure a full and fair determination based on all relevant information.

    Facts

    1. Humble Oil & Refining Co. applied to the Zoning Board of Appeals for a variance and building permits.
    2. The Zoning Board denied Humble Oil’s application.
    3. Humble Oil then presented additional matter (evidence), via affidavit and exhibit, to the Special Term, alleging discrimination and arbitrariness on the part of the Board.

    Procedural History

    1. The Special Term initially ruled against Humble Oil.
    2. The Appellate Division affirmed the Special Term’s decision.
    3. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and the Special Term, remitting the proceedings to the Special Term with the direction to remand to the Zoning Board of Appeals for reconsideration.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the introduction of new evidence at the Special Term level, potentially indicating discrimination or arbitrariness by the Zoning Board, warrants a remand to the Board for reconsideration of the application for a variance and building permits.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the additional evidence presented to the Special Term may have a bearing on a charge of discrimination and arbitrariness on the part of the board, warranting reconsideration by the Board, especially where the Board indicated it would not object to such reconsideration.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the record before the Zoning Board did not justify the petitioners’ application for a variance and building permits. However, the additional matter presented to the Special Term, suggesting discrimination and arbitrariness, warranted further consideration. The court emphasized fairness and completeness in administrative decision-making. The court considered the Zoning Board’s lack of objection to reconsideration as a key factor. The court cited Matter of Berg v. Michaelis, 21 A.D.2d 322, aff’d, 16 N.Y.2d 822, as precedent supporting the remand for reconsideration. The court also references Matter of Colonial Liq. Distrs. v. O’Connell, 295 N. Y. 129, 141 and People ex rel. Fordham Manor Ref. Church v. Walsh, 244 N. Y. 280, 289-291. The ruling emphasizes the importance of a complete and fair administrative record, particularly when allegations of bias or arbitrary action are raised. The court determined that Humble Oil should have the opportunity to present this matter to the Board for its consideration before an ultimate determination is made.

  • Bar Harbour Shopping Center, Inc. v. Andrews, 23 Misc.2d 894 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960): Enforceability of Zoning Regulations Post Variance

    Bar Harbour Shopping Center, Inc. v. Andrews, 23 Misc.2d 894 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960)

    A zoning variance runs with the land, and subsequent owners are entitled to the benefits of that variance unless it was explicitly personal to the original applicant.

    Summary

    Bar Harbour Shopping Center, Inc. sought a permit to construct a supermarket on property previously granted a zoning variance for that purpose. The permit was denied based on new interpretations of the zoning ordinance. The court addressed whether a prior zoning variance, allowing supermarket construction despite zoning restrictions, remained valid for a subsequent owner. The court held that the variance ran with the land. Unless explicitly personal to the original applicant, the new owner was entitled to the variance benefits, and the permit should be granted. This emphasizes the enduring nature of zoning variances tied to specific properties and the importance of clear limitations on such variances.

    Facts

    In 1957, Andrews, the prior owner of the property, obtained a variance to erect a supermarket, a use otherwise prohibited by the zoning ordinance. Subsequently, Bar Harbour Shopping Center, Inc. purchased the land from Andrews. In 1960, Bar Harbour applied for a permit to construct the supermarket pursuant to the variance previously granted. The Building Inspector denied the permit. The denial was based on an interpretation of the ordinance by the Town Attorney different from that when Andrews obtained the variance. No conditions limiting the variance to Andrews were imposed when it was granted.

    Procedural History

    Bar Harbour Shopping Center, Inc. applied to the Building Inspector for a permit, which was denied. Bar Harbour then commenced an Article 78 proceeding in the Supreme Court of New York, seeking to compel the issuance of the permit.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a zoning variance allowing the construction of a supermarket runs with the land and is thus available to subsequent owners, absent explicit restrictions limiting the variance to the original applicant.

    Holding

    Yes, because zoning variances typically run with the land unless the granting authority explicitly restricts the variance to the original applicant. Since no such restriction was imposed when Andrews obtained the variance, Bar Harbour, as the subsequent owner, is entitled to its benefits.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that zoning variances generally attach to the land rather than the individual owner. The court stated that unless there is clear evidence that the variance was intended to be personal to the original applicant, subsequent owners should be able to rely on the existence of the variance. The court emphasized that no conditions were imposed upon Andrews, the original applicant, that would restrict the variance to him personally. Therefore, Bar Harbour, as the new owner, could rely on the validity of the previously granted variance. The court noted the lack of legal changes or factual alterations that would justify reversing the prior determination. The court cited Dexter v. Town Board, 36 N.Y.S.2d 502 as a case where a variance was held to run with the land. The court emphasized that absent a clear showing that the variance was personal, it must be presumed to benefit the land itself. The court ordered the building inspector to issue the permit, solidifying the principle that variances generally transfer with property ownership and ensuring predictability in land use regulations.