New York Law Review

Tag: Youthful Offender Adjudication

  • Matter of Bonacorsa v. Koch, 30 N.Y.2d 254 (1972): Employer’s Right to Inquire About Prior Misconduct Despite Youthful Offender Status

    Matter of Bonacorsa v. Koch, 30 N.Y.2d 254 (1972)

    An employer can inquire into prior misconduct underlying a youthful offender adjudication when evaluating an applicant’s fitness for a sensitive public position, like a police officer, provided that the misconduct is relevant to the position’s requirements.

    Summary

    Bonacorsa, a police trainee, was investigated by the Transit Authority after he failed to disclose a prior arrest and youthful offender adjudication on his application. When confronted, he resigned, claiming duress. He then sued for reinstatement, arguing his resignation was coerced and the Authority couldn’t consider his youthful offender status. The court held the resignation issue required a trial, and while youthful offender status isn’t an automatic disqualification, the Authority could inquire into the underlying misconduct to assess his fitness for the police position.

    Facts

    In 1968, Bonacorsa passed a civil service exam for a Police Trainee position. He was informed that misrepresentation on his application was grounds for disqualification. He completed a questionnaire listing all arrests and police investigations, including juvenile matters. A subsequent investigation revealed he had been arrested in 1967 for criminally receiving stolen property and burglary, pleading guilty to malicious mischief as a youthful offender. He hadn’t disclosed these incidents. Confronted with these misrepresentations in 1969, he resigned.

    Procedural History

    Bonacorsa filed an Article 78 proceeding seeking reinstatement, alleging duress. Special Term found duress and ordered a trial on whether he knowingly made material misrepresentations. After trial, reinstatement was ordered. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Bonacorsa’s resignation was obtained under duress, thus invalidating it?

    2. Whether the Transit Authority could consider Bonacorsa’s youthful offender adjudication, or the underlying conduct, in evaluating his fitness for a police trainee position?

    Holding

    1. The case was remitted to the lower court to determine if the resignation was obtained under duress. The lower court erred in accepting the applicant’s allegations at face value without a hearing.

    2. The Transit Authority can inquire into the misconduct underlying a youthful offender adjudication to assess an applicant’s fitness for a sensitive public position, like a police officer because former section 913-n of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not prevent the employer from considering the illegal and immoral acts which underlie the youthful offender adjudication.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that a trial was needed to resolve the disputed facts surrounding the resignation. A threat to do something one has the legal right to do (like firing a provisional employee) isn’t duress. Bonacorsa was a provisional employee who could be discharged without a hearing unless the action was arbitrary or capricious.

    Regarding the youthful offender adjudication, the court clarified that former section 913-n of the Code of Criminal Procedure (now CPL 720.35) prevents automatic disqualification based solely on the adjudication. However, it doesn’t expunge the underlying misconduct. The court emphasized the public interest in ensuring law enforcement officers possess impeccable character and integrity. Employers must be able to inquire into prior misconduct to assess an applicant’s fitness, particularly for sensitive positions. The court cited examples from other jurisdictions, including California, where expungement statutes didn’t bar inquiries into underlying misconduct when the public interest required it.

    The court noted that a public employer should not be barred from knowing about prior misconduct of prospective employees to intelligently pass on their character and integrity, as well as their fitness for the position they seek. In reaching its decision as to the employability of the applicant, the employer may consider the misconduct underlying prior youthful offender adjudications, but only to the extent that such misconduct is relevant to his fitness and qualifications for the position sought.

    Even if reinstated due to duress, the Authority could still evaluate Bonacorsa’s integrity, judgment, and general fitness. CPL 720.35 protects the confidentiality of official records but doesn’t prevent employers from requiring disclosure of youthful offender adjudications on employment applications, or commencing their own independent investigation into the applicant’s fitness and qualifications, which investigation could include misconduct and arrests underlying the applicant’s youthful offender adjudication.

  • People v. Carpenteur, 21 N.Y.2d 571 (1968): Determining Predicate Felonies for Repeat Offender Sentencing

    People v. Carpenteur, 21 N.Y.2d 571 (1968)

    A youthful offender adjudication in another state, based on statutes and policy considerations similar to New York’s, should be considered when determining predicate felonies for repeat offender sentencing, even though the New York statute preventing the use of youthful offender adjudications technically applies only to those made within New York.

    Summary

    Richard Carpenteur pleaded guilty to second-degree robbery and was sentenced as a second felony offender based on a prior California conviction. In California, he had been adjudicated a youthful offender. New York law prevents using a youthful offender adjudication as a predicate for multiple offender treatment, but the prosecution argued this only applied to New York adjudications. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because Carpenteur was eligible for youthful offender treatment in New York, and California’s determination was based on similar statutes and policies, the California adjudication should preclude using the prior offense for repeat offender sentencing.

    Facts

    In 1951, when he was 18 years old, Richard Carpenteur was convicted of robbery in California.
    Instead of sentencing, he was remanded to the California Youth Authority, which is a disposition similar to a youthful offender adjudication in New York.
    California law would not allow this disposition to be used as a predicate for multiple felony offender treatment.
    Carpenteur later pleaded guilty to robbery in the second degree in New York.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was sentenced as a second felony offender in New York based on the prior California conviction.
    He challenged this sentence, arguing that the California adjudication should not be considered a felony conviction for repeat offender purposes.
    The case reached the New York Court of Appeals, which reversed the lower court’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a youthful offender adjudication in California, where the defendant was eligible for similar treatment in New York, can be used as a predicate felony conviction for sentencing purposes in New York, given that New York law prohibits the use of its own youthful offender adjudications for such purposes.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant was under 19 at the time of the California offense and eligible for youthful offender treatment in New York. The California court, acting under a similar statute and applying identical policy considerations, concluded the defendant should be treated as a youthful offender. Therefore, it was error to consider the California conviction as a felony in New York for sentencing as a second felony offender.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while New York law generally determines whether an out-of-state conviction can be used for multiple offender treatment, this case presented a unique circumstance.
    The court acknowledged that the defendant’s actions in California would have warranted a felony conviction in New York, but a New York court could also have labeled him a youthful offender.
    Quoting the statute, the court stated that on its face, section 913-n only requires this result where the defendant had been adjudicated a youthful offender “ under the provisions of this title”, that does not mean that we may disregard the California determination.
    The court emphasized that the defendant was eligible for youthful offender treatment in New York at the time of the California offense and that the California court’s decision was based on similar statutes and policy considerations.
    Therefore, the court concluded that the California determination should be determinative of the defendant’s status under section 1941, precluding the use of the California conviction for repeat offender sentencing in New York.
    The court noted a revised version of the section recently incorporated into the new Penal Law (L. 1965, ch. 1030, eff. Sept. 1, 1967), a defendant’s previous conviction is not counted unless a sentence of imprisonment in excess of one year was imposed and the defendant was actually imprisoned under such circumstances (§ 70.10, subd. 1, par. [b]). This suggests a legislative intent to limit the use of prior convictions for repeat offender sentencing.