New York Law Review

Tag: wrongful life

  • Alquijay v. St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hospital Center, 63 N.Y.2d 978 (1984): No Recovery for Wrongful Life Claims in New York

    Alquijay v. St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hospital Center, 63 N.Y.2d 978 (1984)

    In New York, a child born with a disability cannot recover damages in a wrongful life action based on a claim that negligent prenatal testing induced the parents to carry the pregnancy to term.

    Summary

    The plaintiff, born with Down’s Syndrome, sued the defendant hospitals alleging negligence in performing an amniocentesis test on her mother. The hospitals erroneously reported that the mother would give birth to a normal male child, which led her to carry the pregnancy to term instead of aborting the fetus. The plaintiff sought to recover the extraordinary expenses for special care and services she would incur upon reaching majority. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, holding that a cause of action for wrongful life is not legally cognizable in New York, as it requires comparing the value of impaired life to nonexistence.

    Facts

    The plaintiff’s mother underwent an amniocentesis test during pregnancy to determine if the fetus had any genetic abnormalities.

    The defendant hospitals negligently reported that the test indicated the mother would give birth to a normal male child.

    Relying on this report, the mother carried the pregnancy to term, resulting in the birth of the plaintiff, who has Down’s Syndrome.

    The plaintiff’s condition will require special treatment and care throughout her lifetime.

    The parents’ claims for damages were time-barred, leaving only the infant’s claim.

    Procedural History

    The Special Term denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the infant’s cause of action.

    The Appellate Division reversed the Special Term’s decision and dismissed the complaint, relying on Becker v. Schwartz.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an infant born with a disability can recover damages from a hospital for the extraordinary expenses incurred due to the disability, based on the hospital’s negligent prenatal testing that induced the parents to carry the pregnancy to term.

    Holding

    No, because the plaintiff’s cause of action is one for wrongful life, which is not legally cognizable in New York, as it demands a comparison between impaired life and nonexistence that the law is not equipped to make.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals agreed with the Appellate Division that the plaintiff’s cause of action was, in essence, a claim for wrongful life, which New York law does not recognize, citing Becker v. Schwartz. The court emphasized that while the parents might have had a valid claim for their pecuniary expenses if it had been timely brought, the infant’s claim for her own wrongful life was different. Such a claim, the court reasoned, “demands a calculation of damages dependent upon a comparison between the Hobson’s choice of life in an impaired state and nonexistence”, a calculation that the law is unable to perform. The court further stated that the argument for allowing recovery based on public policy was better addressed to the Legislature. The court distinguished between the parents’ potential claim for breach of duty, which could have entitled them to recover pecuniary expenses, and the infant’s wrongful life claim, which lacked a legally cognizable injury. This case reinforces the principle that the judiciary is not suited to assess the value of life with disabilities versus no life at all; such considerations are best left to legislative action.

  • Park v. Chessin, 400 N.Y.S.2d 950 (1977): Recovery for Emotional Distress and Expenses Related to a Child’s Birth Defect

    Park v. Chessin, 400 N.Y.S.2d 950 (1977)

    In a case of alleged medical malpractice for failure to diagnose a fetal defect, a cause of action may exist for the parents’ emotional distress and expenses related to raising the child with the defect, but the court did not reach the issue of whether a child can recover for wrongful life when the defendant’s failure to perform a test was within the permissible exercise of medical judgment.

    Summary

    The plaintiffs, parents of a child born with Cri-du-chat syndrome, sued the defendant doctors for medical malpractice, alleging that the doctors failed to perform an amniocentesis during pregnancy, which would have revealed the child’s chromosomal defect and allowed the parents to make an informed decision about terminating the pregnancy. The court declined to rule on the complex legal questions of whether parents can recover for emotional distress and the costs of raising a disabled child or whether a child can recover for “wrongful life” because the defendant’s actions were within the bounds of permissible medical judgment at the time.

    Facts

    The plaintiff mother consulted with the defendant doctors for genetic counseling during her pregnancy. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants negligently failed to advise and perform an amniocentesis. The plaintiffs asserted that this procedure would have revealed that the child was afflicted with Cri-du-chat syndrome, a chromosomal defect causing severe physical and mental retardation. The parents claimed that if they had known about the defect, they would have obtained an abortion.

    Procedural History

    The lower court’s decision to dismiss the six causes of action was appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s failure to perform an amniocentesis constituted medical malpractice, considering the medical history of the patient and the state of medical knowledge in 1969 regarding the amniocentesis test, or was it instead a permissible exercise of medical judgment?

    Holding

    No, because the defendants’ failure to perform the test was a permissible exercise of medical judgment and not a departure from accepted medical practice at the time.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, holding that the plaintiffs did not raise an issue of fact to counter the defendants’ evidence that their failure to perform the amniocentesis was within the bounds of permissible medical judgment. The court cited Pike v. Honsinger, 155 N.Y. 201, which establishes that a physician is not liable for negligence if they exercise their best judgment in applying their skill and knowledge. Because the defendants’ actions were deemed a permissible exercise of medical judgment based on the medical information available at the time (1969), the court did not address the broader legal questions presented by the case. The court stated, “our review of the record does not demonstrate that an issue of fact was raised by the plaintiffs in the face of the uncontroverted showing by the defendants that, on the basis of the patient’s medical history and the state of medical knowledge regarding the use of the amniocentesis test in 1969, the defendants’ failure to perform the test was no more than a permissible exercise of medical judgment and not a departure from then accepted medical practice”. The Court avoided deciding the novel issues concerning “wrongful life” and the extent of the duty owed by physicians in such circumstances, because the factual predicate for reaching those issues was absent.

  • Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240 (1963): The “Wrongful Life” Doctrine and its Rejection

    Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240 (1963)

    A child born as a result of his father’s tortious act of adultery, where the father deceives the mother into believing he is free to marry, does not have a cause of action against his father for “wrongful life.”

    Summary

    This case addresses the novel claim of “wrongful life,” brought by a child born out of an adulterous relationship against his father. The father deceived the child’s mother into believing he was free to marry her, resulting in the child’s birth. The child sought damages for his illegitimate status and the associated social stigma. The Illinois Appellate Court rejected the claim, holding that while the father’s actions were reprehensible, recognizing a cause of action for wrongful life would be against public policy. The court reasoned that the judiciary should not be the instrument to undermine the family, and because calculating damages based on the difference between non-existence and life is inherently impossible, the claim was not legally cognizable.

    Facts

    The defendant, the child’s father, engaged in sexual relations with the child’s mother. He fraudulently represented to her that he was single and free to marry. As a result of this deception, the child was born out of wedlock. The plaintiff, the child, through his mother as next friend, filed suit against his father, alleging that his illegitimate status caused him significant harm.

    Procedural History

    The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint. The plaintiff appealed the dismissal to the Illinois Appellate Court, First District. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the child did not have a cognizable cause of action.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a child born as a result of his father’s intentional tort of adultery, based on the father’s fraudulent representation of his marital status to the mother, has a legally recognizable cause of action against his father for damages relating to the circumstances of his birth and the stigmatizing status of illegitimacy.

    Holding

    No, because public policy considerations and the inherent impossibility of calculating damages in such a case preclude recognition of a “wrongful life” cause of action.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged the father’s morally reprehensible conduct but emphasized that not every wrong is compensable with money damages. The court stated that “being born under one set of circumstances rather than another was not a tort that the common law was prepared to recognize.” The court reasoned that comparing the value of being born into illegitimacy versus not being born at all is a philosophical question, not a legal one. The court stated that the damages would require a calculation of the difference between being and non-being. The court recognized that such a calculation is not within the realm of conventional tort damage assessment. The court further reasoned that allowing the child to recover would have profound social implications, potentially opening the door to suits based on a parent’s undesirable characteristics or genetic predispositions. The court also cited the sanctity of the family unit as a key policy consideration: “[t]he judiciary is not the place to provide a platform for undermining the institution of the family.”