New York Law Review

Tag: Wrongful Birth

  • Foote v. Albany Medical Center Hospital, 71 A.D.3d 25 (2009): Government Benefits Do Not Automatically Preclude Recovery in Wrongful Birth Actions

    Foote v. Albany Medical Center Hospital, 71 A.D.3d 25 (3d Dept. 2009)

    In a wrongful birth action, the availability of government benefits covering some of the extraordinary expenses of caring for a disabled child does not automatically eliminate the parents’ cause of action; a factual question remains as to whether the parents have or will incur uncovered extraordinary financial obligations.

    Summary

    Kristi Foote and Tim Sheridan sued medical providers for failing to inform them about their unborn child’s neurological disorder (Joubert Syndrome). They claimed that had they known, they would have terminated the pregnancy. The defendants sought summary judgment, arguing that government programs would cover all the child’s care expenses. The plaintiffs countered with expert testimony that government programs only provided a minimum level of care, necessitating out-of-pocket expenses for “optimal care.” The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants, finding a triable issue of fact. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the potential availability of government benefits does not preclude a wrongful birth action when uncovered extraordinary expenses remain a factual issue.

    Facts

    Kristi Foote and Tim Sheridan’s child was born with Joubert Syndrome, a severe neurological disorder. The parents sued medical providers, alleging they failed to detect or inform them of the fetal abnormality during pregnancy. The plaintiffs claimed they would have terminated the pregnancy had they known. They sought damages for the extraordinary expenses required to care for their disabled child.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, finding no triable issue of fact regarding extraordinary expenses. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that government aid would only offset damages awarded after trial and that a factual question remained regarding the adequacy of government-provided care. The defendants appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the potential availability of government benefits covering some of the expenses of caring for a disabled child eliminates a parent’s cause of action for wrongful birth as a matter of law, or whether a factual question remains if the parents have or will incur uncovered extraordinary financial obligations.

    Holding

    No, because the potential availability of government benefits does not automatically eliminate the parents’ financial obligation for their son’s extraordinary medical and educational expenses. A triable issue of fact exists as to whether the resources provided by government programs fully cover the extraordinary medical and other treatment or services necessary for the child during minority.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holding in Bani-Esraili v. Lerman, stating that in a wrongful birth action, the parents’ legally cognizable injury is “the increased financial obligation arising from the extraordinary medical treatment rendered the child during minority.” The court found that the expert’s life care plan presented by the plaintiffs was sufficient to demonstrate a triable factual issue as to whether the plaintiffs have or will incur extraordinary financial obligations. The court emphasized that a question of fact existed concerning the difference between government-provided resources and the optimal level of care required by the child. The court stated, “[t]he existence of government programs . . . will not, as a matter of law, eliminate plaintiffs’ financial obligation for their son’s extraordinary medical and educational expenses.” The court declined to address the collateral source rule argument, leaving it for consideration by the Supreme Court.

  • Gelman v. Seiferts, 85 N.Y.2d 1023 (1995): Limiting Recovery in Wrongful Birth Actions to Minority Expenses

    Gelman v. Seiferts, 85 N.Y.2d 1023 (1995)

    In a wrongful birth action, parents can only recover the increased financial obligations arising from the extraordinary medical treatment required by a child with disabilities during their minority, as there is no legal obligation for parental support after the child reaches the age of 21.

    Summary

    This case addresses the scope of damages recoverable in a “wrongful birth” action. The New York Court of Appeals held that parents could not recover from the defendant doctor’s estate the costs of extraordinary expenses for the support and care of their son, born with thalassemia major, after he reached 21 years of age. The court reasoned that under New York law, parents have no legal obligation to support a child after they reach the age of majority. The court emphasized that any extension of liability for post-majority expenses should be addressed by the legislature.

    Facts

    The plaintiff brought a “wrongful birth” action against the estate of the defendant doctor, seeking to recover costs associated with raising their son, who was born with thalassemia major, a serious genetic blood disorder. The plaintiffs sought to recover expenses incurred during the child’s minority and those expected to be incurred after the child reached the age of 21.

    Procedural History

    The trial court held that the plaintiff could not recover expenses related to the care of their child after the age of 21. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, in a wrongful birth action, parents can recover the costs of extraordinary expenses for the support and special care of a child with a disability after the child reaches the age of 21, when there is no legal obligation for such support under New York law?

    Holding

    No, because under New York law, a parent has no legal obligation to continue the support of a child after the age of majority. Therefore, recovery is limited to the increased financial obligations arising from extraordinary medical treatment during the child’s minority.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on the established principle that parental legal obligations to support a child cease when the child reaches the age of majority. The court cited various provisions of New York law, including the Family Court Act § 413(1), Domestic Relations Law § 32(3), and Social Services Law § 101(1), to support this principle. The court acknowledged the plaintiff’s assertion of a moral obligation to support their child beyond the age of 21 but emphasized that the scope of legally cognizable injury is limited to the period of legal obligation. The court stated that “plaintiff may be compensated only in the amount that represents his legally cognizable injury, namely the increased financial obligation arising from the extraordinary medical treatment rendered the child during minority.” The court referenced prior decisions, including Alquijay v. St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hosp. Center, 63 N.Y.2d 978, 979 and Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 413, to reinforce this limitation on damages in wrongful birth actions. The court explicitly deferred to the legislature on any potential expansion of liability, stating, “The argument that public policy is better served by permitting plaintiff to recover the cost of his son’s postmajority extraordinary expenses is more appropriately addressed to the Legislature.”

  • Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401 (1978): Limiting Liability for Emotional Distress to Parents of Child with Genetic Disease

    Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401 (1978)

    A physician’s negligence in failing to diagnose a fetus with a genetic disease does not create a cause of action for the parents’ emotional distress resulting from the child’s birth and subsequent suffering.

    Summary

    The plaintiffs, parents of a child born with Tay-Sachs disease, sued the defendant doctor for negligence, alleging he failed to take a proper genealogical history or properly evaluate it, which would have revealed their heightened risk of having a child with the disease. They claimed that had they been informed of the risk and the availability of testing, they would have aborted the pregnancy. The court held that the parents could not recover for their emotional distress, reasoning that extending liability in this case would create artificial and unmanageable boundaries. The court emphasized the need to limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree, even in the face of genuine suffering.

    Facts

    The plaintiffs, both Eastern European Jews, consulted the defendant doctor. The doctor failed to take a proper genealogical history or to properly evaluate it. The parents subsequently gave birth to a daughter with Tay-Sachs disease, a degenerative genetic disorder. The parents claimed they would have undergone testing and aborted the pregnancy had the doctor properly advised them of the risk and the availability of tests.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs sued, alleging the doctor’s negligence caused them mental distress. The defendant moved to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. Special Term denied the motion. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the complaint.

    Issue(s)

    Whether parents can recover from a doctor for the mental distress and emotional disturbances they suffered as a result of their infant daughter having been born with and eventually succumbing to Tay-Sachs disease, where the doctor was allegedly negligent in failing to diagnose the risk of the disease in utero.

    Holding

    No, because extending liability to the parents in this situation would require an unmanageable extension of traditional tort concepts, leading to arbitrary and artificial boundaries in the law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged the parents’ suffering but emphasized the need to limit the scope of liability. It noted that while the law seeks to provide redress for injuries caused by negligence, it cannot provide relief for every injury suffered. The court distinguished this case from situations where direct physical or emotional injury results from negligence. Here, the parents suffered emotional distress from witnessing their child’s suffering, not from a direct injury to themselves caused by the doctor’s negligence.

    The court cited Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609 (1969), which denied recovery to a mother traumatized by injuries suffered by her child due to another’s negligence. The court reasoned that extending liability to the parents would create artificial boundaries. For example, the dissent would allow the mother to recover while denying recovery to the father. “The law of liability should not turn on hypertechnical and fortuitous considerations of this type.”

    The court recognized the difficulty in drawing a line if recovery were allowed in this case. “Every injury has ramifying consequences, like the ripplings of the waters, without end. The problem for the law is to limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree” (quoting Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 619 (1969)).