New York Law Review

Tag: Written Contract

  • Goldman v. St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 82 N.Y.2d 784 (1993): Enforceability of Oral Employment Contracts Under the Statute of Frauds

    82 N.Y.2d 784 (1993)

    To defeat a motion for summary judgment when asserting a breach of contract claim, the plaintiff bears the burden of presenting sufficient evidence to demonstrate a triable issue of fact, including demonstrating compliance with the Statute of Frauds if the contract falls within its scope.

    Summary

    Goldman sued St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hospital Center, alleging breach of a fixed-duration employment contract. The hospital moved for summary judgment, arguing the contract was unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds because it was not in writing and could not be performed within one year. The plaintiff initially relied on non-contractual documents to support his claim. Only after the hospital raised the Statute of Frauds defense did Goldman claim the existence of a written contract, which he alleged was lost. The Court of Appeals held that Goldman failed to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate a triable issue of fact regarding a written contract, especially given his initial reliance on non-contractual documents. Therefore, the motion for summary judgement was affirmed.

    Facts

    Goldman claimed he was employed by St. Luke’s/Roosevelt Hospital Center for a fixed duration under a written contract. In his complaint, Goldman did not allege the existence of a written contract. Before any responsive pleading, Goldman submitted an affidavit referring to certain non-contractual documents as confirming part of the contract. After the hospital raised the Statute of Frauds as a defense, Goldman claimed for the first time that a written contract existed but was lost.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved for summary judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate a triable issue of fact that a written contract existed to satisfy the Statute of Frauds and defeat the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

    Holding

    No, because the plaintiff’s initial reliance on non-contractual documents and the conclusory nature of his later assertion that a written contract existed, after the Statute of Frauds defense was raised, failed to meet the burden of showing facts sufficient to require a trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that to defeat the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff had the burden of showing “‘facts sufficient to require a trial of any issue of fact’”. The court found that the plaintiff failed to meet this burden because he did not adequately demonstrate the existence of a written contract. The documents he initially relied on were “clearly insufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.” The court noted that the plaintiff’s claim of a lost written contract was made in a “conclusory fashion” only after the defendants raised the Statute of Frauds defense. This inconsistency undermined the plaintiff’s credibility and failed to create a genuine issue of material fact. The court referenced Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562. The court concluded that the Appellate Division correctly found that the plaintiff had failed to meet the burden of making a sufficient factual showing.

  • Rogoff v. San Juan Racing Ass’n, 54 N.Y.2d 883 (1981): Statute of Frauds and Unpleaded Defenses

    54 N.Y.2d 883 (1981)

    A party can raise a Statute of Frauds defense in a motion for summary judgment even if it wasn’t explicitly pleaded in the answer, provided the opposing party has notice of and an opportunity to respond to the defense.

    Summary

    Arthur Rogoff sued San Juan Racing Association for breach of contract. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing the alleged contract was barred by the Statute of Frauds, despite not raising the defense in its answer. Rogoff opposed, arguing the defense was waived and that sufficient writings existed to satisfy the statute. The New York Court of Appeals held that because Rogoff had notice and an opportunity to respond to the Statute of Frauds defense in the motion for summary judgment, the defendant’s failure to plead it in the answer was not fatal. The court also found insufficient written evidence to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, thus affirming the grant of summary judgment for the defendant.

    Facts

    Arthur Rogoff brought a lawsuit against San Juan Racing Association, alleging breach of contract. The specific details of the alleged contract are not fully detailed in the opinion, but it appears to involve some type of agreement not performable within one year, thus potentially falling under the Statute of Frauds. The defendant, San Juan Racing Association, moved for summary judgment.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing the contract was barred by the Statute of Frauds. The plaintiff opposed, contending the Statute of Frauds defense was waived because it wasn’t pleaded in the answer and arguing that sufficient written documents existed to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision granting summary judgment to the defendant. The plaintiff then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a defendant can raise a Statute of Frauds defense in a motion for summary judgment if the defense was not explicitly pleaded in the answer.

    2. Whether the writings presented by the plaintiff were sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.

    Holding

    1. No, because the plaintiff had notice and opportunity to respond to the defense.

    2. No, because there was no single writing or series of writings that satisfied the statutory requirement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals addressed the procedural issue first, stating that the plaintiff fully opposed the Statute of Frauds argument in the motion for summary judgment, both on procedural grounds (failure to plead) and on the merits. The court reasoned that because the plaintiff had notice and an opportunity to respond, it was not reversible error for the Appellate Division to consider the unpleaded defense. The court emphasized the plaintiff’s arguments included “14 written documents which collectively met the requirements of the statute,” that there had been full performance, and that the contract was not subject to the statute. Thus, the plaintiff was not prejudiced by the lack of formal pleading.

    On the merits, the court agreed with the Appellate Division that there was nothing “in the record any writing or series of writings construed as a whole, which could even arguably satisfy [the] statutory requirement.” Therefore, the court found that the Statute of Frauds barred the plaintiff’s claim. The court summarily dismissed the appellant’s remaining arguments as without merit.