New York Law Review

Tag: workplace safety

  • Gammons v. City of New York, 24 N.Y.3d 189 (2014): Labor Law § 27-a as a Predicate for General Municipal Law § 205-e Actions

    24 N.Y.3d 189 (2014)

    Labor Law § 27-a (3)(a)(1), which mandates employers to provide a workplace free from recognized hazards, can serve as a valid predicate for a cause of action under General Municipal Law § 205-e for police officers injured in the line of duty.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether Labor Law § 27-a, specifically its general duty clause, could serve as a predicate for a police officer’s claim under General Municipal Law (GML) § 205-e. The plaintiff, a police officer, was injured while loading barriers onto a truck. The Court held that Labor Law § 27-a(3)(a)(1), which requires employers to provide a safe workplace, could serve as a valid predicate for a GML § 205-e claim. The Court emphasized the legislative intent behind GML § 205-e to provide broad protection for police officers and the expansive interpretation that the courts must apply to the statute. The Court found that Labor Law § 27-a imposed a clear legal duty, satisfying the requirements for a GML § 205-e predicate. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was denied because the plaintiff’s injury was, at least arguably, caused by the truck being improperly equipped, thus presenting a recognized hazard.

    Facts

    Allison Gammons, a New York City police officer, was injured while working on a "barrier truck detail." She was loading wooden barriers onto a police flatbed truck when another officer pushed a barrier into her, causing her to fall off the truck. Gammons claimed the truck was unsafe because it was too short, lacked a tailgate and adequate side railings. She sued the City of New York and the Police Department, alleging common law negligence and a violation of GML § 205-e, based on the alleged unsafe condition of the truck and violation of Labor Law § 27-a(3)(a)(1). Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the general duty clause of Labor Law § 27-a could not serve as a statutory predicate for a GML § 205-e cause of action, and that the plaintiff failed to establish a “recognized hazard”.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, holding that Labor Law § 27-a (3) (a) (1) may serve as a predicate for a violation of GML § 205-e. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision. The Appellate Division granted defendants leave to appeal on a certified question whether the court properly affirmed the denial of defendants' summary judgment motion to dismiss plaintiff's GML § 205-e claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Labor Law § 27-a (3) (a) (1), the general duty clause of the Public Employee Safety and Health Act (PESHA), can serve as a predicate for a claim under GML § 205-e.

    2. Whether the plaintiff established a violation of Labor Law § 27-a (3) (a) (1) by demonstrating a “recognized hazard” in the workplace.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the Court held that Labor Law § 27-a (3) (a) (1) contains a clear legal duty that may serve as a predicate for a GML § 205-e claim.

    2. The court found that defendants failed to meet their burden to establish that the plaintiff's injuries were not caused by a "recognized hazard."

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals analyzed the legislative history and purpose of GML § 205-e. The Court emphasized that the Legislature intended a broad application of GML § 205-e to protect police officers. The Court reviewed prior cases which discussed legislative amendments meant to broaden police officers’ rights to sue for injuries. The Court noted that these amendments were enacted to counteract judicial decisions limiting the application of GML § 205-e, emphasizing the legislative goal of providing a cause of action for police officers. The Court referred to cases, such as Williams v. City of New York, that directed the courts to apply GML § 205-e "’expansively’ so as to favor recovery by police officers whenever possible."

    The Court addressed the question of whether Labor Law § 27-a (3) (a) (1) could serve as a predicate for a GML § 205-e claim. The Court held that it could, reasoning that Labor Law § 27-a contained a clear legal duty. Specifically, it stated that "[e]very employer shall: (1) furnish to each of its employees, employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to its employees and which will provide reasonable and adequate protection to the lives, safety or health of its employees." The Court found that this imposed a clear legal duty, despite being general in nature.

    The Court distinguished the case from Williams, noting that the plaintiff’s claim involved an improperly equipped vehicle, which the Court said could be an occupational injury covered by PESHA. The Court also rejected the argument that Labor Law § 27-a could not serve as a predicate because the Commissioner of Labor had sole authority over enforcement, noting that GML § 205-e allows courts to consider noncompliance with statutes and regulations as evidence of negligence. Dissenting, Judge Pigott argued that a plaintiff should cite to a specific regulation violated to meet the threshold under GML § 205-e when using Labor Law § 27-a as a predicate.

  • Sotire v. Immigrant Food & Rest. Servs., Inc., 10 N.Y.3d 792 (2008): Applying Labor Law § 240(1) to Commercial Window Cleaning

    10 N.Y.3d 792 (2008)

    Commercial window cleaning, comparable to the activity at issue, falls under Labor Law § 240(1) if it involves elevation-related risks that the statute aims to address and the worker is not provided with adequate safety devices.

    Summary

    The plaintiff, a commercial cleaner, was injured while cleaning high interior windows in a dormitory, having been instructed to climb on furniture instead of being provided a ladder. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ rulings, holding that the plaintiff was entitled to partial summary judgment on liability under Labor Law § 240(1). The court reasoned that the activity created an elevation-related risk contemplated by the statute, as the plaintiff was required to climb on furniture to reach the high windows and was not provided with proper safety equipment such as a ladder or scaffold.

    Facts

    The plaintiff’s employer, under a commercial cleaning contract, instructed her to clean 10-foot-high interior windows in a dormitory. She was given only a rag and window washing solution. When she requested a ladder, she was told to use furniture instead. While standing on a bed to clean a window, the plaintiff fell and sustained multiple fractures and other injuries.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff brought a Labor Law § 240(1) action against the defendants. The lower courts granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, reasoning that the plaintiff’s activity constituted routine maintenance not covered by the statute. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division order, granted the plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment as to liability, and denied the defendants’ cross-motions for summary judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the plaintiff’s activity of cleaning high windows by climbing on furniture, without proper safety devices, constitutes an elevation-related risk covered under Labor Law § 240(1), thus entitling her to summary judgment on the issue of liability.

    Holding

    Yes, because the plaintiff was injured while cleaning 10-foot-high windows, and was required to climb upon furniture in order to complete her work—creating an elevation-related risk— and she was not provided a ladder, scaffold or other safety device of the kind contemplated under the statute.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior decision in Broggy v. Rockefeller Group, Inc., which held that commercial window cleaning is covered by Labor Law § 240(1) if it involves an elevation-related risk. The court reasoned that in this case, the plaintiff established that she was injured while cleaning high windows in a college dormitory with a rag, and was required to climb upon furniture to complete her work. This created precisely the type of elevation-related risk that the statute was intended to address. The Court emphasized that the plaintiff was not provided with a ladder, scaffold, or other safety device as required by the statute. The court concluded that the lower courts erred in characterizing the plaintiff’s activity as routine maintenance, as the circumstances clearly indicated a violation of Labor Law § 240(1). The absence of appropriate safety equipment to mitigate the elevation-related risk was the decisive factor in the court’s determination.

  • Nagel v. D & R Realty Corp., 99 N.Y.2d 98 (2002): Labor Law § 241(6) Applies Only to Construction, Demolition, or Excavation

    Nagel v. D & R Realty Corp., 99 N.Y.2d 98 (2002)

    Labor Law § 241(6) imposes a nondelegable duty on owners and contractors to provide reasonable and adequate safety to workers only when the work being performed falls within the context of construction, demolition, or excavation, not routine maintenance.

    Summary

    Bruce Nagel, a laborer, was injured while performing a routine two-year safety inspection on an elevator. He sued D & R Realty Corp., the building owner, alleging violations of Labor Law § 241(6). The New York Court of Appeals held that Nagel could not recover under this section because his work constituted routine maintenance, not construction, demolition, or excavation. The Court emphasized that Labor Law § 241(6) is specifically designed to protect workers engaged in the inherently hazardous activities of construction, demolition, or excavation, as evidenced by the statute’s legislative history and associated regulations.

    Facts

    Bruce Nagel was performing a two-year safety inspection on top of an elevator. The purpose of the inspection was to ensure the elevator’s safety mechanisms, specifically the brakes, were functioning correctly. During the inspection, Nagel slipped on oil and fell, sustaining an injury to his right shoulder. The accident occurred approximately 1.5 hours into the two-hour inspection process. The Nagels then brought an action against D & R Realty Corp., alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240 (1) and § 241 (6).

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted D & R Realty Corp.’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing the complaint. The court reasoned that Nagel was performing routine maintenance work, which did not constitute construction, demolition, or excavation under Labor Law § 241(6). The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, clarifying that maintenance work only qualifies as construction if it involves significant structural work, not routine maintenance. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Labor Law § 241(6) applies to injuries sustained during routine maintenance work, specifically a two-year elevator safety inspection.

    Holding

    No, because Labor Law § 241(6) is intended to protect workers engaged in the inherently hazardous work of construction, excavation, or demolition, and routine maintenance does not fall within this scope.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the legislative history of Labor Law § 241(6) and the Industrial Code demonstrate a clear intent to protect workers from industrial accidents specifically connected with construction, demolition, or excavation. The Court highlighted that the statute’s title, “Construction, excavation and demolition work,” further supports this interpretation. The Court examined the Industrial Code’s definition of “construction work” (12 NYCRR 23-1.4[b][13]), which includes maintenance, but clarified that this definition must be construed consistently with the overall intent of Labor Law § 241(6). The Court reasoned that the regulation refers to protection in the construction, demolition, and excavation context. The Court distinguished this case from Mosher v. State of New York, where the plaintiff was injured while repaving a highway, an activity the court deemed to fall within the scope of Labor Law § 241(6) because it involved construction at a site. The court stated, “That the Legislature sought to protect workers from industrial accidents specifically in connection with construction, demolition or excavation work is, therefore, patent. In the present case, Nagel’s work of performing a two-year elevator test constituted maintenance work that was not connected to construction, demolition or excavation of a building or structure and is therefore not within the statute’s coverage.”

  • Davis v. Fort Ann Central School, 93 N.Y.2d 378 (1999): Establishing a Violation of Labor Law § 240(1) through Improper Ladder Placement

    Davis v. Fort Ann Central School, 93 N.Y.2d 378 (1999)

    A plaintiff can establish a prima facie case for violation of Labor Law § 240(1) by demonstrating that a ladder was not properly placed due to unsafe conditions at the worksite, shifting the burden to the defendant to demonstrate a triable issue of fact.

    Summary

    Plaintiff, Davis, sued Fort Ann Central School under Labor Law § 240(1) after being injured in a fall from a ladder. Davis alleged the ladder slipped due to a slippery film on the floor caused by a prior flooding incident. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that Davis established a prima facie case that the school failed to ensure proper ladder placement due to the floor’s condition. The court emphasized the ultimate responsibility of owners and contractors for worker safety under Labor Law § 240(1), and because the defendant presented no evidence to rebut the prima facie case or challenge Davis’s credibility, summary judgment was properly awarded to the plaintiff.

    Facts

    Davis was injured when a ladder he was using slipped from under him, causing him to fall. The accident occurred in a room that had been flooded with “air scubber water” a few days prior. The defendant conceded this water could have some degree of greasiness or slipperiness. Although the room appeared clean to Davis before the fall, he observed a film or “gunk” on the floor where the ladder had been placed after the accident.

    Procedural History

    Davis commenced an action against Fort Ann Central School pursuant to section 240(1) of the Labor Law in the trial court. The trial court granted summary judgment to Davis. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The case then went to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Appellate Division’s order and answered the certified question in the affirmative.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case of a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) by demonstrating that the ladder was not properly placed due to a dangerous condition on the floor, and whether the defendant presented sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact to defeat summary judgment.

    Holding

    Yes, because the plaintiff presented evidence showing that the ladder slipped due to a film on the floor, which constituted a failure to ensure proper placement of the ladder, and the defendant failed to present any evidence to rebut the prima facie case or challenge the plaintiff’s credibility.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on Labor Law § 240(1), which requires that safety devices like ladders be “constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection” to workers. The court cited Zimmer v. Chemung County Performing Arts, emphasizing the legislative intent to place ultimate responsibility for safety practices on owners and general contractors. The court found that Davis had established a prima facie case by showing the ladder slipped due to the condition of the floor. This shifted the burden to the defendant to present evidence creating a triable issue of fact. Because the defendant failed to present any such evidence or challenge Davis’s credibility, the court held that summary judgment was properly granted. The court referenced Ferra v. County of Wayne to support the proposition that improper placement of a ladder due to floor conditions can establish a violation of Labor Law § 240(1). The court emphasized the lack of contradictory evidence, stating, “Since neither the defendant nor third-party defendant has presented any evidence of a triable issue of fact relating to the prima facie case or to plaintiff’s credibility, summary judgment was properly awarded to the plaintiff.” There were no dissenting or concurring opinions noted.

  • Rocovich v. Consolidated Edison Co., 78 N.Y.2d 509 (1991): Defining Elevation-Related Risks Under New York Labor Law § 240(1)

    Rocovich v. Consolidated Edison Co., 78 N.Y.2d 509 (1991)

    New York Labor Law § 240(1) imposes absolute liability for elevation-related risks inherent in construction work, requiring protective devices when a difference in elevation creates a hazard, but does not apply to general workplace hazards.

    Summary

    Rocovich, an insulation worker, was injured when he slipped and fell into a trough of hot oil while working on a power plant roof. He sued Consolidated Edison, alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1). The Court of Appeals held that § 240(1) did not apply because the injury was not caused by an elevation-related risk requiring protective devices like scaffolding or ladders, but rather from a general workplace hazard. The Court emphasized that § 240(1) is specifically targeted at elevation risks, not all dangerous conditions.

    Facts

    Rocovich, an employee of King Insulation Company, was repairing insulation on pipes located in a recessed area on the roof of Consolidated Edison’s power plant. The recessed area contained a trough, 18-36 inches wide and 12 inches deep, filled with hot oil. While attempting to step across the trough, Rocovich slipped and fell, immersing his foot and ankle in the hot oil, causing injury.

    Procedural History

    At trial, Rocovich moved for a directed verdict based on Consolidated Edison’s violation of Labor Law § 240(1), arguing his comparative negligence was irrelevant. The trial court denied this motion and submitted the case under § 241(6), which allows for consideration of the plaintiff’s culpable conduct. The jury found Consolidated Edison 10% at fault and Rocovich 90% at fault. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. Rocovich appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Labor Law § 240(1) applies to an injury sustained when a worker slips and falls into a trough of hot oil while working on a roof, where the risk is not directly related to an elevation differential requiring protective devices.

    Holding

    No, because Labor Law § 240(1) is intended to protect workers from elevation-related risks requiring specific safety devices like scaffolds and ladders, and does not extend to general workplace hazards, even if dangerous.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that while Labor Law § 240(1) is to be liberally construed to protect workers, its application is limited to specific types of hazards: those related to elevation differentials. The statute lists devices like scaffolding, hoists, ladders, etc., which are designed to protect against risks associated with working at heights or with elevated materials. The court reasoned that the legislative intent behind § 240(1) was to address the special hazards of working where gravity poses a risk due to differences in elevation. The court stated, “Manifestly, a violation of the statute cannot ‘establish liability if the statute is intended to protect against a particular hazard, and a hazard of a different kind is the occasion of the injury’ (DeHaen v Rockwood Sprinkler Co., 258 NY 350, 353)”. The court rejected Rocovich’s argument that the degree of the hazard should determine the applicability of § 240(1). Adopting such an interpretation would render Labor Law § 241(6), which governs general workplace safety, virtually useless. The court held that Rocovich’s injury, while unfortunate, stemmed from a general workplace hazard and not an elevation-related risk contemplated by § 240(1). Therefore, the case was properly submitted to the jury under § 241(6), where comparative fault could be considered.

  • People v. Pymm, 76 N.Y.2d 511 (1990): State Criminal Laws and Federal Workplace Safety Regulations

    76 N.Y.2d 511 (1990)

    The Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) does not preempt state criminal laws from prosecuting employers for conduct, even in the workplace, that violates generally applicable criminal statutes.

    Summary

    Pymm Thermometer Corporation (PTC) and Pak Glass Machinery Corporation, along with their officers, William and Edward Pymm, were convicted of several crimes related to unsafe working conditions involving mercury exposure. The defendants argued that OSHA preempted the state criminal prosecution. The New York Court of Appeals held that OSHA does not preempt state criminal laws. The court reasoned that state criminal laws are not “occupational safety and health standards” under OSHA, and the Act’s savings clause preserves state statutory and common-law rights and duties. State criminal laws serve a broader purpose of protecting all citizens and deterring intolerable conduct, which is consistent with but distinct from OSHA’s goals.

    Facts

    PTC manufactured thermometers, using mercury. Pak Glass serviced PTC’s machinery. Mercury contamination was an ongoing problem at PTC, posing a health risk to employees. Inspections revealed inadequate worker protection from mercury poisoning. In 1985, OSHA discovered a clandestine mercury reclamation operation in PTC’s basement, initially denied by William Pymm. Vidal Rodriguez, an employee, processed broken thermometers in a poorly ventilated area, resulting in mercury exposure and neurological damage. Mercury vapor readings were almost five times the permissible level. Rodriguez developed neurological symptoms consistent with mercury poisoning.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were charged with conspiracy, falsifying business records, assault, and reckless endangerment. The jury found them guilty on all counts. The trial court set aside the verdict, finding preemption by OSHA and insufficient evidence for conspiracy and reckless endangerment. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s order and reinstated the verdict. This appeal followed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) preempts a state’s ability to enforce its general criminal laws against employers for conduct in the workplace that violates those laws.

    Holding

    No, because OSHA does not expressly or impliedly preempt state criminal laws, as these laws serve a broader purpose than workplace safety standards and the Act’s savings clause preserves state authority.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that OSHA does not expressly preempt state criminal laws. Section 18(b) of the Act relates to the development and enforcement of standards, not general criminal laws. The court reasoned that New York’s criminal laws are not “occupational safety and health standards” because they do not dictate specific workplace conditions or practices. Instead, they are triggered by unacceptable acts, reflecting society’s condemnation of certain behavior. The court emphasized that state criminal laws protect all citizens, including workers, and deter morally repugnant conduct. The existence of section 4(b)(4), which preserves state common-law and statutory rights, duties, and liabilities, further suggests that Congress did not intend to preempt state criminal laws. The court found no implied preemption because Federal regulation does not occupy the entire field of occupational health and safety. The Act encourages states to assume responsibility for workplace safety, and section 18 allows states to reassert jurisdiction by submitting a state plan. State prosecution may cause employers to pay stricter attention to the promulgated standards by OSHA, which is consistent with the Act’s goal of ensuring “safe and healthful working conditions”. The court also noted that the limited civil and criminal penalties within OSHA argue against its preemption of state criminal law, which can supplement Federal regulations with appropriate criminal sanctions. Uniformity was not Congress’s primary goal; instead, Congress intended to ensure a minimum level of workplace safety that states could supplement. Finally, it is not impossible to comply with both state and federal law, and the state criminal prosecutions further the goals of ensuring the safety and health of American workers by deterring future instances of criminally culpable employer conduct.