New York Law Review

Tag: workers’ compensation

  • Matter of Neacosia v. New York Power Authority, 73 N.Y.2d 960 (1989): Establishes Compensability for Injuries During Commute From Second Workplace

    Matter of Neacosia v. New York Power Authority, 73 N.Y.2d 960 (1989)

    An employee’s injuries sustained while commuting between their primary workplace and a ratified second workplace at home are compensable under workers’ compensation.

    Summary

    This case concerns a claim for workers’ compensation benefits following the death of an employee in a car accident while commuting home. The Workers’ Compensation Board allowed the claim, finding the employee had a ratified second workplace at home. The Appellate Division reversed, but the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the Board’s decision. The Court of Appeals held that there was substantial evidence to support the Board’s determination that the employee’s at-home work arrangement was regular and beneficial to the employer, thus making the commute compensable, reinforcing the principle established in Matter of Hille v Gerald Records.

    Facts

    The decedent was an engineer laboratory technician who worked for the New York Power Authority. Due to prior heart attacks, he had a separate work area at home. He occasionally worked at home on weekends to complete assignments. On the day of the accident, he drove to his regular workplace and then called his wife to say he was returning home to work. He was involved in a fatal car accident on his way home. His supervisor testified that the work performed at home benefited the employer and that he had permitted this arrangement.

    Procedural History

    The Workers’ Compensation Board accepted the claim, finding a ratified second workplace. The Appellate Division reversed, holding there was insufficient proof of regular work at home. The Workers’ Compensation Board appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether injuries sustained during a commute from a primary workplace to a home office, where the employee sometimes worked, are compensable under workers’ compensation law when the employer knew of and ratified the at-home work arrangement.

    Holding

    Yes, because there was substantial evidence before the Workers’ Compensation Board to conclude that the employee’s injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment, as his home had achieved the status of a place of employment with the employer’s knowledge and ratification.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the precedent set in Matter of Hille v Gerald Records, which established that at-home work and commuting between home and employment can be compensable when it constitutes either a specific work assignment for the employer’s benefit or a regular pattern of work at home that transforms the home into a place of employment. The court distinguished the general rule that commuting injuries are not compensable, explaining that an exception exists when the employee’s home functions as a second workplace. The court emphasized that the Workers’ Compensation Board has exclusive fact-finding authority, and its decision was supported by substantial evidence, including the supervisor’s testimony that the at-home work benefited the employer and was permitted. The court noted that the Board was entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the facts presented. The court directly quoted that at-home work could qualify when it is “either a specific work assignment for the employer’s benefit at the end of the particular homeward trip or so regular a pattern of work at home that the home achieves the status of a place of employment.” This case clarifies the application of the Hille rule, requiring a showing of benefit to the employer and some regularity to the at-home work to establish compensability.

  • Werner v. State of New York, 73 N.Y.2d 884 (1989): Amending Pleadings with Workers’ Compensation Defense

    Werner v. State of New York, 73 N.Y.2d 884 (1989)

    A trial court must permit a defendant to amend their answer to assert a workers’ compensation defense, even if the motion is tardy, unless the plaintiff demonstrates significant prejudice resulting from the delay.

    Summary

    Werner, an employee, sued the defendant, the building owner and president of Werner’s employer, for injuries sustained during employment. Initially, the defendant did not assert a workers’ compensation defense. After jury selection, the defendant moved to amend the answer, arguing workers’ compensation was Werner’s sole remedy. The Supreme Court denied the motion based on laches (undue delay). The Appellate Division reversed, citing the rule in Murray v. City of New York requiring such amendments even if late. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s reversal but clarified that the trial court retains discretion to deny the amendment if the plaintiff demonstrates prejudice that could have been avoided had the defense been raised earlier. Because Werner was aware of his employment status and received benefits, no such prejudice existed.

    Facts

    • Werner was injured during his employment at a building owned by the defendant.
    • The defendant was also the president and sole stockholder of Werner’s employer (the lessee of the premises).
    • Werner sued the defendant, alleging negligence.
    • Werner applied for and received workers’ compensation benefits.

    Procedural History

    • Werner sued in Supreme Court.
    • The defendant initially failed to raise a workers’ compensation defense in their answer.
    • After jury selection, the defendant moved to amend the answer to assert that workers’ compensation was Werner’s exclusive remedy.
    • The Supreme Court denied the motion based on laches.
    • The Appellate Division reversed, holding the amendment should be granted.
    • The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a trial court has discretion to deny a motion to amend an answer to assert a workers’ compensation defense when the motion is made after jury selection.
    2. Whether the plaintiff demonstrated sufficient prejudice to justify denying the defendant’s motion to amend.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the trial court retains discretion to deny the motion if the plaintiff demonstrates prejudice resulting from the delay, showing that the prejudice could have been avoided if the defense had been timely asserted.
    2. No, because the plaintiff was aware of his employment status and had received workers’ compensation benefits, so he could not claim prejudice or surprise.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals agreed with the Appellate Division that denying the amendment was an error but clarified the extent of the trial court’s discretion. The court relied on the principle that amendments to pleadings should be freely granted unless the opposing party demonstrates prejudice. The court stated: “Plaintiff was required to establish prejudice accruing to him as a consequence of defendant’s failure to timely assert the defense, and to include a showing that the prejudice could have been avoided if the defense had been timely asserted.”

    The court emphasized that the plaintiff bore the burden of demonstrating prejudice. Because Werner was aware of his employment status and had already received workers’ compensation benefits, he could not credibly claim surprise or prejudice. The court implicitly recognized the policy consideration of preventing double recovery by an injured employee. By receiving workers’ compensation benefits and then pursuing a negligence claim against the employer’s principal, Werner was potentially attempting to obtain a double recovery for the same injury.

  • Lemon v. New York City Transit Authority, 69 N.Y.2d 324 (1987): Injuries Sustained During Commute Not Compensable

    Lemon v. New York City Transit Authority, 69 N.Y.2d 324 (1987)

    Injuries sustained by an employee while commuting to or from work are generally not compensable under workers’ compensation law, unless the employer assumes responsibility for transportation by contract or custom and derives a benefit from it.

    Summary

    Mattiel Lemon, a subway conductor for the New York City Transit Authority, was injured when she fell on stairs at a subway station while commuting home after her shift, using a free transportation pass provided by her employer. She sought workers’ compensation benefits, which were initially awarded. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that her injury did not arise out of and in the course of her employment. The court found that the commute was not part of her employment, even with the free pass, as the Transit Authority did not assume responsibility for her commute, nor did they derive a specific benefit from it.

    Facts

    Mattiel Lemon was a conductor for the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA). She typically worked evening shifts, signing in and out at the Woodlawn Avenue terminal in the Bronx. She lived in Brooklyn and used the subway to commute, utilizing a free transportation pass provided by the NYCTA. After finishing her shift at 4:00 a.m. on December 15, 1983, she boarded a subway train, and while still in uniform, she fell on the stairs at the Utica Avenue station in Brooklyn, fracturing her knee.

    Procedural History

    Lemon sought workers’ compensation benefits, which the NYCTA contested. The Workers’ Compensation Board awarded benefits, finding the accident occurred within the precincts of her employment. The Appellate Division affirmed, reasoning that the NYCTA implicitly assumed responsibility for transporting Lemon by providing the free pass and was in control of the conveyance. The NY Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an injury sustained by a transit worker while commuting home on a free transportation pass, provided by the employer, arises out of and in the course of employment, making it compensable under workers’ compensation law.

    Holding

    No, because the employee’s commute was not part of her employment, as the employer did not assume a duty to transport her, and the employer did not derive a direct benefit from the employee’s commute.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court stated that while the Workers’ Compensation Law is to be construed liberally, an injury must still arise out of and in the course of employment to be compensable. Commuting is generally not considered part of the employment because the risks are only marginally related to the job. While there are exceptions, such as when the employer assumes responsibility for transportation, the court found none applicable here.

    The court distinguished this case from Holcomb v. Daily News, where the employer benefited from employees being transported on company trucks. In Lemon’s case, the free pass was merely a fringe benefit, and there was no evidence that the NYCTA assumed an obligation to transport her or derived any specific benefit from her using the pass to commute.

    The court emphasized that Lemon’s employment terminated when she signed out at the Woodlawn terminal. The Utica Avenue station, where the injury occurred, was not within the precincts of her employment. Her use of the subway was as a member of the public, regardless of her employment status. Citing Kowalek v. New York Consol. R. R. Co., the court stated, “the company was indifferent as to the way or means by which [s]he reached the place where the day’s work began.” Therefore, the court concluded that there was no sufficient nexus between her accident and her employment to warrant compensation.

    The court also cited Murphy v. New York City Tr. Auth. and Tallon v Interborough R. T. Co., which presented similar fact patterns and in which benefits were denied.

  • Lemon v. New York City Transit Authority, 72 N.Y.2d 324 (1988): Employee Commuting and Workers’ Compensation

    72 N.Y.2d 324 (1988)

    Injuries sustained while commuting to or from work are generally not compensable under workers’ compensation, unless the employer assumes responsibility for transportation through contract or custom, or a specific nexus exists between the employment and the injury.

    Summary

    Mattiel Lemon, a subway conductor, was injured while commuting home from work on the subway after her shift ended. She fell on the stairs at her destination subway station. Although she had a free transportation pass provided by her employer, the New York City Transit Authority, the court held that her injuries were not compensable under workers’ compensation. The court reasoned that her commute was not part of her employment because her shift had ended, and the Transit Authority did not have a contractual or customary obligation to transport her. The mere provision of a free pass did not establish such a duty, nor did it create a sufficient nexus between her employment and the injury.

    Facts

    Mattiel Lemon worked as a subway conductor for the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA).
    She was assigned to a line operating between the Bronx and Brooklyn.
    Lemon received a free transportation pass as a benefit of her employment, allowing her to ride the subway without charge.
    After finishing her shift at 4:00 AM, Lemon boarded a subway train to travel home to Brooklyn.
    Upon arriving at her station in Brooklyn, she exited the train and fell on the stairs leading to the street, sustaining injuries.

    Procedural History

    Lemon filed for workers’ compensation benefits, which the NYCTA contested.
    The Workers’ Compensation Board awarded benefits, finding the accident occurred within the precincts of her employment.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s decision.
    The NYCTA appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Lemon’s injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment with the NYCTA, making them compensable under workers’ compensation law, when she was injured during her commute home after her shift had ended and she was using a free transportation pass provided by the NYCTA.

    Holding

    No, because Lemon’s journey home was not considered part of her employment, as her shift had ended, and the NYCTA did not have a contractual or customary obligation to transport her, thus breaking the nexus between her job and the injury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reiterated the general rule that injuries sustained while commuting to and from work are not compensable under workers’ compensation because the risks inherent in commuting relate to the employment only marginally.
    The court acknowledged exceptions to this rule, such as when the employer has a contractual or customary duty to transport the employee or when there is a reasonable nexus between the risk and the employment.
    The court distinguished this case from Holcomb v. Daily News, where the employer had an established custom of providing transportation and derived a benefit from it. In Lemon’s case, the court found no evidence that the NYCTA assumed an obligation to transport her or that it derived any benefit from her use of the transportation pass for commuting.
    The court noted that the pass was a fringe benefit, equivalent to added compensation, and the NYCTA was indifferent to how employees used it.
    The court emphasized that Lemon’s employment had terminated when she signed out of work in the Bronx, and the accident occurred much later in Brooklyn, making the connection between her employment and the injury too remote.
    The dissent argued that the Board’s determination was rational and consistent with precedent, given that Lemon was injured on the employer’s premises, was wearing her uniform, and was using the free pass provided by the NYCTA.

  • Liss v. Fuld, 68 N.Y.2d 16 (1986): Preclusive Effect of Workers’ Compensation Determinations on Non-Parties

    Liss v. Fuld, 68 N.Y.2d 16 (1986)

    A determination by the Workers’ Compensation Board regarding compensability does not bind defendants in a subsequent civil action who were not parties to the workers’ compensation proceeding and did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue.

    Summary

    Bernice Liss sued Fuld and other defendants for injuries sustained in a car accident during their commute. The defendants asserted a workers’ compensation defense, arguing the accident occurred during Liss’s employment. The Workers’ Compensation Board found the injuries non-compensable after a hearing where the present defendants had limited participation. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Board’s decision did not preclude the defendants from litigating the issue of workers’ compensation coverage in the civil suit, as they were not full parties to the compensation proceeding and thus lacked a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue. The court emphasized that preclusion requires a full and fair prior opportunity to litigate.

    Facts

    Bernice Liss, an employee of Major Watch Case Co. for 35 years, was injured in a car accident while being driven to work by Fuld, the company’s president. This was a regular practice for 20 years. The car, driven by Fuld, collided with a train pillar. Liss sued Fuld, Trans Auto and Holiday alleging negligence. The defendants asserted that Liss’s injuries were covered by workers’ compensation, as the accident occurred in the course of her employment. A hearing occurred before the Workers’ Compensation Board with limited participation of the defendants.

    Procedural History

    Liss sued Fuld, Trans Auto, and Holiday in state court. Defendants asserted the affirmative defense of workers’ compensation coverage. A workers’ compensation judge initially found possible evidence that the accident arose out of and in the course of employment. After a later hearing, the Workers’ Compensation Board found the accident did not arise out of and in the course of Liss’s employment. Defendants then moved for summary judgment in the state court action, arguing the evidence proved the accident arose out of and in the course of Liss’s employment. The Supreme Court denied the motion, finding factual issues and that the defendants had been improperly excluded from the worker’s compensation hearing. The Supreme Court later dismissed the affirmative defense, reasoning that only the employer could raise it. The Appellate Division affirmed but on different grounds holding that the Workers’ Compensation Board’s finding of non-compensability was final as to all parties involved in the accident. The Court of Appeals reversed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a determination by the Workers’ Compensation Board that an injury is not compensable precludes defendants who were not parties to the workers’ compensation proceeding from asserting the workers’ compensation defense in a subsequent civil action arising from the same injury.

    Holding

    No, because defendants who were not parties to the workers’ compensation proceeding are not bound by the Board’s determination, as they did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of compensability.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court held that while the Workers’ Compensation Board has primary jurisdiction over factual issues concerning compensation coverage, its decisions are only binding on parties who had the opportunity to participate in the hearing. The court relied on the principle that issue preclusion requires a “full and fair opportunity” to litigate the issue. The defendants were not considered parties in interest in the compensation case because they had no enforceable interest in a workers’ compensation award. Since the defendants were effectively precluded from fully participating in the workers’ compensation hearing, they are not bound by its outcome in the subsequent civil action. The court emphasized that defendants had no control over the direction of the testimony, no opportunity to cross-examine, and no counsel to guide them. The court noted, “It is clear that where a defendant was not afforded an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses or present evidence at the prior hearing, the outcome of the hearing cannot have preclusive effect on that party.” Further, the court reasoned, “defendants were the only parties who would have favored a finding of compensability at the hearing. Plaintiff and the compensation carrier were of one mind on that issue. Thus… [t]he prior hearing was nonadversarial in nature and defendants’ point of view was never presented.” The court also noted the plaintiff’s ability to re-open the case before the board. Therefore, the defendants were entitled to litigate the affirmative defense of workers’ compensation coverage in the civil action.

  • Richardson v. Fiedler Roofing, Inc., 67 N.Y.2d 246 (1986): Compensability of Injuries Sustained During Illegal Acts in Employment

    67 N.Y.2d 246 (1986)

    An employee’s injury is compensable under workers’ compensation even if sustained during an illegal act, provided the act is a reasonable and sufficiently work-related activity under the circumstances, and the employer has knowledge of and tolerates such activity.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a roofer’s death, occurring while stealing copper downspouts during work hours, was compensable under workers’ compensation. The court affirmed the Workers’ Compensation Board’s decision to award benefits, holding that the employee’s actions were within the scope of employment because the employer knew of and tolerated the practice of roofers stealing and selling scrap. The court reasoned that barring compensation would be inappropriate when the employer was aware of and permitted the illegal activity.

    Facts

    Norman Richardson, a roofer employed by Fiedler Roofing, Inc., died after falling from a roof. At the time of the accident, Richardson and a coworker were waiting for materials to arrive at their worksite. While waiting, they moved to another part of the building and removed copper downspouts to sell for scrap. Richardson slipped on ice and fell to his death during this activity.

    Procedural History

    The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed the Administrative Law Judge’s decision that the accident occurred during the course of Richardson’s employment and awarded benefits to his children. The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s decision. The employer and its insurer appealed, arguing that Richardson’s death resulted from his theft, not his work duties.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an employee’s injury, sustained during an illegal act (theft) while technically on duty but waiting for materials, is compensable under Workers’ Compensation Law § 10, particularly when the employer knew of and tolerated such illegal acts.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Workers’ Compensation Board’s finding that the decedent’s actions did not constitute a deviation from employment was supported by substantial evidence, including the employer’s knowledge and tolerance of the practice of roofers stealing and selling scrap.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied Workers’ Compensation Law § 10, which requires an injury to arise out of and in the course of employment to be compensable. While purely personal pursuits are generally excluded, the court noted that employees waiting for materials are not required to be idle and can engage in reasonable, work-related activities. The court emphasized that the determination of what is reasonable is factual, and the Board has wide latitude. The court found significant that the employer knew of the practice of stealing downspouts and had not disciplined employees for it. The court distinguished this situation from non-work-related injuries caused by illegal acts, for which disability benefits are expressly precluded under Workers’ Compensation Law § 205(3). The court emphasized the remedial nature of the Workers’ Compensation Law, which must be “construed liberally to accomplish the economic and humanitarian objects of the act” (Matter of Holcomb v Daily News, 45 N.Y.2d 602, 607). The court stated: “It is one thing to disqualify a claimant for injuries he sustains during the course of an illegal activity pursued on his own time, an activity unknown to the employer and one which it cannot control. It is quite another to deprive dependents of benefits because the employee’s death results from misconduct during the course of employment when the employer knows about the illegal activity and tolerates it”. The dissent argued that engaging in a larceny could never be a “reasonable” activity and that the employer’s tolerance does not make them responsible for injuries sustained during a crime.

  • Burlew v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 63 N.Y.2d 412 (1984): Exclusivity of Workers’ Compensation for Delay in Authorizing Treatment

    Burlew v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 63 N.Y.2d 412 (1984)

    The Workers’ Compensation Law provides the exclusive remedy for work-related injuries, including those allegedly resulting from an employer’s (or its insurer’s) delay in authorizing medical treatment, unless the conduct rises to the level of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

    Summary

    Bernice Burlew sued American Mutual Insurance Company, her employer’s workers’ compensation insurer, alleging negligence and bad faith due to the insurer’s delay in authorizing surgery for a work-related injury. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Workers’ Compensation Law provided the exclusive remedy for such claims, preempting common-law negligence actions. While intentional torts could be pursued outside the workers’ compensation system, the insurer’s conduct in this case did not meet the high threshold for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court emphasized the comprehensive regulatory scheme of the Workers’ Compensation Law and the availability of administrative remedies for unreasonable delays.

    Facts

    Bernice Burlew suffered a work-related injury due to inhaling fumes at her workplace, Voplex Corporation, and began receiving workers’ compensation benefits from American Mutual Insurance Company, the employer’s insurer. Her physician determined she needed surgery and sought authorization from American Mutual. The insurer delayed authorization for four to five months before finally granting the request. Burlew subsequently sued American Mutual, alleging negligence and bad faith based on the delay.

    Procedural History

    Burlew filed suit in January 1983, seeking compensatory and punitive damages. American Mutual moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Special Term granted the motion to dismiss the negligence cause of action but not the bad faith claim. The Appellate Division modified, dismissing the entire complaint. Burlew appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an employee can bring a common-law negligence action against a workers’ compensation insurer for delays in authorizing medical treatment for a work-related injury.
    2. Whether the insurer’s conduct in delaying authorization constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress, allowing for a tort action outside the scope of the Workers’ Compensation Law.

    Holding

    1. No, because the Workers’ Compensation Law provides the exclusive remedy for work-related injuries, including those arising from delays in authorizing treatment.
    2. No, because the insurer’s conduct, even if considered bad faith, did not meet the high threshold of being “so extreme and outrageous as to exceed all bounds of decency” required for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Workers’ Compensation Law is a comprehensive scheme designed to be the exclusive remedy for work-related injuries. The court emphasized that the law regulates not just the fact of injury but also the administration of claims and provides specific remedies for employer misconduct. According to the court, “all employer conduct that is regulated by the Workers’ Compensation Law is subject to the protection of that law’s exclusivity; if the employer violates any provision of the code, an employee’s remedies cannot exceed those granted in the statutes.” The court noted that the Workers’ Compensation Law provides a mechanism for employees to seek authorization for medical treatment directly from the Workers’ Compensation Board if the employer or insurer delays unreasonably. The Court further reasoned that while intentional torts are generally not covered by workers’ compensation, the insurer’s conduct in this case did not rise to the level of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court cited Fischer v. Maloney, 43 N.Y.2d 553, 557, stating that the conduct must be “so extreme and outrageous as to exceed all bounds of decency or to be utterly intolerable in civilized society.” The court found that neither the agent’s statement nor the attempt to disprove Burlew’s claim met this high standard. The court explicitly declined to rule on whether a third-party beneficiary claim could be brought because the insurer’s behavior did not even amount to “bad faith”.

  • Capizzi v. Southern District Reporters, Inc., 61 N.Y.2d 52 (1984): Compensability of Injuries During Reasonable Activities While Traveling for Work

    Capizzi v. Southern District Reporters, Inc., 61 N.Y.2d 52 (1984)

    Injuries sustained by an employee while traveling for work and engaging in reasonable activities attendant to their employment, even if not directly related to their duties, are compensable under workers’ compensation.

    Summary

    Nelida Capizzi, a transcriber-typist, was sent on a business trip to Toronto by her employer. While preparing for her return to New York, she slipped and fell in her hotel bathtub. The Workers’ Compensation Board awarded her benefits, finding the injury arose out of and in the course of her employment. The Appellate Division reversed, deeming showering a purely personal act. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding the injury compensable because Capizzi was required to travel and stay in a new environment for work, increasing her risk of injury while engaging in a reasonable activity attendant to her employment.

    Facts

    Nelida Capizzi was employed by Southern District Reporters, Inc. On December 30, 1980, she and four co-workers were sent to Toronto, Canada, to transcribe depositions. The hearings were suspended later that evening for the New Year’s holiday. The following morning, at approximately 7:00 a.m., Capizzi slipped and fell while stepping into the hotel bathtub to shower in preparation for her return trip to New York. As a result, she sustained injuries and filed for workers’ compensation benefits.

    Procedural History

    The workers’ compensation law judge initially found that accident, notice, and causal relationship were established. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed, finding that Capizzi was required to travel to Toronto for her employer’s business and was directed to remain there for a specific time, maintaining her employee status throughout the trip. The Appellate Division reversed, holding the injury noncompensable as a purely personal act. The Workers’ Compensation Board appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an injury sustained by a traveling employee due to a slip and fall while showering in a hotel room arises out of and in the course of employment, making it compensable under workers’ compensation.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Capizzi was required to travel and stay in a new environment for work, which increased her risk of injury while engaging in a reasonable activity attendant to her employment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while traditionally, injuries were compensable only when an employee was actively furthering their employer’s business, this has expanded to acknowledge the increased risk to traveling employees. Quoting Matter of Davis v Newsweek Mag., 305 NY 20, 27-28, the court stated that when an employee is “directed, as part of his duties, to remain in a particular place or locality * * * for a specified length of time * * * the rule applied is simply that the employee is not expected to wait immobile, but may indulge in any reasonable activity at that place, and if he does so the risk inherent in such activity is an incident of his employment.” The court acknowledged past distinctions made regarding bathing or dressing injuries, deeming them purely personal and non-compensable. However, the court found it difficult to reconcile these decisions with cases awarding compensation for injuries sustained during other “personal acts” while traveling, such as slipping on a sidewalk after dinner (Matter of Schreiber v Revlon Prods. Corp., 5 AD2d 207), or injuries sustained while bathing on the employer’s premises (Matter of Marco v News Syndicate Co., 257 App Div 887). The court concluded that the claimant was required to work and stay at a place distant from home, increasing her risk of injury and engaging in a reasonable activity (showering) attendant to her employment. Therefore, the injury was compensable.

  • Cunningham v. State, 60 N.Y.2d 248 (1983): Workers’ Compensation Exclusivity and Intentional Torts

    Cunningham v. State, 60 N.Y.2d 248 (1983)

    Acceptance of workers’ compensation benefits or a Workers’ Compensation Board determination that an injury is accidental, employment-related, and compensable precludes a lawsuit against the employer, even for intentional torts.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law bar claimants from suing their employer (the State) for intentional assault related to the Attica prison uprising. The New York Court of Appeals held that claimants who either received workers’ compensation benefits or had a Workers’ Compensation Board determination that their injuries were accidental and compensable are barred from suing the State, even for intentional torts. This is because applying for and accepting benefits or a Board determination triggers the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Law. Claimants must seek reconsideration from the Board, not the courts.

    Facts

    These appeals stem from the Attica Correctional Facility uprising in 1971. Some claimants were survivors of deceased guards, seeking wrongful death damages, alleging intentional injuries inflicted by individuals under the State’s control. Other claimants were employees taken hostage who sought damages for intentional assault also inflicted by persons under the State’s control.

    Procedural History

    The claimants filed actions against the State. The State moved for summary judgment, arguing the Workers’ Compensation Law precluded these actions. The Court of Claims denied the motions. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the suits. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether claimants who applied for and received workers’ compensation benefits can maintain actions against the State for intentional torts related to the same injuries.
    2. Whether claimants, for whom the Workers’ Compensation Board determined that their injuries were accidental, employment-related, and compensable, can maintain actions against the State for intentional torts, even if the State filed the claims and the claimants received indirect benefits.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because by applying for and accepting workers’ compensation benefits, claimants forfeit their right to maintain actions against the employer for intentional torts.
    2. No, because a determination by the Workers’ Compensation Board that a claimant’s injuries are accidental is binding, even if the claimant did not apply for or accept benefits directly.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law, specifically Sections 11, 23, and 29(6). Section 11 states that workers’ compensation liability is exclusive and replaces any other liability. Section 23 states that a decision by the Workers’ Compensation Board is final and conclusive. Section 29(6) makes workers’ compensation the exclusive remedy against the employer. The Court stated, “If the right to sue the employer has been stripped away by [workers’] compensation coverage, it is an arrogation of jurisdiction to consider a tort complaint on its merits.” The Court emphasized that it is the responsibility of the Workers’ Compensation Board to determine factual matters and that claimants cannot circumvent this process by seeking resolution in the courts. Regarding the hostage claimants, the Court stated that the Board has discretion to process claims filed by either the employee or the employer, even if the claimant objects. The court cited O’Connor v. Midiria, stating that a Board determination that injuries are accidental precludes an action against the employer for intentional tort. The court noted that claimants are not without recourse, as they can petition the Board for reconsideration. However, they cannot undermine the Board’s determinations through a collateral attack.

  • Walsh v. New York State Workers’ Compensation Bd., 66 N.Y.2d 836 (1985): Apportioning Litigation Costs in Workers’ Compensation Third-Party Settlements

    66 N.Y.2d 836 (1985)

    In workers’ compensation cases involving third-party settlements, when equitably apportioning litigation costs, courts must consider the total benefit the carrier derives from the recovery, including any relief from future compensation obligations.

    Summary

    This case addresses the proper method for apportioning litigation costs between a workers’ compensation insurance carrier and an employee who recovers a settlement in a third-party lawsuit. The employee, Walsh, settled a third-party action for $85,000, while the carrier had already paid $16,567.14 in benefits. The court considered whether the carrier’s share of litigation costs should be calculated based not only on the recoupment of past benefits but also on the extinguishment of any future benefits the carrier would have been obligated to pay but for the settlement. The Court of Appeals affirmed that the carrier’s total benefit, including relief from future obligations, should be considered.

    Facts

    Joseph Walsh, an employee-claimant, received workers’ compensation benefits from the New York State Workers’ Compensation Board’s insurance carrier. Walsh also pursued a separate third-party action, which he settled for $85,000. At the time of the settlement, the carrier had paid Walsh $16,567.14 in benefits. The carrier then sought to enforce its lien on the settlement proceeds to recoup the benefits it had paid, less its equitable share of Walsh’s litigation costs in the third-party action.

    Procedural History

    The carrier initiated an action to enforce its lien. The Supreme Court ruled that the carrier’s lien should be reduced by Walsh’s litigation costs in recovering the portion of the settlement that inured to the carrier’s benefit. This included recoupment of past benefits and extinguishment of future obligations. The Supreme Court referred the matter for a hearing to determine if the carrier had future compensation obligations to Walsh. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, and the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, in equitably apportioning litigation costs to a workers’ compensation carrier, the court should consider the total benefit the carrier derives from the third-party recovery, including relief from future compensation payments.

    Holding

    Yes, because the court should consider the total benefit the carrier has derived from the recovery, including any relief from a future obligation to make compensation payments.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, emphasizing that the equitable apportionment of litigation costs should reflect the “total benefit the carrier has derived from the recovery.” This total benefit includes not only the recoupment of past benefits paid to the employee but also the extinguishment of any future obligations the carrier would have had to the employee. The court cited Matter of Kelly v State Ins. Fund, 60 NY2d 131, to support this proposition. The court reasoned that failing to consider the elimination of future obligations would unfairly advantage the carrier, as it would be recouping past payments and avoiding future expenses without contributing its fair share to the litigation costs that made this outcome possible. The court effectively stated that the carrier benefits from the claimant’s efforts and should share in the expense. This encourages settlements and ensures fairness in the allocation of costs. The court did not provide dissenting or concurring opinions.