New York Law Review

Tag: Witness Tampering

  • People v. Harris, 25 N.Y.3d 300 (2015): Admissibility of Relevant Evidence and Balancing Probative Value vs. Prejudice

    People v. Harris, 25 N.Y.3d 300 (2015)

    Evidence is admissible if it is relevant and its probative value outweighs the potential for prejudice; however, even if relevant, it may be excluded if the potential for prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals considered whether the trial court properly admitted evidence of a witness’s murder in the defendant’s trial for witness tampering and bribery. The defendant argued that the evidence was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. The court held that the evidence of the witness’s murder was relevant to explain the state of mind of key witnesses and the circumstances surrounding their testimony, and that the trial court’s limiting instructions mitigated any potential prejudice. The court affirmed the lower court’s ruling, emphasizing the trial court’s discretion in balancing the probative value of evidence against the risk of prejudice.

    Facts

    Defendant’s half-brother was accused of murder, with three teenaged girls as witnesses. Defendant cultivated relationships with the girls and persuaded them to recant their testimonies. Defendant gave the girls money. The defendant was charged with witness tampering and bribery. Another eyewitness was murdered, and the girls then revealed to police that they had taken money from the defendant and recanted their identifications. The trial court allowed evidence of the second witness’s murder, to explain the girls’ state of mind and their decision to cooperate with the prosecution, while giving limiting instructions. The defendant was acquitted of the witness tampering charges but convicted of the bribery charges, leading to an appeal.

    Procedural History

    The trial court allowed evidence of the murder of the witness, Gibson, to be presented to the jury. Defendant was convicted of bribery but acquitted of witness tampering. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals heard the case on appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the murder of witness Bobby Gibson, despite defendant’s lack of involvement.

    Holding

    1. No, because the evidence was relevant, and the limiting instructions from the court mitigated any potential prejudice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the general rule that all relevant evidence is admissible unless an exclusionary rule applies. Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to prove a material fact. Even if evidence is relevant, it may still be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the potential for prejudice. Here, the court found the evidence relevant to explain why the girls changed their stories and ultimately provided incriminating testimony against the defendant, thus increasing the jury’s understanding of the surrounding circumstances. The court also found that the trial court properly minimized potential prejudice with limiting instructions to the jury. The court noted the trial court’s specific instructions during voir dire and in its charge to the jury, emphasizing that the defendant was not involved in the witness’s murder.

    Practical Implications

    This case underscores the importance of balancing the probative value of evidence against its prejudicial effect. Attorneys must be prepared to argue both sides of this balance, arguing for admissibility when the evidence is highly probative and any prejudice can be minimized, and for exclusion when the prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value. The case highlights the efficacy of limiting instructions in mitigating prejudice and the need for courts to clearly explain the purpose for which certain evidence is admitted. When facing similar situations, this case directs that attorneys need to understand that the court has broad discretion, and the outcome will depend on the specific facts and the adequacy of limiting instructions.

  • People v. Horton, 24 N.Y.3d 985 (2014): Establishing Witness Tampering Through Online Communication

    People v. Horton, 24 N.Y.3d 985 (2014)

    Evidence of online communications, including social media posts, can be sufficient to establish witness tampering if it demonstrates the defendant knew the person was a potential witness and wrongfully attempted to induce that person to avoid testifying.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction for witness tampering, holding that the defendant’s Facebook posts and YouTube video identifying a confidential informant, combined with threatening comments, were sufficient evidence to prove he attempted to prevent her from testifying in a drug case. The court reasoned that the jury could reasonably infer the online communications were coded threats intended to dissuade the informant from testifying, particularly given the defendant’s knowledge of her role and the pending charges against his friend. The decision highlights the potential for online activity to constitute witness tampering.

    Facts

    A confidential informant assisted the Wayne County Sheriff’s Office in a controlled drug purchase from Clarence Jackson, which was recorded. Jackson was arrested and informed the defendant, Thomas Horton, about his arrest and intention to plead guilty, showing him the videotape. The confidential informant reported that Horton was “outing” her as an informant on Facebook, posting a clip of the surveillance video on YouTube with a link on his Facebook page. Horton and others made denouncing and threatening statements towards the informant on Facebook including “Snitches get stitches” and “I hope she gets what’s coming to her.”

    Procedural History

    Horton was arrested and convicted in Town Court for fourth-degree witness tampering. He was sentenced to one year in jail. Horton appealed to County Court, arguing insufficient evidence that he attempted to prevent the informant from testifying or knew she would testify. The County Court affirmed the conviction. A judge of the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented was sufficient to establish that the defendant knew the confidential informant might testify in a proceeding and that he wrongfully sought to stop her from doing so through online communications.

    Holding

    Yes, because the evidence, viewed favorably to the prosecution, was sufficient for a jury to conclude that the defendant knew the informant might testify and that his online communications constituted a wrongful attempt to prevent her from doing so.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. The court emphasized that after learning about Jackson’s arrest and the informant’s role, Horton posted communications online that the jury could reasonably infer were coded threats intended to induce the informant not to testify. The court also noted that Horton was in contact with the informant and her mother via Facebook messages. The court stated, “[A]fter learning about Jackson’s arrest and the confidential informant’s role as a witness against Jackson and, potentially, himself, defendant immediately posted communications on the Internet that the jury might have reasonably inferred were coded threats that were intended to induce the confidential informant not to testify.” The court concluded that Horton’s actions satisfied the elements of Penal Law § 215.10, which defines witness tampering as wrongfully inducing or attempting to induce a person to avoid testifying, knowing that person is or is about to be called as a witness. The court considered the totality of the circumstances, including the context of the Facebook posts and YouTube video, to determine that the defendant’s intent was to dissuade the informant from testifying.

  • People v. Smart, 23 N.Y.3d 213 (2014): Forfeiture of Confrontation Rights Through Witness Tampering

    People v. Smart, 23 N.Y.3d 213 (2014)

    A defendant forfeits the right to confront a witness when the defendant’s misconduct is a significant cause of the witness’s decision not to testify, even if the witness also has a lawful basis, such as the Fifth Amendment, for refusing to testify.

    Summary

    Floyd Smart was convicted of burglary based, in part, on grand jury testimony of Jane Doe, an accomplice who later refused to testify at trial, invoking her Fifth Amendment rights. The prosecution argued Smart forfeited his confrontation rights by intimidating Doe. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court properly admitted Doe’s grand jury testimony because Smart’s actions significantly contributed to Doe’s decision not to testify, regardless of her Fifth Amendment privilege. This decision reinforces the principle that defendants cannot benefit from their own misconduct in preventing witnesses from testifying.

    Facts

    Smart, along with Robert Verstreate and Jane Doe, planned a burglary. Doe waited in the car while Smart and Verstreate entered the house. The homeowner arrived, and Doe sounded the horn to alert Smart and Verstreate. The three were arrested, and Doe cooperated with authorities, testifying before the grand jury and receiving transactional immunity. Doe was later released and absconded. Prior to trial, the prosecution sought to introduce Doe’s grand jury testimony, alleging Smart had tampered with her. Jailhouse phone recordings revealed Smart threatening Doe and urging his mother to help her avoid testifying.

    Procedural History

    The County Court held a Sirois hearing to determine the admissibility of Doe’s grand jury testimony. The court granted the People’s motion to admit Doe’s testimony. Smart was convicted at trial. He moved to set aside the verdict, which was denied. The Appellate Division modified the sentence but otherwise affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in admitting Doe’s grand jury testimony when Doe invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege and the defendant claimed her unavailability was not a direct result of his actions.

    Holding

    Yes, the trial court did not err because the People presented clear and convincing evidence that Smart’s misconduct was a significant cause of Doe’s decision not to testify, thus forfeiting his right to confront her, even if she also had a valid Fifth Amendment claim.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed that a defendant forfeits their right to confrontation if they procure a witness’s unavailability through violence, threats, or chicanery. The court emphasized that the People must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant engaged in misconduct aimed at preventing the witness from testifying and that those misdeeds were a significant cause of the witness’s decision not to testify. The Court found that Smart’s threats to Doe, his attempts to persuade her to leave town, and his mother’s actions at his behest, all demonstrated a clear intent to prevent Doe from testifying. The court reasoned that Doe’s subsequent invocation of her Fifth Amendment right did not negate the forfeiture, as Smart’s misconduct significantly contributed to her unavailability. The Court stated, “[W]here it has been shown that the defendant procured the witness’s unavailability through violence, threats or chicanery,” the defendant “may not assert either the constitutional right of confrontation or the evidentiary rules against the admission of hearsay in order to prevent the admission of the witness’s out-of-court declarations”. The Court distinguished this case from *People v. Hamilton*, noting that in *Hamilton*, there was no evidence the defendant threatened the witness, unlike in Smart’s case, where ample evidence of threats and attempts to dissuade Doe from testifying existed. The Court concluded that allowing a defendant to benefit from their misconduct would undermine the integrity of the proceedings and incentivize witness tampering.

  • People v. Diaz, 9 N.Y.3d 527 (2007): Forfeiture by Misconduct and Admissibility of Grand Jury Testimony

    People v. Diaz, 9 N.Y.3d 527 (2007)

    A defendant who procures a witness’s unavailability through misconduct forfeits the right to confront that witness, and the trial court has discretion to limit the defendant’s ability to introduce the unavailable witness’s prior statements for impeachment purposes.

    Summary

    Diaz was convicted of assault and weapons possession. The key witness, the victim, did not testify at trial because Diaz threatened him. The prosecution introduced the victim’s grand jury testimony. Diaz attempted to introduce the victim’s prior grand jury testimony to impeach the introduced testimony but the judge denied the request. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, reasoning that Diaz forfeited his right to confront the witness due to his misconduct. The court emphasized that while a tampered witness can introduce out-of-court statements for impeachment, the trial judge has discretion to not allow it where the statements don’t go to the heart of the prosecution’s case.

    Facts

    Diaz shot the complainant, who later testified against him before a grand jury. Diaz’s co-defendant was arrested later, and the complainant testified before a second grand jury. Before trial, the People learned the complainant would not testify because Diaz had conveyed threats through the complainant’s family and friends, attempting to have others kill the complainant.

    Procedural History

    The People moved for a Sirois hearing, after which the court found that Diaz’s misconduct caused the complainant’s unavailability. The court allowed the People to introduce the complainant’s second grand jury testimony. Diaz’s request to introduce the first grand jury testimony for impeachment was denied. Diaz was convicted, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the lower court’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court deprived Diaz of his constitutional rights to a fair trial and to present a defense by allowing the People to introduce selected portions of the complainant’s second grand jury testimony but denying Diaz’s request to introduce the complainant’s first grand jury testimony for impeachment purposes.

    Holding

    No, because Diaz forfeited his right to confront the witness through his misconduct, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the introduction of prior inconsistent statements for impeachment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on People v. Geraci, which established that a defendant who procures a witness’s unavailability forfeits the right to confront that witness and the right to object to the admission of hearsay statements. The Geraci rule protects the integrity of the adversarial process by deterring witness tampering. Quoting People v Geraci, 85 NY2d at 368, the court stated these exceptions are justified “by the public policy of reducing the incentive to tamper with witnesses.” The court recognized that even a defendant who has tampered with a witness is entitled to a fair trial, citing People v. Cotto, 92 NY2d 68. However, the trial judge has discretion to permit impeachment where the jury might be misled, but such impeachment need not always be allowed. Here, the inconsistency in the complainant’s testimony “did not go to the heart of the prosecution’s case and might well have been credibly explained if the witness had been present,” thus, the court found no abuse of discretion. The court distinguished prior cases like People v. Arroyo and People v. Robinson, noting they involved different statutory provisions and factual scenarios. The court found that the defendant did not meet the foundational requirements for the introduction of former grand jury testimony at trial.

  • People v. Sadler, 96 N.Y.2d 297 (2001): Necessity of Sirois Hearing When Witness Intimidation is Alleged

    People v. Sadler, 96 N.Y.2d 297 (2001)

    When the prosecution seeks to introduce an unavailable witness’s hearsay statements based on defendant’s alleged misconduct procuring that unavailability, a Sirois hearing is required unless the evidence of witness tampering is so overwhelming as to satisfy the clear and convincing standard and render a hearing superfluous, or the defendant waives such a hearing.

    Summary

    Sadler, a pastor, was convicted of rape and sodomy involving a 12-year-old parishioner. At trial, the victim refused to testify. The prosecution sought to introduce her grand jury testimony, arguing Sadler had intimidated her into silence. The trial court admitted the testimony without a Sirois hearing, finding defendant had silenced the witness. The Appellate Division reversed, holding a hearing was necessary. The Court of Appeals affirmed, reiterating that a Sirois hearing is crucial to protect the defendant’s confrontation rights, unless the evidence overwhelmingly establishes witness tampering or the defendant waives the hearing. Here, competing inferences existed, necessitating a hearing.

    Facts

    Defendant, a 52-year-old pastor, engaged in a relationship with a 12-year-old girl from his congregation. The girl’s mother discovered sexually explicit letters the girl had written to defendant. After a pregnancy test confirmed the girl was pregnant, the mother took her to the police. The girl, at the police station, made recorded phone calls to the defendant. After defendant’s arrest, the victim testified before the Grand Jury and at a suppression hearing. At trial, however, she refused to testify.

    Procedural History

    Defendant was convicted of rape and sodomy in the second degree and endangering the welfare of a child. He appealed, arguing the trial court erred in admitting the Grand Jury testimony without a Sirois hearing. The Appellate Division reversed. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals by permission.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in admitting the victim’s Grand Jury testimony without holding a Sirois hearing to determine if the defendant’s misconduct procured the witness’s unavailability.

    Holding

    Yes, because the evidence before the trial court did not so overwhelmingly establish witness tampering as to satisfy the clear and convincing standard, and the defendant did not waive his right to a hearing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized the importance of a Sirois hearing to safeguard a defendant’s Sixth Amendment confrontation rights, stating that the hearing plays the “valuable role of sentry, admitting statements not subject to cross-examination only where the requisite link between the defendant’s misconduct and the witness’s silence has been established.” The court cited People v. Geraci, noting that it required “clear and convincing evidence” to overcome a defendant’s constitutional rights. It quoted: “Obviously, a defendant’s loss of the valued Sixth Amendment confrontation right constitutes a substantial deprivation. Additionally, and even more significantly, society has a weighty investment in the outcome, because of the intimate association between the right to confrontation and the accuracy of the fact-finding process.”

    The Court acknowledged that the taped phone calls suggested the defendant exerted pressure on the victim, but also noted that these calls happened before the Grand Jury testimony and arrest. Defendant had a right to challenge the People’s theory at a hearing, which was denied. The Court rejected the argument that defense counsel had waived the hearing, stating he merely argued the application was insufficient and promptly requested a hearing when the court ruled on the Sirois issue. Because a Sirois hearing was necessary to fully vet the issue of witness tampering, the court affirmed the decision of the Appellate Division.

  • People v. Cotto, 92 N.Y.2d 68 (1998): Admissibility of Witness Statements After Witness Intimidation

    92 N.Y.2d 68 (1998)

    When a defendant intimidates a witness, resulting in the witness’s refusal to testify, the court may admit the witness’s prior out-of-court statements if the prosecution demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant’s misconduct caused the witness’s unavailability.

    Summary

    Richard Cotto was convicted of second-degree murder. A key witness, Echevarria, initially identified Cotto as the shooter but later recanted, claiming his family was in danger. The prosecution argued that Cotto intimidated Echevarria. A Sirois hearing was held to determine the validity of the claim of witness tampering. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence of intimidation and admitted Echevarria’s prior statements. Cotto appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient and that his right to cross-examine Echevarria was improperly curtailed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding sufficient evidence to link the threats to Cotto and holding that Echevarria’s statements were sufficiently reliable.

    Facts

    Anthony Echevarria was an eyewitness to the shooting death of Steven Davilla. Echevarria initially identified Richard Cotto as the shooter in statements to police and prosecutors. Before trial, Echevarria informed the prosecution that he would no longer identify the shooter, citing concerns for his family’s safety. At trial, Echevarria claimed he could not identify the shooter. The prosecution alleged that Cotto had intimidated Echevarria into silence, pointing to threats received by Echevarria’s family.

    Procedural History

    The trial court held a Sirois hearing to determine if Cotto had intimidated Echevarria. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence of intimidation and admitted Echevarria’s prior statements. Cotto was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Cotto appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the People presented clear and convincing evidence that Cotto, through violence, threats, or chicanery, caused Echevarria’s unavailability as a witness.

    2. Whether Echevarria’s out-of-court statements possessed sufficient indicia of reliability to be admitted.

    3. Whether the trial court improperly precluded cross-examination of Echevarria after the Sirois hearing.

    4. Whether the victim’s statements to the police officer in the ambulance should have been admitted as an excited utterance.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the circumstantial evidence, including threats to Echevarria’s family, Cotto’s knowledge of Echevarria’s identity, and Cotto’s prior intimidation of Echevarria, sufficiently linked Cotto to the threats.

    2. Yes, because Echevarria’s statements were made shortly after the event, were consistent, and were corroborated by the testimony of multiple witnesses, indicating their reliability.

    3. The issue was unpreserved for appeal.

    4. Yes, because the victim was under extreme stress from a recent gunshot wound, preventing the victim from engaging in reflection and giving his statements the necessary indicia of reliability.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the prosecution had met its burden of demonstrating witness tampering by clear and convincing evidence. The Court reasoned that direct evidence of witness tampering is often difficult to obtain, making circumstantial evidence permissible. The Court found a sufficient link between the threats and Cotto, noting that Cotto knew Echevarria from the neighborhood, was out on bail, and had a motive to silence him. The court emphasized that the threats occurred immediately after Echevarria’s identification of Cotto. Regarding the reliability of Echevarria’s statements, the Court found them sufficiently reliable because they were repeated shortly after the event, were lucid and credible, and described the events in detail. The Court noted that the witnesses recounting the statements were subject to cross-examination. The Court declined to review the issue of cross-examination as it was not preserved. The court held that the victim’s statements were properly admitted under the excited utterance exception because the victim was under severe stress from his gunshot wound and was in great pain, preventing him from engaging in reasoned reflection. The court stated, “the relevant time period `is not measured in minutes or seconds’ but rather `is measured by facts’.”

  • People v. Harper, 75 N.Y.2d 314 (1990): Sufficiency of Evidence for Bribe Receiving by a Witness

    People v. Harper, 75 N.Y.2d 314 (1990)

    An agreement to “drop charges” is not equivalent to an agreement to alter testimony or avoid appearing at a proceeding, and thus, is legally insufficient to establish bribe receiving by a witness under Penal Law § 215.05 without further evidence.

    Summary

    Montey Harper was convicted of bribe receiving by a witness for agreeing to “drop” assault charges against Rick James in exchange for money. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the agreement to drop charges, without evidence of an explicit agreement to alter testimony or avoid appearing in court, was insufficient to support the conviction. The court reasoned that agreeing to drop charges does not necessarily imply an intent to influence testimony or absent oneself from the proceedings. This case highlights the importance of clearly establishing the intent to influence testimony or prevent a witness from appearing to secure a conviction for bribe receiving by a witness.

    Facts

    Montey Harper was allegedly assaulted by Rick James and Carmen Johnson. Harper filed assault charges against them. Harper approached Betty Gladden (James’s mother) and threatened a civil suit and criminal charges unless she paid him $10,000. Gladden paid Harper, who signed a release agreeing to “drop charges” against James and Johnson in exchange for $5,000 plus an additional $5,000 payment schedule for medical expenses. After receiving the initial payment, Harper went to court to drop the charges, but the Assistant District Attorney refused due to lack of access to the case file. The charges were later dismissed due to facial insufficiency. Harper refiled the charges when Gladden failed to make scheduled payments. Gladden then reported the matter to the District Attorney.

    Procedural History

    Harper was charged with bribe receiving by a witness (Penal Law § 215.05) and convicted after a jury trial. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction and dismissed the indictment, finding the evidence legally insufficient. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an unlawful agreement to alter testimony or avoid appearing at an action or proceeding may be inferred from a “release” agreement in which one party agrees to “drop” criminal and civil charges in exchange for money and other valuable consideration, thus satisfying the requirements for bribe receiving by a witness under Penal Law § 215.05.

    Holding

    No, because an agreement to “drop charges” is not the same as an agreement to alter testimony or absent oneself from a proceeding; therefore, it cannot alone support a conviction for bribe receiving by a witness without further evidence of such an agreement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the crime of bribe receiving by a witness requires an “agreement or understanding” that a witness will either influence their testimony or avoid appearing at the proceeding. The court found that the agreement to “drop charges” does not explicitly state or implicitly suggest that Harper would alter his testimony or absent himself from the criminal proceedings. The court noted, “agreeing to ‘drop’ charges is certainly not the same as agreeing to alter testimony or absent oneself entirely from a proceeding. Consequently, evidence that someone has agreed to do the former cannot alone be used as a basis to infer the existence of an agreement to do the latter.” The court reasoned that interpreting “drop the charges” as a promise to halt the proceedings or hinder the prosecution was an overextension of the statute’s intent. The court stated that penal statutes should be interpreted according to the fair import of their terms, and penal responsibility should not be extended beyond the fair scope of the statutory mandate. Further, the court found no evidence that Harper attempted to influence his testimony or avoid appearing. The court noted that Harper made himself available to the prosecution after Gladden failed to make the agreed-upon payments. Therefore, the court affirmed the Appellate Division’s order reversing Harper’s conviction.

  • People v. Rivera, 39 N.Y.2d 519 (1976): Admissibility of Evidence of Witness Tampering

    People v. Rivera, 39 N.Y.2d 519 (1976)

    Evidence of witness tampering, including actions by accomplices and relatives, is admissible to demonstrate consciousness of guilt and a concerted effort to obstruct justice, provided there is a connection to the defendant’s actions.

    Summary

    Rivera appeals his robbery conviction, arguing that the trial court improperly admitted testimony regarding threatening behavior by others. The victim, Murray, was robbed at knifepoint. Subsequently, she experienced threatening gestures from Rivera and others, including phone calls and a funeral arrangement. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence was admissible to show a pattern of harassment and tampering, especially since the defendant’s actions were linked to those of his accomplices. Even though the tampering conviction was later reversed on other grounds, the initial admissibility of the evidence remained valid, as it was relevant to the harassment charge and demonstrated a consciousness of guilt.

    Facts

    Eileen Murray, a student, was robbed at her workplace by Rivera and two others. During the robbery, a knife was held to her throat. After the robbery, Murray saw Rivera making threatening gestures, including crossing his throat. Other individuals, including Rivera’s sister and an accomplice’s brother, engaged in threatening behavior towards Murray, such as phone calls and sending a funeral arrangement. Murray’s employer corroborated her testimony regarding the threatening gestures.

    Procedural History

    Rivera was convicted of robbery in the first degree, two counts of robbery in the second degree, harassment, and tampering with a witness. The Appellate Division affirmed the robbery and harassment convictions but reversed the tampering conviction. Rivera appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in admitting testimony regarding the threatening behavior and actions of individuals other than the defendant.

    Holding

    No, because the evidence was part of the total picture and specifically connected to the charges of tampering and harassment, serving as circumstantial evidence corroborating the complainant’s direct testimony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found that the evidence of threatening behavior by others was admissible as part of a broader pattern of harassment and witness tampering. The court reasoned that these actions, when connected to the defendant, could demonstrate a concerted effort to obstruct justice and indicate a consciousness of guilt. The court cited People v. Shilitano, 218 N.Y. 161, noting that efforts by a defendant’s associates to influence witnesses can be indicative of guilt. The court emphasized that the jury was entitled to infer that the actions of Rivera’s accomplices were tied to his criminal activity. Even though the tampering conviction was ultimately reversed, the evidence was properly admitted when the tampering charge was still active. The court noted that Rivera could have moved to strike the evidence had the tampering charge been dismissed at trial. The Court of Appeals stated, “That such efforts may have some tendency to prove a consciousness of guilt seems to be a fair deduction and, therefore, they were properly received in evidence.” The court also held that the Appellate Division could have ordered a new trial if unfairness or prejudice had existed, but they did not, implying that the evidence’s admission was not unduly prejudicial to the robbery convictions.