New York Law Review

Tag: witness rehabilitation

  • People v. Davis, 61 N.Y.2d 202 (1984): Admissibility of Prior Consistent Statements to Rehabilitate Witness Testimony

    People v. Davis, 61 N.Y.2d 202 (1984)

    A witness’s prior consistent statements are inadmissible to bolster their testimony unless the cross-examiner specifically alleges recent fabrication of the testimony, and the prior statements were made before the alleged motive to fabricate arose.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of robbery based largely on accomplice testimony. The prosecution introduced prior consistent statements from the accomplices to bolster their credibility after defense counsel suggested their testimony was a recent fabrication to gain leniency. The New York Court of Appeals held that the prior consistent statements were improperly admitted because the motive to fabricate existed when the statements were made. The court emphasized that such statements are admissible only to rebut a claim of recent fabrication, and only if the statements predate the alleged motive.

    Facts

    Ricky Cuff and Jacob Whitbeck were accomplices in the robbery of King’s Variety Store. Cuff posed as a customer, and Whitbeck drove the getaway car. Initially, neither Cuff nor Whitbeck admitted their involvement or identified the defendant, Davis. Later, after police told Cuff that Whitbeck implicated him, Cuff confessed and identified Davis. Whitbeck then confessed after being told Cuff implicated him and being threatened with a long prison term. Both accomplices provided written statements consistent with their trial testimony identifying Davis as the gunman.

    Procedural History

    Davis was convicted of robbery, largely on the testimony of Cuff and Whitbeck. The Appellate Division reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial, finding the prior consistent statements were improperly admitted to bolster the accomplice testimony. The dissenting Justice granted the People leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prior consistent statements of accomplices, made after their arrest and being informed they were implicated in the crime, are admissible to rehabilitate their testimony after defense counsel alleges recent fabrication to obtain leniency.

    Holding

    No, because the accomplices’ motive to fabricate existed at the time the prior consistent statements were made; thus, the statements were inadmissible to rehabilitate their testimony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s reversal, holding that the prior consistent statements were inadmissible. The court reiterated the general rule that a witness’s testimony cannot be bolstered by prior consistent statements. An exception exists when the testimony is challenged as a recent fabrication, but the prior statements must predate the motive to fabricate. Here, the motive to fabricate (hope for leniency) arose when the accomplices were arrested and charged. Because the written statements were given after this motive arose, they were inadmissible to bolster the accomplices’ credibility. The court distinguished People v. Baker, where the accomplice’s motive to falsify was influenced not only by a desire to avoid prosecution but also by subsequent gifts of money and food. In Davis, the court noted, “The hope for preferred treatment…was precisely the same at the time of arrest as it was at the time of trial.” Allowing the statements was prejudicial and not harmless error, as the accomplices’ identification was critical to the case.

  • People v. Quinones, 57 N.Y.2d 270 (1982): Admissibility of Evidence and Witness Rehabilitation

    People v. Quinones, 57 N.Y.2d 270 (1982)

    A party cannot claim error on appeal for evidentiary rulings unless a specific objection was made at trial, and a witness can be rehabilitated after an implicit claim of recent fabrication by introducing prior consistent statements.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, upholding the defendant’s conviction. The court held that the defendant’s objections to the admission of a taped conversation were insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. Further, it found no error in allowing a police agent to refresh her recollection with notes, nor in allowing the prosecutor to rehabilitate the agent after the defense implied recent fabrication. Finally, the court determined that the prosecution’s inability to produce a confidential informant did not warrant reversal, as the informant was not an eyewitness, and their unavailability was previously explained.

    Facts

    A police agent engaged in drug transactions with the defendant. During the trial, the prosecution introduced a taped conversation between the agent and the defendant. The agent also testified, using notes to refresh her recollection. The defense cross-examined the agent regarding omissions in her “buy reports.” A confidential informant, whose identity was known to the defendant, was unavailable to testify.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s objections to the admission of the taped conversation were sufficient to preserve a hearsay argument for appellate review.
    2. Whether it was error to allow the police agent to refresh her recollection using notes.
    3. Whether it was error to allow the prosecutor to rehabilitate the agent after the defense implied recent fabrication.
    4. Whether the prosecution’s inability to produce a confidential informant warrants reversal of the conviction.

    Holding

    1. No, because the objections raised at trial were insufficient to preserve the hearsay argument for review.

    2. No, because using notes to refresh a witness’s recollection is permissible, as long as the notes are not offered into evidence.

    3. No, because when a party on cross examination implicitly asserts recent fabrication, the other party can rehabilitate the witness by eliciting testimony of prior consistent statements.

    4. No, because the informant was not an eyewitness to the drug transaction, their identity was known to the defendant, and the unavailability was explained in a prior trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the defendant’s objections to the taped conversation at trial (that it was “self-serving” and “not in furtherance of any conspiracy”) did not preserve the argument that it was inadmissible hearsay. The court cited People v. Gonzalez, 55 NY2d 720 in support of the proposition that specific objections are required to preserve issues for appellate review. The court further reasoned that it was permissible for the police agent to use her notes to refresh her recollection as long as the notes were not offered as evidence themselves.

    Regarding the rehabilitation of the agent-witness, the Court found that the defendant’s cross-examination opened the door for the prosecution to elicit testimony that the agent had included the defendant’s name in an earlier “buy report”. The court stated that the defense attorney had “opened the door by interrogation as to the omission of defendant’s name from her ‘buy reports’ of October 31, and November 28, 1974.” This allowed the prosecution to introduce evidence showing consistency between her testimony and her earlier reports to rebut the implication of recent fabrication.

    Finally, the Court reasoned that the absence of the confidential informant did not warrant reversal because the informant was not an eyewitness to the drug transactions, their identity was known to the defendant, and the unavailability had been explained at a prior trial. The court does not explicitly state what the explanation for the unavailability was, but this suggests that the prosecution made reasonable efforts to locate the informant.