New York Law Review

Tag: witness identification

  • People v. Breland, 83 N.Y.2d 294 (1994): Independent Criminal Acts and Accomplice Corroboration

    People v. Breland, 83 N.Y.2d 294 (1994)

    A witness’s participation in a crime is severed when the defendant commits a subsequent, independent criminal act against that witness, thus nullifying the need for accomplice corroboration regarding the independent act.

    Summary

    Victor Breland was convicted of enterprise corruption and multiple counts of murder and other crimes related to his leadership in a crack cocaine network. Key evidence included accomplice testimony regarding two sets of killings: one at a beauty parlor and another of a man named Lovell. Breland argued that the accomplice testimony was insufficiently corroborated, as required by CPL 60.22. He also argued that a witness, Ashton, who was also a victim of Breland’s violence, should have been considered an accomplice whose testimony required corroboration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Breland’s act of shooting Ashton constituted a separate and independent crime, thus eliminating the need for corroboration of Ashton’s testimony and that sufficient non-accomplice evidence connected Breland to the crimes.

    Facts

    Breland, a leader in a crack cocaine network, orchestrated a series of violent crimes. He and an accomplice murdered two people at the Glamorama Beauty Parlor, intending to kill a rival drug lord. Breland also shot and wounded Willie Ashton, an accomplice who was acting as a lookout, and killed another lookout, Mitchell Rich, to eliminate witnesses. A week later, Breland murdered Joseph Lovell, who had been used to register vehicles for the drug operation. Accomplices provided detailed accounts of both the Glamorama shootings and the Lovell murder.

    Procedural History

    Breland was convicted by a jury in the Supreme Court, Kings County, of enterprise corruption, multiple counts of second-degree murder, attempted murder, assault, and weapons possession. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. Breland appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Willie Ashton should be considered an accomplice as a matter of law regarding Breland’s attempted murder of Ashton, thus requiring corroboration of Ashton’s testimony under CPL 60.22.

    2. Whether there was sufficient non-accomplice evidence to corroborate the accomplice testimony regarding the Glamorama shootings and the Lovell murder, as required by CPL 60.22.

    3. Whether the police identification procedure used with Ashton was impermissibly suggestive, thereby tainting Ashton’s identification of Breland.

    Holding

    1. No, because Breland’s attempted murder of Ashton constituted a subsequent, independent criminal act, severing Ashton’s initial accomplice relationship.

    2. Yes, because the non-accomplice evidence sufficiently connected Breland to both sets of killings, satisfying the requirements of CPL 60.22.

    3. No, because Ashton’s prior relationship with Breland and the circumstances of their encounters ensured that the identification was not the product of police suggestion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding Ashton’s status, the Court reasoned that Breland’s act of shooting Ashton was a distinct criminal event, separate from the initial plan. "Breland’s attempted murder of his erstwhile accomplice, Ashton, constitutes a subsequent independent criminal frame in a series of violent criminal scenes and acts. His own shooting of Ashton outside the beauty parlor severed, in the most profound legal and actual sense, Ashton’s initial accomplice relationship to him." This eliminated the need to corroborate Ashton’s testimony.

    As for accomplice corroboration, the Court emphasized that the non-accomplice evidence need only "fairly tend[] to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime." The Court found sufficient corroboration for both the Glamorama shootings and the Lovell murder, including independent evidence regarding the location of Lovell’s body, vehicle registration records linking Breland to Lovell and the Glamorama attack, and testimony from a UPS driver who identified a getaway vehicle and another accomplice. The court noted, regarding corroboration: "The corroborative glue does not require independent proof of the elements of the crime to sustain a conviction; it just has to bind the accomplice evidence to the defendant."

    Finally, the Court dismissed Breland’s argument about police suggestibility, noting Ashton’s close and intense encounters with Breland. The Court noted "while Ashton’s viewings of Breland’s face and features, as described in the Rodriguez hearing, may have been relatively brief, they could not have been more intense or focused," further observing that Ashton’s face-to-face encounter with Breland at the time he was shot precluded any claims of police suggestibility.

  • People v. Huertas, 75 N.Y.2d 487 (1990): Admissibility of Witness’s Prior Description for Non-Hearsay Purpose

    People v. Huertas, 75 N.Y.2d 487 (1990)

    A witness’s prior description of a perpetrator is admissible for the non-hearsay purpose of assessing the witness’s opportunity to observe and the reliability of their memory, particularly when identification is a central issue in the case.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a complaining witness’s testimony regarding the description of her assailant, given to police shortly after a rape, was admissible. The Court held that the testimony was admissible for a non-hearsay purpose: to allow the jury to assess the complainant’s ability to observe and remember her assailant, and thus the reliability of her identification of the defendant. The Court reasoned that the description was relevant for comparison with the defendant’s actual features, aiding the jury in determining if the identification was accurate or the result of memory failure or suggestion. The fact that the description was given soon after the event enhanced its probative value.

    Facts

    The complainant was raped on March 27, 1986, after encountering the defendant on the street. She observed him under streetlights, describing the illumination as ‘bright’ or ‘decent.’ She provided a detailed account of the assault, including her observations of the defendant’s features. Shortly after the rape, she reported the incident to the police and gave them a description of her attacker. Twelve days later, she saw the defendant again, identified him to police, and he was arrested. At trial, the complainant testified about the description she gave to the police.

    Procedural History

    Before trial, the defense moved to preclude the complainant from testifying about the description she gave to the police, arguing it constituted impermissible bolstering. The trial court denied the motion, and the complainant testified about the description. Defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the complainant’s testimony regarding the description she gave to the police shortly after the rape was inadmissible hearsay and impermissible bolstering of her in-court testimony.

    Holding

    No, because the testimony was properly admitted for a non-hearsay purpose: to allow the jury to assess the complainant’s ability to observe and remember her assailant, which bears on the reliability of her identification of the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the complainant’s testimony was not offered to prove the truth of the description she gave to the police. Instead, it was probative of her ability to observe and remember her assailant, which is relevant to the accuracy of her identification. The Court stated, “It is not the accuracy or truth of the description that establishes its relevance. It is, rather, the comparison of the prior description and the features of the person later identified by the witness as the perpetrator that is the ground of relevance.” The Court emphasized that in a case where identification is the only contested issue, comparing the witness’s prior description with the defendant’s actual features assists the jury in evaluating the reliability of the identification. This allows the jury to determine if the identification was based on accurate memory or influenced by intervening factors. The court cited People v Trowbridge, 305 NY 471, 475 regarding the common-law prohibition against hearsay testimony. The Court also noted that CPL 60.25 and 60.30 allow prior identification testimony as independent evidence of identity, provided the witness is available for cross-examination. The Court rejected the argument that the existence of these statutes necessarily forecloses the non-hearsay use of description testimony. The Court referenced 4 Wigmore, Evidence § 1130 for the criticism of technical application of the hearsay rule, particularly regarding witness testimony about prior identification. The Court concluded, “the background of CPL 60.25 and 60.30 indicates that the Legislature intended by adoption of those statutory ‘exceptions’ only to eliminate a technical bar to the receipt of probative evidence of identification, not to preclude all use of similar testimony.”

  • People v. Legister, 75 N.Y.2d 832 (1990): Improper Juror Experimentation Requires New Trial

    People v. Legister, 75 N.Y.2d 832 (1990)

    A jury verdict must be overturned when a juror conducts a private experiment related to a critical issue in the case, and the experiment is revealed with sufficient guarantees of reliability.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed a conviction and ordered a new trial because a juror conducted an unauthorized experiment during deliberations. The juror, seeking to assess the victim’s ability to identify her attacker in a dimly lit room, recreated similar conditions in her hotel room. She then shared her findings with other jurors before they reached a guilty verdict. The court found that this “conscious, contrived experimentation” was directly material to a critical point in the trial, and the risk of prejudice to the defendant was apparent, warranting a new trial.

    Facts

    During the trial, a key issue was the victim’s ability to identify her attacker in a darkened bedroom.

    After two days of deliberation, the jury had not reached a verdict.

    One juror, during overnight sequestration, adjusted the lighting and opened the curtains in her hotel room to simulate the crime scene conditions based on the victim’s testimony.

    The juror then had another juror walk in and out of the room wearing clothing of a similar color to the attacker’s, to assess whether the victim could have made a reliable identification.

    The juror discussed the experiment with some fellow jurors the next morning, and the jury soon returned a guilty verdict.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial.

    The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a new trial is required when a juror conducts an experiment related to a critical issue in the case outside of the courtroom and shares the results with other jurors.

    Holding

    Yes, because the juror’s conduct was conscious, contrived experimentation, directly material to a critical point at issue in the trial, and the risk of prejudice to defendant is apparent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on People v. Brown, 48 N.Y.2d 388 (1979), stating the juror’s conduct was “conscious, contrived experimentation, directly material to a critical point at issue in the trial.”

    The court emphasized that the victim’s identification was crucial to the prosecution’s case, and the juror’s experiment bolstered the identification with non-record evidence, meaning evidence not subject to challenge by the defendant.

    The court noted “the risk of prejudice to defendant is apparent. The victim’s identification of the defendant was crucial to the prosecution’s case and the juror’s experiment bolstered the identification with nonrecord evidence not subject to challenge by the defendant.”

    The Court found sufficient guarantees that the report of the juror’s conduct was genuine because she discussed the experiment with some fellow jurors just before the final vote and recounted the story almost immediately after the verdict in a conversation that included both defense counsel and the prosecutor.

  • People v. Jenkins, 68 N.Y.2d 896 (1986): Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Admissibility of Prior Misidentifications

    People v. Jenkins, 68 N.Y.2d 896 (1986)

    A defense counsel’s failure to use evidence of a witness’s prior misidentifications, due to an erroneous belief that such evidence is inadmissible, can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if it prejudices the defendant’s case, especially when the case hinges on the witness’s identification testimony.

    Summary

    In a robbery case where the only evidence linking the defendant to the crime was a single witness’s identification, the Court of Appeals held that the defendant was entitled to a hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The defendant alleged his trial counsel failed to use police reports showing the witness had misidentified two other suspects as accomplices, believing this evidence was inadmissible. The court found this evidence probative of the witness’s ability to accurately observe the robbery and that the failure to use it, if due to the mistaken belief of inadmissibility, could be prejudicial, warranting a hearing to determine counsel’s reasoning.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of robbery based solely on the identification testimony of a single witness. During the robbery, the witness was lying face down on the floor with her head resting on her forearms. Police reports, possessed by the defense counsel, indicated that the same witness had identified two other individuals as the defendant’s accomplices. These other identifications proved to be incorrect. The defense counsel did not use these reports at trial.

    Procedural History

    After being convicted, the defendant moved to vacate the judgment, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to use the police reports of the witness’s misidentifications. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing, stating that the misidentifications were collateral to the issues at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, remitting the case to the Supreme Court for a hearing.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defense counsel’s failure to use evidence of a witness’s prior misidentifications, due to a mistaken belief about its admissibility, constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel, thereby entitling the defendant to a hearing on his motion to vacate the judgment.

    Holding

    Yes, because the evidence of prior misidentifications was probative of the witness’s ability to accurately recall or observe the details of the robbery, a material issue at trial, and the failure to use this evidence, if due solely to an erroneous belief that it was inadmissible, could be prejudicial to the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the witness’s prior misidentifications were directly relevant to her ability to accurately observe and recall the events of the robbery. The court stated, “The evidence was clearly probative of the witness’s ability to accurately recall or to observe the details of the robbery, a material, indeed critical, issue in the trial.” The court distinguished this case from People v. Satterfield, noting that unlike in Satterfield, there was no apparent tactical reason for the defense counsel’s omission. The court emphasized that a defense counsel’s performance must be “meaningful,” and that failing to use critical evidence due to a misapprehension of the law can fall below that standard. However, the court also acknowledged that there might be a tactical explanation for the omission, which is why it ordered a hearing. As the Court implied, evidence of prior misidentifications goes to the credibility of the witness and the weight a jury should assign to her testimony. As such, the failure to introduce such evidence could amount to ineffective assistance of counsel if the attorney incorrectly believed the evidence to be inadmissible, or if the failure to introduce that evidence was so egregious that it could not be excused as a reasonable trial strategy.