New York Law Review

Tag: witness bias

  • Caldwell v. Cablevision Systems Corp., 20 N.Y.3d 365 (2013): Admissibility of Fact Witness Testimony When Paid Excessively

    20 N.Y.3d 365 (2013)

    Testimony from a subpoenaed fact witness who receives a fee disproportionately exceeding the statutory minimum is generally admissible; however, the trial court may need to instruct the jury about potential bias if the fee is excessive and unexplained.

    Summary

    Caldwell sued Cablevision Systems Corp. for negligence after she tripped and fell in a trench created during cable installation. CSI, Cablevision’s contractor, subpoenaed the emergency room physician who initially treated Caldwell, to testify that she stated she tripped over her dog. The physician testified consistently with his records. Caldwell’s counsel revealed the physician was paid $10,000 by CSI for his appearance. The court provided a general bias charge but not a specific one related to the doctor’s payment. The jury found CSI negligent, but that such negligence was not a substantial factor in bringing about the accident. The Court of Appeals held the testimony was admissible, but a specific jury instruction regarding potential bias should have been given. However, the error was deemed harmless.

    Facts

    In September 2006, CSI, contracted by Cablevision, installed fiber-optic cable, cutting trenches and test pits along Benefield Boulevard. On October 11, 2006, Caldwell, a resident, tripped and fell while walking her dog, allegedly due to a “dip in the trench.” She claimed injuries from the fall. CSI subpoenaed the emergency room physician who treated Caldwell to testify about his consultation note stating Caldwell “tripped over a dog.” The physician testified confirming his note, and admitted being paid $10,000 by CSI for his appearance.

    Procedural History

    Caldwell sued CSI for negligence. At the trial level, the Supreme Court denied Caldwell’s motion to set aside the jury verdict finding CSI negligent but not the cause of the accident. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding that while the payment to the doctor did not warrant excluding his testimony, the Supreme Court erred by not adequately charging the jury regarding the credibility of a paid fact witness, but deemed the error harmless. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the testimony of a subpoenaed fact witness, who receives a fee alleged to be disproportionately in excess of CPLR 8001 (a)’s mandatory fee requirement for attendance at trial, is inadmissible as a matter of law, and whether the trial court erred by not giving a specific jury instruction regarding the potential bias of the paid fact witness.

    Holding

    No, the testimony is generally admissible, but a specific jury instruction should have been given regarding potential bias, because the payment was substantial and unexplained, but the failure to do so was harmless error under the circumstances of this case.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged concerns about the substantial payment to the fact witness, noting such payments could create an implication that the testimony was bought or influenced. While CPLR 8001(a) sets a minimum witness fee, it doesn’t authorize unlimited payments. The Court referred to precedent stating, “To procure the testimony of witnesses it is often necessary to pay the actual expenses of a witness in attending court and a reasonable compensation for the time lost.” The Court cited Rules of Professional Conduct, permitting “reasonable compensation…for the loss of time.” The Court emphasized the prohibition against paying a fact witness contingent on favorable testimony or the litigation’s outcome. The Court determined, although a more specific jury charge should have been given, Supreme Court’s failure to issue one in this case was harmless. The dispute underlying the doctor’s testimony was not whether he fabricated the contents of the consultation note. In other words, the substance of the doctor’s testimony was such that the jury’s assessment was only tangentially related to the doctor’s credibility. Thus, the Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

  • People v. Spencer, 19 N.Y.3d 955 (2012): Admissibility of Evidence to Show Witness Bias

    People v. Spencer, 19 N.Y.3d 955 (2012)

    Extrinsic evidence demonstrating a witness’s motive to fabricate testimony is not considered collateral and is admissible, provided a good faith basis exists for introducing such evidence; however, the exclusion of such evidence may be deemed harmless error if overwhelming independent proof supports the conviction.

    Summary

    Spencer was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon. He argued the trial court erred in precluding him from presenting evidence that the complaining witness, an off-duty police officer, had a motive to frame him. Spencer wanted to testify that the officer was protecting a third party involved in the incident because they were friends and the officer allowed the third party to deal drugs in front of his home. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that while the trial court erred in excluding the evidence as collateral, the error was harmless because of the overwhelming independent evidence supporting Spencer’s guilt, including multiple eyewitness testimonies and 911 call recordings.

    Facts

    On August 16, 2006, Spencer was involved in a street altercation. An off-duty police officer arrived on the scene and witnessed Spencer brandishing a firearm. The officer ordered Spencer to drop the weapon, which was loaded. Multiple eyewitnesses corroborated the officer’s account. Recordings of two 911 calls placed during the incident were also presented as evidence. Spencer claimed the officer falsely implicated him to protect the third party from the initial altercation, alleging that the third party possessed the firearm.

    Procedural History

    A Queens County grand jury indicted Spencer on charges including second-degree criminal possession of a weapon. At trial, the Supreme Court permitted the People to introduce eyewitness testimony and 911 call recordings but precluded Spencer from introducing evidence that the complaining officer and the third party were friends. The jury convicted Spencer, and he was sentenced to a 15-year prison term. The Appellate Division agreed that the trial court erred in excluding Spencer’s evidence but affirmed the conviction and sentence, concluding the error was harmless. Spencer appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in precluding Spencer from introducing evidence that the complaining witness had a motive to fabricate his testimony against Spencer?

    Holding

    No, the trial court erred in precluding the evidence because extrinsic proof tending to establish a reason to fabricate is never collateral and may not be excluded on that ground; however, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because of the overwhelming independent proof of Spencer’s guilt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged a defendant’s constitutional right to present a complete defense. The Court cited Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986). However, it also recognized the trial court’s discretion to manage proceedings and curtail exploration of collateral matters. The court stated, “[I]t is well established that the trial courts have broad discretion to keep the proceedings within manageable limits and to curtail exploration of collateral matters” (People v. Hudy, 73 N.Y.2d 40, 56 [1988]). The Court emphasized that “extrinsic proof tending to establish a reason to fabricate is never collateral and may not be excluded on that ground” if counsel has a good faith basis for eliciting the evidence. The Court determined that Spencer had a good faith basis for his proposed testimony regarding the officer’s relationship with the third party. However, the Court ultimately concluded that the error was harmless, referencing People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 240-241 (1975), given the overwhelming independent evidence, including multiple eyewitness testimonies and 911 calls corroborating the officer’s version of events.

  • People v. Corby, 6 N.Y.3d 231 (2005): Limits on Cross-Examination and Witness Bias

    6 N.Y.3d 231 (2005)

    A trial court has discretion to limit cross-examination of a witness when the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the risk of confusing the jury, misleading them, or causing undue prejudice, and where the witness’s bias has been explored through other means.

    Summary

    Norcott Corby was convicted of murder and robbery. On appeal, he argued that the trial court improperly limited his cross-examination of the prosecution’s primary witness, Xanderia Burnett, regarding the circumstances under which she implicated him in the crime. Corby contended this violated his right to confront witnesses. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court acted within its discretion in limiting the cross-examination because the potential for jury confusion and speculation outweighed the probative value, and the witness’s bias and motive to lie were already evident to the jury through other testimony.

    Facts

    Corby paid Burnett to use her apartment for a drug transaction. While awaiting the arrival of heroin from San Francisco, Burnett saw Corby with a handgun. Yousef Mohammed arrived with the heroin and visited Burnett’s apartment. Later, Corby, along with others, went to Mohammed’s hotel, retrieved heroin, and returned to Burnett’s apartment. Burnett witnessed Corby and others entering a bedroom, after which she found Mohammed dead. The group, including Burnett, disposed of the body. Initially, Burnett denied knowledge of the murder to the police. Later, after Corby suggested to the DEA that Burnett was involved in Mohammed’s murder, police told Burnett that Corby had implicated her. Burnett then implicated Corby and others.

    Procedural History

    Corby was convicted of murder and robbery in Supreme Court. He appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly limited his cross-examination of Burnett. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. A dissenting Justice granted Corby permission to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion and violated the defendant’s right to confront witnesses by precluding cross-examination of the prosecution’s primary witness regarding the circumstances under which she implicated the defendant, specifically, that she only did so after being told the defendant had implicated her in the same crime?

    Holding

    No, because the trial court did not abuse its discretion as a matter of law, and no constitutional violation occurred. The potential for jury confusion and speculation outweighed the probative value of the evidence, and the witness’s bias and motive to lie were already evident to the jury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the right to cross-examine witnesses is not absolute and that trial courts have discretion to determine the scope of cross-examination. This discretion involves weighing the probative value of evidence against the possibility of jury confusion, misleading the jury, or causing undue prejudice. The court cited People v Williams, 81 NY2d 303, 313 (1993), stating that an accused’s right to cross-examine witnesses is not absolute. The Court stated that the defendant had been given wide latitude to show Burnett’s motive to lie, noting that Burnett’s testimony established her presence at the scene of the crime, her assistance in disposing of the body, and her initial denial of any knowledge of the murder. Further, other evidence implicated Corby, including phone records and notes found in Mohammed’s hotel room linking him to Burnett’s apartment.

    The court distinguished the case from People v Hudy, 73 NY2d 40 (1988), which held that evidence of a witness’s bias is never collateral. The court stated, “[i]f bias or interest has been fully explored through other means, or the precluded area involved cumulative matter already presented, there generally has been no infringement of the right of confrontation” (People v Chin, 67 NY2d 22, 29 [1986]). Here, additional evidence of bias would have been cumulative and of little probative value. A dissenting judge argued that precluding the cross-examination was a constitutional violation. However, the majority concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the scope of cross-examination under the circumstances.