Jerry v. Board of Education, 35 N.Y.2d 534 (1974)

New York Education Law Section 3020-a, as drafted in 1974, does not authorize the suspension of a tenured teacher without pay pending disciplinary proceedings.

Summary

This case addresses whether a Board of Education has the authority to suspend a tenured teacher without pay while disciplinary proceedings are pending under Section 3020-a of the New York Education Law. The Court of Appeals held that the statute, as then written, did not grant such authority. While acknowledging the necessity of suspension power for school administration, the court emphasized that the right to compensation is a substantive right and requires explicit statutory authorization for its deprivation. The court rejected the argument that a clause mentioning restoration of pay after acquittal implied the power to withhold pay during suspension, asserting that such power requires explicit statutory language.

Facts

In Jerry, a physical education teacher was suspended without pay due to allegations of using excessive physical force and inappropriate language toward students, violating prior directives. In Goldin, a guidance counselor was suspended without pay based on charges of sleeping with an 18-year-old female student and subsequently denying the allegations. Both teachers challenged the suspensions without pay, arguing the lack of statutory authority and raising constitutional concerns.

Procedural History

In Jerry, the Supreme Court dismissed the teacher’s petition, but the Appellate Division modified the decision, ordering back pay and a hearing. In Goldin, the Supreme Court upheld the suspension without pay pending resolution of one charge, but the Appellate Division modified by striking an injunction and limiting the withholding of pay to 30 days. Both cases were appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether Section 3020-a of the Education Law authorizes a Board of Education to suspend a tenured teacher without pay pending the determination of disciplinary proceedings.

Holding

No, because Section 3020-a, as worded in 1974, does not explicitly grant the authority to withhold pay during a teacher’s suspension. The power to suspend does not automatically imply the power to withhold pay, which is a substantive right requiring clear statutory authorization.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court reasoned that while the power to suspend is essential for school administration, the right to compensation is a substantive right that cannot be taken away without explicit statutory authorization. The Court found no such explicit authorization in Section 3020-a. The Court dismissed the argument that the phrase “[i]f the employee is acquitted he shall be restored to his position with full pay for any period of suspension” implies legislative intent to allow withholding of pay during suspension. The Court stated, “had there been such an intention the easy and normal manner of its expression would have been to include an explicit, appropriate provision therefor in subdivision 2.”

The dissenting judges argued that subdivisions 2 and 4 of Section 3020-a, read together, imply that the statute sanctions discretionary pre-hearing suspension without pay. They also contended that basic fairness requires that a payless suspension not be unlimited and that the courts are competent to remedy this deficiency by applying the traditional rule of reasonableness. The dissent cited analogous provisions of the Education Law where payless suspensions have long been accepted in administrative practice and in the courts.

The majority stated there was no constitutional impediment to a statutory grant of explicit authority to withhold pay pending Section 3020-a proceedings, but left it to the legislature to grant such authority if it chose to do so. The court also held that the boards were entitled to credit against the teacher’s entitlement to back salary all earnings which the teachers may have had from other employment during their periods of suspension, citing Matter of Lezette v. Board of Educ.

Regarding the Goldin case, the court addressed the teacher’s contention that constitutional protection of his right to privacy precluded the use of the first charge as a predicate for disciplinary proceedings. The court rejected this contention, stating, “We cannot accept the proposition that the Constitution confers an absolute right of privacy. We conclude that such right must give way in these circumstances to a recognition of the legitimate interests of the school.”