New York Law Review

Tag: withdrawn guilty plea

  • Cohens v. Hess, 92 N.Y.2d 511 (1998): Admissibility of Withdrawn Guilty Plea in Subsequent Civil Action

    92 N.Y.2d 511 (1998)

    A withdrawn guilty plea to a traffic violation, vacated on grounds other than due process violations, is admissible as evidence in a subsequent civil action related to the same incident, subject to the defendant’s opportunity to explain the circumstances of the plea.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a withdrawn guilty plea to a traffic offense can be used as evidence in a later civil trial. The plaintiff sued the defendant for injuries sustained in a car accident. The defendant had previously pleaded guilty to a traffic violation related to the accident, but later withdrew the plea. At the civil trial, the plaintiff attempted to introduce the withdrawn plea to impeach the defendant’s testimony. The trial court disallowed it, but the New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding the plea admissible, as its vacatur wasn’t based on due process violations. The court emphasized the distinction between criminal and civil contexts and allowed the defendant an opportunity to explain the circumstances of the plea to the jury.

    Facts

    On July 31, 1992, Mary E. Cohens was injured in a car accident with a vehicle driven by the defendant, Hess. The accident occurred at an intersection controlled by a stop sign facing Hess. Following the accident, Hess was cited for failure to yield the right of way. On August 13, 1992, Hess pleaded guilty to failure to obey a traffic control device and paid a $75 fine. Three years later, after the civil suit commenced, Hess moved to vacate his guilty plea, claiming he lacked legal counsel when he entered it. The court allowed Hess to withdraw his plea and plead guilty to a non-moving violation.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff, Mary E. Cohens, sued the defendant, Hess, for personal injuries. At trial, the court prohibited the plaintiff from using Hess’s withdrawn guilty plea for impeachment. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff but found her 60% at fault. The plaintiff’s motion to set aside the verdict was denied. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, finding the plea admissible.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a guilty plea to a traffic offense, which has been withdrawn by leave of the court, is admissible as evidence in a subsequent civil action for damages arising from the same incident, when the withdrawal was not based on a violation of due process?

    Holding

    Yes, because the vacatur of the defendant’s plea was not based upon any violation of due process grounds, in the circumstances presented, the plaintiff’s intended use of the plea is proper. However, the defendant must be permitted a full and fair opportunity to offer the jury his reasons for the withdrawn plea.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals began by stating that all facts having rational probative value are admissible unless a specific rule forbids it. The Court distinguished its prior holding in People v. Spitaleri, 9 N.Y.2d 168, which held that a withdrawn guilty plea could not be used against a criminal defendant as an admission of guilt, emphasizing that Spitaleri was based on fundamental fairness grounds specific to criminal proceedings. The Court noted that allowing the use of a withdrawn plea in a criminal trial could effectively force the defendant to testify. Citing Ando v. Woodberry, 8 N.Y.2d 165, the Court reiterated that guilty pleas to traffic violations are generally admissible in subsequent civil actions as proof of negligence. The Court emphasized that the City Court’s decision to allow the defendant to withdraw his plea was discretionary and not based on any finding of coercion or misrepresentation. The Court reasoned that the defendant should be allowed to explain his reasons for the withdrawn plea to the jury, allowing the jury to determine how much weight to give the evidence. The court stated, “In our view, since the vacatur of defendant’s plea was not based upon any violation of due process grounds, in the circumstances presented, plaintiffs intended use of the plea is proper, while defendant’s attempted use of Spitaleri is misplaced. The fundamental differences in the considerations at work in criminal and civil trials compel the conclusion that Spitaleri is inapplicable here.”

  • People v. Droz, 39 N.Y.2d 457 (1976): Standard for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

    People v. Droz, 39 N.Y.2d 457 (1976)

    To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that their attorney failed to provide reasonably competent representation, including adequate preparation and familiarity with basic principles of criminal law.

    Summary

    Defendant Droz was convicted of drug possession and sale. He appealed, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. His assigned counsel failed to adequately prepare for trial, neglecting to contact potential witnesses, review the defendant’s record, or utilize readily available impeachment tools like prior testimony. The attorney’s ignorance of basic criminal law principles, such as the inadmissibility of a withdrawn guilty plea, prejudiced the defendant. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the cumulative errors demonstrated inadequate legal representation that deprived Droz of a fair trial. The court emphasized that effective representation requires preparation, knowledge of relevant law, and the diligent application of that knowledge to the client’s defense.

    Facts

    Droz was arrested following an undercover drug sale. Detective McGuckin, accompanied by an informant, allegedly purchased drugs from Droz on two occasions. A subsequent search of Droz’s apartment yielded heroin, needles, and other paraphernalia. Six individuals were present and arrested. Droz was indicted on nine counts related to drug sales and possession. He pleaded guilty to some charges, then withdrew the plea.

    Procedural History

    Initially, the Legal Aid Society represented Droz and a co-defendant. Due to a conflict of interest, the court assigned new counsel to Droz. The first trial ended in a mistrial. During the second trial, Droz’s attorney’s performance was questioned, and the court ultimately dismissed three counts of the indictment. After further errors, the court declared a mistrial but then proceeded with the trial over the defendant’s objection. The jury convicted Droz on all remaining counts. The appellate division affirmed, and Droz appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Droz was deprived of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel due to his attorney’s lack of preparation, ignorance of basic criminal law principles, and cumulative errors during trial.

    Holding

    Yes, because Droz’s counsel made little or no effort to prepare for trial, demonstrated a lack of familiarity with basic principles of criminal law, and made cumulative errors that prejudiced the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that effective representation includes adequate preparation, review of relevant law and facts, and familiarity with basic criminal law principles. Counsel’s failure to consult with Droz until the day of trial, his lack of effort to contact potential witnesses, and his ignorance of Droz’s prior guilty plea (and withdrawal thereof) were significant errors. The court highlighted the attorney’s damaging revelation of the withdrawn guilty plea, compounded by his incorrect advice that it would be admissible on cross-examination regardless. The court stated, “That, of course, is not correct since it is well settled that a guilty plea, once withdrawn, ‘is out of the case forever and for all purposes’ (People v Spitaleri, 9 NY2d 168, 173).” The failure to obtain Detective McGuckin’s prior testimony for potential impeachment was another significant omission. The Court concluded that the cumulative effect of these errors demonstrated that Droz did not receive adequate or effective legal representation. The court noted, “Whether counsel has adequately performed these functions is necessarily a question of degree, in which cumulative errors particularly on basic points essential to the defense, are often found to be determinative”.