Gonzalez v. Concourse Plaza Syndicates, Inc., 41 N.Y.2d 414 (1977)

A party who expressly requests a nonjury trial in their initial filing cannot later claim entitlement to a jury trial based solely on a now-withdrawn jury demand by another party who is no longer involved in the action.

Summary

In a wrongful death action, the plaintiff initially requested a nonjury trial. Later, after multiple trials and appeals, and after the original defendants who had demanded a jury trial were no longer parties to the case, the plaintiff sought to enforce the earlier jury demand. The New York Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff, having initially expressed a preference for a nonjury trial, could not rely on the jury demand of the former defendants. The court reasoned that the statutory protection against unilateral withdrawal of a jury demand doesn’t apply to a party who has already indicated a preference for a nonjury trial.

Facts

Plaintiff’s husband died in 1961 after falling while cleaning a window at the Concourse Plaza Hotel, in an apartment belonging to the Weinbergs. The plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against the hotel (Concourse Plaza Syndicates) and the Weinbergs, requesting a trial without a jury. The Weinbergs filed a demand for a jury trial.

Procedural History

The case went through several trials and appeals. The first trial ended in a mistrial. The second resulted in dismissal, which was reversed on appeal. A third trial resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff against the hotel, but for the Weinbergs. The verdict against the hotel was set aside and remanded for a fourth trial. By the time the fourth trial was about to commence, the Weinbergs were no longer parties to the suit. The hotel and the decedent’s employer (impleaded as a third-party defendant) moved to strike the action from the Jury Calendar. The trial court granted the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The plaintiff appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

1. Whether a plaintiff who initially requests a nonjury trial can later claim entitlement to a jury trial based on a jury demand made by defendants who are no longer parties to the action.
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s motion to file a jury demand nunc pro tunc (retroactively).

Holding

1. No, because the plaintiff expressed an initial preference for a nonjury trial and cannot now rely on a jury demand made by parties no longer involved in the case.
2. No, because the trial court considered and rejected the plaintiff’s request for relief under CPLR 4102 (subd [e]), determining that granting the application would be an injudicious use of its discretion.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that CPLR 4102(a), which prevents a party from withdrawing a jury demand without the consent of all other parties, is designed to protect parties who reasonably rely on an existing jury demand. However, this protection is unnecessary when the plaintiff has already expressed a preference for a nonjury trial. In such a case, the plaintiff has effectively consented in advance to any withdrawal or waiver of a jury demand.

The court further addressed CPLR 4102(e), which allows a court to relieve a party from failing to comply with the jury demand requirements if no undue prejudice would result. The court clarified that the trial court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion to file a jury demand nunc pro tunc was not an error of law, but rather a discretionary decision. The Court of Appeals is limited in its review of discretionary decisions. The Court of Appeals accepted the trial court’s determination that granting such a motion would be an “abuse of discretion” in that particular context and stage of the prolonged litigation.

The dissent argued that the majority’s interpretation of CPLR 4102 made the procedure for waiving a jury vulnerable to unilateral opportunism. The dissent emphasized the constitutional right to a jury trial and the statutory language requiring consent from all parties to withdraw a jury demand. Another dissenting opinion advocated for remittal to determine if the plaintiff should be granted relief under CPLR 4102(e), suggesting the defendant would not be unduly prejudiced by a jury trial given its participation in previous jury trials.