New York Law Review

Tag: withdrawal

  • People v. Wilkins, 68 N.Y.2d 269 (1986): Grand Jury Withdrawal Equals Dismissal Requiring Court Approval

    People v. Wilkins, 68 N.Y.2d 269 (1986)

    When a prosecutor withdraws a case from a grand jury after the presentation of evidence, such withdrawal is considered the equivalent of a dismissal, requiring court approval before resubmitting the case to a second grand jury.

    Summary

    Wilkins was charged with second-degree murder. The prosecution presented the case to a grand jury but withdrew it before a vote on indictment. A second grand jury indicted Wilkins, and his trial ended in a mistrial. Wilkins learned of the withdrawal/resubmission and moved for a hearing, arguing impropriety. The court found the prosecutor acted in good faith but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the unauthorized withdrawal was the equivalent of a dismissal. Resubmission without court approval violated the statutory scheme protecting the grand jury’s integrity. The indictment was dismissed, with leave to the District Attorney to apply for resubmission.

    Facts

    Wilkins was charged with second-degree murder for fatally shooting a victim. The prosecution initially presented the case to a grand jury. Before the grand jury could vote on whether to issue an indictment, the prosecutor withdrew the case. The case was then presented to a second grand jury, which indicted Wilkins for second-degree murder. A trial on this charge resulted in a mistrial because the jury couldn’t reach a verdict. It was during this trial that the defense learned of the withdrawal and resubmission.

    Procedural History

    Following the mistrial, Wilkins moved for an evidentiary hearing regarding the circumstances of the resubmission to the second grand jury. The trial court granted the motion and concluded that the prosecutor acted in good faith. Wilkins was then retried and convicted of first-degree manslaughter. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Wilkins appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the withdrawal and resubmission of charges at the grand jury level was improper.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a prosecutor may withdraw a case from a grand jury after presenting evidence and resubmit it to a second grand jury without the consent of the first grand jury or the court that impaneled it.

    Holding

    No, because such withdrawal is the equivalent of a dismissal by the first grand jury, and the prosecution may only resubmit the charges with the consent of the court.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals recognized that at common law, a prosecutor could resubmit charges to successive grand juries without limitation until an indictment was voted. However, the Legislature enacted statutes to insulate the grand jury process from prosecutorial excesses. CPL 190.75(3) dictates that when a charge has been dismissed, it may not be resubmitted to a grand jury unless the court authorizes or directs the resubmission. The court emphasized that the statutory scheme doesn’t contemplate terminating deliberations without grand jury action. The court noted that once a grand jury hears evidence, the key factor is the extent to which it considered the evidence. In this case, the first presentation was essentially complete. The court reasoned that allowing the prosecutor to unilaterally withdraw the case so late in the process would undermine CPL 190.75(3). “An explicit recognition of such power by this court would furnish the prosecutor the means of defeating CPL 190.75 (3) in almost every case by withdrawing all but ‘open and shut’ cases and resubmitting them after further preparation or a more compliant Grand Jury is impaneled.” The court also noted that the prosecutor could have sought an extension of the grand jury’s term. The resubmission without court leave violated Article 190, impairing the integrity of the process. The court rejected the harmless error argument based on the subsequent conviction, emphasizing that New York law allows for dismissal based on the mere possibility of prejudice.

  • Lang v. Lang, 397 N.Y.S.2d 324 (1977): Rights of Joint Bank Account Holders During Lifetime

    Lang v. Lang, 397 N.Y.S.2d 324 (1977)

    When a joint bank account is established, each tenant immediately gains title to one-half of the funds, and withdrawal of more than one’s moiety creates a right of recovery for the other tenant during their joint lifetimes; however, this right can be negated by consent or ratification of the withdrawal.

    Summary

    This case addresses the legal complexities surrounding joint bank accounts, particularly concerning the rights of each tenant during their lifetimes. Jessie Lang created a joint bank account with her niece, Harriet Heller. Heller withdrew the entire balance. Lang’s estate sued Heller for the amount exceeding Heller’s half. The court examines the nature of joint tenancies in bank accounts, emphasizing that each tenant possesses an immediate, unconditional property interest in half the funds. However, one tenant’s withdrawal of more than their share gives rise to a claim by the other tenant *during their lifetimes*, which can be defeated by proof of consent. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, remanding for factual review on the issue of consent.

    Facts

    Jessie Lang opened a joint savings account with her niece, Harriet Heller, in 1969. All funds deposited belonged to Lang. In August 1970, shortly after Lang entered a nursing home, Heller withdrew $1,094.90 from the account, allegedly for Lang’s benefit, but the nursing home records did not support this. In March 1971, Heller closed the account, withdrawing the remaining $5,469.89 and transferring it to an account in her and her husband’s name. Lang’s accountant discovered the closing withdrawal shortly before Lang’s death. The estate demanded Heller return the amount exceeding her half.

    Procedural History

    The Surrogate’s Court ruled that Heller was required to return the excess amount withdrawn. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Heller was not required to return the funds. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Heller, by withdrawing the entire balance of a joint bank account during Lang’s lifetime, was required to return the amount exceeding her one-half interest to Lang’s estate after Lang’s death, absent Lang’s consent to the withdrawal.

    Holding

    Yes, because while each joint tenant has the right to withdraw their moiety, withdrawing more than that creates a right of recovery for the other tenant during their lifetime, which then accrues to their estate after death, unless the withdrawal was consented to, or ratified by, the other tenant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that opening a joint account creates an immediate property interest for each tenant in an undivided one-half of the funds, regardless of who deposited the money. Citing *Matter of Bricker [Krimer] v Krimer, 13 NY2d 22, 27*, each tenant has the right during the lifetime of the other to withdraw up to the full amount of their moiety. However, the court also noted that withdrawing more than one’s moiety establishes an absolute right in the other tenant, during the lifetime of both, to recover such excess. The court explicitly states: “[W]here a joint tenant withdraws more than his or her moiety, as was the case here, there is an absolute right in the other tenant, during the lifetime of both, to recover such excess.” However, the court also stated that the aunt could have consented to the withdrawal, or ratified it later, which would negate the right of recovery. Such consent can be express or implied, and is often discerned from circumstantial evidence. The court listed factors to consider in determining consent, including: the relationship between the parties; commingling of funds; testamentary dispositions; amounts and patterns of withdrawals; the age and condition of each tenant; the source of funds; knowledge of the withdrawal; and any protest or lack thereof. Since the Appellate Division’s reversal was based solely on the law (inviolability of the right of survivorship) without addressing the factual question of consent, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for a review of the facts to determine whether the niece met her burden of proving the excess withdrawal was with the direct or implied consent of the aunt, or had been ratified by her.