New York Law Review

Tag: Wiretap Evidence

  • People v. Winograd, 68 N.Y.2d 383 (1986): Admissibility of Evidence When a Search Warrant Relies on Both Valid and Invalid Information

    People v. Winograd, 68 N.Y.2d 383 (1986)

    Evidence obtained via a search warrant is admissible if the warrant was supported by probable cause established by untainted information, even if the warrant application also included information obtained in violation of sealing requirements for wiretap evidence.

    Summary

    This case addresses the admissibility of evidence seized under a search warrant when the warrant application contains information from a valid wiretap and an invalid wiretap (due to a failure to seal the tapes promptly). The New York Court of Appeals held that the evidence was admissible because the warrant was supported by probable cause based on information from a reliable informant, which was independent of the tainted wiretap information. The court emphasized that the valid information, standing alone, was sufficient to justify the warrant’s issuance.

    Facts

    A detective obtained two search warrants, one for Gates Avenue and another for Dumont Avenue, based on wiretap information and an informant’s statements. The Gates Avenue warrant was based on a valid wiretap. The Dumont Avenue warrant was based on an informant’s statements and corroborating information from another wiretap. However, the tapes from the second wiretap were not sealed as required by statute at the time the Dumont Avenue warrant was issued. The informant claimed to be a runner in a policy operation, calling in wagers to the Dumont Avenue location.

    Procedural History

    The lower courts ruled on the admissibility of evidence obtained from the search warrants. The case then reached the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant is admissible when the warrant application included information obtained from a wiretap that was not sealed in compliance with statutory requirements, but also included independent information from a reliable informant that, standing alone, established probable cause.

    Holding

    Yes, because the informant’s statements, standing alone, provided probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant, and the infirmity of the corroborative proof does not invalidate the warrant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the validity of a search warrant depends on whether it is supported by probable cause. Here, the detective’s affidavit contained statements from an informant whose reliability had been previously demonstrated. The informant’s statements regarding placing policy wagers at the Dumont Avenue premises provided an independent basis for probable cause. The court stated that while the information from the unsealed wiretap could not be used to support the warrant, its presence did not invalidate the warrant because the informant’s statements were sufficient on their own. The court differentiated this case from cases where the warrant lacked sufficient probable cause without the tainted evidence. The court emphasized a practical approach, focusing on whether probable cause existed independent of the inadmissible evidence. The court noted, “But the infirmity of the corroborative proof does not serve to vitiate the validity of the statements of the informer which, standing alone, provided probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant.” The court also distinguished its holding from People v. Sher, noting that the analysis adopted in People v. Weiss (which was relied upon in this case) was not proposed or considered in Sher.

  • People v. Kerr, 34 N.Y.2d 115 (1974): Admissibility of Wiretap Evidence Despite Lack of Formal Notice

    People v. Kerr, 34 N.Y.2d 115 (1974)

    When a defendant has actual knowledge of an eavesdropping warrant and its contents within the statutory notification period due to their own motion for discovery, the prosecution’s failure to provide formal written notice does not require suppression of evidence obtained from the warrant.

    Summary

    Bonnie Kerr and Anthony Hueston were convicted on drug charges, with evidence obtained from a search warrant that was based on information from a prior wiretap. The wiretap warrant contained a clause waiving notice to Kerr and Hueston. Although the prosecution failed to provide the post-termination notice required by statute, the defendants had moved for discovery of the warrant and supporting documents within the statutory notification period. The New York Court of Appeals held that because the defendants had actual knowledge of the warrant through their own actions, the lack of formal written notice did not require suppression of the evidence. The court reasoned that the purpose of the notice requirement was satisfied.

    Facts

    Police obtained an eavesdropping warrant for Bonnie Kerr’s telephone. The warrant, issued on June 2, 1969, contained a clause stating that notice to Kerr and Tony DeJeste (Hueston) was expressly waived. The wiretap was extended and terminated on July 10, 1969. Based on information obtained from the wiretap, police obtained a search warrant, which led to the seizure of drugs and slugs. Kerr and Hueston were subsequently convicted of drug-related offenses. The prosecution did not provide the written post-termination notice of the eavesdropping warrant as required by statute.

    Procedural History

    The defendants moved to suppress evidence from both the eavesdropping warrant and the search warrant. The County Court denied the motions. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the conversations were illegally intercepted and that the evidence obtained as a result should be suppressed, relying on the federal case of United States v. Eastman, which had suppressed the same wiretap evidence. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the clause in the eavesdropping warrant expressly waiving notice rendered the warrant void on its face.
    2. Whether the prosecution’s failure to provide post-termination notice of the eavesdropping warrant, as required by statute, necessitated the suppression of evidence obtained from the warrant, despite the defendants’ actual knowledge of the warrant.

    Holding

    1. No, because even if the warrant language purported to waive post-termination notice, that statement was a nullity and the warrant was valid.
    2. No, because under the specific circumstances of this case, where the defendants demonstrated actual knowledge of the warrant by moving for its discovery within the statutory notification period, the failure to provide formal written notice did not require suppression.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the clause in the warrant waiving notice was, at best, ambiguous and, at worst, a nullity. The statute guarantees post-termination notice to individuals whose conversations were intercepted, regardless of any contrary statement in the warrant. Regarding the failure to provide formal notice, the court acknowledged the statutory requirement but emphasized the specific circumstances of the case. The defendants moved for an order directing the District Attorney to furnish a copy of the wiretap order and supporting documents within the statutory notification period. The court stated that “the purposes served by the notification requirement are, first, to publicize wiretaps to assure the community that eavesdropping techniques are reasonably employed and that at least the subject will eventually learn of them…and, second, to allow defendants in criminal actions to test the legality of the warrants by making timely motions to suppress evidence.” Here, both purposes were satisfied by the defendant’s own motion. The court concluded that “Where actual knowledge of the existence of the warrant is demonstrated within the time period allowed for notification by the prosecution, such formal written notification becomes a ministerial act, and the failure to so notify does not require suppression of evidence.” The court distinguished this situation from cases where there was a complete lack of notice. They determined no useful purpose would be served by requiring formal notice when the defense already possessed the information. They also found that the warrant application was sufficient under both state and federal law.

  • Sarisohn, Matter of, v. Appellate Division, 21 N.Y.2d 36 (1967): Admissibility of Wiretap Evidence and Judicial Misconduct

    Matter of Sarisohn, 21 N.Y.2d 36 (1967)

    Evidence obtained through illegal wiretaps is inadmissible in judicial disciplinary proceedings, and judges can be disciplined for misconduct both before and during their tenure, provided such misconduct reflects on their fitness for judicial office.

    Summary

    Floyd Sarisohn, a Suffolk County District Court Judge, appealed his removal from office by the Appellate Division. The charges included advising a prostitute, improper conduct as a judge (unlawful jailing of a litigant), imposing excessive bail, and improper handling of a traffic summons. A key piece of evidence was derived from wiretaps. The New York Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the wiretap evidence was illegally obtained and therefore inadmissible. While the court acknowledged the Appellate Division’s broad discretion in removal proceedings, it ruled that the impermissibly obtained evidence significantly impacted the lower court’s decision and warranted reconsideration of the sanction.

    Facts

    Floyd Sarisohn, a District Court Judge, was accused of several acts of misconduct, including:
    1. Advising a prostitute on how to handle her criminal case and continue her activities while Sarisohn was a Justice of the Peace. Evidence for this charge came from wiretapped phone conversations.
    2. Illegally jailing a defendant in a property damage case for refusing to disclose the owner of the vehicle.
    3. Setting an excessively high bail ($1,500,000) for an alleged burglar.
    4. Improperly handling a traffic summons for a journalist friend.
    5. Instructing a court attache to obliterate docket entries in a landlord-tenant case while Sarisohn was a Justice of the Peace.
    6. Displaying prejudice towards an attorney and using abusive language towards trial counsel.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division, Second Department, removed Judge Sarisohn from office based on multiple charges of misconduct. Sarisohn appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing the inadmissibility of wiretap evidence and challenging the basis for his removal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether evidence obtained from wiretaps, authorized under a statute later deemed unconstitutional, is admissible in judicial disciplinary proceedings.
    2. Whether a judge can be disciplined for misconduct committed before their current term in office.

    Holding

    1. No, because the wiretaps were illegally obtained due to insufficient affidavits and unrecorded oral statements supporting the eavesdropping orders.
    2. Yes, because prior conduct affecting general character and fitness for judicial office can be considered, especially when the prior office is of a similar judicial nature.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the wiretap evidence was inadmissible because the orders authorizing the wiretaps were not obtained in accordance with statutory requirements. The affidavits were insufficient, and oral statements made to the issuing Justices were not recorded, failing to establish an adequate factual basis for the orders. Citing People v. McCall, the Court emphasized the need for a complete record to justify such orders.

    Regarding the admissibility of evidence of misconduct prior to Sarisohn’s election as a District Court Judge, the Court held that such evidence is admissible if it reflects on the judge’s general character and fitness for office. The court stated, “It would be an unseemly and unsound distinction with respect to a matter affecting general character and fitness to immunize a Judge from his prior misconduct as a Judge of lesser or higher rank.”

    The Court, referencing Matter of Droege, acknowledged the Appellate Division’s broad discretion in determining what constitutes “cause” for removal. However, it found that the improperly admitted wiretap evidence likely influenced the Appellate Division’s decision. Therefore, the Court remanded the case to the Appellate Division for reconsideration without the tainted evidence.

    Chief Judge Fuld concurred regarding the inadmissibility of the wiretap evidence, asserting that section 813-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure was unconstitutional in its entirety following the decision in Berger v. New York, rendering any ex parte order permitting eavesdropping invalid.

    The Court also highlighted instances of misconduct that supported the removal decision, such as the unlawful jailing of a litigant and attempts to coerce trial counsel, indicating a “pattern of unjudicial conduct.”