New York Law Review

Tag: wills

  • In re Booth’s Will, 127 N.Y. 109 (1891): Intent to Sign Requirement for Wills

    In re Booth’s Will, 127 N.Y. 109 (1891)

    When a testator’s name appears within the body of a will, rather than at the end, there must be clear evidence that the testator intended that name to serve as their signature for the will to be validly executed.

    Summary

    This case concerns the validity of a will where the testator’s name appeared at the beginning of the document rather than as a signature at the end. Cecilia L. Booth wrote “Cecilia L. Booth” at the beginning of a document presented as her will. She declared it was her will to two witnesses and asked them to sign. The court held that because the name was not written at the end of the document, there must be proof that the testator intended for it to be her signature. Since there was no such evidence, the will was deemed invalidly executed, emphasizing the importance of intent when a name appears in an unconventional location on a will.

    Facts

    Cecilia L. Booth wrote a document purporting to be her last will and testament.
    The document began with the words “I, Cecilia L. Booth…” but was not signed at the end.
    Booth declared to two witnesses, Mamie Clifford and another individual, “This is my will; take it and sign it.”
    The witnesses signed the document.
    The will was challenged based on the absence of a formal signature at the end.

    Procedural History

    The Surrogate Court admitted the will to probate.
    An appeal was taken to the General Term, which reversed the Surrogate Court’s decision.
    The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the appearance of the testator’s name in the body of the will, absent a signature at the end, and with the declaration that the document is her will, constitutes a valid signature under New Jersey law, thus properly executing the will.

    Holding

    No, because there was no evidence presented to show that Mrs. Booth intended for her name at the beginning of the document to act as her signature. The court emphasized that when a name appears in an unconventional location, the intent for it to serve as a signature must be proven.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged that at common law, a signature within the body of a document could be valid if written with the intent to execute it.
    However, the court emphasized that when a name appears at the beginning of a document, it is typically descriptive and not intended as a signature. Therefore, there must be proof that the testator intended the name to serve as their signature.
    The court distinguished this case from cases where the signature was at the end of the document, where a presumption arises that the signature was affixed for the purpose of creating a valid instrument.
    Here, there was no evidence that Booth referred to her name in the first line as her signature, nor any act from which it might be inferred that the name was intended as a final execution of the will.
    The court emphasized the importance of construing will execution statutes closely to prevent fraud and imposition.
    The simple declaration “This is my will; take it and sign it” was insufficient to prove the necessary intent.
    As the court stated, “It has been the object of the statutes of the various states prescribing the mode in which wills must be executed, to throw such safeguards around those transactions as will prevent fraud and imposition, and it is wiser to construe these statutes closely, rather than loosely, and so open a door for the jierpetration of the mischiefs which the statutes were designed to prevent.”

  • Matter of Will of Emma G. Simpson, 56 How. Pr. 125 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1878): Codicil Republishes Will Revoked by Marriage

    56 How. Pr. 125 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1878)

    A properly executed codicil republishes a will revoked by the testator’s subsequent marriage, effectively reinstating the will’s provisions as of the codicil’s execution date.

    Summary

    This case concerns the validity of a will executed by an unmarried woman, subsequently revoked by her marriage, and then purportedly revived by a codicil executed after the marriage. The court held that the codicil, which expressly referred to and reaffirmed the will, effectively republished the will, making it valid despite the intervening marriage. The court reasoned that a codicil, when properly executed, incorporates the will it references, and the act of publishing the codicil serves to republish the will itself.

    Facts

    Emma G. Simpson (formerly Emma G. Clark), an unmarried woman, executed a will in 1873. Subsequently, she married, which, under the law at the time, revoked her will. After her marriage, she executed a codicil in 1876. This codicil specifically referred to her prior will by date and witnesses and declared her intention to republish, reaffirm, and adopt the will as modified by the codicil as her present will. The original will was present during the codicil’s execution and identified by one of the witnesses.

    Procedural History

    The Surrogate’s Court initially concluded that the will was revoked by the subsequent marriage of the testatrix. The General Term reversed the decree of the surrogate and remitted the proceedings to him with directions to admit the will to probate. This appeal followed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a will, revoked by the subsequent marriage of the testatrix, is revived and republished by a codicil that refers to the will and expresses the testatrix’s intention to reaffirm it, where the codicil is executed with the formalities required by statute.

    Holding

    Yes, because a properly executed codicil operates as a republication of the will to which it refers, thereby validating the will despite its prior revocation by marriage.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on the well-established doctrine that a codicil, when executed with the statutory formalities for wills, republishes the underlying will, except as modified by the codicil itself. The court stated, “The general doctrine is well settled that a codicil executed with the formalities required by statute for the execution of wills, operates as a republication of a will so far as it is not changed by the codicil.” The court noted that this principle had significant consequences, particularly concerning after-acquired property. By republishing the will, the codicil makes the will speak as of the date of the codicil, extending the will’s reach to property acquired after the original will’s execution but before the codicil. The court emphasized that the codicil expressly referred to the will, identified it, and declared the testatrix’s intent to reaffirm it, leaving no doubt that the codicil was intended to revive the will. The court also cited authorities supporting the proposition that a testamentary document may be incorporated into a will by reference if the will clearly identifies the document. “I am of opinion that the publication of the codicil was a publication of the will, and that both papers together are to be considered as the will of the testatrix.”