New York Law Review

Tag: water rights

  • Knapp v. Hughes, 19 N.Y.3d 672 (2012): Conveyance of Land Bordering Water Includes Submerged Land Absent Clear Intent Otherwise

    Knapp v. Hughes, 19 N.Y.3d 672 (2012)

    A conveyance of land on a pond or stream includes the land under the pond or stream to the center of the water, unless a contrary intention is made clear in the deed.

    Summary

    This case addresses the question of whether a deed conveying waterfront property also conveys the land under the adjacent water. The plaintiffs and defendants both claimed ownership of the submerged land under Perch Pond adjacent to the defendant’s property. The dispute arose from the interpretation of two 1973 deeds. The Court of Appeals held that the conveyance of land along the edge of a pond includes the land under the water to the center of the pond, unless the deed contains a clear expression to the contrary. The Court emphasized the importance of clear and express language to reserve rights to underwater land, clarifying that using terms like “edge” or “shore” is insufficient.

    Facts

    The defendants owned land on the shore of Perch Pond. Plaintiffs and defendants both claimed ownership of the land under the pond adjacent to the defendants’ waterfront land, thus disputing the rights to use that part of the pond. The Furlanos previously owned both the waterfront and submerged land. In 1973, the Furlanos conveyed land “along the waters [sic] edge of Perch Pond” and “along the edge of Perch Pond” to the defendants’ predecessors in title. In 1993, the Furlanos conveyed their remaining waterfront property to the plaintiffs’ predecessors in title, including “all remaining lands of Grantors.” The plaintiffs argued the 1973 deeds only conveyed the land next to the water, not under it, and therefore the submerged land passed to them via the 1993 deed.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs brought an action to enjoin the defendants from using the underwater property. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Appellate Division modified the Supreme Court’s ruling in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that the 1973 deeds set the boundaries at the “edge” of the pond, touching the land but not the water. The Court of Appeals granted defendants leave to appeal, bringing up for review the Appellate Division’s earlier order on summary judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a deed conveying land “along the edge” of a pond includes the land under the water to the center of the pond, absent an express reservation of rights to the underwater land in the deed.

    Holding

    Yes, because New York law presumes that a conveyance of land on a pond includes the land under the pond to the center of the water unless a contrary intention is clearly expressed in the deed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on established New York law and policy considerations to support its holding. The court cited precedent, including Gouverneur v National Ice Co., Seneca Nation v Knight, Stewart v Turney, and White v Knickerbocker Ice Co., to highlight the longstanding rule that a purchase of waterfront property is presumed to include the adjacent underwater land. The Court emphasized that the value of small, non-navigable lakes and ponds is mainly in their relation to the adjacent lands, supporting the presumption that a grantor intends to convey ownership under the water. The Court stated, “If the grantor desires to retain his title to the land . . . underneath the water the presumption must be negatived by express words or by such a description as clearly excludes it from the land conveyed.”

    The Court addressed inconsistent dictum in prior cases that suggested small changes in the words of a deed could create a reservation of underwater rights. The Court explicitly rejected these dictums, stating that “The effect of a grant should not turn on such fine distinctions as that between ‘side’ and ‘edge.’” To make a plain and express reservation of rights to underwater land, a grantor must do more than use the word “edge” or “shore” in a deed; they must clearly state that the land under water is not conveyed. The Court found no intention to withhold underwater lands in the Furlanos’ 1973 conveyance. Therefore, the deeds were read as conveying such land to the center of the pond to the defendants’ predecessors.

  • Swan Lake Water Corp. v. Suffolk County Water Authority, 20 N.Y.2d 81 (1967): Preventing Unauthorized Expansion by a Water Authority

    20 N.Y.2d 81 (1967)

    A water authority cannot extend its service mains into an area where it would compete with an existing waterworks system without obtaining specific approval from the Water Resources Commission, even if the authority has a general authorization to operate within the broader geographic area.

    Summary

    This case concerns a dispute between Swan Lake Water Corp. and the Suffolk County Water Authority over who should provide water service to a hospital. Swan Lake had a water main near the hospital but was authorized to serve a different area. Suffolk County Water Authority had a more general authorization to serve the county, but was prohibited from competing with existing systems. The court held that the Water Authority needed specific approval from the Water Resources Commission before extending its mains to serve the hospital, as it would constitute unauthorized competition with Swan Lake.

    Facts

    Swan Lake Water Corp. served a residential area (Pine Crest) adjacent to a hospital. Their authorized service area ended on the opposite side of the street from the hospital. Suffolk County Water Authority had a water main approximately 2,190 feet away from the hospital. The Water Authority and the hospital entered into a contract for water service without specific approval from the Water Resources Commission. Swan Lake argued this violated a prior order preventing the Water Authority from competing with existing water systems.

    Procedural History

    Swan Lake sued to prevent Suffolk County Water Authority from providing water service to the hospital. The Special Term ruled in favor of the Water Authority. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the Water Authority needed approval from the Water Resources Commission. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Suffolk County Water Authority could extend its water mains to serve a hospital located near Swan Lake Water Corp.’s service area, without specific approval from the Water Resources Commission, given the Water Authority’s general authorization to serve the county but also a prohibition against competing with existing water systems.

    Holding

    Yes, because the extension of the Water Authority’s mains to serve the hospital constituted an unauthorized act of competition with Swan Lake, requiring specific approval from the Water Resources Commission under the Conservation Law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the Water Resources Commission has broad authority to regulate water resources and prevent unauthorized competition. The court emphasized that the Water Authority’s general authorization to serve the county did not override the specific prohibition against competing with existing water systems. The court quoted Matter of Suffolk County Water Auth. v. Water Power & Control Comm., 12 A D 2d 198, 202, noting that the allocation of authority to serve a given territory involves “an advised and specialized administrative judgment.” The court stated, “[T]he commission had no power to dispense with these statutory requirements… defendant’s proposed action would be illegal.” The court determined that furnishing water usually involves a monopoly to avoid duplication of facilities, which is an important reason it is subject to public regulation. The dissent argued that the Water Authority should have been allowed to serve the hospital and that Swan Lake lacked standing. The majority rejected these arguments, holding that Swan Lake was an aggrieved party and that the Water Authority’s actions circumvented the necessary regulatory oversight by the Water Resources Commission. The court explicitly stated it was not determining which entity *should* serve the hospital; that determination was for the Water Resources Commission.

  • People v. Canal Appraisers, 33 N.Y. 461 (1865): State Ownership of Navigable Riverbeds

    33 N.Y. 461 (1865)

    In New York, the State owns the beds of navigable rivers, allowing the State to use the waters for public purposes like canal construction without compensating riparian owners.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the State of New York must compensate a riparian landowner for diverting water from the Mohawk River for use in the Erie Canal. The court held that the Mohawk River is a navigable river owned by the State, allowing the State to use its waters for public projects without compensating adjacent landowners. The court reasoned that the common law rule granting riparian owners ownership to the center of a non-navigable stream did not apply to large, navigable rivers in New York, and historical legislative actions supported the state’s claim of ownership.

    Facts

    The relator (landowner) owned land adjoining the Mohawk River. In 1841, the State constructed a feeder canal that diverted a significant amount of water from the Mohawk River to supply the Erie Canal. This diversion diminished the water power available to the relator’s mill, which had been operating since 1801. The relator’s title derived from a land patent describing the boundary as “down the stream thereof as it runs.” The landowner sought damages from the canal appraisers, who denied the claim because the State asserted ownership of the Mohawk River.

    Procedural History

    The relator sought a writ of mandamus from the Special Term to compel the canal appraisers to assess damages. The Special Term granted the writ. The General Term reversed the judgment, leading the relator to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the State of New York must compensate a riparian owner for diverting water from the Mohawk River for use in the Erie Canal, based on the landowner’s claim to ownership of the riverbed.

    Holding

    No, because the Mohawk River is a navigable river, and the State owns the bed of navigable rivers in New York, giving it the right to use the water for public purposes without compensating riparian owners.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court rejected the common law rule that riparian owners possess title to the center of a non-navigable stream. The court emphasized the unique physical and economic conditions of New York, arguing that this common law principle was ill-suited for large, navigable rivers. The court noted that New York’s legislature had consistently asserted ownership over the beds of navigable rivers, demonstrated by granting portions of the Mohawk River bed to the Western Inland Lock Navigation Company in 1792. This act was seen as an explicit assertion of state ownership and control. The court reviewed past decisions and legislative actions, concluding that New York had established a policy of owning and controlling its navigable waterways for public benefit, regardless of whether the tide ebbed and flowed. The court stated that attempting to apply English common law would be futile when considering the “great fresh water rivers of this continent.” The court relied on *The Canal Appraisers v. The People*, 17 Wend. 571, noting it was universally regarded to have settled the law. While the case of *Commissioner of Canal Fund v. Kempshall*, 26 Wend 404, had caused doubts as to the continuing precedential value of that case, the court found that it would not impact the decision in this case. The court quoted *Furman v. City of New York*, 5 Sandf. 33 as an authority on the idea that the king and, by extension, the state had ownership *tam aquae quam soli* or both water and soil. The court ultimately concluded that the State, as sovereign, possessed the right to use navigable rivers for public purposes without compensating riparian owners for any incidental losses. This right was deemed essential for the State’s ability to develop and maintain its canal system.