New York Law Review

Tag: Warsaw Convention

  • Haggard v. Pan American World Airways, 441 N.Y.S.2d 399 (1981): Consequences of Failure to Deliver Ticket Under Warsaw Convention

    Haggard v. Pan American World Airways, 441 N.Y.S.2d 399 (1981)

    Under the Warsaw Convention, an airline that fails to deliver a passenger ticket before accepting a passenger at the initial point of international travel cannot avail itself of the Convention’s liability limitations, even if a ticket is delivered later during the journey.

    Summary

    Robyn Haggard, a passenger on Pan American World Airways (Pan Am), was injured in a terrorist attack in Rome during a flight from New York to Saudi Arabia. Pan Am claimed the $75,000 liability limitation under the Warsaw Convention. The trial court found that Pan Am did not deliver a ticket to Haggard in New York and thus could not invoke the liability limitations. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that delivery in Rome was sufficient. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the ticket must be delivered before the initial acceptance of the passenger for the international flight to invoke the liability limitations of the Warsaw Convention, and that the burden of proving delivery rests with the airline.

    Facts

    Robyn Haggard, a 16-year-old, was traveling on Pan Am from New York to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, with a stopover in Rome. While in Rome, the airplane was attacked by terrorists, and Haggard suffered severe burns. The trial court determined that Pan Am did not provide Haggard with a ticket before she boarded the flight in New York. Haggard sued Pan Am for injuries exceeding the Warsaw Convention’s liability limit.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court found that Pan Am’s failure to deliver a ticket in New York rendered the Warsaw Convention’s liability limitation inapplicable. The Appellate Division modified, reinstating Pan Am’s affirmative defenses and limiting the damages to $75,000, concluding that delivery of the ticket in Rome was sufficient. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case for review of the factual determination regarding ticket delivery in New York.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an airline can invoke the liability limitations of the Warsaw Convention when it fails to deliver a passenger ticket before accepting the passenger at the outset of international travel, but delivers the ticket later during the journey. Whether the burden of proving delivery of the ticket rests with the airline.

    Holding

    1. No, because subdivision 2 of Article 3 of the Warsaw Convention explicitly states that “if the carrier accepts a passenger without a passenger ticket having been delivered he shall not be entitled to avail himself of those provisions of this convention which exclude or limit his liability.” The delivery must occur before the initiation of the first leg of the trip.
    2. Yes, because assertion of the Convention’s liability limitations is an affirmative defense and the airline is in the best position to show delivery, having access to its own records and copies of tickets sold.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the delivery of the ticket is a prerequisite for the airline to avail itself of the Warsaw Convention’s liability limitations. This requirement stems from the contractual nature of the passenger-carrier relationship; the ticket serves as evidence of the contract and ensures that both parties are aware of the terms, including liability limitations. The court emphasized the language of Article 3(2) of the Convention, which stipulates that the liability limitations do not apply if the carrier accepts a passenger without delivering a ticket. Citing Egan v. American Airlines, the court noted that the entire trip was considered a whole, and the ticket should have been delivered at the beginning of the journey. “The contract plays a role fundamental to the objectives of the Warsaw Conference. The obligations arising from the contract between the carrier and the passenger carry out the Conference goal that the rules of limited liability be known to both parties.”

    Regarding the burden of proof, the court held that the airline, as the party asserting the affirmative defense of limited liability under the Warsaw Convention, bears the burden of proving that it delivered the ticket to the passenger. The court stated, “inasmuch as the Warsaw Convention “Mandates the limitation unless ‘the carrier accepts a passenger without a passenger ticket having been delivered’, there is no need for a carrier who claims the limitation to show more than the delivery of an appropriate ticket, and travel of the passenger thereunder.” The airline has better access to records and personnel who can verify ticket delivery, while the passenger may be deceased or severely injured, making it difficult to prove non-delivery. This aligns with the general principle that the party asserting an affirmative defense bears the burden of proof. The court distinguished this from cases where the passenger alleges willful misconduct by the airline, where the burden of proof rightly falls on the plaintiff.

  • American Banana Co., Inc. v. Venezolana Internacional De Aviación, S. A., 47 N.Y.2d 848 (1979): Defining “Consignee” Under the Warsaw Convention

    American Banana Co., Inc. v. Venezolana Internacional De Aviación, S. A., 47 N.Y.2d 848 (1979)

    Under the Warsaw Convention, the party named as the consignee in the air waybill retains the right to sue for damages, even if the consignor directs delivery to another party and the original consignee is acting in the interest of that other party.

    Summary

    American Banana Co. sued VIASA for damages to a plantain shipment. American Banana was the original consignee, but due to delays, they rejected the shipment and directed it to West Indies Food. VIASA, though notified, did not change the air waybill. The court addressed whether American Banana, despite redirecting the shipment, qualified as a “consignee” under the Warsaw Convention with the right to sue. The Court of Appeals held that because American Banana was named in the air waybill, which was never formally changed, they retained the right to sue under the Convention, even if acting in the interest of West Indies.

    Facts

    American Banana Co. ordered a shipment of plantains from Veneagro to be transported by VIASA from Venezuela to New York.
    Due to mechanical issues, the flight was delayed, and the plantains were offloaded.
    American Banana notified Veneagro they no longer wanted the shipment due to the delay and instructed them to ship it to West Indies Food and Importing, Inc.
    Despite this request, VIASA never officially changed the consignee on the air waybill; they only instructed their personnel to notify West Indies upon arrival at Kennedy Airport.
    American Banana then sued VIASA for damages to the shipment.

    Procedural History

    Special Term initially granted summary judgment in favor of VIASA.
    The Appellate Division reversed this decision.
    The Appellate Division then certified a question to the New York Court of Appeals regarding the correctness of its reversal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether American Banana, having been named as the consignee in the original air waybill but having redirected the shipment to another party, qualifies as a “consignee” under Article 14 of the Warsaw Convention and thus has the right to sue for damages to the shipment.

    Holding

    Yes, because Article 12 of the Warsaw Convention allows the consignor to redirect a shipment but does not explicitly empower the consignor to change the consignee named in the air waybill itself, and Article 14 allows the consignee to enforce rights, and because American Banana was the named consignee on the unamended air waybill, it maintains the right to sue under the Warsaw Convention.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that Article 14 of the Warsaw Convention grants rights to both consignors and consignees.
    The court distinguished previous cases where the plaintiff was never named in the air waybill, unlike American Banana.
    VIASA argued that redirecting the shipment effectively changed the consignee, but the court rejected this.
    The court reasoned that Article 12 of the Convention allows the consignor to redirect delivery but does not equate to changing the consignee itself. The court stated that “Although section (1) of article 12 empowers the consignor, with limitations not pertinent here, to redirect a shipment in transit to a party ‘other than the consignee named in the air waybill’, it does not empower the consignor to change the consignee named in the waybill as such. This limitation, supports an inference that the drafters of the Convention did not intend that the person authorized to exercise the rights of the ‘consignee’ should change simply because the cargo is redirected.”
    The court focused on the fact that the air waybill was never formally changed, holding that the plaintiff should be considered a “consignee” entitled to maintain suit. “In this case, where the plaintiff was named in the air waybill and that waybill was never changed, the plaintiff must be considered a ‘consignee’ entitled to maintain the suit under the terms of the Convention, even though it does so in the interest of West Indies.”
    The decision clarifies that the right to sue as a consignee under the Warsaw Convention is tied to being named in the air waybill, not necessarily to physical receipt of the goods. This provides a clear rule for determining standing in similar cases involving international air shipments.

  • Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 34 N.Y.2d 406 (1974): Defining Willful Misconduct Under the Warsaw Convention

    34 N.Y.2d 406 (1974)

    Under the Warsaw Convention, a carrier’s liability limitations are waived only if damage is caused by willful misconduct, which requires more than just negligence, even gross negligence; it necessitates a conscious intent to do or omit doing an act from which harm results, or a pattern of behavior indicating a reckless disregard of the probable consequences.

    Summary

    Berner sued British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines (BCPA) to recover damages for the loss of a shipment of platinum, arguing BCPA’s actions constituted willful misconduct under the Warsaw Convention, thus precluding BCPA from utilizing the Convention’s liability limitations. The New York Court of Appeals held that while BCPA’s actions may have constituted negligence, they did not rise to the level of willful misconduct required to overcome the liability limitations of the Warsaw Convention. The court emphasized that the evidence, even viewed favorably to the shipper, failed to demonstrate a conscious intent to act improperly or a reckless disregard for probable consequences.

    Facts

    Berner shipped platinum via BCPA. Following a previous misdelivery incident (with eventual recovery), BCPA’s vice-president assured Berner that disciplinary actions had been taken and that employees were reminded to adhere to proper delivery procedures. However, a subsequent shipment was delivered to an impostor named Russo. Berner sued, claiming BCPA’s actions constituted willful misconduct. The evidence showed formal compliance with the carrier’s cargo traffic manual procedures, even though negligently performed. It was stipulated that the delivery to the impostor by BCPA employees, Saunders and Rubenstein, was not, standing alone, willful misconduct. There was no evidence presented that the manual procedures were insufficient if carefully followed, or that the security system was deficient.

    Procedural History

    The trial court found in favor of Berner, concluding that BCPA’s actions constituted willful misconduct. The Appellate Division reversed, finding insufficient evidence of willful misconduct as a matter of law. Berner appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support a finding of willful misconduct on the part of British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines under Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention, thereby precluding the airline from availing itself of the Convention’s liability limitations.

    Holding

    No, because the evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the shipper, was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain a finding of willful misconduct or its equivalent as required by the Warsaw Convention.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court stated that while the evidence might support a finding of negligence, it did not demonstrate the heightened culpability required for willful misconduct under the Warsaw Convention. The court emphasized that Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention requires a showing that the damage was caused by the carrier’s willful misconduct or such default on its part as is considered equivalent to willful misconduct under the law of the court. The court noted the false assurance given by the carrier’s vice-president related to adherence to existing security procedures, not the inauguration of new ones. The evidence showed that the carrier had formally complied with the prescribed steps, even if negligently performed. The court also pointed to the stipulation that the delivery to the impostor, while negligent, was not, standing alone, willful misconduct. The court concluded that there was no evidence that the manual procedures, if carefully followed, were insufficient or that the carrier’s security system was deficient. The court held that, even considering the evidence in the aggregate and most favorably to the shipper, it was insufficient to prove willful misconduct as a matter of law. “Without undertaking a precise verbal definition of willful misconduct or its equivalent for the purposes of the Convention, we hold that the items of proof introduced, whether considered seriatim or in the aggregate, and viewed in the light most favorable to appellant shipper, while sufficient to sustain a finding of negligence, were insufficient as a matter of law to sustain the finding prescribed by the Warsaw Convention.”

  • Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 34 N.Y.2d 385 (1974): Recovery for Psychic Trauma Under Warsaw Convention

    Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 34 N.Y.2d 385 (1974)

    Under the Warsaw Convention, an airline carrier is liable for a passenger’s palpable, objective bodily injuries, including those caused by psychic trauma resulting from an accident, and for the damages flowing from those bodily injuries, but not for the psychic trauma itself without physical manifestation.

    Summary

    Passengers on a hijacked flight sued Trans World Airlines (TWA) seeking damages for psychic trauma suffered during the hijacking, relying on Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. The New York Court of Appeals held that while the Warsaw Convention allows for recovery for physical injuries caused by psychic trauma, it does not permit recovery for purely mental injuries without physical manifestation. The court emphasized the importance of interpreting the treaty to promote uniformity in international air travel and adhering to the ordinary meaning of the term “bodily injury.”

    Facts

    Plaintiffs were passengers on a TWA flight hijacked en route from Tel Aviv to New York. The hijackers, members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, diverted the plane to Jordan, where the passengers were held captive for six days. The passengers experienced fear for their lives and personal safety. Additionally, they endured physical discomforts such as confinement to their seats, extreme temperatures, and inadequate food and water. Some plaintiffs claimed to have developed physical ailments like backaches, skin rashes, weight loss, and dehydration, allegedly exacerbated by the emotional distress.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability. Special Term granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, but the Appellate Divisions reversed, finding triable issues of fact regarding the meaning of the French text of Article 17. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to resolve this dispute.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the term “bodily injury” in Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention encompasses purely psychic trauma, allowing for recovery of damages in the absence of any physical manifestation of injury.

    Holding

    No, because the ordinary meaning of “bodily injury” in Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention connotes a palpable, conspicuous physical injury and excludes mental injury with no observable bodily manifestations. The carrier is liable only for objective bodily injuries, including those caused by psychic trauma, and for the damages flowing from those bodily injuries. The trauma itself without physical injury is not compensable.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court determined that the meaning of the Warsaw Convention’s terms is a question of law, not fact, for the court to decide. While the treaty is written in French, the court stated that where an accurate English translation is agreed upon, the court should determine the ordinary meaning of those terms. The court rejected the argument that French law should govern the interpretation of the treaty’s terms. The court emphasized that the primary objective of the Warsaw Convention is uniformity among its signatory nations. The court analyzed the term “bodily injury,” noting that in its ordinary usage, it suggests a distinction from “mental” injury. The court found the inclusion of the word “bodily” significant. The court stated, “In our view, therefore, the ordinary, natural meaning of ‘bodily injury’ as used in article 17 connotes palpable, conspicuous physical injury, and excludes mental injury with no observable ‘bodily’, as distinguished from ‘behavioral’, manifestations.” The court reasoned that allowing recovery for purely psychic trauma would undermine the goal of uniformity and deviate from the treaty’s plain language. It held that a causal link between the accident (hijacking) and a resulting objective bodily injury is required for recovery under Article 17. The court stated, “A claim for damages under article 17 arises ‘in the event of * * * bodily injury’. The claim must therefore be predicated upon some objective identifiable injury to the body. In addition, there must be some causal connection between the bodily injury and the ‘accident’.” However, once the predicate of liability – the bodily injury – is established, damages sustained as a result of the bodily injury are compensable, including mental suffering. The court quoted Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U. S. 332, 342 stating that the treaty may be afforded a liberal interpretation which tends to support the rights which plaintiffs claim under it.

  • Seiter v. American Airlines, 286 N.Y.S.2d 137 (1967): Adequacy of Notice Under Warsaw Convention

    286 N.Y.S.2d 137 (1967)

    Under the Warsaw Convention, an air carrier cannot avail itself of the Convention’s liability limitations if the passenger ticket fails to provide reasonably legible notice of those limitations.

    Summary

    The administrators of Mrs. Eileen Seiter’s estate sued American Airlines for wrongful death after her plane crashed. American Airlines asserted the liability limitations of the Warsaw Convention as a defense. The court considered whether the flight was “international transportation” under the Convention, and if so, whether the airline provided sufficient notice of the Convention’s liability limitations. The court found that the flight was indeed international transportation because the original ticket was for a round trip from New York to Vancouver. However, the court ultimately held that the airline could not limit its liability because the notice of the Warsaw Convention’s limitations on the ticket was printed in such small and unreadable print as to be virtually unnoticeable, thus failing to provide adequate notice to the passenger.

    Facts

    Mrs. Seiter purchased a round-trip airline ticket from New York City to Vancouver, Canada, with stopovers in Seattle and Chicago. Due to inclement weather, she took a bus from Vancouver to Seattle and obtained a refund for that portion of the flight. She then boarded her originally scheduled flight from Seattle to Chicago. Missing her connection in Chicago, she received a new ticket from Northwest Airlines for an American Airlines flight to New York. The American Airlines flight crashed while landing at La Guardia Airport, resulting in Mrs. Seiter’s death. The original ticket had a footnote in extremely small print referring to the Warsaw Convention’s liability rules.

    Procedural History

    The administrators of Mrs. Seiter’s estate brought a wrongful death action against American Airlines. American Airlines asserted an affirmative defense based on the Warsaw Convention’s limitations of liability. The Special Term upheld the defense, denying the plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss it. The Appellate Division affirmed the Special Term’s order. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the flight from Chicago to New York City constituted “international transportation” under the Warsaw Convention, given that the original ticket was for international travel and the subsequent flight was issued in exchange for it.

    2. Whether the airline provided sufficient notice of the Warsaw Convention’s liability limitations when the ticket contained a statement regarding the Convention in exceedingly small and fine print.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the flight from Chicago to New York was performed under the original contract for international transportation, making the Convention applicable.

    2. No, because the statement regarding the Warsaw Convention on the ticket was printed in such a way as to be virtually unreadable and thus failed to provide adequate notice to the passenger.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the contract, as embodied in the original ticket, was for international transportation. Even though Mrs. Seiter took a bus from Vancouver to Seattle, the remainder of her journey was performed under the original contract, making the Warsaw Convention applicable. The court emphasized that the Convention’s emphasis on the contract “actually ‘made’ appears to have been specifically designed to prevent any subsequent intervening circumstances from affecting the result.” The court stated that the American Airlines flight was also performed under the original contract because the new ticket was part of a “complete routing” from New York to Vancouver and back, at the fare originally paid.

    Regarding notice, the court found that while the ticket contained a statement about the Warsaw Convention, the print was so small that it was “almost to defy reading.” The court determined that literal compliance with Article 3(1)(e) of the Convention was insufficient when the notice was not reasonably decipherable. The court cited Eck v. United Arab Airlines, emphasizing that a “strictly literal reading” of the Convention should be rejected, and Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, which held that similar ticket language failed to give passengers the required notice. The court emphasized the importance of providing passengers with an opportunity to protect themselves by purchasing additional insurance, quoting Lisi that “the quid pro quo for this one-sided advantage is delivery to the passenger of a ticket…which give[s] him notice” of the limited liability. The court also referenced regulations from the Civil Aeronautics Board requiring clear and conspicuous notice of liability limitations. The court concluded that, “An examination of the ticket forms which the respondent used, in the light of that policy, can only lead one to conclude that Mrs. Setter was not sufficiently apprised of the consequences which would result from the fact that her flight happened to carry her outside of the United States.”