New York Law Review

Tag: Warrantless Search

  • People v. Spinelli, 35 N.Y.2d 77 (1974): Warrantless Search of Commercial Property and Plain View Doctrine

    People v. Spinelli, 35 N.Y.2d 77 (1974)

    A warrantless search and seizure of items on private commercial property is unconstitutional, even if the items are in plain view, when there is no exigency and ample time to obtain a warrant.

    Summary

    This case concerns the legality of a warrantless search and seizure of stolen trucks located on the defendant’s commercial property. The Court of Appeals held that the search violated the Fourth Amendment because the trucks, although in plain view, were not discovered inadvertently and there was no exigency justifying the failure to obtain a warrant. The court emphasized that the plain view doctrine does not eliminate the need for a warrant when law enforcement has prior knowledge of the evidence and ample opportunity to secure judicial authorization.

    Facts

    The FBI received information in September 1971 about two hijacked trucks, one leased by Hertz to P. B. Trucking Company marked “Roxanne Swim Suits,” and another belonging to Metropolis Trucking Company. In March 1972, an informant told FBI Agent Garber that both trucks were behind the defendant’s business, Al Spinelli Company. Garber, using binoculars from a public golf course adjacent to the property, observed the trucks matching the descriptions. The local police confirmed the trucks were still listed as stolen.

    Procedural History

    After months of surveillance, the Clarkstown police, acting on Garber’s information, also observed the vehicles from the golf course in August 1972. On August 21, 1972, the defendant was arrested outside his business on an unrelated warrant for unlawful use of credit cards. After the arrest, officers entered the property without a search warrant, inspected the trucks, and seized them. The defendant was later indicted for unlawful possession of one of the trucks. The County Court ordered suppression of the evidence, but the Appellate Division reversed. This appeal followed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the warrantless search and seizure of the truck from the defendant’s commercial property violated the Fourth Amendment, despite the truck being in plain view.

    Holding

    Yes, because the plain view doctrine requires inadvertent discovery and does not eliminate the warrant requirement when the police have prior knowledge of the evidence and ample opportunity to obtain a warrant. Additionally, the arrest on the credit card charge did not justify the search of the area behind the premises.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that the warrantless search and seizure were unconstitutional. The court acknowledged that a businessman’s private commercial property is entitled to Fourth Amendment protections. The court emphasized that the officers knew about the trucks for months, there were no license plates, and there was no risk of the evidence being moved. Therefore, there was no exigency justifying the failure to obtain a warrant. The court cited Coolidge v. New Hampshire, stating that “plain view alone is never enough to justify a warrantless search” and that the discovery must be inadvertent. The court reasoned that, here, the viewing of the trucks could not be said to be inadvertent, as the police anticipated finding them there. The Court emphasized that the officers had probable cause and ample time to secure a warrant. The arrest of the defendant on a credit card charge did not justify a search of the area behind the premises. “The mere fact that it would be burdensome to obtain a warrant, standing alone, is never justification for not obtaining a search warrant.” The court also noted that while the officers could testify to what they observed from the golf course, the actual entry and seizure required a warrant under the circumstances.

  • People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976): Justifying Warrantless Searches Based on Informant Tips

    People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976)

    A warrantless search is permissible if based on a reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable facts, that the individual is carrying a weapon, especially when the suspicion arises from a known informant’s tip regarding a serious crime.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the validity of a warrantless search of the defendant’s handbag and the seizure of a loaded revolver. The search occurred at a police station after the defendant reported being menaced with a knife by Felix Dotson, with whom she lived. Dotson, after being arrested, told the police the defendant had a gun. The court held that the motion to suppress the weapon was properly denied because the police had reasonable suspicion to believe the defendant possessed a weapon, justifying the search. The court emphasized the balance between individual rights and public safety, particularly when dealing with concealed weapons.

    Facts

    The defendant was accosted in her car by Felix Dotson, who threatened her with a knife. She escaped and reported the incident to the police, stating Dotson had been harassing her. Dotson was arrested and told the arresting officer that the defendant was his wife and was “sick” and that she had a gun in her possession. The defendant went to the police station to file a complaint against Dotson. At the station, an officer asked for her handbag, which she surrendered. A search of the handbag revealed a loaded .22 caliber revolver, for which she admitted she had no permit.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to suppress the revolver as evidence, arguing it was obtained through an illegal search. The suppression motion was denied after a hearing. The defendant pleaded guilty to attempted possession of a dangerous weapon. The Appellate Term, Second Department, affirmed the conviction. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a warrantless search of the defendant’s handbag, which led to the discovery of a loaded revolver, violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.

    Holding

    No, because under the totality of the circumstances, the police officer had a reasonable suspicion based on reliable information that the defendant was carrying a concealed weapon, justifying the search of her handbag.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court balanced the need to seize weapons and the individual’s right to privacy, referencing Terry v. Ohio. Reasonable suspicion can be based on personal observation or information from another person. When the information comes from an informant, it must have sufficient indicia of reliability. Here, the informant (Dotson) had just been involved in an altercation with the defendant, involving a knife. He claimed the defendant had a gun. The court distinguished this case from those involving anonymous informants, noting Dotson’s information was immediately verifiable, and he would be subject to charges for falsely reporting an incident. The court emphasized the immediate danger posed by concealed weapons, stating, “Concealed weapons present an immediate and real danger to the public. Although that danger would not warrant a routine weapons check, it should support an appropriate police response on less than a probability.” Given the totality of the circumstances, including the report of a concealed weapon, the court found the search of the defendant’s handbag to be a reasonable, limited intrusion.

  • People v. Berrios, 28 N.Y.2d 361 (1971): Burden of Proof in Challenging Warrantless Searches

    People v. Berrios, 28 N.Y.2d 361 (1971)

    In a motion to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search, the defendant bears the ultimate burden of proving the illegality of the search, while the People have the initial burden of going forward to show the legality of the police conduct.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the burden of proof in challenging the admissibility of evidence obtained during a warrantless search should shift from the defendant to the People (prosecution) due to concerns about potential police perjury. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant retains the ultimate burden of proving the illegality of the search. While the People must initially demonstrate the legality of the police conduct, the defendant must ultimately persuade the court that the search was unlawful. The court rejected the argument that the rise of “dropsy” cases after Mapp v. Ohio warranted a shift in the burden of proof, emphasizing the importance of judicial review and internal police procedures in addressing potential abuses.

    Facts

    The case involved five separate appeals where defendants were charged with possession of heroin. In each case, arresting officers testified that they observed the defendants drop glassine envelopes containing narcotics as the officers approached. The defendants challenged the admissibility of the evidence, alleging that the police testimony was fabricated to circumvent the warrant requirement.

    Procedural History

    The Criminal Court, Bronx County, convicted Berrios after rejecting his testimony that the officer searched him. The Appellate Term affirmed the conviction. In Brown, the Criminal Court suppressed the evidence, but the Appellate Term reversed. In Ortiz and Tate, the Criminal Court granted the motions to suppress, which were subsequently reversed by the Appellate Term. Bryant’s appeal stemmed from a conviction where no motion to suppress or objection to the evidence was made. All cases were appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the burden of proof should shift to the People to prove the admissibility of evidence seized during a warrantless search, when the defendant alleges the police testimony is untrustworthy and potentially fabricated.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant, as the party claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure, bears the ultimate burden of proving the illegality of the search. However, the People must initially come forward with evidence demonstrating the legality of the police conduct. As stated in the opinion, “The People must, of course, always show that police conduct was reasonable.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that under Section 813-c of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a “person claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure” bears the burden of proving the illegality. While the People must initially demonstrate the legality of the police conduct (e.g., showing the search was incident to a lawful arrest or that the evidence was dropped in plain view), the ultimate burden rests with the defendant. The court rejected the argument that the rise in “dropsy” testimony warranted a shift in the burden, stating that it would be a “dismal reflection on society” to automatically view police testimony with suspicion. The court also reasoned that shifting the burden of proof would not necessarily prevent perjury, as the court would still need to assess the credibility of the officer’s testimony. The court emphasized the role of trial judges and appellate courts in assessing credibility and curtailing potential abuses. The Court suggested internal police procedures and prosecutorial discretion as more appropriate methods for addressing potential police misconduct. As Judge Scileppi wrote, “It would be a dismal reflection on society to say that when the guardians of its security are called to testify in court under oath, their testimony must be viewed with suspicion.” The court also noted, “There is no valid proof that all members of law enforcement agencies or that all other citizens who testify are perjurers. Therefore, all policemen should not be singled out as suspect as a matter of law.”

  • Matter of Finn’s Liquor Shop, Inc. v. State Liq. Auth., 24 N.Y.2d 647 (1969): Warrantless Search of Licensed Premises and Implied Consent

    Matter of Finn’s Liquor Shop, Inc. v. State Liq. Auth., 24 N.Y.2d 647 (1969)

    A licensee, by requesting the privilege to dispense liquor, implicitly consents to reasonable regulations and inspections by the State Liquor Authority, thereby making a limited waiver of their Fourth Amendment rights regarding administrative searches of the licensed premises.

    Summary

    Finn’s Liquor Shop challenged the State Liquor Authority’s suspension of its license based on evidence (sales slips indicating illegal credit sales) discovered during a warrantless inspection. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the suppression of the evidence. Although the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law grants the Authority broad inspection powers, the court determined that the search yielding the evidence was not incident to a lawful arrest, nor was it justified by exigent circumstances. The dissent argued that accepting a liquor license implies consent to inspections and a limited waiver of Fourth Amendment rights due to the heavily regulated nature of the alcohol industry.

    Facts

    Investigators from the State Liquor Authority entered Finn’s Liquor Shop during business hours and obtained permission to inspect the premises and its books and records. During the inspection, an investigator found sales slips in a coat hanging in the back of the premises. These slips indicated that Finn’s Liquor Shop had made sales on credit, a violation of section 100 of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law. The State Liquor Authority subsequently initiated proceedings to suspend Finn’s Liquor Shop’s license based on this evidence.

    Procedural History

    The State Liquor Authority suspended Finn’s Liquor Shop’s license. The licensee challenged this decision, arguing the evidence was illegally seized. The lower courts affirmed the suspension. The case then reached the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether evidence discovered during a warrantless administrative inspection of a licensed liquor store, with the owner’s consent to inspect the premises and records, is admissible in a proceeding by the State Liquor Authority against the licensee.

    Holding

    No, because the evidence was unlawfully seized, as the search was not incident to a lawful arrest, nor were there exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search beyond the scope of consent. The general power to inspect does not automatically validate every search.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while the State Liquor Authority has broad powers to regulate the liquor industry, these powers are not unlimited and must be exercised within constitutional constraints. The court emphasized that the search of the coat in the back of the store was not incident to a lawful arrest. Furthermore, no exigent circumstances existed to justify a warrantless search. The court distinguished the right to inspect the premises and records from the right to conduct a general search for evidence of illegal activity. The court stated: “In the instant case, however, there was no claim that the search was incident to a lawful arrest, nor were there exigent circumstances to justify the failure to obtain a warrant. The Authority, therefore, had no right to seize the sales slips found in the coat hanging in the back of the premises.” The dissent argued that by accepting a liquor license, the licensee implicitly consents to reasonable inspections and makes a limited waiver of their Fourth Amendment rights. The dissent cited the peculiar nature of the liquor industry and the state’s recognized right to strictly control it, referencing Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 16 N.Y.2d 47. The dissent also noted prior cases such as Matter of Fortino v. State Liq. Auth., 273 N.Y. 31, where evidence found during an inspection was upheld. Judge Jasen, dissenting, stated: “I believe that, by requesting the privilege to dispense liquor, the licensee implicitly consents to such regulations and inspections and makes a limited waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights.” The majority, however, did not accept the argument of implied consent extending to the search that uncovered the sales slips, emphasizing the absence of exigent circumstances or a search incident to a lawful arrest.

  • People v. Rodriguez, 21 N.Y.2d 392 (1968): Probable Cause for Warrantless Search Based on Informant Tip

    People v. Rodriguez, 21 N.Y.2d 392 (1968)

    An informant’s tip, without specific details connecting the suspects to illegal activity at a particular location, and the mere fact that arrestees stated they came from a specific apartment, are insufficient to establish probable cause for a warrantless search of that apartment.

    Summary

    This case concerns the legality of a warrantless search based on an informant’s tip and statements made by arrestees. Police Detective Dorrish received information from a reliable informant and placed an apartment building under surveillance. After arresting two men who stated they came from the building’s basement, Dorrish entered the basement apartment without a warrant, found drugs in plain view, and arrested the defendants. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the informant’s tip lacked specificity and the arrestees’ statements did not provide sufficient probable cause to justify the warrantless search.

    Facts

    Detective Dorrish received confidential information from a previously reliable informant regarding possible drug activity at a three-story apartment building.

    Two men were observed entering the building and were arrested upon exiting, charged with heroin possession.

    The arrestees stated they had come from the basement of the building.

    Without obtaining a warrant, Detective Dorrish went to the building, opened the unlocked building door, and entered the basement.

    Hearing a voice inside the basement apartment, he forced open the apartment door and observed drug paraphernalia in plain view, arresting the defendants.

    A search of the defendants revealed glassine envelopes containing heroin.

    Procedural History

    The defendants moved to suppress the evidence, but the motion was denied after a hearing.

    The defendants pleaded guilty to violating Section 3305 of the Public Health Law.

    The Appellate Term affirmed the judgments of the Criminal Court, Kings County.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the informant’s tip and the arrestees’ statement provided Detective Dorrish with probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of the basement apartment.

    Holding

    No, because the informant’s tip lacked specific details connecting the defendants to any illegal activity within the apartment, and the arrestees’ statement that they came from the apartment did not, by itself, establish probable cause that the occupants were involved in drug-related crimes.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized that stronger evidence is required for a search conducted without a warrant, citing Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), which stresses the importance of having a neutral magistrate determine probable cause.

    The Court distinguished the facts from cases where informants provided specific information about illegal activity occurring at a particular location. Here, the informant did not specify any particular apartment in the building, and the arrestees’ statement that they “came from” the basement was insufficient to infer that the occupants were drug users or dealers.

    The court found the informant’s tip was too general: “Apparently, the informer did not even specify any particular apartment in the building.”

    The Court stated, “Thus, the statement that the arrested men came from the basement simply does not raise, in our view, the reasonable inference that the occupants of the basement are, therefore, drug pushers, users or possessors.”

    The Court distinguished the case from United States ex rel. Rogers v. Warden, 381 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1967), where the Second Circuit found a warrant invalid due to a deficient affidavit lacking personal knowledge from the informant. In Rodriguez, the informant’s information was even less specific.

    Because the only evidence against the defendants was illegally seized, the Court reversed the conviction and dismissed the indictment.

  • People v. Laverne, 14 N.Y.2d 304 (1964): Warrantless Searches for Criminal Prosecution are Unconstitutional

    People v. Laverne, 14 N.Y.2d 304 (1964)

    A public officer’s warrantless entry into private premises, against the occupant’s resistance, to gather evidence for a criminal prosecution violates the Fourth Amendment, rendering evidence obtained inadmissible.

    Summary

    Laverne was convicted of violating a village ordinance prohibiting business operations in a residential zone, based on evidence gathered by the Building Inspector during three warrantless entries onto his property. Laverne resisted two of the entries. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the warrantless searches violated Laverne’s constitutional rights because they were conducted for the purpose of gathering evidence for a criminal prosecution, not for administrative or civil purposes related to public health and safety. The court distinguished this from cases where warrantless inspections are permitted for regulatory purposes.

    Facts

    Laverne operated a design business from his residence in Laurel Hollow, New York, which was located in an area zoned for residential use. The Village of Laurel Hollow had a Building Zone Ordinance that prohibited operating a business in a residential zone. The Village Building Inspector, acting under the authority of the ordinance, entered Laverne’s property on three separate occasions in 1962 to observe his activities. Laverne objected to the inspector’s entry on two occasions. The inspector’s observations formed the basis of three criminal prosecutions against Laverne for violating the ordinance.

    Procedural History

    Laverne was convicted in the Village Police Court on all three charges, which were consolidated for trial, and received a suspended six-month jail sentence. The County Court affirmed the convictions. Laverne appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which granted permission for the appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a village ordinance authorizing a building inspector to enter private premises without a warrant, against the occupant’s resistance, to obtain evidence for a criminal prosecution, violates the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.

    Holding

    Yes, because official searches of private premises without a warrant for the purpose of criminal prosecutions violate constitutional rights.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the searches were conducted for the purpose of gathering evidence for a criminal prosecution, distinguishing them from searches conducted for administrative or civil purposes related to public health and safety, which may be permissible without a warrant. The court emphasized that the inspector’s entries were not consensual; resistance was met on two occasions, and mere submission to authority does not constitute consent. The court distinguished the case from Frank v. Maryland, where the Supreme Court upheld a conviction for refusing to allow a health inspector access to a property, noting that Frank dealt with a regulatory scheme for the general welfare, not a means of enforcing the criminal law. The court held that the searches violated Laverne’s constitutional rights under Mapp v. Ohio, which established that illegally obtained evidence is inadmissible in state criminal trials. The court also addressed the People’s argument that Laverne waived his objection to the unlawful search by failing to comply with the procedural requirements of Section 813-d of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The court rejected this argument, noting that the section primarily addresses physical evidence, not testimonial evidence based on observations made during an unlawful search, and that the People failed to raise this procedural argument in the lower courts.

  • People v. Santiago, 13 N.Y.2d 326 (1963): Establishing Reasonable Cause for Warrantless Searches Based on Informant Tips

    People v. Santiago, 13 N.Y.2d 326 (1963)

    A warrantless search is lawful if incident to a lawful arrest, and an arrest is lawful if officers have reasonable cause to believe a felony has been committed and the defendant committed it; this reasonable cause can be based on a reliable informant’s tip, especially when corroborated by other factors.

    Summary

    These consolidated appeals address the legality of searches without warrants in two separate narcotics cases. In People v. Santiago, the court upheld the conviction, finding the search was justified by reliable information from a known drug addict corroborated by police investigation. In People v. Martin, the court reversed the conviction, deeming the search illegal because it was based on unverified information from an unreliable informant and involved an unlawful intrusion into a building. The differing factual scenarios highlight the importance of corroboration and the manner of entry in determining the legality of a warrantless search.

    Facts

    People v. Santiago: Police officers, acting on information from Elfman, a known drug addict seeking leniency, identified Lee Santiago as her narcotics supplier. Elfman provided Santiago’s address, phone number, and car description. After confirming the phone number and overhearing Elfman arrange a drug purchase with someone she called “Lee,” officers followed Elfman to Santiago’s apartment. Elfman signaled to the officers that narcotics were present, and the officers entered the apartment where they observed Santiago discard glassine envelopes containing heroin. Santiago admitted the drugs belonged to her.

    People v. Martin: Police officers, after arresting Robert Void on unrelated charges, received information from him about narcotics being cut up at an apartment on Edgecomb Avenue. Void described the occupant as a woman named Rose and advised that entry should not be made from the front. Without verifying Void’s information, officers entered the building by forcing open a skylight. They saw narcotics in an apartment through an open door. Rosalee Martin was later arrested in another apartment and charged with possession of the drugs found in the Edgecomb Avenue apartment.

    Procedural History

    People v. Santiago: Santiago was convicted of felonious possession of narcotics in the Supreme Court, New York County. The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed the conviction. The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    People v. Martin: Martin was convicted of felonious possession of a narcotic drug with intent to sell in the Supreme Court. The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed the conviction. The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. People v. Santiago: Whether the warrantless search of Santiago’s apartment was justified by reasonable cause based on information from an informant.

    2. People v. Martin: Whether the search of the Edgecomb Avenue apartment was legal, considering the unverified information from the informant and the manner of entry.

    Holding

    1. People v. Santiago: Yes, because the officers had reasonable cause to believe Santiago was committing a felony based on the informant’s information, which was corroborated by their own investigation.

    2. People v. Martin: No, because the informant’s story was not checked against any previous experience with him or against any objective facts, and the evidence was obtained by an illegal and forceful intrusion into the building.

    Court’s Reasoning

    People v. Santiago: The Court of Appeals emphasized that the legality of the search hinged on whether the officers had reasonable cause to believe that Santiago possessed narcotics with intent to sell. The court found that reasonable cause existed because the officers knew Elfman as a narcotics user and seller, knew of Santiago’s reputation as a seller, verified the phone number Elfman provided, and overheard a phone conversation arranging a drug purchase. The court cited People v. Coffey, stating that “Substantiation of information can come either from the informer’s own character and reputation or from the separate, objective checking of the tale he tells.” The court distinguished this case from situations where an informer’s story is the sole basis for reasonable belief, emphasizing the corroborating evidence in this case.

    People v. Martin: The Court of Appeals found the search illegal for two primary reasons. First, the information provided by Void, the informant, was not adequately checked or corroborated. The officers had no prior experience with Void and did not verify his claims before acting on them. Second, the officers gained access to the apartment building through an illegal, forceful intrusion by breaking open a skylight. The court emphasized that such an intrusion into a residential building without a warrant or exigent circumstances is unlawful, citing Johnson v. United States and other cases. The court stated that acting on untested information from a person whose reliability was not otherwise confirmed, combined with the illegal entry, rendered the search unconstitutional.

  • People v. Jackson, 16 N.Y.2d 301 (1965): Illegally Obtained Evidence and Fruit of the Poisonous Tree

    People v. Jackson, 16 N.Y.2d 301 (1965)

    Evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal interrogation or search is inadmissible at trial, and this extends to physical evidence discovered as a result of information obtained during that illegal process; this is known as the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine.

    Summary

    Defendant Jackson’s conviction for robbery and homicide was overturned because the court admitted evidence obtained in violation of his rights. After being arrested on a sham vagrancy charge, Jackson made incriminating statements to an acquaintance in a neighboring jail cell, which was overheard by police. This led to the discovery of guns in Jackson’s attic during a warrantless search. The New York Court of Appeals held that the post-arraignment statements, made without counsel, were inadmissible. Furthermore, the guns, discovered as a direct result of the illegally obtained statements, were deemed “fruit of the poisonous tree” and were also inadmissible. The Court emphasized the prosecution’s failure to prove the guns’ discovery was independent of the illegal interrogation.

    Facts

    Jackson was arrested shortly after being released in his attorney’s custody by Buffalo police. He was then arraigned on a vagrancy charge. After questioning, he was placed in a cell next to Bradley, an acquaintance. Jackson made damaging statements about a robbery and homicide to Bradley, which were overheard by the police. Subsequently, Jackson revealed the location where guns were hidden. Without a warrant, police searched Jackson’s attic and found the guns in the location Jackson described. Police testified that a previous search on April 21 did not reveal the guns, and they only knew where to look after overhearing Jackson’s admissions.

    Procedural History

    Jackson was convicted of robbery and homicide based largely on his statements and the discovered guns. He appealed the conviction, arguing that the evidence was illegally obtained and should not have been admitted at trial. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court’s decision to admit the evidence.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether post-arraignment statements made in the absence of counsel are admissible at trial.

    2. Whether physical evidence discovered as a direct result of illegally obtained statements is admissible under the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because all post-arraignment statements made in the absence of counsel are inadmissible, especially when the arraignment is a pretext for holding the defendant for investigation.

    2. Yes, because evidence acquired by exploitation of a primary illegality (the illegally obtained statements) must be excluded; the prosecution failed to prove the guns’ discovery was independent of Jackson’s inadmissible statements.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on established precedent holding that post-arraignment statements made without counsel are inadmissible. Citing People v. Meyer and People v. Davis, the court emphasized that an arraignment cannot be used as a pretext for detaining a suspect for investigation without providing them with legal counsel.

    Regarding the admissibility of the guns, the court applied the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, citing Wong Sun v. United States, Mapp v. Ohio, Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, and Nardone v. United States. The court reasoned that the guns were discovered solely as a result of the illegally obtained statements. The burden was on the prosecution to prove that the discovery of the guns was independent of these statements, which they failed to do. The court noted that the police had previously searched the attic without finding the guns and only located them after Jackson’s admission revealed their specific hiding place.

    The court also noted other trial errors, including references to Jackson’s refusal to answer police questions, which is prohibited. The court cited People v. Bianculli, People v. Travato, People v. Rutigliano, and People v. Abel to support this proposition.

    The Court concluded that the combination of tainted evidence and prejudicial summation affected both Jackson and his co-defendant Robinson, necessitating a new trial for both.