New York Law Review

Tag: warrantless entry

  • People v. Sivertson, No. 3 (N.Y. 2017): Warrantless Entry and Exigent Circumstances in Home Searches

    People v. Sivertson, No. 3 (N.Y. 2017)

    The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement for a home search is narrowly construed; the police must demonstrate an urgent need for immediate action, and that the circumstances made obtaining a warrant impossible or impracticable.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the warrantless entry into Sivertson’s home was justified by exigent circumstances. The dissent argued that the facts did not support exigent circumstances, as Sivertson posed no immediate threat or risk of escape at the time of entry. The majority deferred to the lower court’s findings, emphasizing the need for deference when the facts are disputed or reasonable minds might differ on the inferences from the facts. The case underscores the importance of a fact-specific analysis for exigent circumstances to justify warrantless home entries.

    Facts

    Police responded to a convenience store robbery near the University of Buffalo. Based on the video and employee statements, they described the suspect and learned that the suspect had been seen earlier on a building stoop across the street. Officers went to the building, learned the person had moved into a rear apartment, and surrounded the building. They observed Sivertson in his apartment, lying in bed watching TV, through a window. After knocking for ten minutes and yelling for Sivertson to come out, he made eye contact, rolled over, and closed his eyes. Officers forced entry based on the other officers’ observations and the fact that Sivertson matched the robber’s description. Inside, they seized a black knit hat, gloves, knives, and a scarf and jacket. The trial court partially denied the suppression motion, finding exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry, but the jacket and scarf were suppressed. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    Procedural History

    Sivertson was convicted of first-degree robbery and sentenced to 20 years to life. The trial court denied his suppression motion in part. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the warrantless entry into Sivertson’s home was justified by exigent circumstances.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the Court found that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry into Sivertson’s home.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The majority deferred to the lower court’s ruling that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry. The dissenting judge believed there was no legal basis for exigent circumstances. The dissent emphasized the high level of protection afforded to the home under the Fourth Amendment. The dissent argued that the officers had no facts suggesting Sivertson posed a danger or that he might escape. The dissent underscored that “the police bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need” that justifies warrantless searches. The dissent referenced McBride, which held that exigent circumstances existed based on what the police observed when they arrived. In this case, the dissent argued, the police’s actions were not objectively justified, and they could have waited to obtain a warrant or waited for Sivertson to emerge. The dissent noted that Sivertson made no aggressive actions towards officers.

    Practical Implications

    This case is a reminder that any exceptions to the warrant requirement are construed narrowly. It emphasizes the importance of objective justification for warrantless entries. Police must be able to articulate why obtaining a warrant was not practical in a given situation, and mere probable cause to believe someone committed a crime is not sufficient. The specific facts known to the officers at the time of entry are crucial. The case suggests that in cases involving potential exigent circumstances, police should take precautions such as surrounding the building, and the court will examine the totality of the circumstances at the time of entry to determine if the police’s actions were justified. It also implies a preference for obtaining a warrant whenever possible.

  • People v. McBride, 14 N.Y.3d 440 (2010): Warrantless Home Entry Based on Exigent Circumstances

    14 N.Y.3d 440 (2010)

    Exigent circumstances, such as a reasonable belief that someone inside a residence is in imminent danger, can justify a warrantless entry into a home, even if the police had time to obtain a warrant previously.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that police officers’ warrantless entry into the defendant’s apartment was justified by exigent circumstances. Although the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant for armed robbery and several days to obtain a warrant, they entered the apartment after a woman inside appeared distressed and unresponsive, leading them to believe she was in danger. The Court emphasized that the ultimate inquiry is whether an urgent need justified the entry, but also noted that obtaining a warrant would have been more prudent.

    Facts

    A man robbed a Cosi restaurant at gunpoint. An employee, Mangual, identified defendant McBride, a former employee, from a photo array. Mangual gave police a detailed physical description of the defendant. Police learned McBride was on parole and obtained his address. Three days after the robbery, at 11 PM, five officers went to McBride’s apartment. Hearing voices inside, they knocked and identified themselves, but no one answered. Some officers went to the fire escape, peered into a window, and saw a man lying on the floor. The police demanded the occupants open the door. A woman, Mitchell, eventually opened the door, appearing shaken and unable to speak clearly.

    Procedural History

    McBride was indicted for robbery. He pleaded guilty to attempted robbery after the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence, arguing the police unlawfully entered his home and the lineup was suggestive. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police violated McBride’s Fourth Amendment right against unlawful search and seizure when they entered his apartment without a warrant.

    Holding

    No, because exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged that warrantless entries are presumptively unreasonable, citing Payton v. New York. However, exigent circumstances can justify a warrantless entry to effectuate an arrest, provided probable cause exists. Factors indicating exigent circumstances include the gravity of the offense, whether the suspect is armed, probable cause to believe the suspect committed the crime, strong reason to believe the suspect is on the premises, likelihood of escape, and the peacefulness of the entry, citing United States v. Martinez-Gonzalez. Here, the crime was a violent armed robbery. There was strong reason to believe McBride was inside. The Court deferred to the lower courts’ factual findings that the police only entered after Mitchell opened the door and appeared to be in distress. The Court distinguished People v. Levan, noting that the police did not create the exigency. The Court noted it would have been more prudent to obtain a warrant but the presence of exigent circumstances ultimately legitimized the entry. The Court also found the lineup was not unduly suggestive, as the gray hooded sweatshirt worn by McBride was a “generic and common article of clothing.”

  • People v. Reynoso, 59 N.Y.2d 682 (1983): Warrantless Entry and Preservation of Issues for Appeal

    People v. Reynoso, 59 N.Y.2d 682 (1983)

    An appellate court will not review an issue raised for the first time on appeal if it was not properly preserved in the lower court.

    Summary

    Police officers, acting on overheard incriminating conversations, entered the defendant’s apartment without a warrant. The defendant argued that probable cause was lacking because the officers were not lawfully present in the hallway of the restricted-access building. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the defendant failed to preserve the argument regarding the legality of the officers’ presence in the building by not raising it during the suppression hearing. Additionally, the court found no reviewable issue of law concerning probable cause and exigent circumstances, given the affirmance of the suppression court’s findings. Thus, the warrantless entry was upheld.

    Facts

    Federal agents and police officers overheard incriminating conversations emanating from the defendant’s apartment.

    Based on these conversations, the officers entered the defendant’s apartment without obtaining a warrant.

    The building was a locked, restricted-access, multiple-unit dwelling.

    Procedural History

    The defendant sought to suppress evidence obtained from the warrantless entry.

    The suppression court upheld the warrantless entry.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the suppression court’s decision.

    The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the officers’ entry into the common areas of the locked, restricted access multiple-unit dwelling was lawful, thereby establishing probable cause for the warrantless entry into the defendant’s apartment.

    2. Whether the information available to the officers was sufficient to support a finding of probable cause and exigent circumstances for the warrantless entry.

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant failed to preserve the issue of the legality of the officers’ presence in the building by not questioning it during the suppression hearing.

    2. No, because the affirmance of the suppression court’s findings on probable cause and exigent circumstances leaves no reviewable issue of law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on the principle of preservation of issues for appellate review. It emphasized that arguments not raised at the suppression hearing cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. The court stated, “Examination of the record of the suppression hearing reveals, however, that the legality of these officers’ presence in the building was never questioned by defendant and that argument is thus not preserved for review by this court.” The court cited People v. Martin, 50 NY2d 1029 as precedent. Because the defendant did not challenge the officers’ presence in the building during the suppression hearing, the court declined to consider the argument on appeal.

    Regarding the sufficiency of the information to support probable cause and exigent circumstances, the court found no reviewable issue of law because the suppression court’s findings on these issues had been affirmed. The court cited People v. Harrison, 57 NY2d 470. The court effectively deferred to the lower courts’ factual findings, as its appellate jurisdiction is generally limited to questions of law.

    The court’s decision underscores the importance of raising all relevant arguments at the trial level to preserve them for appellate review. Failure to do so can result in the appellate court declining to address the merits of the argument, as occurred in this case. This rule promotes judicial efficiency and fairness by ensuring that the trial court has the first opportunity to address and resolve the issues presented.

  • People v. Mahoney, 58 N.Y.2d 475 (1983): Admissibility of Evidence Seized Before Physical Possession of Search Warrant

    People v. Mahoney, 58 N.Y.2d 475 (1983)

    A search conducted pursuant to a validly issued search warrant is not rendered unconstitutional merely because the executing officers did not have the warrant in their physical possession at the time of entry, provided they knew it had been issued.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether police officers could enter a suspect’s home before a search warrant’s physical arrival, given their knowledge of its issuance. Police obtained a “no-knock” warrant to search Mahoney’s residence based on informant information. Surveillance indicated restless behavior by the occupants. Officers entered before the warrant’s arrival, detained the occupants, and then conducted the search once the warrant arrived. Mahoney argued the entry was illegal, violating his Fourth Amendment rights. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that physical possession of the warrant at the time of entry was not required because the warrant had been issued. The key factor was that a neutral magistrate had already determined probable cause existed.

    Facts

    Detective Milham arranged to buy cocaine from David Longe. Longe and his girlfriend, Mary Lou Rorick, went to Peter Mahoney’s house, where Longe asked Rorick to deliver the cocaine to the Holiday Inn. After Rorick and defendant’s girlfriend were arrested after selling cocaine to Detective Milham, Rorick told the police that Longe could be located at Mahoney’s residence with a half-pound of cocaine and 40 pounds of marijuana. Police officers were dispatched to surveil Mahoney’s residence. Officers observed Longe and Mahoney pacing and looking out the window. Detective Milham obtained a “no-knock” search warrant for Mahoney’s residence. The surveillance team was informed the warrant had been signed. Before Detective Milham arrived with the warrant, officers broke down the door and entered the residence. Mahoney and Longe were taken into custody. Detective Milham arrived five minutes later with the warrant, and a search was conducted, revealing cocaine and marijuana. Mahoney waived his Miranda rights and admitted to letting Longe use his house to store drugs in exchange for marijuana and cocaine.

    Procedural History

    An Albany County Grand Jury indicted Mahoney for criminal possession of a controlled substance and marijuana. The trial court denied Mahoney’s motion to suppress the physical evidence and his incriminating statement. Mahoney pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree and was sentenced to six years to life. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of Mahoney’s motion to suppress. Leave to appeal was granted by a Justice of the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the entry by police into a residence pursuant to a validly executed but undelivered search warrant is illegal, violating the defendant’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure.

    Holding

    No, because once a warrant had been issued by a neutral magistrate, physical possession of the warrant at the time of entry was not required under the facts of this case.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished this case from Payton v. New York, which prohibited warrantless home entries absent exigent circumstances, because in this case, the police obtained a warrant before entering Mahoney’s residence. The court emphasized that the “evil Payton sought to prevent was the warrantless entry inside a home to search for weapons or contraband.” The court highlighted that Detective Milham sought a warrant after receiving firsthand information about the drugs. The police waited until being informed that a warrant had been issued before entering the premises. The purpose of the warrant procedure, which is to place a neutral magistrate between the police and the citizen, was fully complied with. CPL 690.50(1), requiring officers to show the warrant upon request, was deemed inapplicable because the warrant was executed pursuant to CPL 690.50(2), which allowed a no-knock entry. The court stated, “The fact that the officers entered defendant’s house without actual possession of the search warrant, which they knew had been issued, in no way interfered with defendant’s right to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusions. The entry and search in this case was authorized by a magistrate prior to the entry and search occurring. Our Federal and State Constitutions require nothing more.”

  • People v. Cohen, 58 N.Y.2d 844 (1983): Warrantless Re-entry and Search After Initial Consent

    People v. Cohen, 58 N.Y.2d 844 (1983)

    Once initial consent to enter premises is withdrawn or expires, subsequent re-entries by police without a warrant or valid emergency justification are unlawful, even during a homicide investigation.

    Summary

    Following a reversal of the defendant’s conviction due to evidentiary errors, the defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained during multiple searches of her home. The initial entry was consensual, but subsequent entries the following day were conducted without a warrant. The County Court granted the motion to suppress, finding no emergency justified the re-entries and that the initial consent did not extend to later searches. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that absent a warrant or valid emergency, the re-entry and subsequent search were unlawful, even in a homicide investigation.

    Facts

    Police officers initially entered the defendant’s home with her consent. The next morning, and on subsequent occasions, police re-entered the premises without obtaining a warrant. The defendant had been convicted, but that conviction was reversed due to evidentiary errors committed at trial.

    Procedural History

    The County Court initially convicted the defendant, but the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction (50 N.Y.2d 908). Upon remand, the defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained during the searches. The County Court granted the motion to suppress. The Appellate Division affirmed the County Court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s affirmance.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, absent a warrant or exigent circumstances, police re-entry into a home after an initial consensual entry is permissible solely on the basis that a homicide investigation is underway.

    Holding

    No, because absent a warrant, the re-entry was not sanctioned, without more, by the mere fact that a homicide was being investigated.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the County Court had expressly found that the defendant’s consent to the initial entry did not extend to subsequent entries and that there was no emergency justifying the re-entry. These findings were supported by the record and affirmed by the Appellate Division, precluding further review by the Court of Appeals. The Court relied on Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, and People v. Knapp, 52 N.Y.2d 689, 694, to support its holding that a homicide investigation, without more, does not justify a warrantless search. The court stated: “absent a warrant, the re-entry was not sanctioned, without more, by the mere fact that a homicide was being investigated”. The court explicitly declined to rule on the County Court’s alternative theory regarding the defendant’s ability to waive her rights without counsel present after retaining counsel, emphasizing that the suppression order was justified based on the unlawful re-entry alone. The court noted that there was no abuse of discretion in entertaining the motion to suppress for the first time upon remand (cf. People v. Fuentes, 53 NY2d 892).