New York Law Review

Tag: Waiver of Indictment

  • People v. Foster, 12 N.Y.3d 566 (2009): Limits on Joining Offenses in a Superior Court Information After Waiver of Indictment

    12 N.Y.3d 566 (2009)

    When a defendant waives indictment, offenses joined in the superior court information must be “the same or similar in law,” and the inclusion of a criminal possession of stolen property charge was not sufficiently similar to a grand larceny offense to be properly joined.

    Summary

    Defendant waived indictment and pleaded guilty to grand larceny and criminal possession of stolen property charges in a superior court information (SCI). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the criminal possession charge was improperly joined with the grand larceny charge because the two offenses were not sufficiently similar under Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 200.20(2)(c). The Court emphasized that CPL 200.20(2)(c) is typically used when a defendant violates the same Penal Law provision on multiple occasions, or comparable criminal conduct in discrete incidents is alleged. This case underscores the importance of strict adherence to statutory requirements when utilizing waivers of indictment and the limits on joining offenses.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with grand larceny in the fourth degree for allegedly stealing $1,100 from a victim’s bank account. He was also charged with criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree after being found in possession of a stolen vehicle. These incidents were unrelated and occurred weeks apart.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was arraigned on both sets of charges in Buffalo City Court and held for grand jury action on the felony offenses. The grand larceny charge was dismissed and a new superior court felony complaint was filed. The defendant waived indictment and agreed to be prosecuted by SCI, pleading guilty to both grand larceny and criminal possession of stolen property. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, but the Court of Appeals reversed, vacated the guilty plea, and dismissed the SCI.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the criminal possession of stolen property charge was properly joined with the grand larceny charge in the superior court information (SCI) under Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 200.20(2)(c), which allows joinder of offenses that “are defined by the same or similar statutory provisions and consequently are the same or similar in law.”

    Holding

    No, because the criminal possession of stolen property charge was not sufficiently similar in law to the grand larceny offense to be properly joined in the SCI under CPL 200.20(2)(c).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 200.20(2)(c) is generally applied when a defendant has violated the same Penal Law provision multiple times or has engaged in comparable criminal conduct in separate incidents. The Court found that grand larceny and criminal possession of stolen property lacked the requisite similarity. While both involved misappropriated property, the crimes had different elements and the criminal conduct was distinct. The Court emphasized the importance of ensuring that offenses joined under CPL 200.20(2)(c) share commonality and comparable criminal conduct. "Offenses will not be deemed sufficiently similar to support joinder under CPL 200.20 (2) (c) if the offenses do not share any elements and the criminal conduct at the heart of each crime is not comparable." The improper inclusion of an offense in a waiver of indictment and SCI is a jurisdictional defect that requires reversal and dismissal. The Court distinguished this case from People v. Zanghi, 79 N.Y.2d 815 (1991), noting that in this case, the triggering offense (grand larceny) was included in the SCI. However, the joinder of the possession of stolen property offense was still impermissible because the two offenses were not sufficiently similar in law.

  • People v. Cuadrado, 11 N.Y.3d 363 (2008): Procedural Bar on Collateral Attacks for Waivable Jurisdictional Defects

    People v. Cuadrado, 11 N.Y.3d 363 (2008)

    A defendant who fails to raise a waivable jurisdictional defect on direct appeal is procedurally barred from raising it in a subsequent motion to vacate the conviction under CPL 440.10.

    Summary

    Cuadrado pleaded guilty to first-degree assault based on a superior court information after an allegedly invalid waiver of indictment. He appealed his conviction, challenging only the excessiveness of his sentence. Twelve years later, he moved to vacate his conviction under CPL 440.10, arguing the waiver of indictment was invalid. The Court of Appeals held that because Cuadrado could have raised the issue on direct appeal but failed to do so, he was procedurally barred from raising it in a collateral attack under CPL 440.10(2)(c). The Court emphasized the importance of raising issues on direct appeal to prevent abuse and prejudice to the prosecution.

    Facts

    In 1991, Cuadrado participated in a robbery during which two people were shot, one fatally. He was indicted for murder, attempted robbery, and criminal possession of a weapon, but not assault. In 1992, he agreed to plead guilty to first-degree assault via a superior court information, after signing a waiver of indictment. He received a sentence of 4 to 12 years for the assault, to run consecutively to other sentences.

    Procedural History

    Cuadrado appealed his conviction to the Appellate Division, arguing only that his sentence was excessive. He did not challenge the validity of the waiver of indictment. In 2004, twelve years after his plea, he moved under CPL 440.10 to vacate his assault conviction, arguing the waiver of indictment was invalid. The Supreme Court granted the motion, but the Appellate Division reversed, holding the motion was barred. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant, who could have raised a claim of an invalid waiver of indictment on direct appeal but failed to do so, is procedurally barred by CPL 440.10(2)(c) from raising that claim in a motion to vacate the judgment of conviction.

    Holding

    Yes, because CPL 440.10(2)(c) mandates denial of a motion to vacate a judgment when the defendant unjustifiably failed to raise an issue on direct appeal, where sufficient facts appear on the record to have permitted adequate review of the issue.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on CPL 440.10(2)(c), which states that a court "must deny a motion to vacate a judgment when…[a]lthough sufficient facts appear on the record of the proceedings underlying the judgment to have permitted, upon appeal from such judgment, adequate review of the ground or issue raised upon the motion, no such appellate review or determination occurred owing to the defendant’s . . . unjustifiable failure to raise such ground or issue upon an appeal actually perfected by him." The Court rejected Cuadrado’s argument that the statutory bar should not apply due to the "fundamental jurisdictional" nature of the defect. The Court reasoned that the Legislature has the power to make reasonable rules governing when jurisdictional defects may be challenged, provided those rules give the defendant a fair opportunity to vindicate his rights. CPL 440.10(2)(c) is such a rule. The Court noted the importance of raising issues on direct appeal to avoid abuse and prejudice, highlighting Cuadrado’s 12-year delay in raising the issue and the difficulty the People would face in reviving the case. The Court distinguished People ex rel. Battista v Christian, 249 NY 314 (1928), as a case decided before the enactment of CPL Article 440, and therefore not controlling. The court emphasized that no case holds that the Legislature cannot regulate the manner in which a jurisdictional defect in a conviction may be raised.

  • People v. D’Amico, 96 N.Y.2d 687 (2001): Validity of SCI After Dismissal of Defective Indictment

    People v. D’Amico, 96 N.Y.2d 687 (2001)

    A defendant may waive indictment and plead guilty to a superior court information (SCI) after the dismissal of a defective indictment covering the same charges, even without a formal order granting the People leave to re-present the case to a grand jury, provided the court’s intent to allow re-presentation is clear.

    Summary

    D’Amico was arrested for selling heroin. After indictment, plea negotiations began, but the court realized D’Amico’s name was missing from the indictment’s body. The court dismissed the indictment, and D’Amico then waived indictment and pleaded guilty to a superior court information (SCI) on the same terms. He failed to complete drug treatment, received the agreed-upon sentence, and appealed, arguing his SCI waiver was invalid. The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, holding that the SCI was permissible because the original indictment was entirely defective and the court’s intent to allow re-presentation to a grand jury was evident, even without a formal order.

    Facts

    Defendant D’Amico and Evelyn Ramirez were arrested for selling heroin to an undercover officer.
    They were charged with criminal sale of a controlled substance in or near school grounds and criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree.
    After indictment, D’Amico and the prosecution negotiated a plea deal.
    The court realized that D’Amico’s name was in the caption but not in the body of the indictment itself, naming only Ramirez who acted “in concert with another.”

    Procedural History

    The trial court dismissed the indictment due to the defect.
    The defendant then pleaded guilty to a superior court information (SCI).
    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s waiver of indictment and guilty plea to a superior court information (SCI) is invalid when entered after the court dismissed a defective indictment covering the same charges, but without explicitly granting the People leave to re-present the case to the grand jury?

    Holding

    No, because the indictment was defective and dismissed entirely, and the court’s intent to allow re-presentation was evident, making prosecution by SCI permissible.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court distinguished this case from People v. Boston and People v. Casdia, where a valid indictment (or part of one) was still pending when the defendant waived indictment and pleaded to an SCI. Here, the indictment was entirely defective and was dismissed. The Court noted that “Criminal Procedure Law § 195.10 (2) (b) provides that with the consent of the prosecutor, a defendant may waive indictment and be prosecuted by SCI in ‘the appropriate superior court, at any time prior to the filing of an indictment by the grand jury’” but found that this rule didn’t apply as the prior indictment was void.

    The court emphasized that it was clear to everyone that the omission of D’Amico’s name was a clerical error and that the case would have to be re-presented to a grand jury. The Court found that the trial court implicitly authorized re-presentation, noting that “[a]s the Appellate Division correctly noted, the court obviously authorized representation even though it did not formally order it, considering that both sides agreed to dispose of the case by SCI on the agreed terms. No magic words were required.” The Court found that requiring a formal order in this scenario would be an unnecessary formality.

  • People v. Ford, 86 N.Y.2d 541 (1995): Limits on Waiving Indictment When Originally Charged with a Class A Felony

    People v. Ford, 86 N.Y.2d 541 (1995)

    A defendant held for grand jury action on a felony complaint charging a Class A felony cannot waive indictment and plead to a superior court information, even if the information charges only lesser offenses.

    Summary

    Ford was initially charged with second-degree murder (a Class A felony). To facilitate a plea bargain, the prosecution filed a superior court information charging him with lesser offenses. Ford waived indictment and pleaded guilty to the information. The New York Court of Appeals held that this waiver was invalid. The court emphasized that the waiver of indictment is only permissible when the defendant is *not* initially held for grand jury action on a Class A felony charge. This case underscores the strict limitations on waiving indictment in New York, ensuring adherence to constitutional protections.

    Facts

    Ford was arrested and charged via felony complaint with second-degree murder and weapons charges related to a fatal shooting in 1993.

    He was held pending grand jury action on these charges.

    Ford and the prosecution negotiated a plea agreement where he would plead guilty to manslaughter and a separate, unrelated crime in exchange for concurrent sentences.

    To execute this, the prosecution filed a superior court information charging Ford with manslaughter and criminal use of a firearm.

    Ford waived indictment and pleaded guilty to the charges in the information.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding the waiver of indictment invalid.

    The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant, initially charged with a Class A felony in a felony complaint and held for grand jury action, can validly waive indictment and plead guilty to a superior court information charging only lesser offenses.

    Holding

    No, because the waiver of indictment is impermissible when the defendant is held for grand jury action on a felony complaint that includes a Class A felony charge; the subsequent filing of a superior court information with only lesser charges does not cure this defect.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the constitutional requirement of indictment by a grand jury for capital or infamous crimes. While a constitutional amendment created an exception allowing waiver of indictment, this exception is narrowly defined. CPL 195.10(1) permits waiver of indictment only when “the defendant is not charged with a class A felony.” The court reasoned that this provision refers to the charges in the *original* felony complaint upon which the defendant is held for grand jury action. The court distinguished this case from People v. D’Amico, where the waiver was valid because the defendant was being held on a *new* felony complaint without a Class A felony charge.

    The Court stated: “The waiver procedure is triggered by the defendant being held for Grand Jury action on charges contained in a felony complaint (CPL 195.10 [1] [a]) and it is in reference to those charges that its availability must be measured”.

    The court rejected the People’s argument that focusing on the initial charge was overly formalistic, stating that the prosecution could have sought an indictment on the lesser charges or filed a superseding felony complaint. The court emphasized that constitutional protections should be satisfied rather than evaded for expediency.

    The court further noted that the waiver provision must be interpreted consistently with the limitations in the constitutional authorization. Since the original felony complaint included a Class A felony (murder), the waiver of indictment was unauthorized, regardless of the charges in the subsequent superior court information.

  • People v. Menchetti, 76 N.Y.2d 473 (1990): Validity of Waiver of Indictment for Lesser Included Offenses

    People v. Menchetti, 76 N.Y.2d 473 (1990)

    A defendant held for grand jury action on an offense may waive indictment and plead to a superior court information charging a lesser included offense of the original charge.

    Summary

    Menchetti was charged with third-degree criminal possession of a weapon. He waived indictment and pleaded guilty to fourth-degree criminal possession of a weapon via a superior court information. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the information jurisdictionally defective because it charged a different offense than the felony complaint. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a waiver of indictment is valid even if the superior court information charges a lesser included offense, as a defendant held for grand jury action is held for all lesser included offenses as well.

    Facts

    Defendant fired a gun during an altercation on a public street.

    He was charged via felony complaint with third-degree criminal possession of a weapon.

    At arraignment, defendant waived a felony hearing and was held for grand jury action.

    Pursuant to plea negotiations, defendant waived indictment and agreed to be prosecuted via superior court information charging fourth-degree criminal possession of a weapon.

    Defendant pleaded guilty to the fourth-degree charge and was sentenced.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court accepted the waiver and guilty plea.

    The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the superior court information, holding that it was jurisdictionally defective because the information charged a different offense than the felony complaint.

    The Court of Appeals granted the People leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s waiver of indictment is effective when the superior court information charges a lesser included offense of the offense charged in the felony complaint.

    Whether fourth-degree criminal possession of a weapon is a lesser included offense of third-degree criminal possession of a weapon.

    Holding

    Yes, because a defendant held for grand jury action on an offense is also held for grand jury action on all lesser included offenses. The waiver extends to those lesser included offenses.

    Yes, because it is impossible to commit third-degree criminal possession of a weapon without also committing fourth-degree criminal possession of a weapon.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Article I, § 6 of the New York Constitution and CPL 195.20 permit a waiver of indictment when the information charges any offense for which the defendant was held for grand jury action. Since a defendant is held for grand jury action on lesser included offenses as well as the greater offense charged in the felony complaint, the waiver is valid.

    The court cited CPL 190.65, 210.20(1)(b), and 210.30(1) to support the premise that a defendant held for grand jury action on a greater offense is also held for any lesser included offenses.

    The court further held that fourth-degree criminal possession of a weapon is a lesser included offense of third-degree criminal possession of a weapon under the test articulated in People v. Glover, 57 N.Y.2d 61 (1982): it is impossible to commit the greater offense (third-degree possession) without also committing the lesser offense (fourth-degree possession).

    The Court rejected the argument that permitting waiver by plea to a lesser included offense might circumvent plea-bargaining restrictions in CPL 220.10, because in this case, the plea did not violate those restrictions.

    The court emphasized the purpose of the constitutional amendment and implementing statute: “to allow a defendant who wishes to go directly to trial without waiting for a grand jury to hand up an indictment to do so”.

    The court quoted CPL 195.20, which states that the offenses named in the waiver “may include any offense for which the defendant was held for action of a grand jury”.

    Significantly, the court noted that “an infringement upon the right to prosecution by indictment is jurisdictional and cannot be waived by guilty plea”.