New York Law Review

Tag: Wade Hearing

  • People v. Chipp, 75 N.Y.2d 327 (1990): Scope of Compulsory Process at Pretrial Wade Hearings

    People v. Chipp, 75 N.Y.2d 327 (1990)

    A defendant does not have an unqualified right to call an identifying witness at a pretrial Wade hearing to challenge the suggestiveness of a lineup; the decision to allow such testimony rests within the sound discretion of the hearing court.

    Summary

    Chipp was convicted of sexual abuse and related crimes. At a combined Huntley-Wade hearing, the trial court denied Chipp’s request to call the 10-year-old complaining witness to testify about the suggestiveness of the pre-trial lineup. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that while defendants have the right to call witnesses at criminal proceedings, this right is not absolute at a Wade hearing, which is meant only to determine the suggestiveness of a pretrial identification, and is subject to the discretion of the hearing judge.

    Facts

    Shanica F., a 10-year-old girl, was sexually abused and nearly sodomized by a man she later identified as Chipp. The incident occurred on April 7, 1986, in a building on West 131st Street in Manhattan. Shanica described her attacker to the police. Shermain Thompson, a tenant in the building, recognized the description as matching “Apache,” a friend of her brother, whom she had seen in the building earlier that day. Two days later, police found civilians holding Chipp at the same building. They were told that Chipp was the man who had “raped” the girl. Detective Francisci, who was assigned to the case, arranged a lineup where Shanica identified Chipp within 10 seconds.

    Procedural History

    Chipp was convicted in the trial court. Prior to trial, a combined Huntley-Wade hearing was held regarding the admissibility of Chipp’s statements and Shanica’s lineup identification. The hearing court denied Chipp’s request to call Shanica as a witness at the hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the hearing court’s refusal to allow the defendant to call the complaining witness to testify at a combined Huntley and Wade hearing denied him a constitutional or statutory right to present relevant evidence on the issue of the suggestiveness of a pretrial lineup identification procedure.

    Holding

    No, because any right of compulsory process at a Wade hearing may be outweighed by countervailing policy concerns, properly within the discretion and control of the hearing judge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that while CPL 60.15(1) affords a defendant the right to call witnesses at a criminal proceeding, that right is not absolute. The Court emphasized that a Wade hearing, unlike a trial, does not involve a determination of guilt or innocence but rather determines whether a pretrial identification procedure was unduly suggestive. The Court reasoned that according an absolute right to call an identifying witness at a Wade hearing would enable defendants to harass identifying witnesses and transform the hearing into a discovery proceeding. The court noted that no indicia of suggestiveness was presented to the hearing court. The court reasoned that the complainant’s testimony on the varied complexions of the subjects of the lineup would only have been cumulative, as the court already had a photograph of the lineup before it. The court held that the hearing judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the defendant’s request to call the complainant at the Wade hearing. The Court stated, “Indeed we have held in respect to pretrial hearings more directly addressing the guilt or innocence of an accused that a defendant’s right to require the production of a witness with relevant testimony could be outweighed by countervailing policy considerations (People v Petralia, 62 NY2d 47, 52-53).”

  • People v. Ayala, 75 N.Y.2d 422 (1990): Admissibility of Prior Testimony and Harmless Error Analysis

    People v. Ayala, 75 N.Y.2d 422 (1990)

    Prior testimony from a Wade hearing is inadmissible at trial under CPL 670.10, but the erroneous admission of such testimony, along with inadmissible co-defendant statements, may be deemed harmless error if the properly admitted evidence of guilt is overwhelming and there is no significant probability that the jury would have acquitted without the errors.

    Summary

    Ayala was convicted of murder and attempted assault. The prosecution introduced a redacted transcript of a Wade hearing (testimony about a pre-trial identification) from an unavailable witness and redacted statements from separately prosecuted co-defendants. The Court of Appeals held that admitting the Wade hearing testimony violated CPL 670.10 and the co-defendant statements were inadmissible hearsay. However, the Court affirmed the conviction, finding these errors harmless due to the overwhelming eyewitness testimony establishing Ayala’s guilt in the stabbing death of the victim. The Court emphasized that harmless error analysis depends on the strength of the untainted evidence.

    Facts

    Defendant Ayala was involved in an initial fist fight with McKinley and Barrett. After this, Ayala and others sought out McKinley and Barrett. Ayala encountered McKinley and Barrett in a building lobby. Eyewitness Bunch saw Ayala “jump” McKinley and repeatedly punch him in the chest, resembling a stabbing motion. Gunshots were fired during the altercation. McKinley died from stab wounds to the heart and lungs.

    Procedural History

    Ayala was convicted of second-degree murder and attempted first-degree assault in the trial court. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions, finding that the Wade hearing testimony and co-defendant statements were improperly admitted, but deemed the errors harmless. Ayala appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the prior testimony of an unavailable witness at a Wade hearing is admissible at trial under CPL 670.10.
    2. Whether the admission of the Wade hearing testimony and co-defendant statements, if erroneous, constitutes harmless error.

    Holding

    1. No, because a Wade hearing does not fall within the enumerated categories of prior proceedings for which testimony is admissible under CPL 670.10.
    2. Yes, because the properly admitted evidence of Ayala’s guilt was overwhelming and there is no reasonable possibility that the errors contributed to the conviction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that CPL 670.10 provides only three carefully worded exceptions to the rule against hearsay: testimony given at a trial, a felony hearing, or a conditional examination. A Wade hearing, a suppression hearing concerning pre-trial identification, does not fall under these exceptions. The court rejected the trial court’s expansive reading of the statute, emphasizing a narrow interpretation is appropriate in criminal matters.

    The Court distinguished felony hearings, which involve a mini-trial of the People’s prima facie case, from suppression hearings, which focus on the propriety of official conduct. Legislative intent suggested a narrow reading of CPL 670.10. The harmless error analysis hinged on the strength of the untainted evidence. Here, eyewitness testimony overwhelmingly established that Ayala stabbed McKinley. Even using the more stringent harmless error standard for constitutional violations (admission of co-defendant statements), the Court held there was no reasonable possibility the errors contributed to the verdict given the eyewitness accounts. The Court emphasized that the significance of the erroneously admitted co-defendant statements was marginal in light of the other evidence.

    The Court stated, “[E]ven this highly exacting harmless-error standard, however, does not demand that guilt be proven ‘indisputably’.”

  • People v. Wharton, 74 N.Y.2d 921 (1989): Warranting a Wade Hearing for Undercover Officer Identifications

    People v. Wharton, 74 N.Y.2d 921 (1989)

    A pretrial Wade hearing is not automatically required when a trained undercover officer identifies a defendant shortly after a drug transaction, but the specific facts of the encounter must be examined to determine if the identification procedure was unduly suggestive.

    Summary

    Wharton was convicted of drug sale and possession based on an undercover officer’s identification. The officer bought drugs from Wharton, radioed a description to a backup team who arrested him, and then identified Wharton at the precinct three hours later. Wharton’s motion for a Wade hearing to suppress the identification was denied. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that while a Wade hearing isn’t automatically precluded for police identifications, the circumstances here didn’t suggest undue suggestiveness because the officer was trained, the viewing was close in time to the arrest, and it served to confirm the correct person was arrested. The dissent argued for a hearing to explore potential suggestiveness, emphasizing the fleeting nature of the initial encounter.

    Facts

    An undercover police officer purchased cocaine from Wharton in a “buy and bust” operation. The officer radioed Wharton’s description to a backup team, who arrested Wharton at the scene. Within five minutes, the undercover officer drove past and saw Wharton being detained. Approximately three hours later, the same undercover officer identified Wharton through a one-way mirror at the police precinct.

    Procedural History

    Wharton moved to suppress the identification testimony, seeking a Wade hearing. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing. Wharton was convicted by a jury. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a pretrial station house identification of the defendant by an undercover police officer, who purchased drugs from the defendant in a “buy and bust” operation, requires a Wade hearing to determine if the identification was tainted by unnecessarily suggestive factors.

    Holding

    No, because the identification was made by a trained undercover officer shortly after the drug transaction as a completion of an integral police procedure and to ensure that the correct person was detained, and the circumstances did not suggest undue suggestiveness.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the identification was made by a trained undercover officer who observed Wharton during a face-to-face drug transaction, knowing Wharton would be arrested soon after. The station house viewing occurred at a place and time sufficiently connected and contemporaneous to the arrest, constituting the ordinary and proper completion of an integral police procedure. This ensured an innocent person was not mistakenly detained. The officer’s participation in the operation was planned, and he was experienced and expected to observe Wharton carefully for later identification. The court distinguished this situation from show-up identifications by civilian witnesses, which are more prone to misidentification. The court emphasized they were not creating a categorical rule exempting police officer identifications from Wade hearings but held that based on the record, the trial court did not err in denying the hearing. Titone, J., dissented, arguing that the fleeting nature of the initial contact warranted a hearing to explore potential suggestiveness, citing CPL 60.25 and 60.30 regarding constitutional rights during identification procedures. The dissent highlighted examples from other cases where suggestive circumstances, revealed during Wade hearings, tainted police officer identifications. The dissent argued that the majority’s approach created an “insuperable threshold” by requiring knowledge of the specific events before granting a hearing.

  • People v. Bernier, 73 N.Y.2d 1006 (1989): Consequences of Failing to Provide Timely Notice of Identification Testimony

    People v. Bernier, 73 N.Y.2d 1006 (1989)

    When the prosecution fails to provide timely notice of intent to use identification testimony, as required by CPL 710.30, preclusion is mandatory unless a valid excuse exists for the lack of notice, and a defendant does not waive the right to preclusion by subsequently participating in a suppression hearing after the initial motion to preclude was denied.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of robbery and weapons possession. During jury selection, the defense learned of an unnoticed identifying witness. The defense moved to preclude the testimony due to lack of notice. The court denied the motion, but ordered a Wade hearing after the prosecutor admitted an out-of-court identification occurred. After the initial suppression, the court reopened the hearing to establish an independent source for the in-court identification. The Appellate Division reversed, suppressing the in-court identification. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the initial failure to provide statutory notice mandated preclusion, and the defendant did not waive this right by participating in the Wade hearing after the initial motion to preclude was denied.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with robbery and weapons possession related to three separate incidents at the same gas station. During jury selection, the defense became aware of a witness, Gedeon, who would be the prosecution’s primary identifying witness, but for whom no prior notice had been given as required by CPL 710.30(1). The prosecutor acknowledged that an out-of-court identification had been made by Gedeon.

    Procedural History

    The trial court initially denied the defendant’s motion to preclude Gedeon’s testimony but ordered a Wade hearing. The Wade hearing resulted in suppression of the out-of-court identification. The prosecution then successfully moved to reopen the Wade hearing to establish an independent source for an in-court identification. The trial court then allowed Gedeon to make an in-court identification. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction and suppressed the in-court identification. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s initial motion to preclude identification testimony when the prosecution failed to provide timely notice as required by CPL 710.30.

    2. Whether the defendant waived the protection of CPL 710.30 by participating in a Wade hearing after the initial motion to preclude was denied.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the People failed to present any valid excuse for not giving the required notice under CPL 710.30, requiring preclusion of the identification testimony.

    2. No, because the waiver exception of CPL 710.30(3) does not apply when the defendant initially moved to preclude and lost, and the defendant made no suppression motion qualifying under CPL 710.30(3).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, emphasizing the mandatory nature of CPL 710.30. The court stated, “Inasmuch as the People failed to present or establish any excuse for not giving the required notice, the court should have granted the preclusion motion and suppressed the identification testimony.” The court explicitly referenced People v. O’Doherty, 70 NY2d 479, which firmly established the consequences for failing to adhere to the statutory notice requirements. The Court also rejected the People’s argument that the defendant waived his right to preclusion by participating in the Wade hearing after his initial motion to preclude had been denied. Quoting, “The waiver exception cannot become operative in a case such as this when the defendant clearly moved initially to preclude and lost. In any event, he made no suppression motion qualifying under CPL 710.30 (3) (see, People v Amparo, 73 NY2d 728, 729; People v McMullin, 70 NY2d 855).” The court’s decision underscores the importance of strict compliance with CPL 710.30 and clarifies that a defendant’s participation in subsequent suppression proceedings, after an initial preclusion motion is wrongly denied, does not constitute a waiver of their right to challenge the identification testimony. This prevents the prosecution from benefitting from its initial failure to provide timely notice. The case serves as a reminder that the prosecution bears the burden of demonstrating a valid excuse for failing to provide timely notice of identification testimony, and absent such an excuse, preclusion is the required remedy.

  • People v. Fuentes, 53 N.Y.2d 892 (1981): Standard for Reopening a Wade Hearing

    53 N.Y.2d 892 (1981)

    A trial court may reopen a pretrial Wade hearing only if the defendant demonstrates that they have discovered additional pertinent facts that could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence before the original determination.

    Summary

    Jesus Fuentes appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his requests to reopen the Wade hearing during trial. He claimed new facts warranted a re-examination of the identification procedures. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The court emphasized that under CPL 710.40(4), reopening a pretrial hearing requires a showing by the defendant of newly discovered, pertinent facts that could not have been previously discovered with reasonable diligence. Fuentes failed to meet this burden, justifying the trial court’s denial.

    Facts

    During the trial, the defendant, Jesus Fuentes, sought to reopen a previously held Wade hearing concerning the admissibility of identification evidence. The specific nature of the underlying criminal charges or the identification evidence itself is not detailed in this memorandum opinion, but the defendant argued that new facts had emerged that warranted a re-evaluation of the fairness and reliability of the identification procedures used.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. He appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the trial court’s decision. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing to reopen the Wade hearing during the trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the defendant’s request to reopen the Wade hearing during the trial, based on the defendant’s claim of newly discovered facts.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant failed to demonstrate that the alleged new facts were pertinent and could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence before the initial Wade hearing determination, as required by CPL 710.40(4).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on CPL 710.40(4), which governs the reopening of pretrial hearings. The statute explicitly states that a trial court may reopen a pretrial hearing if it “is satisfied, upon a showing by the defendant, that additional pertinent facts have been discovered by the defendant which he could not have discovered with reasonable diligence before the determination” of the pretrial application. The court emphasized that the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating both the pertinence of the new facts and the prior inability to discover them with reasonable diligence. Since Fuentes failed to establish these elements, the trial court’s refusal to reopen the Wade hearing was deemed a proper exercise of its discretion. The Court of Appeals found no merit in the defendant’s remaining arguments, reinforcing the affirmance of the lower court’s order. This case highlights the importance of diligently pursuing all relevant facts before a pretrial hearing concludes and underscores the limited circumstances under which a court will allow a reopening of such a hearing during trial. The decision also affirms a trial court’s discretion in managing the presentation of evidence and ensuring the orderly conduct of proceedings.