New York Law Review

Tag: Wade Hearing

  • People v. Gee, 99 N.Y.2d 421 (2003): Limits of “Confirmatory Identification” Exception for Police Officers

    People v. Gee, 99 N.Y.2d 421 (2003)

    The “confirmatory identification” exception to the requirement of CPL 710.30 notice (for pretrial identifications) does not apply when a police officer’s initial observation of a suspect is fleeting, unreliable, and susceptible of misidentification, even if the initial encounter and subsequent identification are temporally related.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of attempted burglary based on an officer’s identification. The officer initially saw the suspect briefly at night on a fire escape from 40-50 feet away and later identified the defendant on the street. The prosecution failed to provide CPL 710.30 notice of the identification. The Court of Appeals held that the identification was not a “confirmatory identification” exempt from the notice requirement because the initial viewing was not sufficiently clear to eliminate the risk of misidentification. Therefore, the defendant was entitled to a Wade hearing to determine whether the identification was unduly suggestive, and failure to provide notice was reversible error.

    Facts

    Michael Todd observed someone on a fire escape attempting to open windows and called 911. Police officers responded, and Officer Cremin saw a person on the fire escape for a few seconds from 40-50 feet away at night before the person fled. Officer Cremin described the suspect over the radio. Another officer apprehended the defendant nearby, and Officer Cremin identified him as the person he saw on the fire escape approximately 30 minutes after the initial 911 call. The prosecution did not provide notice of this pretrial identification.

    Procedural History

    The trial court permitted Officer Cremin to testify about the out-of-court identification and to identify the defendant at trial, finding that no CPL 710.30 notice was required. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, deeming the identification a “confirmatory identification.” The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the identification was not exempt from the notice requirement and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a police officer’s identification of a suspect is exempt from the CPL 710.30 notice requirement as a “confirmatory identification” when the officer’s initial observation of the suspect was brief, at night, and from a distance.

    Holding

    No, because the circumstances of Officer Cremin’s initial viewing were not such that, as a matter of law, the subsequent identification could not have been the product of undue suggestiveness. Therefore CPL 710.30 (1)(b) notice was required.

    Court’s Reasoning

    CPL 710.30 requires the prosecution to provide notice of pretrial identifications to allow the defendant to challenge their reliability at a Wade hearing. The “confirmatory identification” exception, established in People v. Wharton, applies only when there is no risk of misidentification. This exception is limited to situations where the identifying witness knows the defendant so well that police suggestiveness could not taint the identification or where a trained undercover officer identifies a suspect immediately after a planned buy-and-bust operation, ensuring that an innocent person is not mistakenly arrested.

    The Court emphasized that “[c]omprehensive analysis, not superficial categorization, ultimately governs.” People v. Gordon, 76 N.Y.2d 595, 601 (1990). The quality of the initial viewing is critical. Because Officer Cremin’s initial observation was brief, at night, and from a distance, it was not sufficiently clear to eliminate the risk of misidentification. The Court reasoned that extending the “confirmatory identification” exception to fleeting and unreliable observations would eliminate the protections offered by a Wade hearing and contravene the procedure mandated by the Legislature. “Misidentifications should be carefully guarded against lest innocent persons be swept into unlawful arrests and convictions.” Id. at 601.

  • People v. Wilson, 4 N.Y.3d 777 (2005): Independent Basis Required for In-Court Identification After Suggestive Lineup

    4 N.Y.3d 777 (2005)

    When a pretrial lineup identification is deemed unduly suggestive, an in-court identification by the same witness is inadmissible unless the prosecution establishes an independent basis for the in-court identification, untainted by the suggestive lineup.

    Summary

    Wilson was convicted based on an eyewitness identification. The eyewitness identified Wilson in a lineup shortly after viewing Wilson’s photograph shown to him by a police officer. Wilson moved to suppress the lineup and any in-court identification. The trial court denied the motion, finding the lineup was not tainted. The appellate court reversed, finding the lineup unduly suggestive. However, the appellate court upheld the conviction, concluding there was an independent basis for the in-court identification. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court had not actually made a finding of an independent basis, and remanded for a hearing on whether such a basis existed.

    Facts

    An eyewitness identified Wilson in a pretrial lineup.
    Prior to the lineup, a police officer showed the eyewitness a photograph of Wilson.
    Wilson moved to suppress the lineup identification and any potential in-court identification.
    The trial court denied the motion, finding the lineup untainted by the photo viewing.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Wilson.
    The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s finding that the lineup was not unduly suggestive but affirmed the conviction, stating that the trial court correctly found an independent basis for the in-court identification.
    Wilson appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an in-court identification is admissible when the pretrial lineup identification is deemed unduly suggestive and the trial court has not made an explicit finding regarding an independent source for the in-court identification.

    Holding

    No, because the trial court did not take the additional step of determining whether an independent source existed for the eyewitness’s in-court identification, the Appellate Division erred in concluding the trial court had “correctly found” that the eyewitness had an independent source for his in-court identification testimony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that because the trial court never explicitly determined whether an independent source existed for the in-court identification, the Appellate Division erred in concluding that the trial court had “correctly found” such a basis.
    The Court emphasized that the Appellate Division could make a de novo independent source determination based on evidence from the suppression hearing but that the inquiry in this case was too truncated to allow for such a determination. The Court noted, “Because Supreme Court never took the additional step of determining whether an independent source existed for the eyewitness’s in-court identification, Supreme Court cannot be said to have ruled “correctly” when it never ruled at all.”
    The Court reiterated the importance of the prosecution presenting independent source evidence at a Wade hearing to avoid the risk of completely renewed proceedings, quoting People v. Burts, 78 N.Y.2d 20, 25 (1991) that, in light of the “risk for completely renewed proceedings” whenever a pretrial identification is challenged, the People are generally well-advised to come forward with any independent source evidence at a
    Wade hearing so that the suppression court may, where appropriate, rule in the alternative.
    This demonstrates a practical consideration for prosecutors to present all available evidence during the initial suppression hearing.
    The remedy was to reverse the conviction and remand the case to the Supreme Court for an independent source hearing prior to retrial.

  • People v. Jackson, 98 N.Y.2d 555 (2002): Effect of Lost Lineup Photo on Appeal

    People v. Jackson, 98 N.Y.2d 555 (2002)

    When a lineup photograph is lost after a Wade hearing, the appellate court must determine if the exhibit is of substantial importance and whether the information it contains is otherwise available in the record; if the information is available, the loss of the exhibit does not prevent proper appellate review.

    Summary

    Ronald Jackson was convicted of robbery, assault, and weapons charges stemming from an armed robbery. The key issue on appeal was the effect of the post-Wade hearing loss of a lineup photograph on the defendant’s challenge to the hearing court’s determination that the lineup was not unduly suggestive. The Court of Appeals held that the loss of the photograph did not automatically require reversal, as long as the information contained in the photograph was otherwise available in the record for appellate review. Because a photocopy of the lineup was available and used at trial, the loss of the original photograph did not prevent meaningful appellate review.

    Facts

    Jackson and a co-defendant robbed two men at gunpoint. Police, responding to the scene, traced the getaway car to the co-defendant’s mother. They found Jackson near the car. The shooting victim described the assailant to police. A detective, noting Jackson’s age, height, and weight, arranged a lineup with four fillers of similar size and skin tone. Jackson chose his position. The detective photographed the lineup and noted the fillers’ ages. The victim identified Jackson in the lineup. Before trial, Jackson moved to suppress the identification testimony, arguing that the fillers were much older. The trial court denied the motion after examining the photograph.

    Procedural History

    The defendant and co-defendant were indicted on multiple counts of robbery and assault. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress the identification testimony from a lineup. The trial court denied the motion. At trial, a detective testified the original lineup photo was misplaced; a photocopy was admitted without objection. The jury convicted Jackson on robbery, assault, and weapons counts but acquitted him of attempted murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the loss of a lineup photograph after a Wade hearing automatically requires reversal of a conviction when the defendant argues the lineup was unduly suggestive.

    2. Whether an age discrepancy between a defendant and the fillers in a lineup, without more, is sufficient to create a substantial likelihood that the defendant would be singled out for identification.

    Holding

    1. No, because an appellate court must determine if the exhibit is of ‘substantial importance’ and if the information it contains is accurately reflected in the record. If the information is reflected in the record and its accuracy is not disputed, the loss of the exhibit itself would not prevent proper appellate review.

    2. No, because an age discrepancy alone is not enough to make a lineup unduly suggestive, absent a showing of other factors that would make the defendant stand out.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding that the loss of the lineup photograph did not preclude meaningful appellate review. The Court cited People v. Yavru-Sakuk, 98 N.Y.2d 56 (2002), for the principle that when a trial exhibit is lost, an appellate court must determine if the exhibit is of “substantial importance” to the issues in the case. If so, the court must then determine whether the information contained in the exhibit is accurately reflected elsewhere in the record. Here, the Court found that a photocopy of the lineup photograph, admitted into evidence at trial without objection and used by defense counsel, provided sufficient information for appellate review. The Court emphasized that “an age discrepancy between a defendant and the fillers in a lineup, without more, is not ‘sufficient to create a substantial likelihood that the defendant would be singled out for identification’ (Chipp, 75 NY2d at 336).” The Court also noted that the victim never mentioned the perpetrator’s age in the description provided to police. The Court cautioned that the original lineup photograph is preferable and that counsel and trial courts should take great care in preserving exhibits that play a key role in a defendant’s case.

  • People v. Merrill, 87 N.Y.2d 948 (1996): Sufficiency of CPL 710.30 Notice After Defendant Moves to Suppress Identification

    People v. Merrill, 87 N.Y.2d 948 (1996)

    When a defendant moves to suppress identification testimony and receives a full hearing on the fairness of the identification procedure, any alleged deficiency in the CPL 710.30 notice provided by the People is irrelevant.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of grand larceny and petit larceny. Prior to trial, Defendant moved to preclude identification evidence, arguing the People’s CPL 710.30 notice was insufficient. The trial court denied preclusion, and after a Wade hearing, denied suppression. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, holding the CPL 710.30 notice was deficient. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because Defendant moved to suppress the identification testimony and received a full hearing, any deficiency in the notice was irrelevant. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division for consideration of the facts.

    Facts

    Defendant was charged with grand larceny and petit larceny. The People intended to offer identification testimony at trial.

    Procedural History

    Prior to trial, Defendant moved to preclude the identification evidence, arguing the People’s CPL 710.30 notice was insufficient. The trial court denied the motion to preclude. Defendant then made an oral motion to suppress the identification testimony, and the court scheduled a Wade hearing. After the hearing, the trial court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress, finding that the identification procedure was not suggestive. Defendant was convicted after a jury trial. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the CPL 710.30 notice deficient. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an alleged deficiency in the People’s CPL 710.30 notice is relevant when the defendant moves to suppress the identification testimony and receives a full hearing on the fairness of the identification procedure.

    Holding

    No, because the purpose of CPL 710.30 is satisfied when a defendant receives a hearing on the identification procedure after moving to suppress the identification testimony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 710.30 requires the People to serve a notice of intent to offer identification testimony to the defendant. However, CPL 710.30(3) excuses the notice requirement when a defendant moves to suppress the identification testimony. The Court stated, “Since the defendant here moved to suppress the identification testimony and received a full hearing on the fairness of the identification procedure, any alleged deficiency in the notice provided by the People was irrelevant.” The Court emphasized that the purpose of the notice requirement is to allow a defendant to test the admissibility of identification testimony. When a defendant is afforded a suppression hearing, the purpose of the notice requirement is satisfied, regardless of the sufficiency of the notice itself. This prevents a defendant from exploiting a technical deficiency in the notice when they have already received the benefit of a full hearing on the identification procedure. The Court cited People v. Lopez, 84 NY2d 425, 428, in support of its holding. By moving to suppress, the defendant demonstrates knowledge of the potential identification testimony and has the opportunity to challenge its admissibility. The actual content of the 710.30 notice becomes moot because the defendant actively pursued a hearing on the identification’s validity.

  • People v. James, 84 N.Y.2d 1042 (1995): Preserving Claims of Prosecutorial Misconduct

    People v. James, 84 N.Y.2d 1042 (1995)

    A claim of prosecutorial misconduct during a lineup procedure, seeking a sanction beyond suppression of the lineup identification, must be preserved by a specific motion (e.g., a Clayton motion) to be reviewable on appeal; otherwise, the claim is waived.

    Summary

    The defendant, convicted of second-degree murder, argued that the trial court erred by not imposing a sanction on the prosecution for misconduct during a lineup, specifically, using fillers significantly older than the 15-year-old defendant and misrepresenting their ages in the lineup report. While the lineup identifications were suppressed due to undue suggestion, the defendant claimed the court should have dismissed the indictment or suppressed in-court identifications. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant failed to preserve the prosecutorial misconduct claim by not raising it in a separate Clayton motion after the Wade hearing, which focused solely on suggestiveness and independent source.

    Facts

    A 15-year-old defendant was placed in a lineup with five fillers who were significantly older (ages 28-42). The lineup report falsely stated that the fillers were teenagers. At a Wade hearing, this discrepancy was revealed. The trial court determined that the lineup was unduly suggestive and suppressed the lineup identifications.

    Procedural History

    The trial court suppressed the lineup identifications after a Wade hearing. The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that further sanctions should have been imposed for the prosecutorial misconduct.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant, after successfully suppressing lineup identifications due to suggestiveness, must make a separate motion (e.g., a Clayton motion) to preserve a claim that the prosecution’s misconduct during the lineup warrants additional sanctions, such as dismissal of the indictment or suppression of in-court identifications.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant failed to raise the prosecutorial misconduct claim in a separate motion, the claim is unpreserved for appellate review. The initial Wade hearing was limited to the issues of suggestiveness and independent source.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the Wade hearing was explicitly limited to determining suggestiveness and independent source. The court and counsel agreed that the Isaacson claim (regarding prosecutorial misconduct) was beyond the scope of the Wade proceeding. The defendant was advised to raise the prosecutorial misconduct claim through a future Clayton motion. While defense counsel claimed at the Wade hearing that in-court identifications should be suppressed, this claim was based on the *taint* of the suggestive lineup, an issue appropriately resolved at the Wade hearing, and was distinct from a claim of prosecutorial misconduct. The court noted that the record did not show that the defense ever made a subsequent Clayton motion or otherwise sought to litigate the issue of sanctions for the People’s misconduct. Because the independent source for the in-court identifications was established, that issue was beyond further review. Therefore, the prosecutorial misconduct claim was unpreserved. The court stated, “The record does not establish that the defense ever made a subsequent Clayton motion or in any way sought to litigate the separate question of an appropriate sanction for the People’s misconduct at any other time. Accordingly, that claim is unpreserved for our review.”

  • People v. Clark, 88 N.Y.2d 552 (1996): Reopening Wade Hearings Based on New Facts

    People v. Clark, 88 N.Y.2d 552 (1996)

    A trial court has discretion to deny a motion to reopen a Wade hearing (regarding the admissibility of identification evidence) when the “additional pertinent facts” presented by the defendant are not sufficiently related to the issue of police suggestiveness.

    Summary

    Clark was convicted of attempted robbery. Prior to trial, a Wade hearing was held regarding the victim’s identification of Clark. At trial, Clark sought to reopen the Wade hearing based on a discrepancy between the arresting officer’s testimony at the Wade hearing and the victim’s grand jury testimony regarding the chase that led to Clark’s arrest. The trial court denied the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the discrepancy was not “pertinent” to the issue of police suggestiveness in the identification.

    Facts

    Ronald Cuocolo was making a delivery when he was accosted by Clark, who demanded money. After a struggle, Clark fled. Cuocolo and others chased Clark. Cuocolo then directed police officers toward Clark, who was standing on the sidewalk two blocks away. The police arrested Clark. Cuocolo identified Clark as the perpetrator in a “corporeal non-lineup.” Prior to trial, a Wade hearing was held to determine the admissibility of Cuocolo’s identification.

    Procedural History

    Prior to trial, Clark moved to suppress Cuocolo’s identification. A Wade hearing was granted. The hearing court denied suppression. At trial, after the People’s opening statement, Clark renewed the motion to suppress or, alternatively, to reopen the Wade hearing based on a discrepancy in testimony. The trial court denied the motion. Clark was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to reopen the Wade hearing based on a discrepancy between the arresting officer’s Wade hearing testimony and the victim’s grand jury testimony regarding the events leading to the defendant’s arrest.

    Holding

    No, because the discrepancy between the testimonies was not “pertinent” to the issue of police suggestiveness in the identification.

    Court’s Reasoning

    CPL 710.40(4) allows a court to permit renewal of a suppression motion if “additional pertinent facts have been discovered by the defendant which he could not have discovered with reasonable diligence before the determination of the motion.” The Court of Appeals stated that the crucial question is whether the asserted facts are “pertinent” to the issue of official suggestiveness such that they would materially affect or have affected the earlier Wade determination. The Court emphasized that the statute doesn’t mandate that the new facts be outcome-determinative, but they must be related to the issue of suggestiveness by law enforcement. The court found that the discrepancy regarding the chase was not pertinent to whether the police engaged in suggestive conduct during the identification. The court distinguished this case from *People v. Dixon*, where no Wade hearing was held initially. The court stated: “To suggest here that this standard was met as a matter of law and that the victim-initiated and uninterrupted chase, culminating in the apprehension of this perpetrator was a police-arranged procedure (dissenting opn, at 559), as a matter of law also, compelling a reopening of the *Wade* hearing, goes well beyond what this record presented to the trial court and Appellate Division.”

  • People v. Johnson, 81 N.Y.2d 730 (1992): Requiring Wade Hearings for Showup Identifications

    People v. Johnson, 81 N.Y.2d 730 (1992)

    A Wade hearing is required to determine if a showup identification procedure was unduly suggestive, unless it falls under a recognized exception such as a confirmatory identification.

    Summary

    Following a robbery, the victim identified the defendant in a showup after police apprehended him in a building. The New York Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in concluding, without a Wade hearing, that the identification was free from police suggestion. The Court emphasized that even though the victim initiated the pursuit of the suspect, the showup did not automatically qualify as a confirmatory identification. The court remitted the case for a Wade hearing to determine whether the showup was unduly suggestive, highlighting the potential for police influence during the pursuit and waiting period.

    Facts

    A robbery victim and his sister informed nearby police officers that he had been robbed of jewelry, allegedly at gunpoint, in his building’s elevator. The victim accompanied the officers in their marked police car, canvassing the adjacent block. The victim identified a person he believed to be the robber. As the police approached in their vehicle, the suspect, wearing a brown sheepskin jacket and a black baseball hat, fled into an apartment building. An officer pursued the suspect on foot. Backup officers arrived and searched the building. The jacket and hat were found on the third floor. The defendant was apprehended in the stairwell and presented to the victim on the ground floor landing, where the victim identified him. Neither a gun nor the stolen jewelry was recovered.

    Procedural History

    The trial court concluded, without holding a Wade hearing, that the victim’s identification was free of police suggestion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals modified the order, remitting the case to the Supreme Court for a Wade hearing. If the hearing determined police suggestiveness tainted the showup, the defendant would be entitled to a new trial; otherwise, the judgment of conviction and sentence should be amended to reflect the hearing’s result.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a Wade hearing is required to determine if a showup identification procedure was unduly suggestive when, after a robbery, the victim identifies the defendant in a showup after police apprehended him in a building, even though the victim initially pointed out the defendant to the police.

    Holding

    Yes, because the showup identification procedure does not automatically fall into the category of confirmatory identifications, and a hearing is necessary to determine if police suggestiveness tainted the procedure.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the trial court erred in determining the identification was free from police suggestion without holding a Wade hearing. The court noted that even though the victim initiated the police chase, the subsequent showup did not automatically qualify as a confirmatory identification, which is a recognized exception to the Wade hearing requirement. The court emphasized the need to examine the circumstances surrounding the identification to determine if it was unduly suggestive. The court stated, “Absent a hearing, it is impossible to discern whether the police had any influence on the victim during the pursuit immediately following the robbery, or to evaluate the effect on the identification procedure of the time the victim spent waiting in the police car outside the building while the police were searching for the perpetrator inside, or to determine the circumstances of the showup itself.” The court further stated, “Therefore, the courts below had no basis to determine that the police-arranged showup was free of taint, and that the victim was impervious to police suggestion.” Because the circumstances surrounding the showup identification were unclear, the Court found that a Wade hearing was necessary to determine if the procedure resulted in an unduly suggestive identification. The court distinguished the case from situations involving confirmatory identifications, where the witness has prior familiarity with the defendant, making a Wade hearing unnecessary.

  • People v. Dixon, 85 N.Y.2d 218 (1995): Right to Wade Hearing After Canvassing Identification

    People v. Dixon, 85 N.Y.2d 218 (1995)

    A defendant is entitled to a Wade hearing when an identification occurs as a result of a police-arranged canvassing procedure, even if the witness spontaneously identifies the defendant.

    Summary

    Dixon was convicted of robbery based on an out-of-court identification by the victim during a police canvass of the crime scene. The trial court summarily denied Dixon’s motion for a Wade hearing, arguing the identification was spontaneous and not police-arranged. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because the canvassing was a police-directed procedure, Dixon was entitled to a Wade hearing to determine if the identification was tainted by police suggestion, regardless of whether the victim’s identification was unprompted.

    Facts

    Harold Knowings was robbed by a group of men. Transit police drove Knowings through the area near the crime scene in a marked police van to search for the perpetrators. During this “canvass,” Knowings pointed to Dixon on the street and identified him as one of the robbers. Dixon was arrested based on this identification and charged with robbery, grand larceny, and assault.

    Procedural History

    The People notified Dixon about the out-of-court identification. Dixon moved for a Wade hearing, arguing the identification procedure was unfair and created a substantial likelihood of misidentification. The People opposed, stating the identification was spontaneous during a canvass, not a police-arranged procedure. The suppression court denied the motion without a hearing. Dixon was convicted of second-degree robbery. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding the identification was spontaneous and not police-arranged. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant is entitled to a Wade hearing when an identification results from a police-directed canvassing procedure, even if the witness’s identification is spontaneous.

    Holding

    Yes, because the canvassing was an identification procedure undertaken at the deliberate direction of the State, and the possibility of police prompting was not foreclosed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals noted that CPL 710.60 requires a hearing unless summary denial is authorized. A suppression motion can be summarily denied if there’s no legal basis for suppression or the factual predicate is insufficient. The Court emphasized that defendants are no longer required to plead specific facts about the identification procedure to be entitled to a Wade hearing. The purpose of a Wade hearing is to test for taint arising from official suggestion during police-arranged confrontations. The Court rejected the argument that a spontaneous identification removes the canvassing from the category of police-sponsored viewings warranting a Wade hearing, distinguishing between witness-initiated procedures and witness-initiated identifications.

    “[T]he due process concerns underlying the notice provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law…are implicated whenever ‘identification procedures…come about at the deliberate direction of the State.’” The Court emphasized the canvassing was arranged for the distinct purpose of identifying perpetrators, making it a police-sponsored procedure. The Court reiterated that exceptions to Wade hearings are narrowly confined to confirmatory identifications or when the protagonists are known to one another. It noted that “'[t]he influence of improper suggestion upon identifying witnesses probably accounts for more miscarriages of justice than any other factor.’” Without a hearing, the courts could not conclude the identification was free from police suggestion. The case was remitted for a Wade hearing.

  • People v. Mato, 83 N.Y.2d 406 (1994): When a Wade Hearing is Required for Undercover Identifications

    83 N.Y.2d 406 (1994)

    A Wade hearing is required when there is a significant lapse of time between an undercover officer’s initial encounter with a suspect and a subsequent identification, or when the circumstances surrounding the identification suggest a risk of misidentification, even if the identification is labeled “confirmatory.”

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of selling drugs based on an undercover officer’s identification. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion for a Wade hearing to determine the admissibility of the identification testimony. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a Wade hearing was necessary due to the time lapse between the initial drug transaction and the subsequent identification, as well as the circumstances surrounding the identification. The court emphasized that a “confirmatory” identification does not automatically obviate the need for a Wade hearing and that a case-by-case analysis is required.

    Facts

    An undercover officer purchased drugs from the defendant on July 12, 1989. The officer mistakenly recorded the address of the transaction. A search warrant was issued based on this incorrect information, leading to the wrongful arrest of a family. On August 7, 1989, the undercover officer returned to the correct address and purchased drugs again. He saw the defendant standing outside the building, had a brief conversation with him, and then arrested him for the July 12 transaction. The undercover officer viewed the defendant again, handcuffed, outside the building and at the police station.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion for a Wade hearing to suppress the identification testimony. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case for a Wade hearing.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a Wade hearing, given the time lapse between the drug transaction and the identification, the officer’s initial mistake regarding the address, and the circumstances of the subsequent viewings of the defendant.

    Holding

    Yes, because the time lapse between the initial encounter and the subsequent identification, combined with the circumstances of the identification, created a significant risk of misidentification, necessitating a Wade hearing to determine the admissibility of the identification testimony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the identification in this case did not meet the criteria for a “confirmatory” identification that would obviate the need for a Wade hearing. The court emphasized that a significant time lapse between the initial encounter and the identification, as seen in People v. Newball, raises concerns about the reliability of the identification. The court distinguished this case from People v. Wharton, where the identification was considered an ordinary and proper completion of an integral police procedure because the viewing by the officer occurred at a place and time sufficiently connected and contemporaneous to the arrest. Here, the 26-day gap, the officer’s mistake about the address, and the suggestiveness of viewing the defendant in handcuffs all pointed to the need for a Wade hearing. The court stated, “(c)omprehensive analysis, not superficial categorization, ultimately governs.” The Court noted that testimony regarding the August 7th identification was only permissible if it directly related back to the original transaction of July 12th and that showup evidence should be avoided and subjected to Wade hearings to safeguard accuracy.

  • People v. Cicero, 572 N.E.2d 986 (N.Y. 1991): Limits on Calling Complainant at Wade Hearing

    People v. Cicero, 78 N.Y.2d 1020, 572 N.E.2d 986 (1991)

    A defendant does not have an absolute right to call a complainant at a Wade hearing to challenge an identification procedure unless there is some indication of suggestiveness in the procedure itself.

    Summary

    Cicero was convicted of a crime, and on appeal, argued that he should have been allowed to call the complainant as a witness at his Wade hearing, which was convened to determine if the pre-trial identification procedure was unduly suggestive. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that a defendant only has the right to call a complainant at a Wade hearing if there is some indication that the identification procedure was suggestive. The Court reasoned that because the showup was conducted promptly at the scene of the crime, and Cicero did not claim the complainant’s testimony would differ from the prosecution’s witnesses, calling the complainant was unnecessary.

    Facts

    The key fact is that the identification procedure used in this case was a showup that occurred promptly at the scene of the crime. Cicero did not dispute the timeliness or location of the showup. Furthermore, Cicero did not allege that the complainant’s potential testimony would contradict the accounts given by the People’s witnesses regarding the identification.

    Procedural History

    The case began in a trial court, which ruled against Cicero’s request to call the complainant to testify at the Wade hearing. Cicero was convicted. He appealed, arguing that the denial of his request was an error. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and Cicero appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the hearing court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s request to call the complainant at the Wade hearing to challenge the identification procedure.

    Holding

    No, because the showup was conducted promptly at the scene of the crime, and the defendant did not claim that the complainant’s testimony would differ from the People’s witnesses; thus, there was no indication of suggestiveness requiring the complainant’s testimony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holdings in People v. Chipp and People v. Love. The Court stated, “A defendant does not have an absolute right to call a complainant at the Wade hearing absent some indicia of the suggestiveness of the identification procedure employed.” The court distinguished cases involving inherently suggestive procedures, such as showups, by noting that the suggestiveness is mitigated when the showup is conducted promptly at the scene of the crime. The court emphasized that Cicero had not claimed that the complainant’s testimony would differ from the prosecution’s witnesses. Thus, the Court concluded that requiring the complainant to testify would be unnecessary and would not serve the purpose of the Wade hearing, which is to determine whether the identification procedure was unduly suggestive. The court essentially found that in the absence of any evidence suggesting impropriety, the defendant’s request was a fishing expedition. As the court stated, “In these circumstances, defendant is not entitled to call the complainant at the hearing.”