New York Law Review

Tag: voting rights

  • Fossella v. Adams, 2025 NY Slip Op 01668: Home Rule and the Power of Local Governments to Determine Voter Eligibility

    2025 NY Slip Op 01668

    The New York State Constitution limits the right to vote in elections to U.S. citizens, but local governments have broad home rule power to manage their affairs. The phrase “People” in Article IX of the Constitution, for voting purposes, includes those eligible under Article II (citizens) and the local government’s right to determine local election rules is limited by these two articles.

    Summary

    In Fossella v. Adams, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality of a New York City law (Local Law 11) that allowed non-citizen lawful permanent residents and individuals authorized to work in the U.S. to vote in municipal elections. The Court held that Article II, Section 1 of the New York State Constitution, which states “Every citizen shall be entitled to vote,” restricts the right to vote in New York elections to U.S. citizens. Further, the court held that Article IX, the Home Rule provision, does not override this limitation. The Court found that the City Council could not implement Local Law 11, which expanded the electorate, absent a public referendum, and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision as modified.

    Facts

    The New York City Council passed Local Law 11 in December 2021, which allowed non-citizen lawful permanent residents and those authorized to work in the United States to vote in municipal elections. After the mayor took no action on the bill, it became effective in January 2022. Plaintiffs, including current and former elected officials and registered voters, sued to declare Local Law 11 unconstitutional, arguing it violated the New York State Constitution, the New York State Election Law, and the Municipal Home Rule Law. The trial court sided with the plaintiffs. The Appellate Division modified the judgment as to the Election Law claim and affirmed the trial court’s other decisions. The City Council and intervenors (non-citizens who would be eligible to vote under Local Law 11) appealed.

    Procedural History

    1. Trial Court: Granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, declaring Local Law 11 unconstitutional. The court held that Local Law 11 violated the New York State Constitution, the New York State Election Law, and the Municipal Home Rule Law.

    2. Appellate Division: Modified the trial court’s judgment regarding the Election Law claim but affirmed the remainder of the lower court’s ruling.

    3. Court of Appeals: Affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision as modified, holding that the New York State Constitution restricts voting rights to citizens and that Article IX did not override that restriction, and Local Law 11 could not be implemented absent a referendum.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Article II, Section 1 of the New York State Constitution limits voting to citizens?

    2. Whether Article IX of the New York State Constitution, which grants local governments home rule powers, creates an exception to the citizen-only voting requirement of Article II?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the language of Article II, Section 1, states: “Every citizen shall be entitled to vote at every election.” The court interpreted this language to restrict the right to vote to citizens.

    2. No, because Article IX expressly incorporates Article II, Section 1, which limits voting to citizens. Therefore, the home rule powers granted by Article IX do not supersede the citizenship requirement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    1. Article II, Section 1: The court emphasized that Article II, Section 1, clearly grants the right to vote to citizens. The court considered that Article II, Section 5, laws “for ascertaining, by proper proofs, the citizens” and Section 7, which dictates “all elections by the citizens” confirmed the limited franchise. The court rejected arguments that the term “citizen” merely provided a minimum qualification, stating that the constitutional language and historical context supported a restriction. The court looked to the history of this provision and relevant case law such as People ex rel. Smith v. Pease and Matter of Hopper v. Britt to support this view.

    2. Article IX and Home Rule: The Court held that Article IX’s incorporation of Article II’s definition of “People” as “Persons entitled to vote as provided in section one of article two of this constitution” maintained the citizen-only voting restriction. The Court found no language in Article IX that directly or indirectly permits municipalities to expand the definition of who may vote in local elections beyond citizens. The Court rejected arguments that the phrase “mean or include” in Article IX, Section 3(d) granted broader discretion. It found that this phrase did not change the fact that the term “people” was defined to align with Article II’s voting rights, which are limited to citizens.

    Practical Implications

    1. Impact on Similar Cases: The decision clarifies that in New York, only citizens may vote in elections, even those at the local level. Any local laws that attempt to grant voting rights to non-citizens are likely unconstitutional. Future cases will likely focus on the precise scope of the definition of “citizen.”

    2. Changes to Legal Practice: This ruling establishes that the home rule power of local governments is limited by the state constitution’s voting requirements. Legal practitioners advising local governments must understand that they cannot unilaterally expand the franchise beyond citizens.

    3. Business and Societal Implications: This decision reinforces the role of citizenship in the electoral process. It will likely affect the political participation of non-citizens. The decision also raises questions about how local governments can best engage with and represent the interests of non-citizen residents, and how local governments’ role will be defined. This decision ensures that, absent a state constitutional amendment, only citizens will have the right to vote in New York elections.

    4. Later Cases: While this decision is relatively recent, it will undoubtedly be cited in future cases dealing with the intersection of voting rights, home rule, and local government powers in New York. Cases regarding the definition of citizenship and the scope of “municipal elections” are probable.

  • Stefanik v. Hochul, 2024 NY Slip Op 04236: NY Early Mail Voter Act Upheld, No Constitutional Requirement for In-Person Voting

    2024 NY Slip Op 04236

    The New York Constitution does not explicitly require in-person voting, and the legislature has broad authority to regulate the manner of elections, including early voting by mail, provided secrecy in voting is preserved.

    Summary

    In Stefanik v. Hochul, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality of the Early Mail Voter Act, which allows all registered voters to vote early by mail. The plaintiffs, a coalition of elected officials and voters, argued that the Act violated the New York Constitution, contending that it implicitly mandates in-person voting except for specific absentee ballot provisions. The Court of Appeals disagreed, affirming the lower court’s decision to uphold the Act. The Court found no explicit constitutional requirement for in-person voting, emphasizing the legislature’s broad power to regulate elections and the evolution of voting methods over time. The court’s ruling highlights the interplay between constitutional text, historical context, and legislative authority in defining voting rights.

    Facts

    The Early Mail Voter Act, enacted in 2023 and effective January 1, 2024, allows any registered voter in New York to apply to vote early by mail. The Act followed the failure of a proposed constitutional amendment that would have eliminated the requirement for voters to provide a reason for voting by absentee ballot. The plaintiffs argued that the Act contradicted Article II, Section 2 of the New York Constitution, which outlines provisions for absentee voting. The Supreme Court and the Appellate Division both dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims, leading to this appeal before the Court of Appeals.

    Procedural History

    The case began in September 2023 with the enactment of the Early Mail Voter Act. The plaintiffs initiated legal action, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Act was unconstitutional, along with an injunction. The Supreme Court of Albany County granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaint, and the plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment was denied. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the lower court’s decision, and the plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals as a matter of right.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Early Mail Voter Act, which permits early voting by mail, violates Article II, Section 2 of the New York Constitution, thereby requiring in-person voting.
    2. Whether the legislature exceeded its constitutional authority by enacting the Early Mail Voter Act.

    Holding

    1. No, because the Early Mail Voter Act does not violate Article II, Section 2 of the New York Constitution, and the Constitution does not explicitly require in-person voting.
    2. No, because the legislature’s actions were within its constitutional power to regulate the manner of elections.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals began by acknowledging the strong presumption of constitutionality afforded to legislative enactments. The Court determined that the legislature’s power to regulate elections was broad and limited only by the Federal and State Constitutions. The Court thoroughly analyzed the text and historical context of Article II, Section 2, which addresses absentee voting, finding that it does not expressly mandate in-person voting. The Court emphasized that the legislature has the authority to determine the method of voting, as per Article II, Section 7, which permits voting by ballot or by any other method as prescribed by law, provided secrecy is maintained. The Court considered the historical evolution of voting methods, noting the deletion of the Election District Provision in 1966, which had previously been interpreted as requiring in-person voting. The Court rejected arguments that the Constitution implicitly requires in-person voting, concluding that the legislature’s actions were constitutional. The Court’s rationale highlighted the importance of the textual analysis and legislative intent.

    Practical Implications

    This ruling provides significant clarity on the scope of the legislature’s power to regulate elections in New York. It confirms that the state constitution does not inherently require in-person voting, opening the door for various voting methods, including mail-in voting, to be implemented. Legal practitioners must be aware that challenges to election laws based on the lack of an explicit constitutional requirement for in-person voting are unlikely to succeed. This case has important implications for election law practice in New York and provides important precedent for future cases involving challenges to voting methods, emphasizing the legislature’s authority to adapt to evolving technologies and voter needs. The decision also illustrates how courts will balance legislative authority with the need to protect fundamental voting rights.

  • Matter of Brown v. Board of Elections, 39 A.D.2d 403 (1972): Constitutionality of Durational Residency Requirements for Voting

    39 A.D.2d 403 (1972)

    Durational residency requirements for voting are subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause and will be struck down if less restrictive means can achieve the state’s interest in preventing voter fraud.

    Summary

    This case concerns the constitutionality of New York’s 90-day durational residency requirement for voting. Petitioners, who became county residents in September 1971, were denied voter registration for the November 1971 election because they did not meet the 90-day requirement. The court held that the 90-day residency requirement violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as it impinged on the rights to vote and interstate travel. The court reasoned that less restrictive means, such as voter registration and independent verification of residence, could adequately prevent voter fraud, making the durational residency requirement unconstitutional.

    Facts

    Petitioners established residency in Onondaga County in September 1971.

    They attempted to register to vote in the November 2, 1971 general election.

    Registration was denied because they had not resided in the county for 90 days prior to the election, as required by the New York Constitution and Election Law.

    Procedural History

    Petitioners challenged the 90-day residency requirement under Section 331 of the Election Law.

    The lower court upheld the residency requirement.

    This appeal followed, ultimately reaching the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    Whether New York’s 90-day durational residency requirement for voting violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    Holding

    Yes, because the 90-day durational residency requirement infringes upon the fundamental rights to vote and travel, and the state failed to demonstrate that it was the least restrictive means to achieve a compelling state interest.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied strict scrutiny, noting that any restriction on the right to vote must be “necessary to promote a compelling state interest.” Citing Dunn v. Blumstein, the court emphasized that durational residency requirements impinge on constitutionally secured rights, including the right to vote and interstate travel.

    The court found that New York’s 90-day requirement was indistinguishable from the requirement invalidated in Dunn v. Blumstein. It reasoned that the state’s interest in preventing voter fraud could be achieved through less restrictive means, such as voter registration systems and independent verification of residence. The court highlighted that New York’s system of permanent personal registration and the practice of keeping registration books open until 30 days before an election undermined the argument that a longer residency requirement was necessary for investigation.

    The court stated, “And if there are other, reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a lesser burden on constitutionally protected activity, a State may not choose the way of greater interference. If it acts at all, it must choose ‘less drastic means’”.

    The court concluded that broadly imposed political disabilities, such as durational residency requirements, are too imprecise to withstand constitutional scrutiny, given the availability of less restrictive alternatives.

  • Palla v. Suffolk County Bd. of Elections, 31 N.Y.2d 36 (1972): Establishing Residency for Student Voters

    31 N.Y.2d 36 (1972)

    A student may establish residency for voting purposes at their college location, but election boards can make detailed inquiries to ensure the claimed residency is bona fide and independent of their student status.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether students can establish residency for voting purposes at their college or university location. The New York Court of Appeals held that students can establish residency where they attend college, but election boards are entitled to make detailed inquiries to ensure that the claimed residency is bona fide and independent of their student status. The court upheld the constitutionality of Section 151 of the New York Election Law, which allows for these inquiries, finding that it does not create an unconstitutional barrier to student voting but rather ensures that all voters meet the traditional requirements of bona fide residence.

    Facts

    Several students residing at college dormitories in New York State were either denied voter registration or notified that their existing registration would be challenged. The Suffolk County Board of Elections denied registration to students at Stony Brook. In Oneida and Onondaga Counties, some students were registered, but later notified their right to vote would be challenged. These students challenged the constitutionality of Section 151 of the New York Election Law, arguing it unfairly restricted their right to vote based on their status as students.

    Procedural History

    In Palla v. Suffolk County Bd. of Elections, the Special Term initially found that the students had established residency, but the Appellate Division reversed and remanded for a hearing. In Bell and Gorenberg, the Special Term upheld the constitutionality of Section 151 and dismissed the petitions. The Appellate Division affirmed in Bell and Gorenberg. The cases were then consolidated and appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Section 151 of the New York Election Law violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment by creating a special burden for students seeking to register to vote.
    2. Whether Section 151 violates the Voting Rights Act or the Twenty-Sixth Amendment by abridging the right to vote of 18-year-olds.

    Holding

    1. No, because Section 151 represents a permissible effort to ensure that all applicants for the vote actually fulfill the traditional requirements of bona fide residence.
    2. No, because the statute does not disenfranchise anyone, but merely determines the place where one may legally vote.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that residence for voting purposes requires both an intention to reside at a fixed place and physical presence, coupled with conduct indicating such intent. The court emphasized that Section 151 does not impose additional qualifications for student voters but merely provides a framework for determining whether a student has genuinely changed their domicile. The court stated, “That statute, insofar as relevant, provides that for ‘the purpose of registering and voting no person shall be deemed to have gained or lost a residence… by reason of his presence or absence… while a student of any institution of learning’.” The court found that the statute is neutral and does not disenfranchise anyone but merely determines the appropriate place for an individual to vote. The court acknowledged that students might face a more detailed inquiry into their residency, but this was justified by the fact that their presence in a college town is often temporary. The court held that the classification was reasonable and did not violate equal protection, as it served the legitimate state interest of preventing non-residents from voting. The court held, “We deal admittedly with what is foremost among all political rights — the right to vote. Section 151 distinguishes between residents and nonresidents — not students and other citizens.” The court determined the Board of Elections erred in summarily denying the students’ applications based solely on their student status.

  • Van Berkel v. Power, 16 N.Y.2d 37 (1965): Constitutionality of State Laws Requiring a Waiting Period for Naturalized Citizens to Vote

    Van Berkel v. Power, 16 N.Y.2d 37 (1965)

    A state law requiring a 90-day waiting period between naturalization and the ability to vote does not violate the U.S. Constitution because states have the power to set voting qualifications within reasonable limits.

    Summary

    Van Berkel, a naturalized citizen, challenged New York’s constitutional and statutory provisions that required a 90-day waiting period between naturalization and voter registration. He argued that this violated his rights under the Federal Constitution, as it imposed a more rigorous requirement on naturalized citizens than on native-born citizens. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that the 90-day waiting period was constitutional. The Court reasoned that states have broad authority to determine voter qualifications, provided the restrictions promote intelligent use of the ballot and are not unduly oppressive. The waiting period was deemed a reasonable measure to allow new citizens time to understand their civic responsibilities.

    Facts

    Petitioner Van Berkel, a Dutch immigrant, became a naturalized U.S. citizen on August 11, 1964, in New York City.
    On August 13, 1964, he attempted to register to vote in the upcoming November 3 election.
    The New York City Commissioners of Election denied his registration because he had not been a citizen for at least 90 days prior to the election, as required by New York State Constitution and Election Law § 150.

    Procedural History

    Van Berkel initiated a proceeding challenging the constitutionality of the 90-day waiting period.
    The Supreme Court declared the 90-day period unconstitutional and ordered the Election Commissioners to register Van Berkel.
    The Election Commissioners registered Van Berkel but appealed the Supreme Court’s judgment directly to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether New York State’s constitutional and statutory provisions, requiring naturalized citizens to be citizens for at least 90 days before being eligible to vote, violate the U.S. Constitution.

    Holding

    No, because the power to establish voter qualifications primarily rests with the states, and the 90-day waiting period is a reasonable and permissible restriction designed to promote intelligent use of the ballot.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized the strong presumption of validity afforded to legislative enactments, requiring challengers to demonstrate invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt. It also noted the presumption that the legislature investigated and found a need for the legislation. The Court found a reasonable basis for the 90-day waiting period, suggesting it provides newly naturalized citizens time to consider their new responsibilities. The court cited other states with similar laws, including Minnesota, whose statute was upheld by its highest court. The court acknowledged the primary power of states to set voter qualifications, subject to specific limitations under the U.S. Constitution. Quoting Gray v. Sanders, the Court stated that states may impose qualifications “within limits” and such restrictions are permissible if designed to promote intelligent use of the ballot, citing Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd. The Court concluded that New York’s 90-day requirement was not irrational, did not violate the Federal Constitution, and did not enter a preempted field. Setting voting qualifications remains the business of the states.