New York Law Review

Tag: Voter Registration

  • Clark v. Cuomo, 66 N.Y.2d 186 (1985): Executive Power to Facilitate Voter Registration

    Clark v. Cuomo, 66 N.Y.2d 186 (1985)

    The Executive branch has the power to implement a plan to facilitate voter registration by making registration forms and assistance available at State agencies, as long as it does not usurp legislative prerogatives or act inconsistently with existing legislation.

    Summary

    This case addresses the legality of Executive Order No. 43, issued by Governor Cuomo, which established a voter registration program in state agencies. The program aimed to increase voter participation by making registration forms available and providing assistance at agencies with public contact. The Republican State Chairman challenged the order, arguing it violated the separation of powers and a constitutional provision regarding bipartisan representation on election boards. The Court of Appeals upheld the executive order, finding that it implemented existing legislative policy to encourage voter participation, but also upheld an injunction against providing receptacles for completed forms in agency offices.

    Facts

    Governor Cuomo issued Executive Order No. 43, creating a voter registration program in state agencies. The program mandated agencies to provide voter registration forms and staff assistance. Staff were required to maintain strict neutrality regarding party enrollment. The Voter Registration Task Force was created to oversee the program’s implementation. Agencies made forms available and posted signs about voter registration. Completed forms could be mailed by the applicant or placed in receptacles for pickup by the local Board of Elections.

    Procedural History

    The Republican State Chairman filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing the order was unconstitutional. Special Term granted a preliminary injunction, but the Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals initially affirmed the reversal. After a trial, Trial Term declared the executive order unconstitutional. The Appellate Division reversed again, declaring the order constitutional but enjoining the use of receptacles for completed forms at agency locations. Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Executive Order No. 43 violates the constitutional principle of separation of powers by infringing upon the legislature’s power to establish a system of voter registration?

    2. Whether Executive Order No. 43 violates Article II, Section 8 of the New York Constitution by creating a board or officer charged with registering voters without ensuring bipartisan representation?

    3. Whether the Appellate Division exceeded the scope of its equitable powers by enjoining the provision of receptacles for completed voter registration forms at agency locations?

    Holding

    1. No, because the executive order implements existing legislative policy to encourage voter participation and does not usurp legislative prerogatives.

    2. No, because the executive order is not a law and the personnel implementing it do not actually register voters.

    3. No, because the injunction was a proper exercise of equitable power to prevent the potential for abuse by ensuring that completed voter registration forms are not in the custody of agency personnel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the separation of powers doctrine does not prohibit all overlap between governmental branches. The Executive branch has the power to enforce legislation and has great flexibility in determining methods of enforcement. Executive Order No. 43 did not violate the separation of powers because the Legislature had already declared its policy to encourage broad voter participation (Election Law § 3-102(13); § 5-210(2)). The order simply facilitated the distribution and completion of forms, which is consistent with the legislative policy. The Court distinguished this case from Rapp v. Carey, where the executive order reached far beyond existing legislation and set state policy, which is a legislative function. The court stated, “It is only when the Executive acts inconsistently with the Legislature, or usurps its prerogatives, that the doctrine of separation is violated.”

    Regarding Article II, Section 8, the Court held that this provision only applies to laws and bodies directly involved in registering voters, distributing ballots, or counting votes. Executive Order No. 43 is not a law, and the state agency personnel do not register voters. The Court acknowledged that a “but for” analysis could argue the program does register voters because the critical stage of registration could not be reached unless someone supplied the forms and helped registrants fill them out. However, the Court reasoned that such an interpretation would preclude all private voter registration drives and thus be completely contrary to the expressed legislative policy of encouraging as widespread voter registration as possible.

    The Court upheld the injunction against providing locked receptacles for completed registration forms. While it appeared the program preferred local Boards of Election to have sole custody of the keys to the boxes, this preference was often not followed. The court stated: “The potential for mischief when the key to the box, and the transportation of its contents to Board offices, are the responsibility of agency personnel, is obvious. Less obvious, but in our view also infused with both the perception of and potential for abuse, is the presence of the locked receptacles even in other circumstances.”

  • George v. Goldin, 64 N.Y.2d 95 (1984): Establishing Irreparable Harm for Preliminary Injunctions

    George v. Goldin, 64 N.Y.2d 95 (1984)

    A preliminary injunction will not be issued unless the plaintiff demonstrates a failure of proof of irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted.

    Summary

    This case concerns the denial of a preliminary injunction against the implementation of a New York State voter registration program. The plaintiff sought to halt the program, arguing it violated constitutional and statutory provisions. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision to deny the preliminary injunction, holding that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient proof of irreparable harm that would result from the program’s implementation. The court emphasized that encouraging voter registration, in itself, does not constitute an injury. Injury would occur only if the program was implemented in a discriminatory manner or involved duress, which the plaintiff failed to demonstrate.

    Facts

    The Governor issued Executive Order No. 43, which promulgated a “State Program for Voter Registration.” The plaintiff instituted an action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, challenging the program. The plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the defendants from implementing the voter registration program. The plaintiff argued that the program violated the New York Constitution and Election Law.

    Procedural History

    Special Term issued a preliminary injunction, enjoining the defendants from implementing the voter registration program. The Appellate Division reversed the Special Term’s order and denied the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The Appellate Division granted the plaintiff permission to appeal to the Court of Appeals, certifying the question of whether the Appellate Division erred in reversing the Special Term’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division erred as a matter of law in reversing the order of Special Term and denying the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction.

    Holding

    No, because the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient proof of irreparable injury that would result from the implementation of the voter registration program.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on the principle that a showing of irreparable injury is a prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. The court found that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate any irreparable injury that would result from the voter registration program. The court reasoned that simply encouraging voter registration does not constitute an injury. The court acknowledged that a legally cognizable injury might occur if the program was implemented in a discriminatory manner (e.g., based on geography, demographics, or party enrollment) or if it involved duress or other improper methods. However, the court emphasized that the plaintiff did not present any evidence of such discrimination or improper methods. The court stated, “Of course, the implementation of an informational and promotional program by the agencies of government which would lead to the voluntary registration of additional voters would not of itself result in injury to plaintiff.” The court also noted that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the program fell within the scope of section 8 of article II of the Constitution or section 5-210 (subd 6, par [a]) of the Election Law, which concern bipartisan participation in voter registration. Therefore, the plaintiff could not claim injury based on the alleged denial of bipartisan participation. Because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a risk of irreparable harm, the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction.

  • Matter of Wydler v. Suffolk County Board of Elections, 61 N.Y.2d 609 (1983): Upholding Validity of Designating Petitions Despite Technical Challenges

    Matter of Wydler v. Suffolk County Board of Elections, 61 N.Y.2d 609 (1983)

    Election Law provisions regarding designating petitions are to be interpreted practically, and technical defects will not invalidate petitions absent fraud, confusion, or a failure to substantially comply with statutory requirements.

    Summary

    This case concerns a challenge to designating petitions filed by candidates seeking the Conservative Party nomination for District Court Judge. The petitioners sought to invalidate the petitions on several grounds, including the candidates’ non-enrollment in the Conservative Party, incomplete address information on the petitions, and issues with the witnesses’ qualifications and alterations to the petition sheets. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the validity of the petitions, finding that the objections were without merit under the Election Law. The Court emphasized that the statutory requirements were met, and there was no evidence of fraud or confusion that would warrant invalidation.

    Facts

    Three respondents filed designating petitions with the Suffolk County Board of Elections seeking the Conservative Party nomination for District Court Judge. The petitioners sought to invalidate these petitions, arguing: (1) the respondents were not enrolled members of the Conservative Party; (2) some signatures listed incomplete addresses; (3) one witness (Raymond Nugent, Jr.) was not a qualified Conservative Party member when he witnessed the petitions; and (4) alterations on some sheets witnessed by Mary Hynes were not properly initialed.

    Procedural History

    The Trial Term dismissed the petition, holding it lacked jurisdiction because the petitioners failed to serve specifications of objections on the respondents as required by a State Board of Elections rule. However, the Trial Term also considered the objections and found none warranted invalidation. The Appellate Division affirmed, focusing solely on the failure to comply with the State Board of Elections rule. The Court of Appeals addressed the specific objections since the parties agreed there were no disputed facts.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether candidates not enrolled in the Conservative Party require a certificate of resolution to run for the party’s nomination for District Court Judge, given Election Law § 6-120(4)?

    2. Whether signatures lacking the hamlet of residence but containing the street address, election district, and town meet the address requirements of Election Law § 6-130(1)?

    3. Whether a witness (Raymond Nugent, Jr.) was qualified to witness designating petitions despite a prior lapse in his voter registration?

    4. Whether alterations to a witnessing clause on petition sheets, specifically the crossing out of one name and replacement with another, require invalidation of the petitions?

    Holding

    1. No, because Election Law § 6-120(4) expressly excludes judicial candidates from the certificate of resolution requirement, and any conflicting party rules are invalid.

    2. Yes, because providing the street address, election district, and town satisfies the statutory requirement to designate the signer’s “town or city.”

    3. Yes, because Nugent’s prior registration was canceled when he moved and failed to transfer his registration, making him a new voter upon re-registering, thus immediately qualified to witness petitions.

    4. No, because there was no evidence the alteration was made by someone other than the subscribing witness or that it resulted in any fraud or confusion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the Conservative Party rules requiring a certificate of resolution for non-enrolled candidates conflicted with Election Law § 6-120(4), which specifically exempts judicial candidates from this requirement. The Court cited Matter of Grancio v. Coveney, 60 N.Y.2d 603, emphasizing that statutes prevail over conflicting party rules. Regarding the address issue, the Court found that listing the street address, election district, and town sufficiently complied with Election Law § 6-130(1). As for Raymond Nugent Jr.’s qualifications, the Court applied Election Law § 5-400(2), noting his prior registration was canceled upon moving without transferring it. Therefore, his 1983 registration made him a new voter effective immediately under Election Law § 5-300, qualifying him to witness the petitions. Finally, concerning the alteration on some sheets witnessed by Mary Hynes, the Court followed the principle articulated in Matter of Waible v. Dosberg, 83 A.D.2d 983, affd 54 N.Y.2d 780, holding that alterations do not invalidate petitions absent evidence of fraud or confusion. The Court stated that since, “[t]here is no evidence that the alteration was made by anyone other than the subscribing witness or that it resulted in any fraud or confusion and it does not require invalidation of the petitions”. The decision underscores a practical approach to election law, focusing on substantial compliance and the absence of fraud or confusion over strict adherence to technicalities.

  • Matter of Merrill v. Suffolk County Bd. of Elections, 46 N.Y.2d 983 (1979): Residency Requirements for Voting by Psychiatric Center Residents

    Matter of Merrill v. Suffolk County Bd. of Elections, 46 N.Y.2d 983 (1979)

    An affidavit from a voluntary resident of a psychiatric center, stating their intent to reside there permanently and lacking any contradictory evidence, is sufficient proof of residency for voter registration purposes.

    Summary

    This case concerns the registration of residents of the Pilgrim State Psychiatric Center to vote. The Suffolk County Board of Elections argued that an evidentiary hearing was always required to establish residency. The Court of Appeals held that an unrefuted affidavit from a resident, stating their voluntary and long-term residency at the center, and declaring the center as their home, was sufficient proof of residency for voter registration when the board presented no opposing evidence. The court also held the case was not moot, because the issue of voter registration was a continuing one.

    Facts

    An individual voluntarily residing at the Pilgrim State Psychiatric Center for over 30 years submitted an affidavit to the Suffolk County Board of Elections. The affidavit stated that the individual had no other residence, considered Suffolk County their home, and intended to remain at the psychiatric center. The Board of Elections sought an evidentiary hearing to verify the individual’s residency, arguing the affidavit was insufficient.

    Procedural History

    The case began as a proceeding to compel the Suffolk County Board of Elections to allow certain residents of the Pilgrim State Psychiatric Center to register to vote. The Appellate Division found the affidavit adequate, and the Board of Elections appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an affidavit from a voluntary resident of a psychiatric center, stating their intent to reside there permanently and lacking any contradictory evidence, is sufficient proof of residency for voter registration purposes, or whether the Board of Elections can demand an evidentiary hearing in all such cases.

    Holding

    Yes, because the affidavit, unrefuted by any factual showing from the Board of Elections, constitutes sufficient proof of residency under Election Law § 335.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from Matter of Palla v Suffolk County Bd. of Elections, where issues of fact were raised by opposing affidavits. Here, the Board of Elections provided no opposing evidence to contradict the resident’s affidavit. The court emphasized that the affidavit, stating the resident’s voluntary long-term residency and intent to make the center their home, was sufficient. The court relied on Election Law § 335, which allows the court to consider the affidavit as sufficient proof of residency when unrefuted. The court stated, “Under the circumstances here, however, the court had a right to consider and rely upon an affidavit by the individual seeking registration, unrefuted by any factual statement or showing, as sufficient proof of residency.” The court further noted that registration to vote is a continuing status, so the matter was not moot despite the passing of the election. The court also cited Matter of Carr v New York State Bd. of Elections, noting that review should not be declined on mootness grounds when the issue is likely to recur.

  • DeSapio v. Koch, 14 N.Y.2d 735 (1964): Invalidating Votes Cast Without Signed Registration Poll Records

    DeSapio v. Koch, 14 N.Y.2d 735 (1964)

    Votes cast by individuals who fail to sign the registration poll records are invalid and should not be counted in an election.

    Summary

    This case concerns a dispute over a Democratic primary election for the position of Male Leader. DeSapio challenged the election results, alleging that numerous invalid votes were counted for Koch. The Court of Appeals addressed whether votes cast by individuals who did not sign the registration poll records should be invalidated. The Court held that such votes are indeed invalid under the New York Constitution and Election Law. However, because the number of invalid votes was substantial enough to render the election’s outcome uncertain, the Court ordered a new primary election.

    Facts

    In a Democratic primary election, Edward I. Koch was declared the winner by a margin of 41 votes. DeSapio contested the results, claiming that 65 specific votes were invalid. A significant number of these votes (45) were cast by individuals who did not sign the registration poll records as required.

    Procedural History

    The Special Term sustained objections to 35 votes (15 for failure to sign poll records and 20 for lack of party enrollment or residency), but dismissed objections to the remaining 30 votes cast by those who did not sign the poll records. The Appellate Division affirmed the Special Term’s decision. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the court should invalidate votes cast by individuals who concededly failed to sign the registration poll records as required by the New York Constitution and Election Law.

    Holding

    Yes, because the New York Constitution and Election Law mandate the signing of registration poll records, and failure to do so invalidates the vote.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Article II, Section 7 of the New York Constitution and Section 413 of the Election Law, which implicitly require voters to sign the registration poll records. The court stated plainly that “the votes so cast were invalid and should not have been counted.” Because invalidating the 30 votes in question changed the outcome of the election, but the irregularities in the election were such “as to render impossible a determination as to who rightfully was nominated or elected,” the proper remedy was to order a new primary election instead of declaring DeSapio the winner. This highlights a key principle: even when specific invalid votes can be identified, the remedy is not necessarily awarding the election to the challenger; a new election may be required when the extent of irregularities casts doubt on the entire process. The court did not elaborate further on specific policy considerations, focusing instead on the plain requirements of the Constitution and Election Law.