39 A.D.2d 403 (1972)

Durational residency requirements for voting are subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause and will be struck down if less restrictive means can achieve the state’s interest in preventing voter fraud.

Summary

This case concerns the constitutionality of New York’s 90-day durational residency requirement for voting. Petitioners, who became county residents in September 1971, were denied voter registration for the November 1971 election because they did not meet the 90-day requirement. The court held that the 90-day residency requirement violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as it impinged on the rights to vote and interstate travel. The court reasoned that less restrictive means, such as voter registration and independent verification of residence, could adequately prevent voter fraud, making the durational residency requirement unconstitutional.

Facts

Petitioners established residency in Onondaga County in September 1971.

They attempted to register to vote in the November 2, 1971 general election.

Registration was denied because they had not resided in the county for 90 days prior to the election, as required by the New York Constitution and Election Law.

Procedural History

Petitioners challenged the 90-day residency requirement under Section 331 of the Election Law.

The lower court upheld the residency requirement.

This appeal followed, ultimately reaching the Appellate Division.

Issue(s)

Whether New York’s 90-day durational residency requirement for voting violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Holding

Yes, because the 90-day durational residency requirement infringes upon the fundamental rights to vote and travel, and the state failed to demonstrate that it was the least restrictive means to achieve a compelling state interest.

Court’s Reasoning

The court applied strict scrutiny, noting that any restriction on the right to vote must be “necessary to promote a compelling state interest.” Citing Dunn v. Blumstein, the court emphasized that durational residency requirements impinge on constitutionally secured rights, including the right to vote and interstate travel.

The court found that New York’s 90-day requirement was indistinguishable from the requirement invalidated in Dunn v. Blumstein. It reasoned that the state’s interest in preventing voter fraud could be achieved through less restrictive means, such as voter registration systems and independent verification of residence. The court highlighted that New York’s system of permanent personal registration and the practice of keeping registration books open until 30 days before an election undermined the argument that a longer residency requirement was necessary for investigation.

The court stated, “And if there are other, reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a lesser burden on constitutionally protected activity, a State may not choose the way of greater interference. If it acts at all, it must choose ‘less drastic means’”.

The court concluded that broadly imposed political disabilities, such as durational residency requirements, are too imprecise to withstand constitutional scrutiny, given the availability of less restrictive alternatives.