New York Law Review

Tag: Voluntary Participation

  • Matter of Estate of Marguerite G. McFadden v. A. Russo Wrecking, Inc., 80 N.Y.2d 674 (1993): Voluntary Off-Duty Athletic Activity and Workers’ Compensation

    Matter of Estate of Marguerite G. McFadden v. A. Russo Wrecking, Inc., 80 N.Y.2d 674 (1993)

    Under Workers’ Compensation Law § 10(1), injuries sustained during voluntary participation in off-duty athletic activities are not compensable unless the employer requires participation, compensates the employee, or otherwise sponsors the activity, and the activity must be part of the employee’s work-related duties.

    Summary

    This case concerns a claim for workers’ compensation benefits following the death of an accountant who suffered a fatal heart attack while bowling on a team sponsored by a client. The Workers’ Compensation Board denied the claim, citing Workers’ Compensation Law § 10(1), which excludes compensation for injuries sustained during voluntary off-duty athletic activities. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the bowling activity was not part of the employee’s work-related duties, and the employer neither required nor compensated the employee for participating, nor did the employer sponsor the activity.

    Facts

    The decedent, an accountant, bowled in a Monday night league on a team sponsored by Tom Cardinal, a client of his firm. The decedent and Cardinal were friends and discussed business before and after bowling. No other employees from either firm participated. On the night of his death, Cardinal picked up the decedent, they discussed business, and then bowled three games. The decedent suffered a cardiovascular collapse and died shortly after. The Workers’ Compensation Board focused on whether the activity fell under the statutory exclusion for voluntary athletic activities.

    Procedural History

    The Workers’ Compensation Law Judge initially ruled on the case. The Workers’ Compensation Board reversed the Law Judge’s decision, denying the claim based on Workers’ Compensation Law § 10(1). The Appellate Division upheld the Board’s decision. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the decedent’s death, occurring during a voluntary, off-duty athletic activity (bowling), is compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Law, specifically considering the restrictions outlined in Workers’ Compensation Law § 10(1)?

    Holding

    No, because the bowling activity was a voluntary, off-duty athletic activity not part of the employee’s work-related duties, and the employer did not require, compensate, or sponsor the activity as outlined in Workers’ Compensation Law § 10(1).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Workers’ Compensation Law § 10(1) explicitly bars compensation for injuries sustained during voluntary off-duty athletic activities unless the employer requires participation, compensates the employee, or otherwise sponsors the activity. The Court emphasized that the activity must constitute part of the employee’s work-related duties. The Court distinguished between activities that are merely work-related and those that are part of an employee’s actual job duties, stating, “Were the test simply whether an activity was work-related, the statutory bar and the Legislature’s intent would be defeated by an open-ended interpretation.” The Court found no evidence that the employer required or compensated the decedent for bowling, nor did it formally sponsor the activity. Mere knowledge or acquiescence by the employer was deemed insufficient to constitute sponsorship. The Court highlighted the legislative intent behind the 1983 amendment to section 10, which aimed to narrow the standards for compensable work-related sports injuries and prevent awards based on insufficient employer involvement. The Court quoted the legislative memorandum, stating that the amendment “will not change the liability of the employer when participation in an activity is overtly encouraged by the employer.” The Court concluded that the Board’s determination was supported by substantial evidence, and the activity did not fall within the exceptions permitting compensation.

  • Judge Rotenberg Educ. Ctr. v. Maul, 91 N.Y.2d 301 (1998): Voluntary Nature of Transitional Care Funding

    Judge Rotenberg Educ. Ctr. v. Maul, 91 N.Y.2d 301 (1998)

    A social services district’s participation in New York State’s transitional care funding program for disabled young adults is voluntary, and therefore the district is not prohibited from withdrawing from the program.

    Summary

    Judge Rotenberg Educational Center sued to compel New York City to continue funding the care of eight severely disabled young adults placed at the Center by the City when they were children. The City withdrew from the State’s transitional care funding program, arguing that participation was optional under Social Services Law § 466. The New York Court of Appeals held that the City’s participation in the transitional care funding program is voluntary, based on the plain language of the statute and legislative history. The court affirmed the lower courts’ dismissal of the petition, finding the City could withdraw without following administrative procedures applicable to individual placement changes.

    Facts

    The Judge Rotenberg Educational Center, located in Rhode Island, provides residential schooling for severely disabled children. New York City had placed eight disabled children at the Center. These children “aged out” of the educational programs at age 21. New York State law requires localities to contract with out-of-state facilities when in-state facilities are not available. A transitional care funding program was created in 1982 to provide funding for these individuals until appropriate in-state adult care placements became available. The City participated in this program, with the State reimbursing 50% of the costs. In October 1994, the City announced its withdrawal from the transitional care funding program, citing the State’s primary responsibility for specialized care for mentally disabled adults. The City and State entered a memorandum of understanding in January 1995, where the City agreed to provide $1.116 million for transitional care until funds ran out, with explicit recognition that participation was optional. The funds were exhausted on May 31, 1995, and the City ceased funding.

    Procedural History

    The Judge Rotenberg Educational Center commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding in Supreme Court to compel the City to continue payments. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Social Services Law § 466 prohibits New York City from withdrawing from the State’s transitional care funding program for severely disabled young adults.

    Holding

    No, because Social Services Law § 466 makes participation in the transitional care funding program voluntary for social services districts, thus districts are not prohibited from withdrawing from the program.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court based its reasoning on the plain language of Social Services Law § 466 (2), which states that social services districts “may expend funds to provide transitional care.” The Court emphasized that “[i]t is fundamental that a court, in interpreting a statute, should attempt to effectuate the intent of the Legislature, and where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the court should construe it so as to give effect to the plain meaning of the words used.” The Court found that the legislative history supported the interpretation that the program was always intended to be voluntary. The Court cited the State Executive Department’s memorandum, noting that the Legislature was aware that some localities had already withdrawn from the program. The legislative response was to shift responsibility to the State, not to lock localities into the program. Regarding the petitioner’s argument about Social Services Law § 466 (5), the Court clarified that the administrative procedures outlined therein apply only when an individual is offered an appropriate in-state placement, and the individual’s procedural rights have been exhausted. Section 466(5) provides a mechanism to terminate payments by a participating locality; it does not define a substantive right to locally funded transitional care. The Court also emphasized Section 16 of chapter 600 of the Laws of 1994, which states that no provision of the act creates any right or entitlement for any individual to receive funds or services.