New York Law Review

Tag: Voluntary Appearance

  • CIBC Mellon Trust Co. v. Mora Hotel Corp., 100 N.Y.2d 215 (2003): Enforcing Foreign Judgments and Voluntary Appearance

    CIBC Mellon Trust Co. v. Mora Hotel Corp., 100 N.Y.2d 215 (2003)

    A defendant who appears in a foreign court to argue the merits of a case, after unsuccessfully contesting jurisdiction, makes a voluntary appearance and waives the right to challenge the foreign court’s jurisdiction in a subsequent enforcement action in New York.

    Summary

    CIBC Mellon Trust sought to enforce English judgments against Mora Hotel and Chascona in New York. The defendants had previously contested jurisdiction in the English courts but later defaulted by failing to comply with discovery orders. They then applied to the English High Court to set aside the default judgments and defend on the merits. The New York Court of Appeals held that by arguing the merits in the English court, the defendants made a voluntary appearance, precluding them from challenging the English court’s jurisdiction when CIBC Mellon sought to enforce the judgments in New York. The court emphasized that CPLR 5305(a)(2) retains the distinction between general and special appearances for recognition actions.

    Facts

    CIBC Mellon Trust and DaimlerChrysler Canada lost millions in investments due to fraud allegedly perpetrated by Wolfgang Stolzenberg. They sued Stolzenberg and others, including Mora Hotel and Chascona, in England. Mora and Chascona were Netherlands Antilles corporations that owned and operated the Gorham Hotel in New York. CIBC Mellon obtained Mareva orders (asset-freezing injunctions) against Mora and Chascona. The High Court granted these after finding CIBC had a “good arguable case.” Mora contested the English court’s jurisdiction over Stolzenberg, but this challenge was ultimately unsuccessful. Mora and Chascona failed to comply with the Mareva orders, leading to default judgments against them in England.

    Procedural History

    CIBC Mellon sued in New York to recognize and enforce the English judgments. Supreme Court granted summary judgment to CIBC Mellon, recognizing the judgments and ordering the sale of the Gorham Hotel. The Appellate Division affirmed. Mora and Chascona then unsuccessfully sought to set aside the default judgments in the English High Court before appealing the New York judgment to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals initially withheld decision pending the outcome of the High Court application.

    Issue(s)

    Whether defendants, by applying to the English High Court to set aside the default judgments and to defend the case on its merits, made a voluntary appearance in the English proceedings, thus precluding them from challenging the English court’s jurisdiction in a subsequent New York action to enforce the judgments under CPLR 5305(a)(2)?

    Holding

    Yes, because by arguing the merits of the case in their application to the English High Court, the defendants did more than was necessary to preserve a jurisdictional objection, thereby making a voluntary appearance and waiving their right to challenge jurisdiction in New York.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals noted New York’s tradition of enforcing foreign judgments, codified in CPLR Article 53. CPLR 5305(a)(2) states a foreign judgment shall not be refused recognition for lack of personal jurisdiction if the defendant voluntarily appeared, unless solely to protect seized property or contest jurisdiction. The court emphasized that by arguing the merits of the conspiracy claims in their application to set aside the English judgments, the defendants did more than was necessary to preserve their jurisdictional objection, which was already foreclosed. The court cited the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, stating that a defendant may submit to a court’s jurisdiction by taking steps in the action after judgment. The court reasoned that CPLR 5305(a)(2) retains the traditional distinction between general and special appearances for recognition purposes, even though New York no longer formally distinguishes them. Because the defendants sought affirmative relief by asking the High Court to adjudicate the case on its merits, they made a voluntary appearance, preventing them from later challenging the English court’s jurisdiction in New York. The Court also addressed the use of Mareva orders, stating that, while potentially disruptive, their use does not inherently render the English legal system incompatible with due process.

  • People v. Shurn, 50 N.Y.2d 914 (1980): Construction of ‘Voluntarily’ in Bail Jumping Statute

    50 N.Y.2d 914 (1980)

    The term “voluntarily” in New York Penal Law § 215.57, regarding bail jumping, preserves a grace period, limiting the scope of the non-intent crime and defining when the crime is committed rather than leaving it to the event of arrest.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the inclusion of “voluntarily” in Penal Law § 215.57 preserves the grace period found in predecessor statutes. This limits the scope of bail jumping as a non-intent crime. The majority reasoned that the term prevents determining the commission of the crime based merely on the fortuitous event of arrest. The dissent argued that appearing due to arrest is not voluntary and thus does not satisfy the statute’s requirement. The court favored a construction that provides certainty about when the crime is committed.

    Facts

    The facts of the case are not explicitly detailed in the Court of Appeals memorandum. However, the core issue revolves around a defendant who failed to appear as required and was subsequently arrested. The question was whether his appearance after arrest, but within 30 days, constituted a voluntary appearance under Penal Law § 215.57, thus precluding a charge of bail jumping.

    Procedural History

    The case originated in a lower court. The Appellate Division issued an order, which the Court of Appeals affirmed. The specific details of the lower court’s ruling are not included in the Court of Appeals’ memorandum, but the central point of contention was the interpretation of the word “voluntarily” in the context of the bail jumping statute.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the inclusion of the word “voluntarily” in Penal Law § 215.57 eliminates the grace period present in predecessor statutes, thereby making an appearance within 30 days of a failure to appear, even if prompted by arrest, a bar to prosecution for bail jumping?

    Holding

    No, because the inclusion of “voluntarily” in Penal Law § 215.57 preserves the grace period that existed in prior statutes, thereby limiting the scope of the non-intent crime of bail jumping to instances where a defendant fails to voluntarily appear within the specified timeframe and before arrest.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the inclusion of “voluntarily” was intended to maintain the grace period established in previous iterations of the bail jumping statute. By construing “voluntarily” in this manner, the court ensures that the determination of when the crime is committed is not dependent on the arbitrary timing of an arrest. The court highlighted the need for certainty in determining the commission of the crime. The majority implicitly adopted the reasoning of the Appellate Division, which likely emphasized a more lenient interpretation benefiting the defendant in cases of ambiguity. The dissenting opinion, referencing the dissent at the Appellate Division, argued that an appearance prompted by arrest cannot be considered voluntary. The dissent suggested that the purpose of including “voluntarily” was to provide an opportunity for defendants who fail to appear to rectify their mistake by appearing on their own within 30 days, thus escaping additional punishment. If the appearance is a direct consequence of being arrested, the dissent argued, the requirement of voluntariness is not met, and prosecution under § 215.57 is permissible. The majority’s approach effectively favors leniency and certainty, preventing the possibility of penalizing individuals who eventually appear within a reasonable time, even if prompted by law enforcement action. The practical effect is that prosecutors must demonstrate that the defendant’s appearance was not voluntary in the sense that it was prompted by arrest or other compulsory measures to secure a conviction for bail jumping under this statute.