People v. Parker, 57 N.Y.2d 136 (1982)

A defendant’s voluntary absence from trial, even with knowledge of the trial date, is insufficient on its own to constitute a waiver of the right to be present; the defendant must also be aware that the trial will proceed in their absence.

Summary

Parker was indicted for criminal sale of a controlled substance. After being notified of her trial date, she told her attorney she might be too ill to attend. She did not appear, and the trial court, after a hearing, determined her absence was voluntary and proceeded with a trial in absentia, over defense counsel’s objection, without issuing a bench warrant. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that a voluntary absence, even with knowledge of the trial date, is insufficient to waive the constitutional right to be present at trial. The Court emphasized that the defendant must be aware that the trial will proceed in their absence for a valid waiver.

Facts

The defendant was indicted on drug charges in February 1977.
Defense counsel was notified on July 5, 1977, that the trial was scheduled for July 8, 1977.
Defense counsel informed the defendant, who stated she was ill and might not be able to attend.
The defendant did not appear on July 8, and the trial was adjourned to July 11.
The defendant again failed to appear on July 11.
Jeanette Harris, who posted bail for the defendant, testified that the defendant had mentioned an intention to leave town but never said she was ill. On cross, Harris admitted that her son told her the defendant was “out in the street.”
The trial court found that the defendant’s absence was voluntary.

Procedural History

The trial court tried the defendant in absentia, and the jury found her guilty.
The defendant was sentenced in absentia.
The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction.
The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding the trial court’s finding of voluntary absence insufficient to establish an implicit waiver of the right to be present.

Issue(s)

Whether a criminal defendant’s voluntary failure to appear for trial, with knowledge of the trial date, is sufficient to constitute a waiver of their right to be present at trial, thus permitting the court to proceed with a trial in absentia.

Holding

No, because a valid waiver of the right to be present at trial requires, at a minimum, that the defendant be aware that the trial will proceed in their absence. Mere voluntary absence, even with knowledge of the trial date, is insufficient to establish such a waiver.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals acknowledged the constitutional right to be present at a criminal trial, as protected by the Confrontation Clauses of both the State and Federal Constitutions. While this right can be waived, any such waiver, including an implied one, must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
The court distinguished its prior holdings in People v. Epps and People v. Johnson, where the defendants were present at the start of trial and were warned of the consequences of their conduct (disruptive behavior or refusal to leave a jail cell). In those cases, the defendants’ conduct clearly expressed a desire not to be present at trial.
The court rejected the argument that a forfeiture analysis should apply, where a right can be lost without a knowing and intelligent decision to relinquish it. The Court emphasized the need for a constitutional waiver analysis in this case because the defendant’s mere disappearance was more ambiguous than the clear expressions of intent in Epps and Johnson. There was no evidence that she was ever informed that the trial would proceed in her absence.
The court stated that “in order to effect a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver, the defendant must, at a minimum, be informed in some manner of the nature of the right to be present at trial and the consequences of failing to appear for trial.”
The Court noted that even after a valid waiver, a trial in absentia is not automatically authorized. The trial court must exercise sound discretion, considering factors like the possibility of locating the defendant, the difficulty of rescheduling, and the risk of lost evidence or witnesses.
The Court emphasized that “the simple expedient of adjournment pending execution of a bench warrant could provide an alternative to trial in absentia unless, of course, the prosecution can demonstrate that such a course of action would be totally futile.”