New York Law Review

Tag: Voluntary Abandonment

  • People v. Gibson, 16 N.Y.3d 161 (2011): Acquisition of DNA Evidence and Right to Counsel

    16 N.Y.3d 161 (2011)

    The collection of a suspect’s DNA from a voluntarily discarded item, like a cigarette butt, does not violate the suspect’s indelible right to counsel when the interaction with law enforcement is not a custodial interrogation and the suspect initiates the contact.

    Summary

    Jeffrey Gibson, suspected of armed robbery, was arrested on an unrelated warrant where his right to counsel had attached. While incarcerated, he initiated contact with a detective, and during their conversation, he smoked a cigarette. The detective obtained the cigarette butt, extracted Gibson’s DNA, which matched DNA from the robbery. The New York Court of Appeals held that obtaining the DNA this way did not violate Gibson’s right to counsel because the detective did not interrogate Gibson about the robbery, and Gibson voluntarily discarded the cigarette butt. The DNA was not a compelled statement or response.

    Facts

    Jeffrey Gibson was a suspect in a gas station armed robbery. He was arrested on a bench warrant for an unrelated matter where his right to counsel had already attached. While in custody, Gibson asked to speak to a detective he knew. The detective brought Gibson to an office where Gibson asked for and was given a cigarette. Gibson smoked the cigarette, and after he was done, he extinguished it in an ashtray. The detective took the cigarette butt. DNA was extracted from the saliva on the cigarette butt and matched DNA found on clothing believed to have been worn by the robber.

    Procedural History

    Gibson was indicted and convicted of robbery in the first degree after a jury trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. A dissenting Justice at the Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the collection of the defendant’s DNA from a cigarette butt he voluntarily discarded while in custody violated his indelible right to counsel.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant initiated the interaction, the detective did not interrogate him about the robbery, and the DNA evidence obtained was not a communicative act or statement protected by the right to counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while Gibson’s right to counsel had attached, preventing police from questioning him about criminal matters, the detective did not question him about the robbery. Providing a cigarette at Gibson’s request was not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. The DNA obtained from the cigarette was not a “response” or “statement” protected by the right to counsel because “the transfer of bodily fluids was not a communicative act that disclosed ‘the contents of defendant’s mind’” (quoting People v. Havrish, 8 N.Y.3d 389, 395 (2007)). The Court emphasized that Gibson initiated the interaction and voluntarily abandoned the cigarette butt, therefore the detective “capitalized on the situation that manifested itself through . . . defendant’s own actions.” This was not a coerced surrender of evidence or the functional equivalent of an uncounseled consent to a search.

  • Roe v. Doe, 29 N.Y.2d 188 (1971): Parental Support Obligations and Emancipation Through Voluntary Abandonment

    Roe v. Doe, 29 N.Y.2d 188 (1971)

    A minor child of employable age who voluntarily abandons the parent’s home without cause, against the will of the parent, and to avoid parental control forfeits the right to demand support.

    Summary

    This case addresses the extent of a parent’s obligation to support a minor child. The father of a 20-year-old college student ceased providing support after she moved into an off-campus apartment against his wishes. The daughter’s guardian initiated support proceedings. The New York Court of Appeals held that the father was not obligated to support his daughter because she had voluntarily abandoned his home to avoid parental control. The court reasoned that a parent has a right to impose reasonable regulations on a child in return for support, and a child who abandons the home to avoid those regulations forfeits the right to support.

    Facts

    The respondent, a prominent New York attorney, had been fully supporting his 20-year-old daughter, who was attending the University of Louisville. The daughter, without her father’s knowledge or consent, moved out of the college dormitory and into an off-campus apartment with a classmate. Upon learning of this, the father terminated all further support and instructed her to return to New York. The daughter sold her car (a gift from her father) to fund her continued residence at the university. The daughter had a history of academic probation and experimentation with drugs. Tuition payments were past due, prompting the guardian to commence support proceedings.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court initially issued a temporary order requiring the father to pay tuition and medical expenses and later issued a final order requiring him to pay $250 per month in support until the daughter’s 21st birthday, along with tuition payments. The father was also held in contempt for failing to comply with the temporary order. The Appellate Division modified the temporary order, directing the father to pay only bills rendered before November 30, 1970, and reversed the final order entirely. The guardian appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a minor child of employable age who voluntarily abandons the parent’s home, against the will of the parent and for the purpose of avoiding parental control, forfeits the right to demand support from the parent.

    Holding

    Yes, because where a minor of employable age voluntarily abandons the parent’s home without cause, against the will of the parent, and to avoid parental control, that child forfeits the right to demand support.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized the fundamental policy that a father is responsible for the discipline and support of his minor child. However, this duty is reciprocal, with the father having the right to establish reasonable regulations in return for maintenance and support. The court adopted the view that a child who voluntarily abandons the parent’s home to avoid parental discipline forfeits the claim to support. The court reasoned that allowing a minor to deliberately flout the legitimate mandates of her father while requiring support would be unjust. The court stated that it is a parent’s natural and legal duty to care for, control, and protect a child from potential harm and that courts should not interfere with this responsibility absent misfeasance, abuse, or neglect. The court found that the father’s request that his daughter reside in the dormitory or return home was reasonable, given her past behavior and “the temptations that abound outside.” The court quoted Stant v. Lamberson, stating that the obligations of parenthood require of the child “‘submission to reasonable restraint, and demands habits of propriety, obedience, and conformity to domestic discipline.’” The court concluded that while a minor may choose to abandon the home rather than submit to proper discipline, she cannot then enlist the court’s aid in frustrating parental authority by requiring the father to underwrite her chosen lifestyle. The court emphasized that it was not dealing with a case where a father was casting a helpless daughter out into the world but rather a situation where the daughter was asserting independence in a manner inconsistent with parental control.