New York Law Review

Tag: voir dire

  • People v. Harris, 28 N.Y.3d 1117 (2017): When a Juror’s Assurances of Impartiality are Sufficient

    People v. Harris, 28 N.Y.3d 1117 (2017)

    A prospective juror’s unequivocal assurances of impartiality, despite prior statements suggesting bias, can be sufficient to deny a challenge for cause.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, which had found that the trial court erred in not excusing a prospective juror for cause. During voir dire, the prospective juror initially expressed concerns about impartiality due to the nature of the case (involving the death of a child). However, after the trial court’s thorough questioning, the juror provided unequivocal assurances that they could be impartial and follow the law. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the defense’s for-cause challenge because the juror’s responses, when viewed in context, sufficiently demonstrated impartiality. The case underscores the importance of the juror’s explicit statements of impartiality.

    Facts

    During voir dire in a criminal trial concerning the death of a five-year-old child, defense counsel asked the prospective jurors if any of them had a problem with the case involving the death of a five-year-old child. One prospective juror stated that they could not be impartial, which led defense counsel to inquire if other jurors had similar feelings. Prospective juror No. 383 stated, “It’s a five year old. I feel the same. Adult [defendant]. I can’t do it.” Despite this initial statement, the juror later responded affirmatively that the burden was on the People to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court then questioned the prospective juror, and the juror provided unequivocal assurances that they would follow the law and be impartial. Defense counsel moved to dismiss the juror for cause, but the court denied the application.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defense’s for-cause challenge. The defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, holding that the trial court erred in not excusing the juror for cause. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the defendant’s for-cause challenge to a prospective juror who initially expressed bias but later provided assurances of impartiality.

    Holding

    1. No, because the juror unequivocally stated that they would be impartial and follow the law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court’s decision under CPL 270.20 (1)(b), which allows a challenge for cause if a juror has a state of mind likely to prevent them from rendering an impartial verdict. The court reiterated that a prospective juror raising serious doubts about their impartiality must be excused unless they unequivocally state on the record that they can be fair and impartial. The court emphasized that a prospective juror must “expressly state that his [or her] prior state of mind concerning either the case or either of the parties will not influence [the] verdict.” The court found that the trial court’s questioning of juror No. 383, taking place after her initial statements, sufficiently elicited unequivocal assurances of impartiality. The court emphasized that the juror’s statements, taken in totality and context, reflected their ability and willingness to render an impartial verdict. The court stated, “The CPL … does not require any particular expurgatory oath or ‘talismanic’ words.”

    Practical Implications

    This case underscores that trial judges have considerable discretion in assessing a juror’s impartiality. An initial indication of bias doesn’t automatically disqualify a juror. Instead, the critical factor is whether the juror, after further inquiry, can unequivocally assure the court that they will set aside any preconceived notions and render an impartial verdict based on the evidence and the law. Attorneys should be prepared to rehabilitate jurors who express initial concerns but demonstrate their ability to be impartial. This case provides guidance on the types of questions that may be effective in eliciting these assurances. Moreover, this case shows that specific “talismanic” words are not required, it depends on the totality of the context of the juror’s responses.

  • People v. Alvarez, 19 N.Y.3d 78 (2012): Preservation Requirement for Public Trial Violations

    People v. Alvarez, 19 N.Y.3d 78 (2012)

    A defendant must preserve the argument that they were deprived of the right to a public trial when family members were excluded from the courtroom during voir dire by raising a timely objection; otherwise, the claim is waived on appeal.

    Summary

    These consolidated appeals address whether a defendant must preserve the argument that his right to a public trial was violated when family members were excluded from the courtroom during voir dire. In Alvarez, defense counsel moved for a mistrial after discovering the defendant’s parents were excluded during jury selection. In George, defense counsel did not object when the court stated spectators might be asked to leave during jury selection. The New York Court of Appeals held that preservation is required. The Court affirmed in George because the issue was unpreserved, but reversed in Alvarez and remitted for a new trial because the issue was adequately preserved by a timely objection and motion for mistrial.

    Facts

    Alvarez: Alvarez was charged with weapon possession. Before trial, Alvarez declined a plea offer after discussing it with his mother. During jury selection, Alvarez’s parents were excluded from the courtroom. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial based on the denial of a public trial, which the court denied, stating the courtroom was filled with prospective jurors and family members are usually asked to step out initially.

    George: George was charged with robbery and larceny. Prior to jury selection, the court stated that spectators might have to leave when potential jurors entered due to limited seating. Defense counsel thanked the judge without objecting. After preliminary instructions, some prospective jurors were excused, and the court asked remaining jurors to move forward, freeing seats for the public and instructing a court officer to inform spectators they could re-enter.

    Procedural History

    Alvarez: The Appellate Division modified the conviction, vacating convictions for criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, but otherwise affirmed, finding the public trial argument unpreserved and without merit. Leave to appeal was granted. The Court of Appeals reversed.

    George: The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding the public trial argument unpreserved and without merit. Leave to appeal was granted. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a defendant must preserve an objection to the exclusion of family members from the courtroom during voir dire to raise a public trial violation on appeal.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because errors of constitutional dimension, including the right to a public trial, must be preserved with a timely objection.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The right to a public trial extends to voir dire. While proceedings may be closed when necessary to protect an overriding interest, the court must consider alternatives to closure. The Court relied on Presley v. Georgia, which held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to a public trial during voir dire, and trial courts must consider alternatives to closure, even if the parties do not offer them. However, Presley did not address the preservation requirement. The Court stated, “Bringing a public trial violation to a judge’s attention in the first instance will ensure the timely opportunity to correct such errors.” Since George raised no objection, his claim was unpreserved. In Alvarez, the defense counsel’s protest immediately after the violation was sufficient to preserve the issue. The appropriate remedy would have been to grant a mistrial and restart jury selection. The Court emphasized that preservation is crucial to give the trial court an opportunity to address and correct the error promptly.

  • People v. Harris, 20 N.Y.3d 679 (2013): Juror Impartiality and Hearsay Instructions

    People v. Harris, 20 N.Y.3d 679 (2013)

    A prospective juror who expresses doubt about their impartiality must be excused unless they provide an unequivocal assurance of their ability to be fair; furthermore, when hearsay statements are admitted for a limited purpose, the trial court must provide a limiting instruction to the jury.

    Summary

    Cal Harris was convicted of second-degree murder in the disappearance of his estranged wife, Michele. The conviction was based on circumstantial evidence, as Michele’s body was never found. Prior to the retrial, there was extensive media coverage. During jury selection, a prospective juror admitted to having a pre-existing opinion about Harris’s guilt. The trial court denied a challenge for cause, and Harris used a peremptory challenge. Additionally, the trial court admitted hearsay statements but failed to give a limiting instruction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the trial court erred in denying the for-cause challenge without obtaining an unequivocal assurance of impartiality from the juror and in failing to provide a limiting instruction regarding the hearsay evidence.

    Facts

    Michele Harris disappeared on September 11, 2001. Her unoccupied minivan was found at the bottom of the driveway the next morning. Michele was in the process of divorcing her husband, Cal Harris, but they were still living in the same residence. Blood was found in the kitchen and garage of the Harris residence. During a visit to his brother’s house, Harris was confronted by his sisters-in-law about threatening statements he allegedly made to Michele, including that he would kill her and police would never find the body.

    Procedural History

    Harris was indicted for second-degree murder in 2005 and convicted in 2007. That verdict was set aside based on new evidence. Harris was retried and again convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. A Justice of the Appellate Division granted Harris leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s challenge for cause of a prospective juror who admitted to having a pre-existing opinion about the defendant’s guilt without obtaining an unequivocal assurance of impartiality.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in admitting hearsay statements for a limited purpose but failing to provide a limiting instruction to the jury regarding the use of those statements.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the prospective juror’s statements raised a serious doubt regarding her ability to be impartial, and the trial court failed to elicit an unequivocal assurance of her ability to be fair.

    2. Yes, because the trial court’s failure to issue a limiting instruction created a real danger that the jury accepted the hearsay statements for their truth, especially given the circumstantial nature of the evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on CPL 270.20 (1) (b), which allows a party to challenge a potential juror for cause if the juror “has a state of mind that is likely to preclude him from rendering an impartial verdict based upon the evidence adduced at the trial.” The court emphasized that “a prospective juror whose statements raise a serious doubt regarding the ability to be impartial must be excused unless the juror states unequivocally on the record that he or she can be fair and impartial” (People v Chambers, 97 NY2d 417, 419 [2002]). Because the juror stated her opinion would be a “slight part” of her consideration, the court found the trial court should have followed up with its own inquiry to try to elicit an unequivocal assurance of impartiality.

    Regarding the hearsay statements, the court found that the trial court erred in failing to grant defendant’s request for a limiting instruction, explaining that the jury was required to consider the statements only in relation to Harris’s reaction upon being confronted with them, and not for their truth. The court stated that “[t]he trial court’s failure to issue the appropriate limiting instruction was not harmless,” particularly in a case lacking a body or weapon, where the evidence was purely circumstantial. The prosecutor’s summation compounded the error by relying on those statements as direct evidence.

    The court acknowledged the extensive pretrial publicity and urged the trial court to exercise “special vigilance” in ensuring the fairness of any subsequent trial and to consider changing venue if for-cause disqualifications became excessively burdensome. The court recognized that “it is unrealistic to expect and require jurors to be totally ignorant prior to trial of the facts and issues in certain cases” (People v Culhane, 33 NY2d 90, 110 [1973]) but that the trial court has a responsibility to mitigate the effects of adverse publicity.

  • People v. Guay, 17 N.Y.3d 578 (2011): Dismissal of Hearing-Impaired Juror & Judicial Discretion

    People v. Guay, 17 N.Y.3d 578 (2011)

    A trial court has discretion to dismiss a prospective juror for cause if the record supports a determination that the juror’s hearing impairment would unduly interfere with their ability to serve, especially when no reasonable accommodation is requested or apparent.

    Summary

    Defendant Dean Guay was convicted of rape and sexual abuse of his seven-year-old daughter. During jury selection, a prospective juror indicated he had difficulty hearing. The trial court dismissed the juror for cause over defense counsel’s objection, citing concerns that the juror’s hearing impairment would prevent him from understanding the testimony of child witnesses, who tend to speak softly. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the juror because the record supported the determination that the hearing impairment would have unduly interfered with the juror’s ability to serve, and no reasonable accommodation was requested.

    Facts

    Dean Guay sexually abused his seven-year-old daughter, Jane, during a week-long summer camp trip. Guay confessed to police, admitting to crawling into bed with Jane and sexually assaulting her. Prior to trial, during jury selection, a prospective juror (venire member 1405) indicated he had difficulty hearing. The trial court noted the juror had trouble hearing instructions and questions. The prosecutor moved to dismiss the juror for cause, arguing the hearing impairment could cause him to miss critical parts of Jane’s testimony.

    Procedural History

    The trial court granted the People’s motion to dismiss the hearing-impaired juror for cause. Guay was convicted on all counts. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction with a modification regarding post-release supervision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it dismissed a hearing-impaired prospective juror for cause, or whether the court was obligated to accommodate the juror’s hearing impairment.

    Holding

    No, because the record supported the trial court’s determination that the juror’s hearing impairment would unduly interfere with his ability to be a trial juror, and no reasonable accommodation was requested or apparent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that jury service is a civil right and a privilege protected by the State Constitution. However, this right must be balanced against the accused’s constitutional rights to a fair trial. Judiciary Law § 510 requires jurors to be able to understand and communicate in English. The court cited People v. Guzman, 76 N.Y.2d 1 (1990), emphasizing that a hearing impairment does not automatically disqualify a person from jury service, and reasonable accommodations should be considered if they allow the juror to fulfill their duties without interfering with the defendant’s rights. However, Guzman also recognizes the trial court’s discretion in determining whether an auditory problem would unduly interfere with a juror’s ability to perform their functions. The Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion here because the juror had difficulty hearing, the court observed nonverbal cues indicating a lack of comprehension, and the court was concerned about the juror’s ability to understand a soft-spoken child witness. Significantly, no specific accommodation beyond sitting in the front row was requested by the juror or the defense. The Court stated, “[a]s with most juror qualification questions, [this determination must] be left largely to the discretion of the trial court, which can question and observe the prospective juror…during the voir dire.” The Court also noted, “[i]t is imperative that the privilege and duty of jury service be made available to all eligible individuals—regardless of disability—who are capable of performing this civic function. For this reason, a judge should endeavor to make a reasonable and tactful inquiry of any prospective juror who appears to have a hearing impairment and consider offering to provide an assistive amplification device or some other appropriate accommodation available in our court system.”

  • People v. Steward, 16 N.Y.3d 104 (2010): Limits on Voir Dire Questioning

    16 N.Y.3d 104 (2010)

    A trial court abuses its discretion when it imposes an unreasonably short time restriction on attorney questioning of prospective jurors during voir dire, especially in a complex felony case where potential jurors have expressed biases or have connections to the victim.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a five-minute time limit on defense counsel’s questioning of prospective jurors during voir dire. The court found that this limitation, given the serious felony charges, the victim’s prominence, and the jurors’ potential biases, deprived the defendant of a fair opportunity to assess juror qualifications. The Court emphasized the need for trial courts to tailor voir dire procedures to the specific circumstances of each case, and to reconsider time limitations when they prove unduly restrictive and prejudicial.

    Facts

    Defendant was charged with robbery after allegedly stealing a necklace from Raashaun Casey, a radio personality known as “DJ Envy.” Casey and a friend pursued the defendant, leading to his apprehension. Before jury selection, the trial court imposed a five-minute time limit for each round of voir dire. During voir dire, several prospective jurors revealed they or their close relations were victims of robbery or theft. Some jurors also indicated familiarity with the victim, DJ Envy. Defense counsel objected to the time limit but the court continued to enforce it.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of robbery. He appealed, arguing that the time restriction during voir dire denied him a fair trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a five-minute limitation on counsel’s questioning of jurors during voir dire in a multiple felony case, thus denying the defendant a fair trial.

    Holding

    Yes, because the trial court’s time restriction prevented defense counsel from adequately exploring potential juror biases and relevant matters affecting their qualifications, especially given the serious nature of the charges and the identity of the victim.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals recognized the broad discretion afforded to trial courts in supervising voir dire under CPL 270.15(1)(c), but emphasized that any time restrictions must still afford counsel a “fair opportunity to question prospective jurors about relevant matters.” The Court acknowledged the absence of rigid guidelines for determining appropriate time limits but highlighted several factors, including the number and seriousness of charges, media attention, and unique concerns arising from the identity of the defendant, victim, or witnesses. The court noted that the five-minute restriction was significantly shorter than those previously upheld.

    The Court also found it significant that the victim was a local radio celebrity known to many prospective jurors and that a number of venire members stated that they or someone close to them had been a crime victim. The Court reasoned that these circumstances called for a more extended period for counsel questioning. Although the trial judge was conscientious in her examination of the venire, “the attorneys were significantly limited in their efforts to follow-up on provocative answers given by prospective jurors in response to the court’s inquiries.”

    The Court stated, “Given the lack of clarity in the record concerning whether certain prospective jurors were discharged or retained, we cannot say that defendant’s claim of prejudice is refuted by the record.” The Court emphasized that “trial judges are not always able to cover all avenues of questioning that interest the parties during voir dire—that is why the Legislature has directed that counsel must be provided a ‘fair opportunity’ to examine prospective jurors after the court has concluded its questioning.”

    The Court concluded that “the unusually short time restriction imposed by the court prevented counsel from having a sufficient opportunity to examine the various prospective jurors whose statements could reasonably be expected to elicit further questioning, and defendant’s claim of prejudice cannot be discounted…” and reversed the conviction.

  • People v. Martin, 16 N.Y.3d 607 (2011): Public Trial Right Requires Consideration of Alternatives to Courtroom Closure

    People v. Martin, 16 N.Y.3d 607 (2011)

    A trial court violates a defendant’s right to a public trial when it closes the courtroom without considering reasonable alternatives, even if the closure is intended to address concerns about overcrowding or potential jury influence.

    Summary

    Roy Martin was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance. Prior to voir dire, the trial judge, concerned about seating and potential juror influence, ordered Martin’s father to leave the courtroom and remain in the hallway until space became available. Defense counsel objected, arguing this violated Martin’s right to a public trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court violated Martin’s right to a public trial by failing to consider alternatives to closure, such as reserving seating or instructing jurors to avoid contact with spectators. This failure warranted reversal, irrespective of prejudice.

    Facts

    Roy Martin was arrested and charged with multiple counts related to drug and weapons possession.

    Before jury selection, the trial judge addressed Martin’s father, who was present in the courtroom.

    The judge, citing limited seating and concern that Martin’s father might communicate with or influence potential jurors, ordered him to leave the courtroom and remain in the hallway.

    The judge instructed a court officer to inform Martin’s father when he could re-enter, but this never occurred during the morning session of voir dire.

    Martin’s attorney objected, arguing that excluding his father violated Martin’s right to a public trial.

    Martin’s father left the courthouse during the lunch break and did not return until the following day. He later attended the trial.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Martin of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court violated the defendant’s right to a public trial by excluding his father from the courtroom during voir dire without considering alternatives to closure.

    Holding

    Yes, because the trial court failed to consider reasonable alternatives to closing the courtroom, thereby violating the defendant’s right to a public trial, regardless of the reasons for the closure.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the fundamental nature of the right to a public trial, guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and state law. This right extends to the voir dire portion of the trial. The court acknowledged that trial courts have discretion to close courtrooms, but only under “ ‘unusual circumstances’ ” necessitating it.

    Quoting Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984), the Court reiterated the four-prong test for courtroom closures: “ ‘[a] party seeking to close [a] hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and…must make findings adequate to support the closure.’ ”

    The Court found the trial court’s reasons for closure—limited seating and potential juror influence—did not, without more, constitute an “overriding interest.” The Court cited Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. —, 130 S. Ct. 721 (2010), noting the “generic risk” of juror prejudice is inherent and insufficient to justify closure without a specific threat.

    The Court stressed that trial courts must actively consider alternatives to closure, such as reserving seating, dividing the jury venire, or instructing jurors to avoid interacting with audience members, even if neither party suggests them. The failure to consider such alternatives constitutes a violation of the right to an open trial.

    The Court rejected the People’s argument that the closure was trivial, distinguishing this case from Gibbons v. Savage, 555 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2009), because here, substantive juror questioning occurred during the exclusion. The Court also distinguished People v. Peterson, 81 N.Y.2d 824 (1993), because that case involved a brief, inadvertent closure, whereas this case involved an intentional exclusion.

    Because a violation of the right to a public trial is not subject to harmless error analysis, the Court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial.

  • People v. Agramonte, 6 N.Y.3d 585 (2006): Preserving Objections to Jury Instructions

    6 N.Y.3d 585 (2006)

    A defendant’s failure to object to a trial court’s preliminary jury instructions before the trial court results in the claim being unpreserved for appellate review.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of robbery and criminal possession of stolen property for forcibly stealing body wash from a pharmacy. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by instructing potential jurors on the elements of the crimes during voir dire. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that because the defendant failed to object to the preliminary jury instructions before the trial court, the claim was not preserved for appellate review. The Court also found the defendant’s remaining contentions to be without merit.

    Facts

    A security officer observed the defendant concealing two bottles of body wash in his pants at a pharmacy. The security officer attempted to stop the defendant from leaving the store. The defendant punched the security officer twice in the jaw and shoved him against a wall. The defendant was then charged with robbery in the third degree and criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of robbery in the third degree in the trial court. He was sentenced, as a second felony offender, to a term of 2 1/2 to 5 years. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by prematurely instructing potential jurors during voir dire on the elements of the crimes. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court committed a “mode of proceedings” error by instructing the jury at the outset as to the elements of the crimes, and whether the defendant’s claim is preserved for review if no objection was made before the trial court.

    Holding

    No, because the trial court’s preliminary instructions did not constitute a “mode of proceedings” error that went to the essential validity of the process and was so fundamental that the entire trial is irreparably tainted. No, because the defendant failed to object before the trial court, his claim is unpreserved for appellate review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the trial court’s preliminary instruction on the elements of the crimes did not constitute a “mode of proceedings” error that would excuse the requirement for a timely objection. The Court cited People v. Agramonte, 87 N.Y.2d 765, 770 (1996), stating that a mode of proceedings error goes to the essential validity of the process and is so fundamental that the entire trial is irreparably tainted. Because the defendant failed to object to the instruction before the trial court, the claim was unpreserved for appellate review. The Court cited People v. Gray, 86 N.Y.2d 10 (1995) in support of the preservation rule. The court summarily dismissed the defendant’s remaining contentions, including a claim regarding the trial court’s Sandoval ruling, as without merit.

  • People v. Serrano, 7 N.Y.3d 730 (2006): Scope of Trial Court’s Discretion in Jury Selection

    People v. Serrano, 7 N.Y.3d 730 (2006)

    A trial court has broad discretion under CPL 270.15 (1)(a) to manage jury selection, including the number of prospective jurors called for simultaneous voir dire questioning, provided the defendant’s ability to conduct an effective voir dire is not demonstrably impaired.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by calling 44 prospective jurors for simultaneous voir dire questioning. The Court emphasized that CPL 270.15(1)(a) allows for “not less than twelve” jurors to be called, indicating a legislative intent to grant trial judges discretion in managing jury selection for efficiency. The Court found that the defendant failed to demonstrate any prejudice or inability to effectively conduct voir dire under the trial court’s procedure.

    Facts

    The defendant was arrested for selling heroin in a buy-and-bust operation. During jury selection, the trial court called 44 prospective jurors for simultaneous questioning, seating 12 in the jury box and the rest in the front rows. The defense attorney objected, arguing that the large number of jurors and their seating arrangement would hinder his ability to conduct an effective voir dire.

    Procedural History

    The trial court overruled the defense’s objection, citing prior approval of this procedure. The defendant was subsequently convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, upholding the trial court’s jury selection procedure. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion by calling 44 prospective jurors for simultaneous voir dire questioning, thereby impairing the defendant’s ability to conduct an effective voir dire.

    Holding

    No, because CPL 270.15(1)(a) grants trial courts discretion in managing jury selection, and the defendant failed to demonstrate any actual prejudice or impairment of his ability to conduct an effective voir dire.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court based its decision on the language and legislative intent of CPL 270.15(1)(a), which states that “the court shall direct that the names of not less than twelve members of the panel be drawn.” The Court noted that the 1981 amendment, changing the language from a mandatory 12 to “not less than twelve,” was intended to improve the efficiency of jury selection by allowing simultaneous examination of more jurors. The Court emphasized that the Legislature set no upper limit on the number of prospective jurors, thus granting judges discretion to manage their courtrooms efficiently.

    The Court distinguished the case from situations where a defendant could demonstrate actual prejudice or an inability to observe, hear, or assess prospective jurors. Here, the defendant did not express any specific difficulties during voir dire, nor was there any evidence of prejudice on the record. The Court stated, “Defendant has not demonstrated that he could not conduct a voir dire by the trial court’s decision to expand the jury box. During voir dire, counsel expressed no inability to observe, hear or assess the demeanor and qualifications of, or exercise challenges against, any prospective jurors.”

    The Court cited previous Appellate Division cases, such as People v. Camacho, that approved similar jury selection procedures. By affirming the lower court, the Court of Appeals signaled its deference to trial courts in managing the practical aspects of jury selection, absent a clear showing of prejudice to the defendant.

  • People v. Nicholas, 98 N.Y.2d 749 (2002): Unequivocal Juror Impartiality Standard

    People v. Nicholas, 98 N.Y.2d 749 (2002)

    A prospective juror whose statements raise a serious doubt regarding their ability to be impartial must be excused unless the juror states unequivocally on the record that they can be fair and impartial.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder. The appeal centered on whether a prospective juror should have been excused for cause after expressing that they would tend to believe police testimony to some degree. The defense challenged the juror’s impartiality, but the trial court denied the challenge. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding that the juror ultimately stated unequivocally that they could be fair. The Court of Appeals affirmed, emphasizing the need for unequivocal assertions of impartiality and suggesting further questioning to clarify any ambiguity.

    Facts

    During voir dire, a prospective juror acknowledged believing that “trained police officers are good observers” and that they “would tend to believe police testimony to some degree.” Defense counsel questioned the juror about whether this belief would affect their ability to be fair and listen fairly to police testimony. The juror responded, “No, I don’t think so.”

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defense’s motion to excuse the prospective juror for cause. The defense then used a peremptory challenge to excuse the juror and subsequently exhausted all peremptory challenges. The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prospective juror’s statement, “No, I don’t think so,” constituted an unequivocal assertion of impartiality sufficient to satisfy the legal standard for jury selection.

    Holding

    No, because the juror’s statements, taken in context and as a whole, were unequivocal. The trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s challenge for cause.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reiterated the established standard that a prospective juror must be excused if their statements raise serious doubts about their impartiality, unless they state unequivocally that they can be fair. The court acknowledged that the juror’s initial statements suggested a predisposition to believe police testimony. However, the court emphasized that the juror ultimately stated, “No, I don’t think so,” in response to the question of whether their belief would affect their ability to be fair. While the word “think” might, in some cases, render a statement equivocal, here the court found that the statement, taken in context, was unequivocal. The court noted that the use of “think” is often challenged and advised trial courts to ask additional questions to clarify a juror’s impartiality when a “yes” or “no” response is qualified. The Court cited People v. Blyden, 55 N.Y.2d 73, 79 (1982) in support of the proposition that “the juror’s use of the word ‘think’ might not in every case render his or her statements inadequate.” The Court also observed, “Time and again this Court has been called upon to measure a particular statement by a prospective juror against the clear legal standard requiring an unequivocal assertion of impartiality.” The Court emphasized the need for trial courts to dispel any doubt as to equivocation to assure an impartial jury and avoid appeals.

  • People v. Janvier, 86 N.Y.2d 995 (1995): A Defendant’s Right to Waive Presence During Voir Dire

    People v. Janvier, 86 N.Y.2d 995 (1995)

    A defendant has the right to voluntarily waive their presence during sidebar questioning of prospective jurors, and a trial court abuses its discretion by summarily refusing to permit the defendant to exercise that right.

    Summary

    These cases address a defendant’s waiver of their right to be present during voir dire under People v. Antommarchi. In People v. Janvier, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the defendant to waive his right to be present during the voir dire of prospective jurors in the robing room. In People v. Williams, the Court held that the trial court did not err in refusing to allow the defendant to rescind his prior voluntary waiver. The Court emphasized trial courts’ broad discretion in managing court proceedings but found an abuse of discretion in Janvier.

    Facts

    In People v. Janvier, at the start of jury selection, defense counsel informed the judge that the defendant wished to waive his right to be present during robing room voir dire. The stated reason was to prevent prospective jurors from inferring that the defendant was incarcerated, which they might deduce from seeing him escorted by security. The trial judge refused the waiver without explanation. In People v. Williams, the defendant initially waived his right to be present at robing room and sidebar conferences after being advised by counsel and questioned by the judge. However, shortly after jury selection began, the defendant changed his mind and wanted to attend the conferences, but the judge denied his request.

    Procedural History

    In People v. Janvier, the defendant was convicted after being compelled to attend robing room voir dire conferences. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the case was appealed to the Court of Appeals. In People v. Williams, the defendant was convicted after the trial court refused to allow him to rescind his waiver of presence. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the case was appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. In People v. Janvier: Whether the trial court erred by refusing to allow the defendant to waive his right to be present during the voir dire of prospective jurors in the robing room.
    2. In People v. Williams: Whether the trial court erred by refusing to allow the defendant to rescind his waiver of the right to be present after he had voluntarily waived it at the beginning of voir dire.

    Holding

    1. In People v. Janvier: Yes, because the trial court abused its discretion by summarily refusing to permit the defendant to exercise his right to waive his presence at sidebar and robing room conferences.
    2. In People v. Williams: No, because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to rescind the defendant’s waiver.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals recognized the broad discretion of trial courts to manage court proceedings, particularly voir dire. Regarding People v. Williams, the court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s refusal to allow the defendant to rescind his waiver, citing People v. Vargas, 88 N.Y.2d 363 (1996), and People v. Spotford, 85 N.Y.2d 593 (1995). However, concerning People v. Janvier, the Court held that the trial court’s summary refusal to accept the defendant’s waiver was an abuse of discretion. The court emphasized that the right to be present during sidebar questioning of prospective jurors can be waived voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, referencing People v. Vargas. The Court acknowledged that a defendant might strategically choose to be absent, believing jurors may be less truthful about biases in their presence or fearing jurors might infer incarceration from the presence of security personnel. The Court stated that the trial court compelled the defendant to alter his trial strategy by not allowing him to waive his right.