People v. Tarsia, 50 N.Y.2d 1 (1980)

A defendant’s confession is not per se involuntary solely because it followed a voice stress evaluation test, and the admission of testimony and recordings related to the test is permissible when the defense strategy opens the door to such evidence.

Summary

Joseph Tarsia was convicted of attempted murder. His appeal centered on the admissibility of a voice stress evaluation test and subsequent confessions. The New York Court of Appeals held that because Tarsia’s defense strategy focused on the alleged coercion of the test, the trial court did not err in admitting testimony and recordings related to it. The Court also found that the confessions were not involuntary as a matter of law simply because they followed the test, absent evidence of coercion beyond the test itself. This case clarifies the circumstances under which evidence related to a voice stress test can be admitted and the standard for determining the voluntariness of confessions following such a test.

Facts

Tarsia’s estranged wife was shot. Tarsia, found in the woods behind the house, claimed he was hunting. He denied involvement but agreed to a voice stress evaluation to dispel suspicion. After the test, the examiner questioned Tarsia further, leading to Tarsia confessing to shooting his wife. Tarsia then made multiple oral and written confessions.

Procedural History

Tarsia was convicted of attempted murder after a jury trial. He unsuccessfully sought to suppress his confessions at a pretrial hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Tarsia appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing the voice stress test coerced his confessions and the introduction of test-related evidence was reversible error. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the trial court erred in admitting testimony concerning the defendant’s submission to a voice stress evaluation test and a tape recording of the test questions and answers.
2. Whether the defendant’s oral and written inculpatory statements were rendered involuntary as a matter of law because they followed his participation in the voice stress evaluation test.

Holding

1. No, because the defendant’s trial strategy focused on the alleged coerciveness of the test, opening the door to the admission of such evidence.
2. No, because the confessions were not coerced as a matter of law solely due to their temporal proximity to the voice stress evaluation test.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court reasoned that the defendant’s trial strategy, which emphasized the coercive nature of the voice stress test, justified the admission of the test-related evidence. Defense counsel made it his “business to expose, rather than to suppress, the circumstances surrounding the testing of his client.” The Court noted that to allow the defendant to now claim the evidence should have been excluded would be to “countenance his eating his cake and having it too.”

Regarding the voluntariness of the confessions, the Court acknowledged the potential for abuse in using psychological tests like voice stress evaluations but found no evidence of coercion beyond the test itself. The Court emphasized that Tarsia voluntarily consented to the test, was informed of his Miranda rights, and was not subjected to physical abuse or mistreatment. The Court distinguished this case from others where confessions were deemed coerced due to misrepresentations about the test’s accuracy or admissibility. Here, “no impression that the voice stress test was omniscient was foisted upon defendant. To the contrary, he was informed that the test could not determine whether he was lying.” The Court concluded that the “police, their investigatory ardor not having been stilled by the test results, continued their inquiry in a manner calculated to undermine defendant’s free will.” The Court emphasized that absent coercion exceeding the test itself, the confession was voluntary.