New York Law Review

Tag: Voice Identification

  • People v. Allweiss, 48 N.Y.2d 40 (1979): Admissibility of Voice Identification Testimony Based on Prior Familiarity

    48 N.Y.2d 40 (1979)

    Due process considerations regarding suggestive pretrial identification procedures are relaxed when a witness identifies a defendant’s voice based on prior familiarity, provided the witness’s ability to observe and recall events is not impaired and police suggestion is minimal.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of voice identification testimony where a witness, Ruby Cohen, identified the defendant, Allweiss, as a participant in a crime after hearing recorded phone calls. Ruby knew Allweiss through the victim’s daughter. The court held that the identification was admissible because Ruby was familiar with Allweiss’s voice, and the circumstances of the identification at the police station were not unduly suggestive. The court emphasized that due process concerns are lessened when a witness identifies someone based on a prior relationship and familiarity.

    Facts

    Mrs. Otti Cohen received threatening phone calls demanding money. She initially recognized the caller as Bobby Stephenson, but the caller later denied being Bobby. Mrs. Cohen contacted the police, who recorded subsequent calls. Mrs. Cohen’s daughter, Ruby, knew the defendant, Allweiss, through Stephenson. Allweiss was arrested after Mrs. Cohen paid the money. Ruby was asked to come to the police station to listen to the recorded calls and identify the voices.

    Procedural History

    Allweiss was convicted of attempted grand larceny. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Allweiss appealed, arguing that Ruby Cohen’s voice identification testimony should have been suppressed because seeing Allweiss at the police station before the identification was unduly suggestive.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the testimony of a witness identifying the defendant’s voice on recorded phone calls should be excluded because the witness saw the defendant at the police station prior to making the voice identification, thus potentially tainting the identification process.

    Holding

    No, because the witness was already familiar with the defendant’s voice from prior interactions, and the circumstances surrounding the identification were not so suggestive as to create a substantial risk of misidentification.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged the due process concerns associated with suggestive pretrial identification procedures, citing United States v. Wade and People v. Adams. However, it distinguished the case from typical eyewitness identification scenarios. The court reasoned that when a witness is familiar with the defendant prior to the crime, the risk of misidentification due to police suggestion is significantly reduced. The Court highlighted the relationship between Ruby Cohen and Allweiss, noting that Ruby knew Allweiss and could identify her voice based on prior conversations. The court emphasized that the primary purpose of pretrial notice requirements is to alert the defendant to possible constitutional violations in identification procedures. In cases where the witness is familiar with the defendant, such notice may be unnecessary. The court stated, “When a crime has been committed by a family member, former friend or long-time acquaintance of a witness there is little or no risk that comments by the police, however suggestive, will lead the witness to identify the wrong person.” The Court also noted that the existing identification procedures were designed for eyewitnesses, and may be unsuitable in other contexts, such as voice identification from prior relationships. Because the lower courts found that the witness was well acquainted with the defendant and that there was no impermissible police suggestion or risk of irreparable mistaken identification, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

  • People v. Acevedo, 40 N.Y.2d 701 (1976): Admissibility of In-Court Demonstrations

    People v. Acevedo, 40 N.Y.2d 701 (1976)

    A trial court has discretion to exclude in-court demonstrations or experiments if they are not sufficiently similar to the actual events at issue or if their probative value is outweighed by the potential for prejudice, confusion, or delay.

    Summary

    Acevedo was convicted of robbery based largely on voice identification by a hotel employee, Skolnick, who had extensive prior interactions with him. The defense sought to conduct an in-court experiment where Skolnick would be blindfolded and asked to identify Acevedo’s brother’s voice uttering phrases from the robbery. The trial court denied the request. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, finding no abuse of discretion. The court reasoned that the proposed experiment did not replicate the conditions under which Skolnick identified Acevedo’s voice and therefore had the potential to mislead the jury. The court modified the order of the Appellate Division by reversing the conviction of grand larceny in the third degree, determining that it was a lesser included offense.

    Facts

    Judith Skolnick, an assistant hotel manager, was accosted by a masked robber who forced her to open the manager’s office at gunpoint. The robber, familiar with the office layout, spoke frequently during the 20-25 minute robbery, both in Spanish to his accomplice and in English to the victims. Skolnick recognized the robber’s voice as that of Agilio Acevedo, a hotel security guard she had known and spoken with extensively for nearly two years. Acevedo had a slight speech impediment, particularly noticeable in his pronunciation of the word “security,” which further solidified her identification. Immediately after the robbery, Skolnick confidently identified Acevedo as the robber.

    Procedural History

    Acevedo was convicted after a jury trial. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing to allow an in-court voice identification experiment during the cross-examination of the key witness. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Acevedo then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow the defense to conduct an in-court voice identification experiment during the cross-examination of the key witness.
    2. Whether the defendant’s conviction for grand larceny in the third degree was proper given the convictions for robbery in the first and second degrees.

    Holding

    1. No, because the proposed experiment did not sufficiently replicate the conditions under which the witness identified the defendant’s voice and therefore had the potential to mislead the jury.
    2. No, in part, because grand larceny in the third degree is a lesser included offense under the circumstances.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that while demonstrative evidence can be convincing, trial courts have broad discretion to exclude tests or demonstrations that are not properly relevant or that could mislead the jury. The proposed voice identification test was deemed dissimilar to the actual circumstances of Skolnick’s identification: her familiarity with Acevedo’s voice was extensive and recent, whereas her familiarity with his brother’s voice was limited and dated. The court noted, “The voice identification test proposed by the defendant in the case before us patently would not have duplicated the circumstances which surrounded Ms. Skolnick’s voice identification of the defendant.” The court also noted the jury had ample opportunity to evaluate the witness’s description of the defendant’s speech impediment. Finally, regarding the multiple convictions, the court noted that one crime is only included within another when it is impossible to commit the crime in the greater degree without also committing “by the same conduct” a crime in the lesser degree. The court reversed the conviction for larceny in the third degree holding that it was a lesser included offense in these circumstances.