71 N.Y.2d 769 (1988)

A trial court has discretion to exclude a defendant’s voice exemplar offered as real or demonstrative evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or jury confusion, particularly when the exemplar is easily feigned.

Summary

Defendants Scarola and Merchant, in separate robbery cases, sought to demonstrate speech impediments to the jury through voice exemplars without facing cross-examination on the underlying facts. The trial courts denied these requests. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that while relevant evidence is generally admissible, trial courts retain discretion to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by the risk of prejudice or jury confusion. The court emphasized the inherent unreliability of voice exemplars, which are easily feigned, and the difficulty in verifying their authenticity. This ruling underscores the trial court’s gatekeeping role in ensuring fairness and preventing misleading evidence.

Facts

In Scarola’s case, the victim identified him as her assailant, noting no speech impediment. Scarola’s sister testified he had a nasal speech impediment. Scarola wanted to provide a voice exemplar, but the court ruled he would be subject to cross-examination about the incident. In Merchant’s case, the victim identified him as the robber, who spoke without any noted impediment. Merchant’s father and a speech therapist testified to Merchant’s speech problems. The therapist admitted Merchant could camouflage his impediment in short sentences. Merchant sought to offer a voice exemplar, which the court denied, citing the risk of faking a speech impediment.

Procedural History

Scarola was convicted of robbery; the Appellate Division affirmed. Merchant was convicted of robbery; the Appellate Division affirmed. Both defendants appealed, and the Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals due to the similar legal issue.

Issue(s)

Whether the trial courts erred in denying the defendants the opportunity to provide voice exemplars to the jury to demonstrate alleged speech impediments, without being subjected to cross-examination on the substantive facts of the case.

Holding

No, because the trial courts did not abuse their discretion in finding that the probative value of the voice exemplar evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and the potential to mislead the jury, given the ease with which such evidence could be feigned.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals acknowledged that relevant evidence is generally admissible but emphasized that trial courts have discretion to exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or jury confusion. The court distinguished voice exemplars from other forms of demonstrative evidence, such as scars or tattoos, which are more difficult to feign. The court highlighted the inherent unreliability of voice exemplars, noting that a defendant could easily fake a speech impediment. The court cited People v. Alvino, 71 NY2d 233, 242, stating, “Even where technically relevant evidence is admissible, it may still be excluded by the trial court in the exercise of its discretion if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger that it will unfairly prejudice the other side or mislead the jury”. The court also distinguished State v. Tillett, 351 So.2d 1153 (La.), where the defendant was identified by his accent, making a voice exemplar more reliable. Here, neither defendant was identified by his voice, and the foundation laid did not preclude the possibility of feigning a speech defect. The court also held that Scarola waived his right to object to the People’s use of a single photograph of the defendant after he chose to leave the courtroom during the eyewitness testimony. The court reasoned that the defendant cannot complain about the identification procedure when he voluntarily absented himself.