New York Law Review

Tag: Violent Felony

  • People v. Dais, 19 N.Y.3d 337 (2012): Resentencing and De Novo Review of Prior Violent Felony Status

    People v. Dais, 19 N.Y.3d 337 (2012)

    In resentencing proceedings under the Drug Law Reform Act of 2009 (DLRA), both the prosecution and the defendant can litigate de novo whether the defendant’s prior felony conviction was for a violent felony, regardless of prior predicate felony adjudications.

    Summary

    These consolidated appeals address whether, in a resentencing proceeding under the 2009 Drug Law Reform Act, the prosecution can introduce a new predicate felony statement alleging a prior violent felony (People v. Dais), or whether the defendant can challenge the nonviolent designation of a prior felony (People v. Stanley). The New York Court of Appeals held that a de novo review of whether a defendant’s prior felony was violent or nonviolent is proper in a 2009 DLRA resentencing proceeding. This ruling ensures that resentencing reflects the distinction between violent and non-violent offenders as intended by the DLRA.

    Facts

    In People v. Dais, Dais was originally sentenced as a second felony offender based on a prior nonviolent drug offense. He later sought resentencing under the 2009 DLRA. The prosecution then sought to introduce a prior violent felony (robbery) to enhance his sentence. In People v. Stanley, Stanley was originally sentenced as a second felony offender. He later sought resentencing and tried to challenge the classification of a prior Florida robbery conviction as equivalent to a New York violent felony.

    Procedural History

    In Dais, the Supreme Court allowed the prosecution to file the new predicate felony statement, and the Appellate Division affirmed. In Stanley, the Supreme Court resentenced Stanley as a second felony offender with a prior violent felony. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that Stanley was not entitled to a de novo determination of his predicate felony status. The New York Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether, in a resentencing proceeding under the 2009 DLRA, the prosecution can introduce a new predicate felony statement to demonstrate that the defendant has a prior violent felony conviction, despite the defendant previously being adjudicated a second felony offender based on a nonviolent felony.
    2. Whether, in a resentencing proceeding under the 2009 DLRA, the defendant can challenge whether a prior felony conviction was for a nonviolent felony, even if it was not challenged in the original sentencing.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the 2009 DLRA directs resentencing courts to resentence eligible individuals in accordance with Penal Law § 70.70, which distinguishes between violent and nonviolent prior felonies.
    2. Yes, because the ameliorative purpose of the 2009 DLRA is to ensure that second felony drug offenders with prior nonviolent felonies receive potentially more lenient sentences than those who have a history of violent felonies.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the 2009 DLRA, in conjunction with Penal Law § 70.70, requires a distinction between second felony drug offenders with prior violent felonies and those with prior nonviolent felonies. The court emphasized CPL 400.21(2), which mandates that the prosecution file a predicate felony statement indicating whether a prior felony conviction was violent when such information is available. The court noted that prior to the 2004 DLRA, there was no distinction made regarding the violent nature of the predicate felony, which incentivized a de novo review in resentencing proceedings. As the Court stated, “[w]hen information available to the court or to the people prior to sentencing for a felony indicates that the defendant may have previously been subjected to a predicate felony conviction . . . a statement must be filed by the prosecutor…setting forth…whether the predicate felony conviction was a violent felony”. Regarding Stanley, the Court held that he should have the opportunity to argue that his prior Florida convictions would not be considered violent felonies in New York for the purpose of resentencing. However, Stanley could not relitigate his basic predicate felony status.

  • People v. Steward, 16 N.Y.3d 493 (2011): Resentencing Eligibility and Predicate Felonies

    People v. Steward, 16 N.Y.3d 493 (2011)

    A defendant is ineligible for resentencing under the Drug Law Reform Act of 2009 if they have a prior violent felony conviction within the preceding ten years, regardless of whether they were formally adjudicated a predicate felon based on that violent felony.

    Summary

    Defendants Steward and Wright sought resentencing under the Drug Law Reform Act of 2009 for drug offenses. The trial courts denied their motions, finding they were ineligible due to prior violent felony convictions within the statutory time frame. The defendants argued that because they were not *adjudicated* predicate felons based on those violent felonies at the time of their sentencing for the drug offenses, the violent felonies should not disqualify them from resentencing. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, holding that a formal adjudication as a predicate felon based on the violent felony is not required for the exclusion to apply. The court reasoned that the plain language of the statute indicates that prior adjudication is only required under a separate provision not applicable here.

    Facts

    Steward was convicted in March 2004 for criminal sale of a controlled substance. He had a 1991 conviction for robbery in the first and second degrees (violent felonies).
    Wright was convicted in May 2005 for criminal possession of a controlled substance. He had two 1994 convictions for attempted robbery in the second degree (violent felonies).
    Neither defendant was adjudicated a predicate felon based on their violent felony convictions at the time of their sentencing for the drug offenses.

    Procedural History

    Both Steward and Wright moved for resentencing under the Drug Law Reform Act of 2009.
    The trial courts denied the motions, finding them ineligible due to prior violent felony convictions.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the trial courts’ decisions.
    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant must have been formally adjudicated a predicate felon based on a prior violent felony conviction to be excluded from resentencing eligibility under CPL 440.46(5)(a)(i).

    Holding

    No, because the plain language of CPL 440.46(5)(a)(i) does not require a formal adjudication as a predicate felon based on the violent felony for the exclusion from resentencing to apply.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the statutory interpretation of CPL 440.46(5)(a)(i). The court emphasized that the statute excludes individuals with a prior conviction for a violent felony offense within the preceding ten years. The defendants conceded they had prior violent felony convictions within that timeframe.

    The court distinguished between CPL 440.46(5)(a) and CPL 440.46(5)(b). The latter provision explicitly requires a prior adjudication for certain offenses to trigger the exclusion, while the former does not. The court applied the principle that “(w)hen different terms are used in various parts of a statute . . . , it is reasonable to assume that a distinction between them is intended” (Matter of Albano v Kirby, 36 NY2d 526, 530 [1975]). Since paragraph (b) included a “prior adjudication” requirement, but paragraph (a) did not, the legislature intentionally omitted that requirement from paragraph (a).

    The court also addressed the defendants’ argument that Penal Law § 70.06(1)(b) and CPL 400.21(7)(c) limit the term “predicate felony conviction” to only those convictions previously adjudicated. The court clarified that while CPL 400.21(7)(c) requires an adjudication for the term “second felony offender,” the term “predicate felony conviction” itself does not require such an adjudication.

    The court noted that defendants seeking resentencing can still challenge the validity of the underlying prior violent felony convictions. Quoting L 2004, ch 738, § 23, the court stated that a court may “conduct a hearing, if necessary, to determine whether [a defendant] qualifies to be resentenced or to determine *any controverted issue of fact relevant to the issue of sentencing*.” Thus, the court affirmed the Appellate Division’s orders, finding that the defendants were ineligible for resentencing due to their prior violent felony convictions, irrespective of whether they were previously adjudicated predicate felons on those bases.