New York Law Review

Tag: Violation of Probation

  • People v. Feliciano, 17 N.Y.3d 16 (2011): Duty to Promptly Execute a Violation of Probation Warrant

    People v. Feliciano, 17 N.Y.3d 16 (2011)

    A court’s failure to promptly execute a violation of probation (VOP) warrant for a defendant incarcerated out-of-state does not automatically divest the court of jurisdiction, especially when extradition is complex and the delay is partially attributable to the defendant’s actions.

    Summary

    Luis Feliciano pleaded guilty to a felony drug charge and received a split sentence of jail time and probation. He violated his probation by fleeing to Puerto Rico, prompting the court to issue a VOP warrant. Years later, while incarcerated in Pennsylvania for a separate crime, Feliciano requested resolution of the VOP. The New York court delayed the VOP hearing until Feliciano’s release from Pennsylvania due to extradition difficulties. After his release, Feliciano was resentenced to a prison term. The New York Court of Appeals held that the delay did not divest the court of jurisdiction because of the complexities of interstate extradition and the defendant’s initial flight, distinguishing the case from situations where a defendant is readily available within the state.

    Facts

    In 1992, Feliciano was sentenced to jail and probation for a drug felony.

    He violated probation by fleeing to Puerto Rico without permission.

    A VOP complaint was filed, and a warrant was issued for his arrest.

    In 2000, he was arrested in Pennsylvania for homicide-related crimes.

    In 2002, he requested resolution of the outstanding VOP from New York.

    The District Attorney noted the difficulties of extraditing him from Pennsylvania.

    The court postponed the VOP hearing until his release from Pennsylvania.

    In 2007, after his release from Pennsylvania, the VOP warrant was executed, and he was resentenced.

    Procedural History

    The County Court initially imposed a split sentence for the drug charge.

    After Feliciano violated his probation, the County Court declared him delinquent and issued an arrest warrant.

    After serving time in Pennsylvania, Feliciano was returned to Greene County, and the County Court revoked his probation and resentenced him.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the resentencing.

    Feliciano filed two CPL 440.20 motions, claiming jurisdictional defect and ineffective assistance of counsel, both of which were denied.

    His application for a writ of error coram nobis was denied by the Appellate Division, but leave to appeal was granted by the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the five-year delay in adjudicating the VOP complaint, due to the defendant’s incarceration in another state and the difficulties of extradition, violated his statutory or constitutional rights and divested the County Court of jurisdiction to revoke his probation.

    Holding

    No, because the delay was not unreasonable given the complexities of interstate extradition, the defendant’s initial flight from New York, and the lack of a clear legal obligation for New York to prioritize his return for the VOP hearing while he was serving a sentence in Pennsylvania.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. Horvath, where the probationer was incarcerated within New York and readily available. The court emphasized that CPL 410.30 requires the court to “promptly take reasonable and appropriate action,” but what constitutes “reasonable and appropriate action” depends on the circumstances.

    The court cited Carchman v. Nash and Moody v. Daggett, highlighting that the Supreme Court has drawn distinctions between detainers based on criminal charges and those based on probation violations, noting the reduced urgency and constitutional dimension of the latter.

    The court also distinguished this case from People v. Winfrey, where the People made no effort whatsoever to secure the defendant’s return from out-of-state. Here, the District Attorney investigated the possibility of extradition and determined it was impractical.

    The court stated, “The arguments that defendant asserts trial counsel should have advanced at the VOP hearing are not so strong that ‘no reasonable defense lawyer could have found [them] … to be not worth raising.’ They are, in fact, novel and call for an extension of or change in — not an application of — existing law.”

    Because the arguments were not clearly dispositive, appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise them.

  • In re Jazmin A., 14 N.Y.3d 440 (2010): Limits on Family Court’s Authority to Detain Juvenile Probationers

    In re Jazmin A., 14 N.Y.3d 440 (2010)

    Absent the filing of a violation of probation (VOP) petition, the Family Court lacks the statutory authority to remand a juvenile to detention after the juvenile has been placed on probation.

    Summary

    Jazmin A., a 14-year-old, was adjudicated delinquent and placed on probation. After a poor probation report citing missed school and curfew violations, the Family Court remanded her to detention without a VOP petition. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the Family Court lacked the authority to detain her absent a VOP petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Family Court Act does not authorize detention of a juvenile probationer before a VOP petition is filed, and continuing jurisdiction does not expand the court’s powers beyond those authorized by statute. This case clarifies the limits on Family Court’s power to detain juveniles already on probation.

    Facts

    Jazmin A., age 14, threatened her mother with a knife and injured her stepfather. She was adjudicated delinquent based on unlawful possession of a weapon and placed on probation under the Bronx Juvenile Accountability Court (JAC) program. Conditions of probation included obeying her parents, observing curfew, attending school, and submitting to drug testing. At her first monitoring hearing, the probation report was unfavorable; she had missed school and violated curfew. The Family Court remanded her to the custody of the Commissioner of Juvenile Justice.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court remanded Jazmin to detention on April 16, 2008. Jazmin appealed the detention order. The Appellate Division reversed and vacated the Family Court’s order on May 19, 2009. The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, certifying the question of whether its reversal of the Family Court’s order was proper. The Court of Appeals retained jurisdiction despite the mootness of the case and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Family Court has the authority to remand a juvenile to detention after an order of disposition placing the juvenile on probation, but before a violation of probation petition has been filed.

    Holding

    No, because the Family Court Act does not empower the Family Court to order detention of a juvenile probationer before the filing of a VOP petition.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the specific junctures in a delinquency proceeding where the Family Court is authorized to remand a juvenile to detention, as outlined in Article 3 of the Family Court Act, including after a pre-petition hearing, at the initial appearance, after a probable cause hearing, and after a VOP petition is filed. The Court noted the absence of any statutory provision empowering the Family Court to order detention before a VOP petition is filed. The court stated, “Because the Legislature did not similarly empower Family Court to order detention of a juvenile probationer before the filing of a VOP petition, we are unwilling to imply such authority in the absence of a statutory peg.” The Court rejected the presentment agency’s argument that Jazmin had consented to detention, finding no valid waiver of the VOP petition requirement. The Court further dismissed the argument that the monitoring hearing was an “adjournment” of the “initial appearance,” clarifying that a probation compliance check is distinct from the initial appearance on the underlying delinquency petition. The court emphasized that continuing jurisdiction does not grant the Family Court authority to act beyond the powers authorized by Article 3 of the Family Court Act.