New York Law Review

Tag: Vindictiveness

  • People v. Young, 94 N.Y.2d 171 (1999): Presumption of Vindictiveness After Retrial

    94 N.Y.2d 171 (1999)

    A presumption of vindictiveness in sentencing does not automatically arise when a defendant receives a greater sentence on an individual count after retrial, but a lesser overall sentence; courts must examine the record for a reasonable likelihood that the enhanced sentence was retaliatory.

    Summary

    Defendant was initially convicted of multiple offenses and sentenced to an aggregate term of 45 years to life. After a successful appeal and retrial, he was convicted of only one offense, but received a sentence of 25 years to life on that count, exceeding the original sentence for that specific count, though the aggregate sentence was reduced. The New York Court of Appeals held that a presumption of vindictiveness did not automatically arise because his aggregate sentence was lower and required examination of the record to determine the likelihood the enhanced sentence was a result of vindictiveness. It affirmed the sentence because the record indicated it was based on his extensive criminal history.

    Facts

    Defendant was charged with burglary and related offenses. He was convicted and sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 45 years to life. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction. Upon retrial, Defendant was convicted of only one count: criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree. The second trial court sentenced Defendant, as a persistent felony offender, to 25 years to life on that count.

    Procedural History

    The initial conviction was reversed by the Appellate Division. After retrial and a new sentence, the Appellate Division affirmed the new sentence, finding no increased sentence. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a presumption of vindictiveness arises when a defendant receives a lesser overall sentence following retrial, but a greater sentence on an individual count?

    Holding

    No, because the presumption of vindictiveness arises only if the circumstances evince a reasonable likelihood that the greater sentence on the individual count was the result of vindictiveness.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the principle that defendants should not be penalized for exercising their right to appeal, citing United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 (1982) (“To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation ‘of the most basic sort’”). It noted the presumption of vindictiveness arises when defendants who have won appellate reversals are given greater sentences after retrials. However, this presumption is not absolute. Quoting Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 799 (1989), the court stated that the presumption of vindictiveness “do[es] not apply in every case where a convicted defendant receives a higher sentence on retrial”. The court reasoned that the key is whether there is a “reasonable likelihood” that the enhanced sentence was retaliatory.

    The court declined to adopt a strict “aggregate” or “count-by-count” approach. Instead, it mandated examination of the record to determine whether there’s a “reasonable likelihood” that the enhanced sentence was due to vindictiveness. In this case, the court emphasized Defendant’s extensive criminal history, including convictions for murder, robbery, and burglary, and the sentencing judge’s focus on this history. The court explained that the initial lenient sentence on the stolen property count was because the other convictions allowed for the desired overall sentence, but after retrial, the stolen property conviction was the only means to impose an appropriate sentence. Therefore, no presumption of vindictiveness arose because it was clear the increased sentence was based on his criminal history.

  • People v. Van Pelt, 76 N.Y.2d 156 (1990): Enhanced Sentences and Due Process After a Successful Appeal

    People v. Van Pelt, 76 N.Y.2d 156 (1990)

    Under the New York State Constitution’s Due Process Clause, a presumption of institutional vindictiveness applies when a defendant receives a harsher sentence after a successful appeal and retrial, even if a different judge imposes the second sentence; this presumption can only be overcome by articulating objective reasons based on events occurring after the original sentencing.

    Summary

    Van Pelt was convicted of robbery, but the conviction was reversed on appeal. After a retrial, he was convicted again and received a higher sentence from a different judge. The New York Court of Appeals held that the enhanced sentence violated state due process protections because the sentencing court failed to justify the tougher sentence based on cognizable reasons occurring after the first sentencing. The court emphasized that the Due Process Clause of the New York Constitution requires a presumption against punitively toughened sentences in such circumstances, even with a different sentencing judge.

    Facts

    Defendant and his brother were indicted for a gunpoint robbery. The brother pleaded guilty, and the defendant was convicted and sentenced. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction due to an error in the jury instructions regarding the alibi defense. At the retrial before a different Justice, the defendant was again convicted. The second judge imposed a harsher sentence than the first judge.

    Procedural History

    1. Defendant was convicted and sentenced.
    2. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction.
    3. Defendant was retried, convicted, and received an enhanced sentence.
    4. The Appellate Division affirmed the enhanced sentence.
    5. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an enhanced sentence after a successful appeal and retrial violates State constitutional due process protections when the sentencing court does not adequately justify the tougher sentence with reasons occurring subsequent to the first sentencing, sufficient to overcome the presumption of institutional vindictiveness, even when a different judge imposes the second sentence?

    Holding

    No, because the Due Process Clause of the New York State Constitution requires the application of the presumption of institutional vindictiveness in such cases as a procedural safeguard against punitively toughened sentences, and the sentencing court failed to cite sufficiently objective conduct or events occurring after the first sentence to justify the increased sentence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on North Carolina v. Pearce, which established a rule to prevent judicial vindictiveness after a successful appeal. While Texas v. McCullough held that the Pearce presumption might not apply when a different judge imposes the second sentence under Federal law, the New York Court of Appeals held that the Due Process Clause of the New York Constitution requires the application of the presumption in this case. The court emphasized that a record articulation of some event becoming known or available only after the first sentence and justifying the more severe sentence is necessary. Here, the sentencing judge’s reasons (disbelief of alibi witnesses, complainant having to testify twice) did not constitute new facts or intervening events that would justify the increase. The court also noted the importance of protecting the statutory right to appellate review and preventing defendants from hesitating to exercise that right due to the threat of a tougher sentence. The court emphasized that the presumption of vindictiveness is rebuttable, but requires a clear articulation that the increased sentence was premised on cognizable and temporally relevant data. The court stated that the State due process provision confers a more protective benefit than the Federal counterpart.