Tag: victim impact statement

  • People v. Brown, 1 N.Y.3d 1 (2003): Discretion to Allow Multiple Victim Impact Statements

    1 N.Y.3d 1 (2003)

    Sentencing courts have discretion to allow more than one person to make a victim impact statement at sentencing, beyond the single statement from the victim or victim’s surrogate mandated in CPL 380.50 (2), provided the statements are not unduly prejudicial or negatively impact the fair administration of justice.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon after fatally shooting Darnell Brown. At sentencing, the prosecution sought to call several of Brown’s family members and a friend to offer victim impact statements, which the defense objected to. The sentencing court allowed Brown’s mother, the mother of Brown’s child, his uncle, his cousin, and a close friend to speak. The New York Court of Appeals held that sentencing courts have discretion to allow multiple victim impact statements. The Court reasoned that CPL 380.50 (2) grants victims the right to speak, but does not restrict the court’s discretion to allow others close to the victim to address the court, so long as the statements are not unduly prejudicial or inflammatory.

    Facts

    Defendant shot and killed Darnell Brown. At trial, Defendant claimed he shot Brown in self-defense during a struggle over a gun. The jury acquitted Defendant of homicide charges but convicted him of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, requiring proof that he possessed a loaded firearm with intent to use it unlawfully against another. At the sentencing proceeding, the prosecutor sought to call several of Brown’s family members and a friend to offer victim impact statements.

    Procedural History

    The trial court allowed five people to make victim impact statements at the sentencing proceeding. The defendant was sentenced to a determinate term of eight years. Defendant appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed his conviction and sentence. A Judge of the Court of Appeals granted defendant leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a sentencing court has the authority to hear victim impact statements from multiple individuals beyond the single statement from the victim or victim’s surrogate mandated in CPL 380.50(2).

    Holding

    Yes, because CPL 380.50(2) grants victims a right to speak at sentencing, but does not restrict a sentencing court’s discretionary authority to allow others close to the victim to address the court, provided the statements are not unduly prejudicial to the defendant or will negatively impact the fair administration of justice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 380.50(2) was enacted to afford victims a greater voice in the criminal justice process, particularly in sentencing. The statute guarantees victims the right to speak at sentencing. However, nothing in the statute’s language or legislative history indicates that it was intended to restrict a sentencing court’s existing discretionary authority to allow others close to the victim to address the court. Prior to the enactment of CPL 380.50 (2), no statute or decision of this Court precluded a sentencing court from hearing remarks by victims. The statute elevated what had previously been a privilege left entirely to the discretion of the sentencing court to “a right that a victim could exercise at his or her discretion.” The court emphasized that its holding does not eliminate the sentencing court’s discretion to limit or prohibit victim impact statements that are unduly prejudicial, inflammatory, or unhelpful. The Court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to allow the statements. As the court stated, “Multiple statements should not be allowed if the court concludes they will be unduly prejudicial to the defendant or will negatively impact the fair administration of justice.” The Court also found that despite arguments by the defendant regarding the appropriateness of the sentence in light of his youth, the sentencing court chose a term of imprisonment well within the permissible range despite the grave circumstances surrounding defendant’s possession of a loaded weapon with the intent to use it unlawfully.