New York Law Review

Tag: Vicious Propensity

  • Petrone v. Fernandez, 12 N.Y.3d 546 (2009): Strict Liability for Dog Bites and the Vicious Propensity Rule

    Petrone v. Fernandez, 12 N.Y.3d 546 (2009)

    In New York, liability for harm caused by a domestic animal, including a dog, is determined solely by the rule of strict liability based on the animal’s known or should-have-been-known vicious propensities, precluding negligence claims based on violations of leash laws alone.

    Summary

    A mail carrier, Melanie Petrone, was injured when she jumped back into her car to avoid an unleashed Rottweiler. She sued the dog owner, alleging negligence based on a violation of the local leash law and the dog’s supposed vicious propensities. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that liability for harm caused by a domestic animal is determined solely by the rule of strict liability for known vicious propensities, as established in Collier v. Zambito and Bard v. Jahnke. A violation of a leash law is irrelevant in the absence of such knowledge.

    Facts

    Melanie Petrone, a mail carrier, encountered an unleashed Rottweiler on a customer’s lawn. The dog was on the unfenced lawn of the defendant’s property. Fearing the dog, Petrone retreated to her vehicle. While attempting to get back into her car, she injured her finger. The dog did not bite, threaten, or make any contact with Petrone. She sued, alleging the dog owner was negligent for violating the local leash law.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the defendant, dismissing the complaint. The Appellate Division reversed, finding that a dog owner could be liable for violating a leash ordinance, even without prior vicious propensities. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the Supreme Court’s order, dismissing the negligence claim.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a dog owner may be held liable for injuries sustained as a result of an unleashed dog’s behavior based solely on a violation of a local leash ordinance, absent evidence of the dog’s known vicious propensities.

    Holding

    No, because in New York, liability for harm caused by a domestic animal is determined solely by the rule of strict liability for harm caused by an animal whose owner knows or should have known of the animal’s vicious propensities, precluding negligence claims based solely on violations of leash laws.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holdings in Collier v. Zambito and Bard v. Jahnke, which established that strict liability, based on the owner’s knowledge of an animal’s vicious propensities, is the sole basis for liability in domestic animal injury cases. The court stated, “[W]hen harm is caused by a domestic animal, its owner’s liability is determined solely by application of the rule articulated in Collier…i.e., the rule of strict liability for harm caused by a domestic animal whose owner knows or should have known of the animal’s vicious propensities.” The Court reasoned that a leash law violation is, at best, evidence of negligence, but negligence is no longer a basis for liability after Collier and Bard. Judge Pigott concurred, but expressed reservations about the elimination of negligence as a basis for liability, stating, “[N]egligence by an owner, even without knowledge concerning a domestic animal’s [vicious] propensity, may create liability”. However, he felt constrained by the precedent of Bard v. Jahnke. The ruling reinforces the focus on an animal’s known history rather than an owner’s general negligence.

  • Bard v. Jahnke, 6 N.Y.3d 592 (2006): Liability for Harm Caused by Domestic Animals

    6 N.Y.3d 592 (2006)

    The owner of a domestic animal is liable for injuries caused by the animal only if the owner knew or should have known of the animal’s vicious propensities.

    Summary

    Larry Bard, a carpenter, was injured by a bull while working on a dairy farm owned by Reinhardt Jahnke. Bard sued Jahnke, alleging strict liability and negligence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision in favor of Jahnke, holding that the owner of a domestic animal is liable for injuries caused by the animal only if the owner knew or should have known of the animal’s vicious propensities. The Court rejected Bard’s argument that an owner has a general duty to protect others from the normal dangerous characteristics of domestic animals, absent prior knowledge of the animal’s specific vicious tendencies.

    Facts

    Larry Bard, a self-employed carpenter, was asked to help repair cow mattresses at Reinhardt Jahnke’s dairy farm. Jahnke owned a dairy bull named Fred, who roamed freely in the “low cow district” of the barn. Fred had never previously injured anyone. Bard, while working on the mattresses, was attacked by Fred and sustained serious injuries. Jahnke was not aware that Bard would be working on the farm that day.

    Procedural History

    Bard sued Jahnke, alleging strict liability and negligence. Supreme Court granted Jahnke’s motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that Jahnke was not liable because he did not know or should not have known of the bull’s vicious propensities. Bard appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the owner of a domestic animal is liable for injuries caused by the animal if the owner did not know and had no reason to know of the animal’s vicious propensities.

    Holding

    No, because liability for harm caused by a domestic animal is determined solely by application of the rule articulated in Collier v. Zambito: the owner of a domestic animal who either knows or should have known of that animal’s vicious propensities will be held liable for the harm the animal causes as a result of those propensities.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior decision in Collier v. Zambito, which held that the owner of a domestic animal is liable for injuries caused by the animal if the owner knew or should have known of the animal’s vicious propensities. Vicious propensities include the propensity to do any act that might endanger the safety of others. The Court noted that knowledge of vicious propensities can be established by proof of prior acts, but also by something less, such as evidence that the animal had been known to growl, snap, or bare its teeth. However, the court stated, “Here, Fred had never attacked any farm animal or human being before September 27, 2001. He had always moved unrestrained within the limits of the barn’s low cow district, regularly coming into contact with other farm animals, farm workers and members of the Jahnke family without incident or hint of hostility. He had never acted in a way that put others at risk of harm. As a result, Bard cannot recover under our traditional rule.”

    The Court rejected Bard’s argument that Jahnke was negligent in failing to restrain Fred or to warn non-farm personnel of his presence, based on the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 518, Comments g and h. The court stated, “But this is no different from arguing that Jahnke was negligent in that he should have known of Fred’s vicious propensities because—as plaintiffs’ expert put it—’bulls, in particular breeding bulls, are generally dangerous and vicious animals.’” The court declined to hold that particular breeds or kinds of domestic animals are dangerous, and therefore when an individual animal of the breed or kind causes harm, its owner is charged with knowledge of vicious propensities. The court emphasized that liability is determined solely by the rule articulated in Collier.