New York Law Review

Tag: Veterans’ Preference

  • Matter of McSpedon v. Poughkeepsie, 62 N.Y.2d 916 (1984): Veterans’ Credits and Temporary Employment

    Matter of McSpedon v. Poughkeepsie, 62 N.Y.2d 916 (1984)

    An administrative procedure requiring temporary employment status until veterans’ preference credits are processed does not impermissibly deny or impair benefits afforded to veterans under Civil Service Law § 85, especially when the credits are preserved for later use.

    Summary

    McSpedon, a former pari-mutuel examiner, challenged his termination, arguing it was unlawful because his appointment was permanent after passing probation. The Department of Civil Service required employment to remain temporary until Form S-203 (disposing of veteran’s credits) was processed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of McSpedon’s petition, holding that the procedure did not deny or impair veteran’s benefits under Civil Service Law § 85 because the credits were preserved for later use. The administrative procedure was a reasonable means of assuring accurate information about those claiming veteran’s credits.

    Facts

    Appellant McSpedon was appointed as a pari-mutuel examiner on May 10, 1979, and terminated on October 10, 1979.
    Prior to his appointment, he indicated his willingness to accept the position on a temporary or permanent basis.
    McSpedon claimed his appointment was permanent after completing an eight-week probationary period without incident.
    The respondent contended that McSpedon’s employment was temporary until Form S-203, disposing of veteran’s preference credits, was processed on June 7, 1979.
    His probationary period was extended on July 25, and he was terminated on October 10 without a hearing.

    Procedural History

    McSpedon initiated an Article 78 proceeding seeking reinstatement, challenging his termination as unlawful. The lower court initially ruled against McSpedon. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision dismissing the petition. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, upholding the termination.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the respondent, by implementing an administrative procedure of the Department of Civil Service requiring that employment remain temporary until a completed Form S-203 is processed, impermissibly denied or impaired benefits afforded appellant, as a veteran, by section 85 of the Civil Service Law.

    Holding

    No, because the administrative procedure did not deny or impair the benefit set forth in section 85, but instead was a reasonable means of assuring that the veterans’ preference credits, though claimed, would later be available to the appellant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while the Civil Service Department can establish its own rules and internal operating procedures, such rules cannot be inconsistent with specific statutory provisions or erect a barrier to a benefit conferred by the Legislature. The Court emphasized that there was no inconsistency or barrier in this case.

    McSpedon claimed veteran’s preference credits on his employment application, a benefit available only once in a lifetime under Civil Service Law § 85(4)(a). Because his examination score was sufficient for appointment without the additional credits, the credits were automatically preserved for later use under Civil Service Law § 85(4)(c).

    Form S-203 did not deny or impair the benefit under § 85 but was an administrative procedure to ensure the veteran’s preference credits would be available to McSpedon later. The procedure aimed to enhance the accuracy of information about those who had claimed credits and applied equally to all persons in this category; therefore, it was neither discriminatory nor arbitrary.

    The court stated, “Form S-203 in no way denied or impaired the benefit set forth in section 85, but is instead an administrative procedure for assuring that the veterans’ preference credits, though claimed, would later be available to appellant. Nor can we say that such a procedure, which had the purpose of enhancing the accuracy of information as to those who had claimed credits, and which applied equally to all persons in this category, was discriminatory or arbitrary.”

  • Matter of Department of Personnel v. City Civil Service Commission, 61 N.Y.2d 420 (1984): Standing of City Personnel Director to Challenge Civil Service Commission Decisions

    Matter of Department of Personnel v. City Civil Service Commission, 61 N.Y.2d 420 (1984)

    A municipal Personnel Director has standing to challenge decisions of the City Civil Service Commission regarding veterans’ preference credits when those decisions interfere with the Director’s statutory duty to enforce civil service laws and ensure merit-based appointments and promotions.

    Summary

    The New York City Personnel Director challenged decisions by the City Civil Service Commission awarding veterans’ preference credits to police officers who were briefly called to active duty during a postal strike. The Personnel Director argued that the officers’ limited service did not warrant the credits. The Court of Appeals held that the Personnel Director had standing to bring the challenge because the decisions impacted the Director’s responsibility to enforce civil service laws and ensure merit-based appointments. The court further held that veterans’ credits should only be awarded when military service significantly disrupts civilian life, which was not the case here.

    Facts

    Respondent police officers, as Armed Forces reservists, were summoned to active duty for a few hours during a postal workers’ strike in 1970. They were released shortly after due to their essential civilian occupations. Based solely on this brief service, they claimed veterans’ preference credits, which would give them an advantage over other officers with higher scores on promotional exams. The City Personnel Director disallowed these credits, but the City Civil Service Commission reversed this decision, relying on a lower court opinion.

    Procedural History

    The Personnel Director initiated Article 78 proceedings challenging the Commission’s decisions. Special Term dismissed the petitions, holding that the Personnel Director lacked standing and that the Commission’s decisions had a rational basis. The Appellate Division affirmed without opinion. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Personnel Director did have standing and that the Commission’s decisions should have been annulled.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the City Personnel Director has standing to challenge the decisions of the City Civil Service Commission regarding veterans’ preference credits.

    2. Whether the City Civil Service Commission’s decisions to award veterans’ preference credits to police officers for brief active duty during a postal strike were proper.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the Personnel Director has a statutory duty to enforce civil service laws and ensure merit-based appointments, giving them an interest within the zone of protection of those laws and causing them harm when the Commission’s decisions interfere with that duty.

    2. No, because veterans’ preference credits should only be awarded when military service significantly disrupts civilian life and employment, which was not the case for the brief active duty during the postal strike.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the Personnel Director is responsible for setting civil service policy, enforcing civil service laws, and ensuring the legality of appointments in New York City. The Commission, on the other hand, functions as an appeals board. Citing Matter of Dairylea Coop. v Walkley and Matter of Bradford Cent. School Dist. v Ambach, the Court stated the criteria for standing: (1) the asserted interest must be within the zone of interest protected by the relevant statutes, (2) the administrative decision must have a harmful effect, and (3) there must be no legislative intent negating review. The Court found that the Personnel Director met these criteria.

    On the merits, the Court emphasized that appointments and promotions should be based on merit and fitness, and that veterans’ preferences, as an exception, should be construed narrowly. The Court distinguished this case from situations involving significant disruption of civilian life due to military service. The court found that extending veterans’ credits to persons whose military service was performed without any interference with their normal employment or mode of life would dilute the reward conferred on ex-servicemen who made full-scale sacrifices. Quoting Palmer v Board of Educ., the court emphasized the duty of administrative officers to discontinue illegal employment when noted and to challenge the legality of appointments in court.

    The Court explicitly stated that: “[V]eterans’ credits should be awarded for civil service appointments and promotions only where the applicant’s service as a ‘member of the armed forces’ during a ‘time of war’ was on a full-time basis evidencing a sacrifice in the form of disruption of civilian life and divorce from civilian occupation. It is not enough that an applicant’s service fall within the literal definitions of ‘member of the armed forces’ and ‘time of war’ if that service did not significantly interfere with the applicant’s normal employment and way of life.”

  • Matter of Michael J. Abrams v. Robert J. Bronstein, 42 N.Y.2d 832 (1977): Retroactive Application of Veterans’ Credits on Civil Service Exams

    Matter of Michael J. Abrams v. Robert J. Bronstein, 42 N.Y.2d 832 (1977)

    Veterans’ preference credits on civil service exams are granted only at the time the eligibility list is established, and subsequent legislative amendments extending the period for veterans’ benefits do not apply retroactively to alter finalized eligibility lists.

    Summary

    This case concerns whether a legislative amendment extending the “time of war” period for Korean conflict veterans’ benefits should be applied retroactively to a promotional eligibility list that had already been established. Fire Department members sought additional veterans’ preference points after the amendment’s enactment. The New York Court of Appeals held that the constitutional mandate specifying that veterans’ credits are granted only when the eligibility list is established precludes retroactive application of the amendment. The Court reasoned that attempting to find legislative intent for retroactive application is futile in light of the Constitution’s explicit timing requirement, ensuring civil service lists are finalized promptly.

    Facts

    Petitioners, members of the New York City Fire Department, successfully passed a competitive examination for promotion to Lieutenant.

    A promotional eligibility list was created on July 13, 1972.

    Subsequently, the Legislature amended Section 85(1)(c)(3) of the Civil Service Law, extending the “time of war” period of the Korean conflict to January 31, 1955.

    This amendment authorized veterans’ preference credit for those who served during the extended period (L 1976, ch 313 [eff June 8, 1976]).

    The amendment aimed to align the State’s recognition of the Korean conflict dates with the Federal Government’s (38 U.S.C. § 101(9)).

    The respondents denied petitioners’ request for additional veterans’ preference points based on the amended law.

    Procedural History

    Petitioners initiated Article 78 proceedings to compel respondents to award them additional veterans’ preference points.

    The lower courts initially ruled in favor of the petitioners.

    The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, dismissing the petition.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a legislative amendment extending the “time of war” period for veterans’ preference credits on civil service examinations should be applied retroactively to an eligibility list that was already established when the amendment was enacted.

    Holding

    No, because the New York Constitution specifies that veterans’ preference credits are granted only at the time of the establishment of the eligibility list, precluding retroactive application of subsequent amendments.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on Article V, Section 6 of the New York Constitution, which mandates that veterans’ preference credit “shall be granted only at the time of the establishment of [the eligibility] list.” The Court emphasized that civil service eligibility lists must be finalized as soon as practicable. Since the eligibility list was already established when the amendatory legislation was enacted, the petitioners were not entitled to additional veterans’ preference credit.

    The Court further stated that attempts to discern legislative intent for retroactive application were unavailing in light of the Constitution’s specific command. The Court highlighted the importance of having a fixed point in time for determining eligibility, preventing constant revisions and uncertainty in the civil service system.

    The court reasoned that allowing retroactive application would undermine the integrity and finality of the established eligibility list. This would create administrative difficulties and potentially disadvantage other candidates who relied on the initial rankings.

    The Court did not delve into potential legislative intent for retroactivity, finding the constitutional provision decisive. The decision reflects a strict interpretation of the constitutional requirement to ensure the prompt finalization of civil service eligibility lists. The case serves as a reminder of the limitations on applying legislative changes retroactively when constitutional provisions dictate specific timing requirements.

  • In re Keymer, 148 N.Y. 219 (1896): Constitutionality of Veteran’s Preference in Civil Service Appointments

    In re Keymer, 148 N.Y. 219 (1896)

    A state law granting civil war veterans an absolute preference for civil service positions, without competitive examination, violates the New York State Constitution’s requirement that appointments be based on merit and fitness as determined by examinations, so far as practicable.

    Summary

    This case addresses the constitutionality of a New York law that gave Civil War veterans preference for civil service appointments without requiring competitive examinations. The New York Court of Appeals found the law unconstitutional, holding that it violated the state constitution’s mandate that civil service appointments be based on merit and fitness, ascertained through examinations, as far as practicable. The Court emphasized that while veterans are entitled to preference after demonstrating merit and fitness, they cannot be exempt from the examination process altogether. This decision reinforces the principle that merit-based selection is paramount in civil service, even when considering veteran’s preferences.

    Facts

    Relator Keymer, a Civil War veteran, applied for a non-competitive examination for a messenger position in Brooklyn, relying on an 1895 law granting veterans preference and exempting them from competitive exams for positions paying under $4 per day. His application was denied. The 1895 law amended existing civil service laws to favor veterans, stating competitive exams were unnecessary for lower-paying positions, requiring only an assessment of the applicant’s fitness. The New York Constitution (1894) stipulated appointments should be based on merit and fitness, ascertained by examinations, preferably competitive, with veterans receiving preference.

    Procedural History

    Keymer initiated a legal proceeding after his application for a non-competitive exam was denied. The case reached the New York Court of Appeals, which reviewed the constitutionality of the 1895 law in light of Article 5, Section 9 of the New York Constitution of 1894. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, finding the 1895 law unconstitutional.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a state law that exempts honorably discharged Civil War veterans from competitive civil service examinations for positions paying less than four dollars a day violates Article 5, Section 9 of the New York Constitution, which requires appointments and promotions in the civil service to be made according to merit and fitness, ascertained, so far as practicable, by examinations, which, so far as practicable, shall be competitive?

    Holding

    No, because the law creates an unconstitutional preference by exempting veterans from competitive examinations, which conflicts with the constitutional mandate that merit and fitness be the primary basis for civil service appointments, determined through examinations, whenever practicable.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the New York Constitution mandates appointments and promotions in civil service be based on merit and fitness, determined by examinations, which should be competitive where practicable. While the Constitution grants veterans a preference, it does not allow for complete exemption from examinations. The 1895 law, by exempting veterans from competitive exams for lower-paying positions, created an unconstitutional preference. The Court emphasized that all citizens should be on equal footing for examinations determining merit and fitness. The veteran’s preference applies only after a list of qualified candidates is established through examinations. The Court stated, “It seems to us clear that this section of the Constitution, read according to its letter and spirit, contemplates that in all examinations, competitive and non-competitive, the veterans of the civil war have no preference over other citizens of the state, but when, as a result of those examinations, a list is made up from which appointments and promotions can be made, consisting of those whose merit and fitness have been duly ascertained, then the veteran is entitled to preference without regard to his standing on that list.” The Court also noted the arbitrariness of exempting veterans based on compensation level, as compensation does not determine the practicability of competitive examinations. This decision underscores that merit-based selection is paramount, and preferences, like those for veterans, can only be applied after merit and fitness have been established through examinations.