New York Law Review

Tag: Verdict Sheet

  • People v. Wells, 21 N.Y.3d 182 (2013): Use of GPS Tracking Devices and Verdict Sheet Annotations

    People v. Wells, 21 N.Y.3d 182 (2013)

    Warrantless GPS tracking of a vehicle constitutes an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment, but the admission of evidence derived from such tracking may be harmless error if the evidence is redundant to legally obtained evidence and there is overwhelming independent evidence of guilt; verdict sheets can contain locations of offenses to distinguish counts for the jury.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of multiple counts related to a forged credit card scheme. The prosecution used evidence obtained from a GPS device placed on the defendant’s car without a warrant, as well as wiretap evidence. The trial court provided the jury with a verdict sheet that included the locations where the offenses occurred. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that while the GPS tracking was unlawful, its admission was harmless error because the evidence was redundant. The Court also found the verdict sheet annotations permissible as they aided in distinguishing the numerous counts for the jury.

    Facts

    Defendant and co-defendants engaged in a scheme to steal property using forged credit cards. They acquired credit card numbers from legitimate accounts, placed the stolen information on blank cards using a reader/writer machine, and made purchases at stores in Manhattan. Investigators obtained a warrant to wiretap the defendant’s cell phones, which revealed his activities. Due to difficulties with visual surveillance, investigators placed a GPS device on the defendant’s vehicle without obtaining a warrant.

    Procedural History

    A grand jury indicted the defendant on 61 counts. The case proceeded to trial on 26 of those counts. The defendant was found guilty on 20 counts. The defendant moved for a new trial based on the GPS evidence, which was denied. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred by submitting to the jury a verdict sheet that contained the locations of the designated offenses, violating CPL 310.20(2)?

    2. Whether law enforcement’s warrantless installation of a GPS tracking device on the defendant’s vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment?

    Holding

    1. No, because the annotations aided the jury in distinguishing between the multiple counts and fell within the statute’s purpose.

    2. Yes, because under People v. Weaver and United States v. Jones, the use of a GPS device to monitor a vehicle’s movements constitutes a search, requiring a warrant. However, the violation was harmless error.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the verdict sheet, the Court distinguished People v. Miller, which prohibited verdict sheets from including legal instructions. Here, the annotations merely identified the stores or banks involved in each count, helping the jury differentiate them. This fell within the permissible scope of CPL 310.20(2), which allows for the inclusion of “the dates, names of complainants or specific statutory language” to distinguish between counts. The Court reasoned that the stores’ names were essentially proxies for the “complainants.”

    Regarding the GPS device, the Court acknowledged that under People v. Weaver and United States v. Jones, attaching a GPS device to a vehicle constitutes a search and requires a warrant. The Court stated, “When the police want to place a GPS device on a suspect’s automobile, they must obtain a warrant first.” However, the Court held that the admission of the GPS evidence was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. The GPS information was redundant because the investigators had already learned about the defendant’s destination (a Best Buy store) through legally obtained wiretap evidence. Furthermore, the People presented overwhelming independent evidence of the defendant’s guilt, including surveillance video, sales receipts, and eyewitness testimony. As the court stated, “there is no reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to defendant’s conviction.”

  • People v. Miller, 18 N.Y.3d 704 (2012): Verdict Sheet Annotations and Harmless Error

    18 N.Y.3d 704 (2012)

    A verdict sheet containing annotations beyond those authorized by statute (CPL 310.20(2)) constitutes reversible error, and harmless error analysis does not apply.

    Summary

    Jeffery Miller was convicted of second-degree murder. The verdict sheet included the question of whether the defendant established the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance by a preponderance of the evidence. Miller appealed, arguing the verdict sheet violated CPL 310.20(2). The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that including the burden of proof on the verdict sheet was an unauthorized annotation under the statute. The Court further held that the error was not subject to harmless error analysis, adhering to prior precedent in People v. Damiano despite a 1996 amendment to CPL 310.20(2). This case clarifies the limitations on verdict sheet content and reinforces the strict application of CPL 310.20(2).

    Facts

    Miller was charged with second-degree murder for shooting his former girlfriend. At trial, Miller requested that the jury consider the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, which, if proven, would reduce the charge to first-degree manslaughter. The trial court provided the jury with a six-page verdict sheet. On the first page, the jury was instructed to consider the extreme emotional disturbance defense only if they found Miller guilty of second-degree murder. The verdict sheet asked: “Has the Defendant established by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted under Extreme Emotional Disturbance?” Miller objected to this language.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Miller of second-degree murder. The Appellate Division reversed and ordered a new trial, finding a violation of CPL 310.20(2) that could not be considered harmless error (People v. Miller, 73 AD3d 1435 [4th Dept 2010]). The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the inclusion of language regarding the burden of proof for the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance on the verdict sheet violated CPL 310.20(2).

    Whether a violation of CPL 310.20(2) is subject to harmless error analysis.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the language constitutes an instruction on burden of proof, which is not authorized by CPL 310.20(2).

    2. No, because the 1996 amendment to CPL 310.20(2) did not alter the established precedent that harmless error analysis is inapplicable when a verdict sheet exceeds the statutory limitations.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holdings in People v. Spivey and People v. Damiano, which established that it is reversible error to provide a jury with a verdict sheet containing unauthorized annotations. The 1996 amendment to CPL 310.20(2) permits including dates, names of complainants, or specific statutory language to distinguish between counts, but does not authorize instructions on the burden of proof. The court rejected the argument that the 1996 amendment opened the door for harmless error analysis when a verdict sheet exceeds the statutory limits. The court stated, “legislative history cannot supply something that is just not in the statute.” The court contrasted the legislative response to People v. Ranghelle, where the legislature explicitly allowed for harmless error analysis in cases involving Rosario violations. The absence of similar language in the CPL 310.20(2) amendment indicated that the legislature did not intend to alter the existing rule against harmless error analysis in verdict sheet cases. The dissenting opinion argued that the 1996 amendment was specifically intended to countermand the strict precedent established in Spivey and Damiano and that the Governor’s Approval Memorandum supported this interpretation. The dissent concluded that the error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of Miller’s guilt and the weakness of his extreme emotional disturbance defense.

  • People v. Collins, 99 N.Y.2d 14 (2002): Instructions on Verdict Sheet Do Not Violate Right to be Present

    99 N.Y.2d 14 (2002)

    A trial court’s instruction to a jury on a verdict sheet regarding the order in which submitted charges should be considered does not violate a defendant’s right to be present during a material stage of the trial, even if the instruction is not also delivered orally.

    Summary

    Collins was convicted of burglary and related charges. At trial, the court initially failed to instruct the jury to consider burglary in the third degree only if they acquitted him of burglary in the second degree. After the jury retired, the court, at defense counsel’s request and in the defendant’s presence, agreed to add language to the verdict sheet instructing the jury to consider the counts in the alternative. The defendant then left the room, and the specific language was decided upon in his absence. The Court of Appeals held that providing this instruction on the verdict sheet, as authorized by CPL 310.20, did not violate the defendant’s right to be present at a material stage of the trial, nor did it constitute a mode of proceedings error excusing the lack of preservation.

    Facts

    Collins was charged with burglary in the second and third degrees, criminal possession of stolen property, criminal trespass, and petit larceny, stemming from entering the victim’s apartment. The second-degree burglary count involved knowingly entering and remaining unlawfully with intent to commit a crime, while the third-degree count involved breaking into the building with the same intent. After the jury retired to deliberate, the defense requested the verdict sheet direct them to consider the burglary counts in the alternative. Collins then left the courtroom temporarily.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court convicted Collins on multiple counts. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. Collins appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the manner in which the jury was instructed constituted a mode of proceedings error requiring reversal, despite the lack of a timely objection.

    Issue(s)

    Whether instructing the jury through a verdict sheet, outside the defendant’s presence, to consider burglary charges in the alternative constitutes a mode of proceedings error that violates the defendant’s right to be present during a material stage of the trial, requiring reversal despite the absence of a timely objection.

    Holding

    No, because the written communication was authorized under CPL 310.20 and did not violate the defendant’s right to be present under CPL 310.30. Failure to object to the lack of supplemental oral instruction is fatal to the claim.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while a defendant has the right to be present during instructions to the jury on fundamental legal principles, not every communication requires the jury to be recalled or the defendant to be present. CPL 310.20(2) authorizes a court to provide a written list of offenses and possible verdicts to the jury. Citing People v. Cole, the Court stated that a trial court may include on a verdict sheet “a direction regarding the order in which the submitted charges should be considered”. Because the instruction was authorized by statute, its submission on the verdict sheet outside the defendant’s presence was permissible. The court distinguished this situation from cases involving substantive irregularities in jury instructions where preservation is not required. The Court noted that the defendant was present when his counsel requested the alternative instruction, and his subsequent absence for the drafting of the instruction involved only a ministerial act and a purely legal argument. As such, his presence was not required.

  • People v. Damiano, 87 N.Y.2d 477 (1996): Improper Verdict Sheet Annotations and Reversible Error

    87 N.Y.2d 477 (1996)

    It is reversible error for a trial court to submit a verdict sheet to the jury that contains statutory elements or terms of the charged offense without the consent of all parties, even in the absence of an objection by defense counsel.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and reckless endangerment for throwing a boulder off an overpass, killing a motorist. The Appellate Division reversed the murder conviction, citing the trial court’s error in submitting a verdict sheet with parenthetical references to the elements of murder and manslaughter. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that providing such an annotated verdict sheet without the consent of both parties constitutes reversible error, regardless of whether defense counsel objected at trial. The Court emphasized strict compliance with CPL 310.30, which requires consent for any expanded verdict sheet.

    Facts

    The defendant and his accomplices threw rocks from overpasses onto cars traveling on the New York State Thruway. On one occasion, they dropped a 52-pound boulder that struck and killed a motorist. The verdict sheet in question listed “murder in the second degree” followed by the parenthetical phrase “(depraved mind murder)”. The lesser included offense was listed as “manslaughter in the second degree” followed by “(reckless manslaughter)”.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in the trial court. The Appellate Division modified the judgment by reversing the murder conviction, remitting for a new trial on the murder count, and otherwise affirming the judgment. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and cross-appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether it is reversible error for a trial court to provide the jury with a verdict sheet containing statutory elements or terms of the charged murder offense without the consent of all parties, even if defense counsel does not object.

    Holding

    Yes, because CPL 310.30 demands the parties’ consent to references to statutory terms or elements on a verdict sheet. The lack of an objection does not constitute consent, and the error cannot be deemed harmless.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court strictly construed CPL 310.30, which requires the parties’ consent before a court can furnish an expanded verdict sheet with statutory terms or elements. The Court reasoned that trial counsel is best positioned to assess the usefulness or potential prejudice of such references. The Court emphasized that the jury’s role is fact-finding, not legal interpretation, quoting People v Owens, 69 N.Y.2d 585, 591 (1987): “the nature of the jury’s role is fact finding, not interpretation of the applicable legal terms.” Because the record was barren of any indication that the court presented the verdict sheet to the parties or recited its substance, defense counsel’s silence could not be construed as consent. The Court rejected the argument that the error was harmless, stating, “As any attempt to evaluate the impact of these annotations is necessarily predicated on speculation about the thought processes of the jurors, a harmless error analysis is inappropriate.”

  • People v. Spivey, 81 N.Y.2d 356 (1993): Establishing Intent in Felony Assault and Verdict Sheet Restrictions

    People v. Spivey, 81 N.Y.2d 356 (1993)

    The intent necessary for a felony assault conviction is inferred from the intent to commit the underlying felony, and the defendant need not be physically present at the scene of the assault, as long as the assault occurs during the immediate flight from the predicate felony; furthermore, verdict sheets listing statutory elements are reversible error unless agreed upon by both parties.

    Summary

    Defendant Spivey was convicted of second-degree assault (felony assault) after his accomplices assaulted a police officer during their flight from a robbery. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the assault count and ordering a new trial, also directing the trial court to sanction the prosecution for a Rosario violation (failure to produce a police officer’s memo book). The Court of Appeals reinstated the assault count, holding that the intent for felony assault can be inferred from the underlying felony, even if the defendant wasn’t physically present during the assault. The Court also affirmed the new trial order due to an improper verdict sheet but removed the mandate to fashion a Rosario sanction because the defendant received the relief requested at trial.

    Facts

    Transit Police Officer Schumacher witnessed Spivey and three others robbing a man. Schumacher apprehended Spivey but pursued the other three into a subway. The three suspects assaulted Schumacher. After a chase, two were caught. Spivey was tried jointly with the other defendants. Officer Schumacher’s memo book, containing entries about the case, was lost before trial. At a reconstruction hearing, Schumacher testified about the incident. The defense moved for a mistrial or to preclude Schumacher’s testimony, but the court denied the mistrial and stated there was no reconstruction testimony before the jury.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Spivey of second-degree assault and other crimes. The Appellate Division reversed the assault conviction, dismissed that count, and remanded for a new trial on the remaining counts. The Appellate Division also directed the trial court to fashion a sanction for the Rosario violation. The People appealed the dismissal of the assault count and the Rosario sanction direction. Spivey appealed the new trial order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the intent necessary for a felony assault conviction can be inferred from the intent to commit the underlying felony, similar to felony murder doctrine.
    2. Whether a defendant must be physically present at the scene of the assault for a felony assault conviction.
    3. Whether the defendant was entitled to an additional sanction for the Rosario violation.
    4. Whether the verdict sheet containing additional explanatory language was proper.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the intent necessary to sustain a conviction for felony assault is inferred from the intent to commit the underlying felony, and whether the assault occurred during the immediate flight from a predicate felony is a question of fact for the jury.
    2. No, because it is sufficient that the assault is made on a nonparticipant of a predicate felony “in furtherance of the commission or attempted commission of [the] felony, * * * or of immediate flight therefrom” (Penal Law § 120.05 [6]).
    3. No, because the trial court granted the alternative relief requested by the defense (preclusion of reconstruction testimony), no additional sanction is required.
    4. No, because giving the jury a verdict sheet that lists some of the statutory elements of the counts is reversible error unless the parties agree.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals analogized felony assault (Penal Law § 120.05 [6]) to felony murder (Penal Law § 125.25), noting their similar language. It cited People v. Gladman, 41 NY2d 123, stating that in felony murder, intent is inferred from the intent to commit the underlying felony. The Court applied the same logic to felony assault, referencing People v. Snow, 74 NY2d 671, which affirmed the Appellate Division’s reasoning that the intent for felony murder or assault is inferred from the underlying felony. The Court held that the assault occurring during immediate flight is a factual question for the jury.

    The Court further held that physical presence isn’t required, emphasizing the statute’s language about assaults made “in furtherance” of the felony or flight. Regarding the Rosario violation, the Court noted that the defense requested, and received, preclusion of reconstruction testimony, thus satisfying the need for a sanction.

    Finally, the Court reaffirmed the rule against verdict sheets listing statutory elements without agreement from both parties, citing People v. Kelly, 76 NY2d 1013, and other cases. This necessitates a new trial despite the reinstatement of the assault charge.

  • People v. Knight, 87 N.Y.2d 1014 (1996): Verdict Sheet Annotations and Impact on Conviction Reliability

    People v. Knight, 87 N.Y.2d 1014 (1996)

    When a verdict sheet provided to the jury lists elements of a charged crime, it creates a risk of unfairly skewing the deliberative process, potentially undermining the reliability of a guilty verdict, and impacting convictions for factually related charges.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s reversal of the defendant’s convictions for first-degree robbery and second-degree criminal possession of a weapon. The trial court erred by providing the jury with a verdict sheet that, over the defendant’s objection, listed not only the charged crimes but also some of the statutory elements of the robbery counts. The Court of Appeals held that this error created an unacceptable risk of unfairly influencing the jury’s deliberations. Furthermore, the court found that the conviction for weapon possession, being factually related to the robbery, may also have been tainted by the improper verdict sheet.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with robbery in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. At trial, the court provided the jury with a verdict sheet. This sheet, in addition to listing the charged crimes, also included some of the statutory elements of the robbery charges. The defendant objected to the inclusion of the elements on the verdict sheet.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the defendant of both first-degree robbery and second-degree criminal possession of a weapon. The Appellate Division reversed the convictions. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether it was error for the trial court to provide the jury with a verdict sheet that listed some of the statutory elements of the charged crimes over the defendant’s objection.
    2. Whether the error of including elements on the verdict sheet for the robbery charge also tainted the conviction for criminal possession of a weapon, when that charge was factually related to the robbery.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because providing a verdict sheet listing elements of the charged crimes creates a risk of unfairly skewing the jury’s deliberative process, thus jeopardizing the reliability of the guilt determination.
    2. Yes, because the weapon possession count was factually related to the robbery count, so it too may have been affected by the improper notations on the verdict sheet.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holdings in People v. Taylor, 76 N.Y.2d 873 and People v. Nimmons, 72 N.Y.2d 830, which established that providing a verdict sheet listing elements of the charged crime constitutes reversible error. The court reasoned that such an error introduces an unacceptable risk that the jury’s deliberative process will be unfairly influenced, calling into question the reliability of the ultimate determination of guilt. As the court stated, “Since such an error creates a risk that the jury’s deliberative process will be unfairly skewed it puts in serious question the reliability of the ultimate guilt determination (see, People v Owens, 69 NY2d 585, 590-591).”

    Regarding the weapon possession charge, the court referred to People v. Cohen, 50 N.Y.2d 908, holding that because the weapon possession count was factually related to the robbery count, it too may have been affected by the improper notations on the verdict sheet. The Court emphasized the potential for the improper verdict sheet to have influenced the jury’s consideration of all factually connected charges, thereby warranting reversal of both convictions. This demonstrates a concern for ensuring fairness and preventing spillover effects of errors related to one charge affecting convictions on related charges.