New York Law Review

Tag: Vehicular Manslaughter

  • People v. Asaro, 21 N.Y.3d 677 (2013): Establishing Recklessness Through Speeding and Prior Warnings

    People v. Asaro, 21 N.Y.3d 677 (2013)

    To prove recklessness in vehicular manslaughter or assault cases involving speeding, the prosecution must demonstrate an “additional affirmative act” beyond simply exceeding the speed limit, coupled with proof that the defendant was aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial risk.

    Summary

    Patrick Asaro was convicted of manslaughter and assault after a high-speed car crash that killed one person and injured several others. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that there was sufficient evidence to prove Asaro acted recklessly. The evidence showed that Asaro, after drinking and possibly smoking marijuana, stopped his car, revved the engine, accelerated to speeds over 90 mph in a 55 mph zone, crossed a double yellow line, and crashed head-on into another vehicle. Crucially, he had also been warned about speeding on that road earlier that evening and immediately before the crash.

    Facts

    Several hours before the accident, Asaro attended a party where he consumed vodka and beer. He showed off modifications to his car designed to increase its speed and noise. He drove to pick up two individuals from a train station, and on the way back to the party, he stopped in the middle of the road for no apparent reason. Asaro revved the engine and rapidly accelerated to a high speed. A passenger warned him to slow down as they approached a sharp turn. Asaro crossed the double yellow line and collided head-on with another vehicle, killing the driver and injuring the passenger. Witnesses testified to Asaro’s high speed and that he appeared intoxicated. A blood test revealed the presence of marijuana, although a later test was negative. At the scene, Asaro said, “I’m sorry, I only had a few.”

    Procedural History

    Asaro was indicted on multiple charges, including manslaughter, assault, reckless endangerment, and reckless driving. At trial, he moved to dismiss the manslaughter and assault charges, arguing insufficient evidence of recklessness. The trial court denied the motion, and the jury convicted him on most charges. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to establish that Asaro acted with the mental state of recklessness to support convictions for second-degree manslaughter and second-degree assault.
    2. Whether the trial court erred by giving an adverse inference charge regarding lost Rosario material (the accident reconstruction expert’s handwritten notes) instead of striking the expert’s testimony about the car’s speed.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because there was sufficient evidence that Asaro was aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk by driving at an extremely high speed after being warned about the danger of the road.
    2. No, because the defendant requested to strike all of the expert’s testimony, not specifically the testimony relating to speed, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying that broad request.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that a finding of recklessness requires more than just speeding; there must be an “additional affirmative act.” Here, the court pointed to Asaro’s stopping the car, revving the engine, and rapidly accelerating as such acts. Furthermore, the court highlighted the testimony that Asaro had been warned twice about speeding on that particular road, first earlier in the evening and again immediately before the crash. This established that Asaro was aware of the risk and consciously disregarded it. The court distinguished recklessness from criminal negligence, noting that recklessness requires awareness of the risk, while criminal negligence involves a negligent failure to perceive the risk. The court quoted People v. Cabrera, 10 NY3d 370, 377 (2008), stating the evidence demonstrated conduct exhibiting “the kind of seriously blameworthy carelessness whose seriousness would he apparent to anyone who shares the community’s general sense of right and wrong.” The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to issue an adverse inference charge rather than striking the accident reconstruction expert’s testimony, as the defendant’s request to strike was overly broad. The court emphasized that the defendant didn’t specifically target the speed-related testimony.

  • People v. Cabrera, 78 N.Y.2d 705 (1991): Criminal Negligence Requires Gross Deviation from Reasonable Care

    People v. Cabrera, 78 N.Y.2d 705 (1991)

    To be convicted of criminally negligent homicide, a defendant’s conduct must constitute a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation, demonstrating a failure to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction for criminally negligent homicide and vehicular manslaughter. The court held that driving while intoxicated, off a public highway, into an unfamiliar field at high speed, without headlights, and crashing through a hedgerow constituted a gross deviation from reasonable care, sufficient to establish criminal negligence. The court further clarified that the vehicular manslaughter statute applies to driving under the influence regardless of location, even if the conduct wouldn’t violate the Vehicle and Traffic Law.

    Facts

    The defendant, Cabrera, while legally intoxicated, drove his motor vehicle at night off a public highway and into a farmer’s field he was unfamiliar with. He accelerated to approximately 50 miles per hour, intermittently operated the vehicle without headlights, and then forcefully drove through a hedgerow of small trees and shrubs. A passenger in the vehicle died as a result of the incident.

    Procedural History

    Cabrera was convicted of criminally negligent homicide and vehicular manslaughter in the second degree. He appealed, arguing that his conduct did not constitute criminal negligence and that the vehicular manslaughter statute did not apply to his actions because he was not driving on a public highway. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and Cabrera appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s actions constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe, thus establishing criminal negligence for the purposes of criminally negligent homicide.

    2. Whether the vehicular manslaughter statute applies to driving under the influence of alcohol regardless of whether the driving occurred on a public highway or other areas defined in the Vehicle and Traffic Law.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because driving while intoxicated, off a public highway, into an unfamiliar field at high speed, without headlights, and crashing through a hedgerow constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care a reasonable person would have observed.

    2. Yes, because the Penal Law does not incorporate the Vehicle and Traffic Law’s limitation to public roads and areas when defining vehicular manslaughter, thus applying the statute to driving under the influence regardless of location.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that criminal negligence requires a failure to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk, constituting a gross deviation from reasonable care. The court found that Cabrera’s actions met this standard, stating, “A rational juror could certainly have found that this conduct grossly deviated from the standard of care a reasonable person would have observed in a similar situation. Accordingly, the conduct was sufficiently blameworthy to sustain defendant’s conviction for criminally negligent homicide.”

    Regarding vehicular manslaughter, the court acknowledged that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 prohibits driving under the influence on public highways. However, Penal Law § 125.12, defining vehicular manslaughter, only references subdivisions (2), (3), and (4) of § 1192, which prohibit driving while intoxicated or under the influence of drugs, but does not incorporate subdivision (5) (now subd [7]), which limits the prohibition to public roads. The court reasoned that the Penal Law and Vehicle and Traffic Law serve different purposes, and the vehicular manslaughter statute applies to anyone causing a death by driving under the influence, regardless of location. The court emphasized, “With the understanding that penal laws have different purposes than vehicle and traffic laws, we conclude the vehicular manslaughter statute applies to any person causing a death by driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, regardless of location, even though there could be no separate punishment for such driving under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 where the driving did not occur on public roads or other areas defined in that section.”

  • People v. Cooper, 78 N.Y.2d 476 (1991): Procedure for Proving Prior Convictions That Enhance an Offense

    People v. Cooper, 78 N.Y.2d 476 (1991)

    When a prior conviction raises the grade of an offense, the prosecution must follow the procedure outlined in CPL 200.60, allowing the defendant to admit or deny the prior conviction outside the jury’s presence to avoid potential prejudice.

    Summary

    Cooper was convicted of first-degree vehicular manslaughter. The element that elevated the charge was that he committed the crime knowing his license was revoked due to a prior DWI conviction. The prosecution introduced evidence of the prior conviction and license revocation. The Court of Appeals held that the prosecution erred by not following the procedure in CPL 200.60, which requires the defendant to be given the opportunity to admit the prior conviction outside the presence of the jury. The Court reasoned that this procedure is crucial to avoid unfair prejudice to the defendant. The court reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial, finding the error was not harmless.

    Facts

    Cooper was indicted for first-degree vehicular manslaughter. The indictment alleged he committed the crime while knowing his license was revoked due to a prior conviction for driving under the influence (DUI). The prosecution also filed a special information charging Cooper with the prior DUI conviction. At arraignment, Cooper admitted the prior DUI conviction. At trial, the prosecution presented evidence that Cooper’s license revocation stemmed from the prior DUI conviction, despite Cooper’s objection. A State Trooper testified about the license revocation based on Cooper’s driving record.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Cooper of first-degree vehicular manslaughter. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding that CPL 200.60 did not prevent the prosecution from proving the reason for the license revocation. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remanded for a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, in a prosecution for first-degree vehicular manslaughter where the enhancing element is a prior conviction and knowledge of license revocation based on that conviction, the prosecution must follow the procedure outlined in CPL 200.60 for alleging and proving prior convictions.

    Holding

    Yes, because the letter and sense of CPL 200.60 require that the prescribed procedure for alleging and proving earlier convictions be followed for the entire enhancing element of vehicular manslaughter in the first degree.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 200.60 aims to prevent prejudice to defendants by keeping prior convictions from the jury unless the defendant denies them. The court recognized that the prior conviction was an “indispensable ingredient” of the higher-grade offense of first-degree vehicular manslaughter. The court stated, “In a situation such as the one before us—where pleading and proving knowledge of a prior conviction necessarily reveals the conviction—the protection afforded by CPL 200.60 can be effectuated only by reading the statute to require resort to the special information procedure for all of the conviction-related facts that constitute the enhancing element.” The court held that Cooper should have been given the chance to admit, outside the jury’s presence, all the facts related to the prior conviction and license revocation. Failing this, the prosecution improperly presented evidence of Cooper’s prior conviction to the jury, thereby undermining the protections afforded by CPL 200.60. The court rejected the argument that a limiting instruction could cure the prejudice, noting the legislative determination that such instructions are often ineffective. The court emphasized that the People must establish the requisite culpable mental state as to every element of an offense, including the defendant’s knowledge that the license revocation was a result of the prior conviction. The procedure ensures a fair trial by allowing the defendant to decide whether the jury hears about the prior conviction while still allowing the prosecution to prove its case if the defendant denies the relevant facts.

  • Matter of Johnston, 75 N.Y.2d 403 (1990): Defining ‘Essentially Similar’ Felonies for Attorney Disbarment

    Matter of Johnston, 75 N.Y.2d 403 (1990)

    For an attorney to be automatically disbarred in New York based on a felony conviction in another jurisdiction, the elements of the foreign felony must be ‘essentially similar’ to a felony in New York, requiring more than a superficial resemblance.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether an attorney’s conviction for involuntary manslaughter in Texas warrants automatic disbarment in New York. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Texas felony was not ‘essentially similar’ to the New York felony of vehicular manslaughter because the Texas statute required a lower level of intoxication and did not require proof of a culpable mental state, whereas New York requires criminal negligence in addition to intoxication. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s order of disbarment, emphasizing that automatic disbarment is only warranted when the out-of-state felony is substantially similar to a New York felony.

    Facts

    Appellant Johnston, an attorney, was convicted of involuntary manslaughter in Texas after being involved in a fatal car accident. Under Texas law, she was found to have caused the death of an individual while operating a motor vehicle in an intoxicated state. The Texas statute defined intoxication as not having the normal use of mental or physical faculties. Based on this conviction, the Departmental Disciplinary Committee sought to have Johnston automatically disbarred in New York.

    Procedural History

    The Departmental Disciplinary Committee applied to the Appellate Division to have Johnston’s name removed from the roll of attorneys based on Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (b) and (e), which mandates automatic disbarment for attorneys convicted of felonies. The Appellate Division granted the application and ordered Johnston’s disbarment, finding the Texas felony essentially similar to New York’s vehicular manslaughter statute. Johnston appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Texas felony of involuntary manslaughter, as defined in Texas Penal Code § 19.05 (a) (2), is ‘essentially similar’ to the New York felony of vehicular manslaughter, as defined in New York Penal Law § 125.12, such that automatic disbarment is warranted under Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (e).

    Holding

    No, because the Texas and New York felonies differ significantly in the level of intoxication required and the necessary proof of a culpable mental state; the Texas felony does not require proof of criminal negligence, while the New York felony does.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals analyzed the Texas and New York statutes to determine if they were ‘essentially similar.’ The Texas statute required only that the driver not have the normal use of their mental or physical faculties due to voluntary intoxication, and proof of intoxication causing death was sufficient to establish the offense. The New York statute, however, required a higher degree of impairment constituting ‘intoxication’ and also required proof of criminal negligence, meaning the driver failed to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk. The court noted that, in New York, merely being ‘impaired’ by alcohol is insufficient for a vehicular manslaughter conviction; criminal negligence must also be proven. The court emphasized, “It has long been the rule in this State that proof of intoxication alone is insufficient to establish criminal negligence and that the People must also show that the ‘intoxication affected [the defendant’s] physical and mental capacity to the extent that it caused him to operate his vehicle in a culpably reckless manner’.” Because the Texas statute did not require proof of criminal negligence and had a lower threshold for intoxication, the Court found the two felonies were not ‘essentially similar,’ and therefore automatic disbarment was not warranted. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the matter for further proceedings, meaning a disciplinary hearing would be required to determine the appropriate sanction.

  • People v. Casadei, 66 N.Y.2d 846 (1985): Admissibility of Blood Test Evidence Obtained via Warrant in Vehicular Manslaughter Case

    People v. Casadei, 66 N.Y.2d 846 (1985)

    A search warrant may be validly issued to obtain a blood sample in the event of a violation of the Penal Law, even when Vehicle and Traffic Law offenses are part of the same indictment; Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 does not constitute the exclusive method of obtaining a blood sample in such cases.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a blood sample obtained via a search warrant was admissible as evidence in a case involving both Penal Law (manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide) and Vehicle and Traffic Law violations (driving while intoxicated), despite the defendant’s argument that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 provided the exclusive means for obtaining such samples. The court distinguished its prior ruling in People v. Moselle, emphasizing the presence of a court-ordered warrant based on probable cause in this case. The court also noted that the legislature subsequently amended Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 to overrule Moselle on its facts.

    Facts

    The defendant was involved in a two-car accident where the other driver died. Subsequently, the defendant was indicted on multiple charges, including manslaughter in the second degree, criminally negligent homicide, driving while intoxicated, and other Vehicle and Traffic Law violations. A chemical blood test was administered to the defendant without his consent, based on a search warrant.

    Procedural History

    The County Court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress the results of the blood test. The Appellate Division reversed the County Court’s order, denying the suppression motion. The defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194, in effect at the time of the accident, constituted the exclusive method of obtaining a blood sample for a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192, precluding the use of a search warrant to obtain such evidence when Penal Law violations are also charged in the same indictment.

    Holding

    No, because a search warrant may validly be issued to obtain a blood sample in the event of a violation of the Penal Law, and, in such circumstances, the court declined to extend People v. Moselle to require separate resort to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 to sustain Vehicle and Traffic Law offenses which are part of the same indictment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished this case from People v. Moselle, noting the critical difference: the presence of a court order based on probable cause authorizing the blood sample. The court acknowledged that Moselle held that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 was the exclusive method for obtaining a blood sample for Vehicle and Traffic Law violations. However, the court emphasized that Matter of Abe A. established that a search warrant could be validly issued to obtain a blood sample in the event of a violation of the Penal Law.

    The Court reasoned that requiring separate resort to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 for the Vehicle and Traffic Law offenses, when those offenses are part of the same indictment as Penal Law violations, would be an unnecessary and impractical extension of Moselle. Furthermore, the court highlighted that the Legislature had amended Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 (L 1983, ch 481) to overrule Moselle on its facts, signaling a legislative intent to allow for blood samples to be obtained via warrant even in Vehicle and Traffic Law cases. The court stated: “It is clear that a search warrant may validly be issued to obtain a blood sample in the event of a violation of the Penal Law (Matter of Abe A., 56 NY2d 288), and, in such circumstances, we decline to extend Moselle to require separate resort to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 to sustain Vehicle and Traffic Law offenses which are part of the same indictment.”

    Therefore, the court concluded that the blood sample obtained via a valid search warrant was admissible, even though the defendant was also charged with Vehicle and Traffic Law violations.