New York Law Review

Tag: Vehicular Homicide

  • People v. Caban, 14 N.Y.3d 369 (2010): Admissibility of License Suspension in Criminal Negligence Cases

    14 N.Y.3d 369 (2010)

    Evidence of a driver’s license suspension, particularly when the suspension is for conduct similar to that leading to a criminally negligent act, is admissible to demonstrate a gross deviation from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person.

    Summary

    Caban was convicted of criminally negligent homicide after fatally hitting a pedestrian while backing her car. Her driver’s license had been suspended three months prior due to a similar incident of unsafe backing. The New York Court of Appeals held that the trial court properly admitted evidence of the license suspension because it was relevant to determining the extent of Caban’s negligence – specifically, whether her failure to perceive the risk constituted a gross deviation from reasonable care. The court reasoned that a jury could find it more unreasonable to drive carelessly when the state has already deemed the driver unfit to drive. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division to consider an unpreserved issue related to jury notes.

    Facts

    On January 2, 2003, Caban backed her car on Third Avenue in Manhattan, hitting and killing an elderly woman, Francesca Maytin, who was crossing the street. Three months prior, on October 3, 2002, Caban’s license was suspended after she attempted to evade a parking ticket by backing her car unsafely in a busy intersection, failing to yield to pedestrians. She received summonses for unsafe backing and failing to yield to pedestrians in a crosswalk. At the time of the fatal incident, Caban’s license remained suspended.

    Procedural History

    The People sought to admit evidence of the October 3 incident, but the trial court limited its admissibility to the fact of the license suspension. Caban was convicted of criminally negligent homicide. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the license suspension inadmissible. The Court of Appeals granted the People leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether evidence of a driver’s license suspension, resulting from prior similar conduct, is admissible to prove criminal negligence in a subsequent vehicular homicide case.

    Holding

    Yes, because the license suspension is relevant to determining whether the defendant’s failure to perceive a substantial risk constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding the license suspension was relevant to the issue of criminal negligence, defined by Penal Law § 15.05 (4) as failing to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk, where the failure constitutes a gross deviation from reasonable care. The court stated: “Thus the jury in this case had to consider not only whether defendant failed to perceive ‘a substantial and unjustifiable risk’ that her careless driving would kill someone, but also whether that failure was ‘a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.’ In other words, the jury not only had to decide whether defendant was at fault, but also had to consider how much she was at fault.” The court reasoned that the license suspension could demonstrate that Caban was more negligent, because “a jury could find that the license suspension should, if it did not keep defendant off the road, at least have prompted her to pay more attention to safety while she was driving.”

    The Court distinguished this case from situations where the prejudicial effect of evidence outweighs its probative value, noting that the suspension was for conduct strikingly similar to the fatal incident. The court noted that the evidence was not merely offered to show criminal propensity, but to show the extent of defendant’s negligence. The Court also remitted the case to the Appellate Division to consider a claim under People v. O’Rama regarding jury notes that had not been preserved in the lower court.

  • People v. Haney, 75 N.Y.2d 944 (1990): Establishing Criminal Negligence in Vehicular Homicide

    People v. Haney, 75 N.Y.2d 944 (1990)

    To be found guilty of criminally negligent homicide, a driver’s failure to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death from operating a motor vehicle must be a gross deviation from the ordinary standard of care.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction for criminally negligent homicide, holding that sufficient evidence existed to prove the defendant failed to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk when operating his vehicle, constituting a gross deviation from the standard of care. The defendant was driving at an excessive speed, ignored warnings to slow down, and struck a State Trooper. Unlike a related case decided the same day, *People v. Boutin*, the court found ample evidence of criminally culpable, risk-creating conduct by the defendant.

    Facts

    The defendant was driving at least 90 miles per hour in a 55 miles per hour zone. He was aware that he was traveling through a police radar area. The defendant observed a line of traffic backed up ahead on the Thruway, with cars halted on the side of the road. Despite a warning from his passenger to reduce speed, the defendant accelerated his vehicle. Subsequently, the defendant struck and killed a State Trooper.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was tried and convicted of criminally negligent homicide. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether sufficient evidence existed to support the jury’s verdict finding the defendant guilty of criminally negligent homicide based on his operation of a motor vehicle.

    Holding

    Yes, because the evidence at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, sufficiently demonstrated that the defendant failed to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death would result from his operation of the motor vehicle and that this failure was a gross deviation from the ordinary standard of care.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied Penal Law §§ 125.10 and 15.05 (4), referencing the standard for criminally negligent homicide, which requires a failure to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk, constituting a gross deviation from the standard of care. The court distinguished this case from *People v. Boutin*, a case decided the same day, where the evidence of risk-creating conduct was insufficient. In *Haney*, the court found ample evidence of “criminally culpable risk-creating conduct.” The court emphasized the defendant’s excessive speed, awareness of the radar area, observation of stopped traffic, disregard for passenger warnings, and ultimate striking of the State Trooper as factors supporting the jury’s verdict. The court stated that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the People (see, People v Malizia, 62 NY2d 755, cert denied 469 US 932), is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict finding defendant guilty of criminally negligent homicide for failing to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death would result from his operation of a motor vehicle when that failure was a gross deviation from the ordinary standard of care (see, Penal Law §§ 125.10, 15.05 [4]; People v Ricardo B., 73 NY2d 228, 236).