New York Law Review

Tag: Vehicular Assault

  • People v. Heidgen, 22 N.Y.3d 896 (2013): Intoxication and Depraved Indifference

    People v. Heidgen, 22 N.Y.3d 896 (2013)

    Voluntary intoxication, even to the point of extreme inebriation, does not automatically preclude a finding of depraved indifference in crimes such as assault or murder, particularly in cases involving drunk driving; however, the lack of evidence to support all elements of depraved indifference assault warrants a reduction in culpability.

    Summary

    The defendant, heavily intoxicated, drove the wrong way on a parkway, causing a head-on collision. He was initially convicted of first-degree depraved indifference assault, based on his actions of becoming intoxicated knowing he would drive. The Appellate Division reversed this conviction, deeming his state of mind too remote from the crash. The Court of Appeals affirmed the reduced charge of second-degree assault due to insufficient evidence of depraved indifference, but Justice Graffeo’s concurrence addressed the question of whether extreme intoxication could negate a finding of depraved indifference, noting legislative efforts to address this issue in vehicular crimes.

    Facts

    The defendant drove the wrong way on a Long Island parkway while heavily intoxicated (three times the legal limit). Despite warnings from other drivers, he continued and caused a head-on collision, injuring others. His blood alcohol level was .18% or higher. After the accident, when informed he had injured people, he responded with indifference.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was indicted for multiple offenses, including first-degree depraved indifference assault. The trial court found insufficient evidence of depraved indifference at the time of the collision due to the defendant’s extreme intoxication, but convicted him based on his earlier decision to drive while intoxicated. The Appellate Division reversed the first-degree assault conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed the reversal, reducing the conviction to second-degree assault.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the voluntary consumption of alcohol to the point of extreme inebriation precludes the formation of a depravedly indifferent state of mind, particularly in the context of vehicular assault.

    Holding

    No, not necessarily because voluntary intoxication does not automatically negate a finding of depraved indifference; however, in this specific case, the evidence was insufficient to prove all elements of depraved indifference assault, warranting the reduced charge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Justice Graffeo, in her concurrence, highlighted the evolution of understanding depraved indifference from an objective standard to a subjective state of mind, as established in People v. Feingold. She acknowledged that while Penal Law § 15.25 allows intoxication to negate an element of a crime, voluntary intoxication typically doesn’t excuse recklessness, and it may not excuse “extreme recklessness… that is needed to establish depraved indifference” (People v. Baker, 14 NY3d 266, 273 [2010]). She argued that exonerating someone from the consequences of their actions simply because they became extremely drunk serves no social or penological purpose. She cited that driving an automobile along a crowded sidewalk at high speed is one quintessential example of depraved indifference. Justice Graffeo noted that legislative changes in 2006 and 2007, including the creation of aggravated vehicular assault and homicide, aimed to address the difficulty of proving depraved indifference in vehicular crimes due to intoxication claims. She emphasized the need for the legislature to clarify whether intoxication can serve as a defense to depraved indifference crimes, offering potential legislative solutions such as amending Penal Law § 15.05 or including specific provisions in assault and murder statutes for intoxicated drivers. She stated, “there is no social or penological purpose to be served by a rule that permits one who voluntarily drinks to be exonerated from failing to foresee the results of his conduct if he is successful at getting drunk” (People v Register, 60 NY2d at 280-281).

  • People v. Loughlin, 76 N.Y.2d 804 (1990): Addressing Inconsistent Verdicts Under New York Criminal Procedure Law

    People v. Loughlin, 76 N.Y.2d 804 (1990)

    Under New York Criminal Procedure Law, when a jury renders an inconsistent verdict, resubmission to the jury is required only if there’s evidence of confusion regarding an essential element of the crime for which the defendant was convicted.

    Summary

    In People v. Loughlin, the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a trial court erred in failing to resubmit an inconsistent verdict to the jury. The defendant was convicted of criminally negligent homicide and vehicular assault but acquitted of vehicular manslaughter. A dissenting judge argued that the inconsistency in the verdict, specifically regarding intoxication, necessitated resubmission to the jury under CPL 310.50(2). The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that resubmission is only required when the jury’s confusion pertains to an essential element of the crime for which the defendant was convicted.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with multiple offenses, including criminally negligent homicide, vehicular manslaughter, and vehicular assault, stemming from an incident involving the operation of a motor vehicle. The jury returned a verdict convicting the defendant of criminally negligent homicide and vehicular assault but acquitted him of vehicular manslaughter. The defendant argued the verdict was inconsistent, as the conviction for vehicular assault seemed to contradict the acquittal on vehicular manslaughter, particularly concerning the element of intoxication.

    Procedural History

    The trial court did not resubmit the verdict to the jury, and the defendant was sentenced. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court violated CPL 310.50(2) by failing to direct the jury to reconsider its inconsistent verdict. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, finding that the inconsistency did not necessitate resubmission.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred by failing to resubmit the jury’s verdict for reconsideration under CPL 310.50(2) due to an alleged inconsistency between the convictions for criminally negligent homicide and vehicular assault and the acquittal for vehicular manslaughter.

    Holding

    No, because resubmission is only required if the jury’s confusion relates to an essential element of the crime for which the defendant was convicted, and in this case, the inconsistency did not demonstrate such confusion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its precedent in People v. Robinson, clarifying that CPL 310.50(2) does not mandate resubmission for every instance of a jury failing to comply with instructions. The court reasoned that unless “the jury held the defendant guilty of a crime on which it had found he did not commit an essential element,” there is no evidence of confusion requiring resubmission. The court distinguished the case from situations where the jury’s confusion is evident in returning an inherently inconsistent verdict concerning essential elements. Here, the court found no such confusion that would mandate resubmission. The dissenting judge argued that the jury’s verdict was indeed inconsistent, as the conviction for vehicular assault seemed to contradict the acquittal on vehicular manslaughter, particularly concerning the element of intoxication. The dissent emphasized that the mandatory language of CPL 310.50(2) requires resubmission when the verdict is legally defective or inconsistent. The dissent also noted that the new rule is at odds with the court’s insistence that a claim of repugnancy in a verdict be raised before the jury is discharged in order to preserve the error for appellate review, designed to permit the court to resubmit the matter to the jury to obtain a consistent verdict. The majority rejected this view, finding no reversible error in the trial court’s handling of the verdict.