New York Law Review

Tag: Vehicle Stop

  • People v. Spencer, 84 N.Y.2d 749 (1995): Limits on Stopping Vehicles to Request Information

    84 N.Y.2d 749 (1995)

    Police may not stop a moving vehicle solely to request information from the driver about a third-party suspect’s whereabouts without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that police violated the Fourth Amendment when they stopped a moving vehicle solely to ask the driver about the location of a suspect in a prior assault. The police stopped the vehicle based on a tip from the assault victim that the driver was a friend of the suspect and might know his location. The Court reasoned that stopping a vehicle is a greater intrusion than stopping a pedestrian and requires reasonable suspicion, not just a desire to gather information. The evidence obtained as a result of the stop was therefore suppressed.

    Facts

    On May 17, 1989, police officers received a report of an assault with a gun that occurred the previous day. The officers picked up the complainant (victim) and drove around the neighborhood looking for the suspect. The complainant identified the defendant, who was driving a double-parked car, as a friend of the suspect. As the defendant began to drive away, the officers stopped him using their lights and horn, intending to ask about the suspect’s whereabouts. Upon approaching the vehicle, the officers saw marijuana in plain view and subsequently found a loaded revolver under the driver’s seat.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged with criminal possession of a weapon and marijuana. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence, holding that the police had the right to stop the vehicle to request information. The Appellate Division affirmed, relying on People v. John BB., which permitted stops pursuant to a uniform roadblock. The New York Court of Appeals reversed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether police may stop a moving vehicle to request information from the driver regarding the whereabouts of a criminal suspect, without reasonable suspicion that the driver or occupants have committed, are committing, or are about to commit a crime?

    Holding

    No, because the stop of an automobile is a seizure that implicates constitutional limitations, requiring at least a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and the governmental interest in investigating past criminal conduct does not outweigh the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights in this context.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that stopping an automobile is a greater intrusion than stopping a pedestrian and thus requires greater justification. While police have the right to request information from citizens, this right does not include the right to unlawfully seize them. Stopping a vehicle constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The Court distinguished this case from permissible stops such as routine traffic checks or stops based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Here, the police lacked reasonable suspicion; they only wanted to ask the defendant for information about a third party. The Court balanced the government’s interest in investigating a past crime against the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights, finding the intrusion unjustified under the circumstances. The Court noted the importance of avoiding unchecked police discretion and the availability of less intrusive alternatives. The court highlighted that “the Fourth Amendment does not permit the stopping of potential witnesses to the same extent as those suspected of crime.” The Court distinguished People v. John BB., emphasizing the lack of objective standards circumscribing the officers’ discretion in this case. A dissenting opinion argued that the stop was reasonable given the violent nature of the underlying crime and the victim’s belief that the defendant knew the suspect’s location, suggesting there was a preventative governmental interest in the stop as well as an investigative one, and the intrusion was minimal. The dissent further argued that it was reasonable for the officers to believe the defendant had fresh information about the suspect’s location at that very moment and that the police action was not arbitrary.

  • People v. May, 81 N.Y.2d 725 (1992): Reasonable Suspicion Required for Vehicle Stop

    People v. May, 81 N.Y.2d 725 (1992)

    A vehicle stop constitutes a seizure and is lawful only if supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; merely being parked on a deserted street known for criminal activity and slowly driving away from approaching police officers does not provide reasonable suspicion.

    Summary

    Defendant was sitting in a parked car with a companion on a deserted street known for criminal activity when police officers approached in a marked car with turret lights and a spotlight. The defendant started the car and slowly drove away. The officers ordered the defendant to pull over using a loudspeaker. After the stop, the officers discovered the car was stolen and found crack cocaine on the defendant. The New York Court of Appeals held that the initial stop was unlawful because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Evidence obtained as a result of the illegal stop was suppressed.

    Facts

    Two police officers, patrolling in a marked car, observed the defendant and a female companion seated in a parked Oldsmobile on a deserted street known for criminal activity at approximately 2:30 a.m. The officers approached the parked car, activating the patrol car’s red turret lights and spotlight. As the officers approached, the defendant started the engine of the Oldsmobile and slowly pulled away. One of the officers, using the police car’s loudspeaker, ordered the car to pull over. The defendant complied.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to suppress the crack cocaine and police photographs of the stolen car, arguing they were the fruits of an illegal stop and seizure. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, granted the defendant’s motion to suppress, and dismissed the indictment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether police officers, who observe a vehicle parked on a deserted street known for criminal activity and then slowly pulling away as they approach with activated turret lights and spotlight, have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justifying a vehicle stop.

    Holding

    No, because the police officers lacked reasonable suspicion that a crime had been or was about to be committed. The police officers only knew that the defendant and another person were sitting in a car parked on a desolate street, which provided them with no information regarding criminal activity.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that the defendant was effectively “seized” when the police, using red turret lights, a spotlight, and a loudspeaker, ordered him to pull the car over. Because a seizure occurred, the stop was only proper if the officers had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, as required by People v. Sobotker, 43 N.Y.2d 559 (1978), and People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976). The Court reasoned that the circumstances did not give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The Court noted that the defendant’s action in slowly moving the car away as the police approached could not create a reasonable suspicion because the defendant had a right “to be let alone” and refuse to respond to police inquiry, citing People v. Howard, 50 N.Y.2d 583 (1980). The Court stated that the police could have followed the car to keep it under observation while they checked on its plates, but they had no legal basis to stop the car when they did. The court emphasized that police cannot forcibly detain civilians for questioning without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The court stated, “once defendant indicated, by pulling away from the curb, that he did not wish to speak with the officers, they should not have forced him to stop without legal grounds to do so.” The evidence was suppressed based on Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), because it was obtained as a result of the illegal stop.

  • People v. McRay, 51 N.Y.2d 594 (1980): Appellate Review of Mixed Questions of Law and Fact in Vehicle Stops

    People v. McRay, 51 N.Y.2d 594 (1980)

    Appellate courts have limited review power over mixed questions of law and fact, especially when lower courts independently assess the facts to determine if reasonable suspicion existed for a vehicle stop.

    Summary

    This case addresses the scope of appellate review concerning a County Court’s decision on the legality of a vehicle stop. The suppression court initially found no probable cause for the stop. The County Court affirmed, using a reasonable suspicion standard but stated that no reasonable suspicion existed “as a matter of law.” The Court of Appeals held that because the County Court independently assessed the facts, its determination of this mixed question of law and fact was beyond the Court of Appeals’ review powers, affirming the lower court’s decision to suppress the evidence.

    Facts

    Police stopped the defendant’s van for alleged traffic infractions. The exact nature of these alleged infractions is not specified in the Court of Appeals decision. The suppression court initially ruled that there was no probable cause to justify the stop. The People appealed this decision to the County Court.

    Procedural History

    The suppression court ruled in favor of the defendant, suppressing evidence obtained from the vehicle stop. The People appealed to the County Court, which affirmed the suppression order, stating that the stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion as a matter of law. The People then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the County Court’s determination that no reasonable suspicion existed for the vehicle stop is reviewable by the Court of Appeals, given that the determination involved a mixed question of law and fact and the County Court independently assessed the facts.

    Holding

    No, because the County Court independently assessed the facts in determining that no reasonable suspicion existed. This rendered the issue a mixed question of law and fact, which is beyond the review powers of the Court of Appeals.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the legality of a vehicle stop based on reasonable suspicion is generally a mixed question of law and fact. Citing People v. Harrison, the court reiterated that such questions are “rarely…resolved as a matter of law.” The court emphasized that while the County Court stated its determination was “as a matter of law,” it was evident the County Court independently assessed the facts to reach its conclusion. Because the County Court engaged in an independent assessment of the facts, the Court of Appeals found itself bound by the County Court’s findings. The Court of Appeals noted that it lacks the power to review such mixed questions of law and fact when a lower appellate court has made its own factual assessment. Therefore, the Court of Appeals affirmed the County Court’s decision, upholding the suppression of the evidence. The court did not delve into the specific facts that led the County Court to find a lack of reasonable suspicion, focusing instead on the limitations of its appellate review function. The decision underscores the importance of the factual record and the assessments made by lower courts in determining the outcome of search and seizure cases.

  • People v. Marner, 47 N.Y.2d 982 (1979): Justification for Vehicle Stops Based on Reasonable Suspicion

    47 N.Y.2d 982 (1979)

    A police officer may stop a vehicle if the officer has a reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that the occupants have been, are, or are about to be engaged in criminal conduct.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s suppression order, holding that police had reasonable suspicion to stop a van. The officers observed the van near the scene of a recent burglary at 4:30 AM in an area known for burglaries. An individual hurriedly entered the van. The driver appeared nervous and gave an inconsistent statement about his destination. These circumstances, combined with the nearby burglary, provided reasonable suspicion for the stop and subsequent search of the van, which revealed burglar’s tools and stolen property. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division for a review of the facts.

    Facts

    At 4:30 AM, police officers discovered a broken storefront at a department store in Brooklyn and observed property scattered outside. The area was deserted but known for store burglaries. After securing the scene, the officers saw an unmarked, closed van, the only vehicle on the street, turning onto Fulton Street about 200 feet from the burglarized store. An unidentified man quickly entered the van as a passenger. The van then proceeded along a route that brought it near the location where the police had initially seen it.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged with burglary-related offenses. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence found in the van. The Appellate Division reversed, granting the motion to suppress. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the van based on the totality of the circumstances?

    Holding

    Yes, because the officers had reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts that the occupants of the van were engaged in criminal activity.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that the police had sufficient justification to stop the van. The court relied on the following factors: the early morning hour, the proximity to a recent burglary, the area’s history of burglaries, the unmarked nature of the van, the hurried entry of the passenger, and the driver’s nervous demeanor and inconsistent statement about his destination. The court stated that “the actions of the van’s driver and the fleeing passenger together with the knowledge that a burglary had only recently been committed in the area gave the police reason to suspect that the van’s occupants had been engaged in conduct in violation of the law.” The passenger’s flight further strengthened the predicate for a more thorough search of the van, leading to the discovery of incriminating evidence. The court distinguished this case from situations involving random stops without any reasonable suspicion. Judge Jones dissented, arguing that there was no probable cause to justify the stop, emphasizing that merely observing a man entering a van suddenly is not inherently suspicious.

  • People v. Sobotker, 43 N.Y.2d 559 (1978): Limits on Vehicle Stops Based on Suspicion

    People v. Sobotker, 43 N.Y.2d 559 (1978)

    A vehicle stop is unlawful unless based on a reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that the occupants have been, are, or are about to be engaged in criminal activity.

    Summary

    Sobotker was convicted of felony weapon possession after a gun was found in his car following a traffic stop. Police stopped the car because the occupants glanced at two bars while driving slowly. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the stop was an unlawful seizure. The court emphasized that a vehicle stop requires more than a mere hunch; it requires reasonable suspicion rooted in specific, articulable facts suggesting criminal activity. The act of glancing at a bar, even in a high-crime area, is insufficient to justify a stop.

    Facts

    Two plainclothes police officers were stationed in an unmarked car in a well-lit shopping and entertainment area in Wantagh, Long Island, due to recent burglaries. They observed a Buick driving slowly (approximately five miles per hour) towards an intersection. The car paused briefly opposite a bar (“J.T.’s”), during which the three occupants turned their heads towards the bar. The car stopped at a stop sign at the next intersection, where the occupants “glanced” towards a second bar. The police then activated their siren and lights, forcing the car to stop.

    Procedural History

    Sobotker was convicted of possession of a weapon as a felony in the trial court. His motion to suppress the weapon was denied. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. He then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the investigative stop of the vehicle Sobotker was driving violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures under the New York State and United States Constitutions.

    Holding

    Yes, because the police lacked reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, to believe that the occupants of the vehicle had been, were, or were about to be engaged in criminal activity.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on People v. Ingle, which established that vehicle stops require either a non-arbitrary traffic procedure or reasonable suspicion of a law violation. The court distinguished this case from a common-law right to inquire, stating that such a right does not include the right to unlawful seizure. The court emphasized that absent reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, stopping a car is an impermissible seizure. Reasonable suspicion requires “the quantum of knowledge sufficient to induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious man under the circumstances to believe that criminal activity is at hand.” This standard requires more than a subjective “hunch” or “gut reaction”; it must have demonstrable roots in objective evidence.
    In this case, the court found no objective evidence of criminal activity at the time of the stop. The occupants’ act of glancing at a bar, even in a “high crime neighborhood,” did not reasonably indicate criminal conduct. The court noted that the officers’ hunch might have been correct, but a search cannot be justified solely by its results. Allowing hindsight to justify searches would erode constitutional safeguards. The court noted, “almost any series of indiscriminate seizures is bound to produce some instances of criminality that might otherwise have gone undetected or unprevented. But were hindsight alone to furnish the governing criteria, a vital constitutional safeguard of our personal security would soon be gone.” The order of the Appellate Division was reversed, the judgment vacated, and the indictment dismissed.

  • People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976): Justification for Police Stops Based on Reasonable Suspicion

    People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976)

    A police officer may stop a motor vehicle based on a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, justifying an investigative check of the operator’s license and registration.

    Summary

    This case addresses the permissible grounds for a police officer to stop a motor vehicle. Officers stopped a vehicle matching the description of one seen earlier that evening with different license plates. The Court of Appeals held that the stop was justified because the officers had a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was stolen or involved in other criminal activity, supporting an investigative check. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s request for a fourth adjournment to secure a witness.

    Facts

    On September 24, 1971, Officers Santiago and Braga, assigned to a taxi and truck surveillance unit, stopped a blue Buick Riviera with Queens license plates. Later that evening, the officers observed a similar Buick Riviera near the Triborough Bridge, but this one had Brooklyn license plates and multiple occupants. The officers stopped the second vehicle because it appeared identical to the first but had different plates. During the stop, officers discovered that the driver was not the registered owner, and a visible envelope containing what appeared to be cocaine was found in plain view. The occupants, including the defendant, were arrested.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was indicted for criminal possession of a dangerous drug. The trial court denied the defendant’s suppression motion. After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a police officer’s suspicion of criminal activity justifies stopping a motor vehicle for an investigative check.
    2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s request for an adjournment to secure the presence of a witness.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the officer had a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was stolen or involved in other criminal activity, warranting the stop for an investigative check of the driver’s license and registration.
    2. No, because the trial court had already granted multiple adjournments, and the defendant’s own actions contributed to the witness’s unavailability.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the police action in stopping the vehicle was permissible because it was based on the officer’s observation of two apparently identical cars with different license plates within a short time frame. This observation created a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was stolen or involved in other criminal activity, thus justifying the stop for an investigative check. The court distinguished this situation from routine or arbitrary stops, which are prohibited under People v. Ingle. The court emphasized that “it [is] enough if the stop is based upon ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion’ (Terry v Ohio, 393 US 1, 21, supra).”

    Regarding the adjournment, the court found no abuse of discretion. The trial court had granted multiple adjournments, and the defendant had contributed to the witness’s unavailability by previously absconding from the jurisdiction. The court distinguished this case from People v. Foy, where the trial court denied even a brief adjournment. Here, the court had been cooperative and accommodating. The court also noted that there was doubt about the needfulness of the potential witness’s testimony since the defense attorney admitted to not knowing whether the testimony would help or hurt the defendant.

    The court held that a trial court’s discretion in granting adjournments should not be manipulated to avoid due process, especially when the defendant’s actions contributed to the situation. The court concluded that, under the circumstances, the additional adjournment denial was within the trial court’s discretion.

  • People v. Allende, 39 N.Y.2d 474 (1976): Unjustified Vehicle Stop and Search Based on Whim

    People v. Allende, 39 N.Y.2d 474 (1976)

    A vehicle stop and search is illegal if based on a mere whim or caprice, without any reasonable suspicion that a crime has been, is being, or is about to be committed.

    Summary

    This case addresses the legality of a vehicle stop and search. Police officers, without any prior information or reasonable suspicion, approached a double-parked car with guns drawn, effectively seizing the vehicle and its occupants. A subsequent search revealed an illegal weapon. The New York Court of Appeals held that the seizure was unlawful because it was based on a mere whim, lacking any reasonable basis to suspect criminal activity. Therefore, the evidence obtained from the illegal search was inadmissible, and the defendant’s conviction was overturned.

    Facts

    Two plainclothes police officers in an unmarked taxi observed four men, including Allende, in a double-parked car with the engine running. The officers had no prior information about the vehicle or its occupants. Without any radio bulletin or other information suggesting criminal activity, the officers approached the vehicle with their guns drawn.

    Procedural History

    Allende was charged with possession of a weapon. He moved to suppress the gun as evidence, arguing it was obtained through an illegal search. The trial court denied the motion, and Allende pleaded guilty. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police officers’ approach of the double-parked vehicle with guns drawn, absent any reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, constituted an illegal seizure under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 12 of the New York Constitution, thereby rendering the subsequent search and seizure of the weapon unlawful.

    Holding

    Yes, because the police action constituted an unlawful seizure based on nothing more than a whim or caprice, as the officers lacked any reasonable basis to believe that the occupants had committed, were committing, or were about to commit a crime.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that approaching the vehicle with guns drawn constituted a seizure under both the State and Federal Constitutions. The legality of the seizure hinged on whether the officers had reasonable cause for the intrusion. The court emphasized this was not a routine traffic stop, as the officers admitted their primary objective was to determine if the vehicle was stolen, not to address the double-parking violation. Quoting Terry v. Ohio, the court stated that the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure must “warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.” The court found no such facts existed, stating, “the seizure, judged as it must be as of its inception, was one based on nothing but a mere ‘whim or caprice’.” Because the initial seizure was unlawful, the subsequent discovery of the weapon was also tainted, and the evidence should have been suppressed. The court emphasized the importance of deterring unlawful police conduct, quoting Elkins v. United States: “to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way— by removing the incentive to disregard it”.