New York Law Review

Tag: Vehicle and Traffic Law

  • People v. Prescott, 95 N.Y.2d 656 (2001): Attempted DWI and the Limits of Criminal Attempt

    People v. Prescott, 95 N.Y.2d 656 (2001)

    Under New York law, attempted driving while intoxicated (DWI) and attempted aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle are not legally cognizable offenses due to the comprehensive nature of the Vehicle and Traffic Law and its specific penalty scheme, which do not contemplate such attempts.

    Summary

    Defendant was found in the driver’s seat of a truck, keys in the ignition, attempting to start it while intoxicated. He was charged with attempted DWI and attempted aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle. The New York Court of Appeals held that these are not legally cognizable offenses. The Court reasoned that the Legislature did not intend to create liability for attempted drunk driving, as evidenced by the detailed statutory scheme in Article 31 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, which provides specific penalties for various degrees of DWI but lacks any provisions for attempts. Allowing such charges would disrupt this carefully crafted system and create confusion.

    Facts

    Jeffrey Orlando heard noises outside his home and saw Defendant in his truck, attempting to start it with the keys in the ignition. Defendant stated he wanted to use the truck to pull his own vehicle out of a ditch. Orlando believed Defendant was intoxicated. The truck was operable but hard to start, requiring specific knowledge to engage the engine.

    Procedural History

    The County Court dismissed the charges of attempted DWI and attempted aggravated unlicensed operation, relying on People v. Campbell. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that attempted DWI is possible because DWI proscribes conduct, not just a result, citing People v. Saunders. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether attempted driving while intoxicated is a legally cognizable offense in New York.

    2. Whether attempted aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the first degree is a legally cognizable offense in New York.

    Holding

    1. No, because the Legislature did not contemplate criminal liability for attempted drunk driving, given the comprehensive nature of Article 31 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law and its discrete penalty scheme.

    2. No, because like drunk driving, the Legislature did not contemplate an attempted offense under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511, which is part of an integrated statutory scheme with specific and well-defined penalties.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that generally, an attempt to commit a strict liability crime is not cognizable if the crime targets an unintended result, but it is cognizable if the crime targets specific conduct. While DWI appears to target conduct (“operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated”), statutory and policy considerations inform the analysis. The Court emphasized the legislative history and the comprehensive nature of Article 31 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, enacted to address drunk driving with specific penalties and procedures. “Article 31 emerged as a tightly and carefully integrated statute the sole purpose of which is to address drunk driving.” The statute’s detailed penalty scheme for various DWI offenses indicates that the Legislature did not contemplate a separate crime of attempted DWI. Creating such an offense would lead to confusion, especially regarding appropriate punishments and license sanctions. The Court also noted the broad definition of “operation” under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192, which encompasses conduct “dangerously close” to driving. Given this broad definition, the Legislature likely saw no need to expand sanctions to include attempted DWI. Regarding aggravated unlicensed operation, the Court found that the Legislature similarly did not intend to create attempt liability, given the specific penalties and well-defined nature of the offense within Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511.

  • Bliss v. State, 95 N.Y.2d 911 (2000): Defining Recklessness Standard for Highway Workers

    Bliss v. State, 95 N.Y.2d 911 (2000)

    When a vehicle is ‘actually engaged in work on a highway,’ as per Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b), the driver is exempt from the rules of the road but must not act recklessly, defined as consciously disregarding a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow.

    Summary

    George Bliss sued the State for injuries sustained when his car was struck by a New York State Thruway Authority (NYSTA) truck driven by John Lawler. The Court of Claims granted summary judgment to the State, applying a recklessness standard and finding insufficient evidence of recklessness. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals modified the order, holding that while the recklessness standard applied, there was a triable issue of fact regarding whether Lawler acted recklessly, and remitted the case to the Court of Claims for further proceedings.

    Facts

    On October 20, 1995, George Bliss was injured when his vehicle was struck by a NYSTA truck driven by John Lawler. The accident occurred on a bridge located on a heavily-traveled interstate highway. Lawler was backing the truck down a narrow decline. The truck only had side view mirrors and no rear view mirror. Lawler strayed 100 to 250 feet from the cone truck instead of staying within the required 30 feet according to NYSTA safety directives. There was no spotter provided for the backing operation. The work crew was allegedly hurrying to dismantle the lane closure because they started late. Lawler pleaded guilty to unsafe backing in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1211(a) as a result of the incident.

    Procedural History

    The Court of Claims granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that the recklessness standard applied and that the claimant failed to present sufficient evidence of recklessness. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals modified the order, denying the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and remitting the case to the Court of Claims for further proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b), Lawler’s truck was exempt from the rules of the road because it was “actually engaged in work on a highway,” and if so, whether the claimant presented sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether Lawler acted recklessly.

    Holding

    Yes, because under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b), Lawler’s truck was exempt from the rules of the road since it was “actually engaged in work on a highway.” No, because while factual and credibility issues remained, the claimant presented sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue for the jury to consider regarding whether Lawler acted recklessly.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b), which exempts vehicles “actually engaged in work on a highway” from the standard rules of the road. Because Lawler was exempt, the claimant needed to demonstrate recklessness to recover damages. The court defined recklessness by quoting Saarinen v. Kerr, 84 N.Y.2d 494, 501 (1994), as acting in conscious disregard of “a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow.” The court found the claimant presented enough evidence to demonstrate recklessness to warrant a trial. This evidence included Lawler backing his truck down a narrow decline on a bridge located on a heavily-traveled interstate highway, at an excessive speed, using only side view mirrors. There was no indication Lawler slowed down or sounded his horn. Furthermore, Lawler violated NYSTA safety directives. The court noted that Lawler’s guilty plea to a traffic offense further supported a finding of recklessness. The court explicitly declined to determine whether Lawler acted recklessly as a matter of law, and remitted the case to the lower court for trial. The court also did not rule on the viability of the defendant’s affirmative defenses, stating that the Court of Claims should address the claimant’s motion to dismiss those defenses in the first instance.

  • Riley v. County of Broome, 95 N.Y.2d 407 (2000): Duty of Care for Vehicles Engaged in Road Work

    Riley v. County of Broome, 95 N.Y.2d 407 (2000)

    Vehicles engaged in work on a highway are exempt from the rules of the road, and their operators are liable only for conduct that demonstrates a reckless disregard for the safety of others.

    Summary

    This case addresses the standard of care applicable to vehicles engaged in highway work under New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b). Two separate cases were consolidated. In the first, a street sweeper caused a dust cloud leading to a collision. In the second, a snowplow turned unexpectedly, colliding with a car. The New York Court of Appeals held that § 1103(b) exempts vehicles “actually engaged in work on a highway” from the rules of the road, limiting liability to reckless disregard for the safety of others. The Court reasoned that the legislative history supported this interpretation and that the standard of care should be consistent with that applied to emergency vehicles.

    Facts

    In Riley v. County of Broome, Betty Riley collided with a street sweeper operated by Garwood Young, a Broome County employee. The sweeper was moving slowly, creating a cloud of dust. In Wilson v. State of New York, John Wilson’s car collided with a snowplow operated by William Hunt. The snowplow made a sudden turn across Wilson’s lane during a snowstorm with poor visibility.

    Procedural History

    In Riley, the trial court instructed the jury that the recklessness standard applied under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b), and the jury found for the defendants. The Appellate Division affirmed. In Wilson, the Court of Claims dismissed the claim after trial, holding that the recklessness standard applied and the evidence was insufficient to meet that standard. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b) exempts “hazard vehicles” engaged in highway work from all rules of the road, or only from the stopping, standing, and parking regulations of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1202(a)?

    Whether the applicable standard of care for vehicles engaged in highway work is ordinary negligence or reckless disregard for the safety of others?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the statute’s plain language exempts all vehicles “actually engaged in work on a highway” from the rules of the road.

    2. Reckless disregard, because the 1974 amendment to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b) explicitly references reckless disregard, and the legislative history indicates an intent to align the standard of care with that of emergency vehicles.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the language of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b) is clear: all vehicles “actually engaged in work on a highway” are exempt from the rules of the road. The Court rejected the argument that designated “hazard vehicles” are only exempt from stopping, standing, and parking regulations. The Court stated, “the statute nowhere states that ‘hazard vehicles’ are a distinct class from ‘work vehicles,’ nor does it deny ‘hazard vehicles’ the special protection given to all vehicles actually engaged in road work.”

    Regarding the standard of care, the Court relied on its prior holding in Saarinen v. Kerr, which interpreted identical language in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e) (regarding emergency vehicles) as imposing a recklessness standard. The Court reasoned that the Legislature’s specific reference to “reckless disregard” would be unnecessary if the intended standard was ordinary negligence. The Court stated, “the only way to apply the statute is to read its general admonition to exercise ‘due care’ in light of its more specific reference to ‘recklessness’.” The Court also referenced the Attorney General’s memorandum, which explicitly stated that the amendment “extends the standard of care presently applicable to drivers of authorized emergency vehicles under § 1104 * * * to persons engaged in maintenance and hazardous operations”. Despite acknowledging concerns that extending this lesser standard of care was unjustified, the court deferred to the Legislature and made it clear that “Any change in that standard, therefore, must come from the Legislature, not the courts.”

  • People v. Walker, 81 N.Y.2d 1000 (1993): Predicate Felonies and Non-Penal Law Convictions

    People v. Walker, 81 N.Y.2d 1000 (1993)

    A prior felony conviction, including a Vehicle and Traffic Law felony, can serve as a predicate felony to enhance the severity of punishment for a subsequent Penal Law felony.

    Summary

    The defendant was sentenced as a second felony offender after pleading guilty to criminal sale of a controlled substance. He argued that his two prior Vehicle and Traffic Law (VTL) felony convictions should not have been considered predicate felonies under Penal Law § 70.06 (1) (b) (i). The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the statute does not require a prior felony to be defined by the Penal Law to be considered a predicate felony. The court emphasized that the Legislature intended to include *any* prior felony conviction to enhance punishment for subsequent Penal Law felonies, serving an important deterrent purpose.

    Facts

    The defendant pleaded guilty to criminal sale of a controlled substance in the fifth degree.

    Prior to this conviction, the defendant had two felony convictions under the Vehicle and Traffic Law.

    The sentencing court classified the defendant as a second felony offender based on these prior VTL felony convictions.

    The defendant challenged this classification, arguing that VTL felonies are not predicate felonies for sentencing purposes under the Penal Law.

    Procedural History

    The trial court sentenced the defendant as a second felony offender.

    The defendant appealed, arguing that the sentencing was improper.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision.

    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Penal Law § 70.06 (1) (b) (i) requires that a prior felony be defined by the Penal Law to be considered a predicate felony for sentencing a defendant as a second felony offender.

    Holding

    No, because the express language of Penal Law § 70.06 (1) (b) (i) does not require the prior felony to be one defined by the Penal Law. The omission of restrictive language indicates that the Legislature intended to include any prior felony conviction as a predicate felony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the plain language of Penal Law § 70.06 (1) (b) (i), which defines a predicate felony conviction without specifying that it must be a felony defined in the Penal Law. The court contrasted this subdivision with Penal Law § 70.06 (1) (a), which explicitly limits second felony offender status to individuals who commit a “felony defined in this chapter.” The court reasoned that this distinction indicates a deliberate legislative choice to treat *any* prior felony as a predicate for enhancing punishment under § 70.06 (1) (b) (i). The court noted the legislative intent to punish repeat offenders more harshly, emphasizing the deterrent effect of the statute.

    The court stated, “Rather, the specific omission of any restrictive language preceding the definition of what constitutes a ‘predicate felony conviction’ for sentencing purposes indicates that the Legislature intended to include any prior felony conviction, including a Vehicle and Traffic Law felony, as a predicate felony to enhance the severity of punishment.”

    The court also cited *People v. Clearwater*, *Haag v. Ward*, and *Dillard v. La Vallee* in support of its holding, underscoring the consistency of this interpretation with existing case law.

  • People v. Demperio, 86 N.Y.2d 550 (1995): Clarity Required for License Revocation Statutes

    People v. Demperio, 86 N.Y.2d 550 (1995)

    A statute revoking a driver’s license is not unconstitutionally vague if it clearly indicates that a new license application is required after the revocation period expires.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed a lower court decision, holding that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193 (2)(b)(3) is not unconstitutionally vague. The defendant was charged with aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle after his license was revoked due to a prior DWI conviction. He argued the statute was vague because it didn’t explicitly state a new application was needed for reinstatement. The Court of Appeals found the term “revoke” implies permanence, and another part of the statute clarifies that reissuance is at the commissioner’s discretion, implying a new application is necessary. The presumption of constitutionality further supported their decision.

    Facts

    Defendant was stopped for driving in Geddes, NY, on September 19, 1992.
    He was charged with aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the second degree.
    His license had been revoked due to a prior conviction for driving while intoxicated (DWI) on September 18, 1990.
    He also had a prior conviction for driving while ability impaired the previous year.
    His license was revoked on April 17, 1991, for a minimum of one year under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193 (2)(b)(3).
    He had not applied to have his license reinstated at the time of the incident.

    Procedural History

    Defendant argued that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193 (2)(b)(3) was unconstitutionally vague in Town Court.
    The Town Court agreed with the defendant.
    The County Court affirmed the Town Court’s decision.
    The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193 (2)(b)(3) is unconstitutionally vague because it does not explicitly state that a driver must make a new application to have a revoked license reinstated.

    Holding

    No, because the term “revoke” implies permanence, and the statute, read as a whole, makes it clear that reissuance of a license after revocation is not automatic and requires a new application.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court began by noting the presumption of constitutionality afforded to legislative enactments. The Court stated that the word “revoke” means “to annul, void or cancel” and has a “core element of permanence.” The court reasoned that any ambiguity was resolved by the statute’s following paragraph, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193(2)(c)(1) which states:

    “(c) Reissuance of licenses; restrictions. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, where a license is revoked pursuant to paragraph (b) of this subdivision, no new license shall be issued after the expiration of the minimum period specified in such paragraph, except in the discretion of the commissioner.”

    The court concluded that this language gave the defendant reason to know that a new application would be required. Additionally, the court noted that the Department of Motor Vehicles sends written notices to individuals whose licenses have been suspended or revoked due to alcohol-related offenses, explicitly stating that “If your license was revoked, you must apply to the Department of Motor Vehicles for a new license.”

    Therefore, considering the plain meaning of “revoke,” the statutory context, and the DMV’s notification practices, the court determined that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague.

  • People v.的好色喔啦, 76 N.Y.2d 870 (1990): Implied Consent and Blood Alcohol Tests for Unconscious Drivers

    People v.的好色喔啦, 76 N.Y.2d 870 (1990)

    Under New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(2)(a)(1), the implied consent to a blood alcohol test applies even if the driver is unconscious and not formally placed under arrest, provided the officer has reasonable grounds to believe the driver violated § 1192 and the test is administered within two hours of when the arrest would have occurred.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that the implied consent provision of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(2)(a)(1) allows for a blood alcohol test to be administered to an unconscious driver, even if a formal arrest has not been made. The defendant was involved in an accident and remained unconscious for two weeks. The court reasoned that a formal arrest would have been a meaningless gesture in this situation and that the statutory requirements were met because the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the defendant was driving under the influence, and the test was administered within two hours of when the arrest would have occurred had the defendant been conscious. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision to admit the blood alcohol test results as evidence.

    Facts

    The defendant was involved in a motor vehicle accident and was found unconscious at the scene by police officers.

    The defendant remained comatose for approximately two weeks following the accident.

    A blood sample was taken from the defendant at the direction of a police officer, and the test revealed a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit.

    The blood alcohol test was administered within two hours of the accident.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was tried for reckless and vehicular manslaughter.

    The trial included evidence obtained from the blood alcohol test administered pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 (2) (a) (1).

    The defendant argued that the evidence should have been suppressed because he had not been formally placed under arrest at the time the blood sample was taken.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision to admit the evidence.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether evidence obtained from a blood alcohol test administered to an unconscious driver, who was not formally placed under arrest, is admissible under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(2)(a)(1)?

    Holding

    Yes, because a formal arrest would have been an empty gesture given the defendant’s unconscious state, and the statutory requirements of reasonable grounds and timely testing were met.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on the language of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(2)(a)(1), which states that any person who operates a motor vehicle in the state is deemed to have consented to a chemical blood alcohol test if a police officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person was driving under the influence and the test is administered within two hours after the person has been placed under arrest.

    The court reasoned that the purpose of the statute is to obtain evidence of intoxication in a timely manner and that requiring a formal arrest of an unconscious person would serve no practical purpose. The court stated that “a formal arrest would have been an empty gesture in defendant’s case, since defendant was unconscious when the police first arrived at the scene of the accident and he remained comatose for approximately two more weeks.”

    The court distinguished the case from People v. Almond, 151 A.D.2d 820, where the blood test was suppressed because the police found the defendant conscious but waited until he was unconscious due to medical treatment before administering the test, without formally arresting him first.

    The court emphasized that the key factors were the officer’s reasonable belief that the defendant was driving under the influence and the fact that the test was administered within two hours of when the arrest would have occurred. By focusing on these key elements, the court ensured that the implied consent statute would be applied in a manner consistent with its purpose of promoting highway safety and deterring drunk driving.

  • People v. Thomas, 70 N.Y.2d 823 (1987): Permissible Consequences Notification in Breathalyzer Refusal

    People v. Thomas, 70 N.Y.2d 823 (1987)

    In New York, informing a driver of consequences beyond statutory license suspension/revocation for refusing a breathalyzer test does not automatically invalidate a subsequent breathalyzer test if probable cause exists and the driver ultimately consents.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed a County Court order, holding that a breathalyzer test was admissible even though the police informed the defendant of consequences for refusal beyond those explicitly stated in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 (2). The Court reasoned that the statute is not violated when officers inform a person of all the consequences of refusing a breathalyzer, and there was independent support for the suppression court’s finding of probable cause to administer the test.

    Facts

    The defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated. The arresting officer requested the defendant submit to a breathalyzer test. The officer informed the defendant that if he refused, his license would be immediately suspended and subsequently revoked, as required by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 (2). The officer also informed the defendant that refusal would result in arraignment before a Magistrate and the posting of bail. Initially, the defendant refused the test but subsequently agreed to take it.

    Procedural History

    The defendant sought to suppress the breathalyzer test results, arguing that the police violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 (2) by administering the test after his initial refusal and by informing him of consequences not specified in the statute. The County Court denied the suppression motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed the County Court’s order, upholding the admissibility of the breathalyzer test results.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 (2) by administering a breathalyzer test after the defendant’s initial refusal, and by informing him of consequences of refusal beyond license suspension/revocation.

    Holding

    No, because the statute does not prohibit informing a driver of all consequences of refusing a breathalyzer test, and independent probable cause existed for the arrest.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 (2) requires informing a driver that their license will be immediately suspended and subsequently revoked for refusing a breathalyzer. However, the Court found that the statute does not prohibit informing the driver of other potential consequences beyond the specific statutory warning. The Court stated, “Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the statute is not violated by an arresting officer informing a person as to the consequences of his choice to take or not take a breathalyzer test.” The Court also emphasized that the suppression court’s finding of probable cause was supported by the record, and the Court of Appeals’ review process ends when such support exists, citing People v. Jones, 69 N.Y.2d 853, 855. This affirms that even if additional, non-statutory consequences are mentioned, a subsequent consent to the test is valid if probable cause is established.

  • People v. Moser, 70 N.Y.2d 476 (1987): Defining “Personal Supervision” for Blood Alcohol Tests

    People v. Moser, 70 N.Y.2d 476 (1987)

    The “personal supervision” requirement of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(7)(a) for blood alcohol tests does not require the supervising physician to be physically present and observing the procedure when a laboratory technician draws the blood sample.

    Summary

    This case clarifies the meaning of “personal supervision” under New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(7)(a) regarding blood alcohol tests. The Court of Appeals held that a physician need not be physically present and observing when a lab technician draws blood. It is sufficient if the physician directs and supervises activities in the emergency room, authorizes the test, and is available for inquiries and emergencies. This interpretation balances the need for medical oversight with the statute’s purpose of easing the process of obtaining blood alcohol tests.

    Facts

    The defendant was arrested and a blood sample was taken by a lab technician to determine its alcohol content. A physician in charge of the emergency room authorized the taking of the sample, directing and supervising all activities. The physician was not physically present, observing the technician draw the blood.

    Procedural History

    The City Court found that the physician personally supervised the procedure within the meaning of the statute and admitted the blood alcohol test results. County Court reversed, concluding the statute required the physician’s physical presence. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(7)(a) requires a physician to be physically present, observing the procedure, when a laboratory technician draws a blood sample for the purposes of conducting a test to determine its alcoholic or drug content.

    Holding

    No, because the statute’s purpose is to make blood alcohol and drug content tests easier to obtain, and requiring the physician’s physical presence would undermine that purpose. The physician’s authorization and availability to respond to inquiries and emergencies sufficiently addresses the supervision requirement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the County Court’s interpretation conflicted with the statute’s intent. The 1969 amendment aimed to enlarge the class of authorized persons to draw blood, easing the process of obtaining tests. Requiring the physician to stand by the technician during the procedure would negate the benefit of allowing technicians to draw blood in the first place. The court emphasized that the physician’s authorization of the test, implying a medical judgment that it poses no undue risk to the patient, and their availability for inquiries and potential emergencies, sufficiently addresses the concerns underlying the supervision requirement.

    The Court stated that “the personal supervision of a physician is an important safeguard for the health of the suspects to be tested, it would be anomalous in light of the purposes of the amendment to require the physician to put his other duties aside to watch the technician perform the procedure. If that were the requirement, there would be no reason to allow the technician to take the sample in the first place.”

  • People v. Batterson, 69 N.Y.2d 420 (1987): Corroboration of Admissions in DWI Cases

    People v. Batterson, 69 N.Y.2d 420 (1987)

    In New York, a conviction cannot be based solely on a defendant’s admission without additional proof that the offense charged has been committed, though the corroborating evidence need not prove the entire case independently.

    Summary

    Batterson was convicted of driving while impaired. His conviction stemmed from an incident where his father’s car was found in a ditch. Batterson admitted to driving and swerving to avoid a deer. The officer noted signs of intoxication. The County Court reversed, finding insufficient corroboration of Batterson’s admission. The Court of Appeals reversed the County Court’s decision, holding that there was sufficient corroborating evidence, namely the car in the ditch, the absence of skid marks, and Batterson’s behavior, to support an inference that a crime had been committed.

    Facts

    At approximately 3:00 a.m., a vehicle owned by Batterson’s father was found in a ditch, facing the wrong direction. Batterson and two companions were standing beside the vehicle. Batterson stated he was driving, swerved to avoid a deer, and ended up in the ditch. The officer smelled alcohol on Batterson’s breath and observed signs of intoxication. A breathalyzer test revealed a blood alcohol level of .08%.

    Procedural History

    Batterson was convicted in the Walworth Town Court. The Wayne County Court reversed the judgment, dismissing the information due to insufficient corroboration. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the County Court’s order, reinstating the Town Court’s judgment and remitting the case to Wayne County Court for consideration of the facts.

    Issue(s)

    Whether there was sufficient corroborating evidence to support Batterson’s admission that he was driving while impaired, as required by CPL 60.50.

    Holding

    Yes, because there was sufficient independent evidence to corroborate Batterson’s admission that he was driving while impaired. This evidence included the location of the vehicle in a ditch, the absence of skid marks, and Batterson’s demeanor at the scene.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that CPL 60.50 requires “some proof, of whatever weight,” that the offense charged has been committed. The purpose of the statute is to prevent convictions based solely on confessions when no crime has actually occurred. The court emphasized that the corroborating evidence need not be substantial on its own, noting that “sufficient corroboration exists when the confession is ‘supported’ by independent evidence of the corpus delicti.” The court cited the presence of Batterson at the scene and the circumstances of the accident as supporting an inference of guilt. The court noted the vehicle was in a ditch, facing the wrong way, the pavement was dry, and Batterson exhibited signs of intoxication. The Court stated that, “Defendant’s admission was the ‘key’ that explained those circumstances and established defendant’s connection to the criminal act”.

  • People v. Alvarez, 70 N.Y.2d 375 (1987): Foundation Required for Breathalyzer Test Results

    People v. Alvarez, 70 N.Y.2d 375 (1987)

    To admit breathalyzer test results in a Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 prosecution, the prosecution must present evidence allowing a reasonable fact-finder to conclude the testing device was in proper working order and that the chemicals used were of the proper kind and mixed in the proper proportions.

    Summary

    Alvarez was convicted of driving while intoxicated. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the breathalyzer test results were improperly admitted. The Court found the prosecution failed to establish a proper foundation for the breathalyzer results by not presenting any evidence the machine was functioning accurately, or the chemicals were properly constituted. Proof the operator was certified or that the defendant appeared intoxicated was insufficient. The case clarifies foundational requirements for admitting breathalyzer evidence, emphasizing the need to prove the machine’s accuracy, not just the operator’s certification or the defendant’s apparent intoxication.

    Facts

    The defendant, Alvarez, was arrested and charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI) under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192. At trial, the prosecution introduced breathalyzer test results to establish the defendant’s blood alcohol content exceeded the legal limit. The prosecution offered proof that the test operator was certified. The arresting officers testified as to the defendant’s behavior and field sobriety test results.

    Procedural History

    The trial court admitted the breathalyzer test results. The defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecution laid a sufficient foundation for the admission of breathalyzer test results by offering proof that the test operator was certified and presenting observations of the arresting officers and field sobriety test results, without offering any evidence the breathalyzer machine was in proper working order or that properly constituted chemicals were used.

    Holding

    No, because the People must introduce evidence from which the trier of fact could reasonably conclude that the testing device was in proper working order and that the chemicals used in conducting the test were of the proper kind and mixed in the proper proportions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that admitting breathalyzer results requires a foundational showing that the testing device was functioning accurately. Citing prior case law, the Court reiterated the necessity of demonstrating both the machine’s proper working order and the appropriate constitution of the chemicals used. Proof of the operator’s certification, while relevant to whether the test was properly administered, does not establish the machine’s accuracy. The Court noted that “proof that the test operator was certified by the Health Department to conduct breathalyzer tests, while permitting the inference that the test was properly given (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 [9]; see, People v Mertz, 68 NY2d 136) is not probative of the distinct foundational requirement concerning the accuracy of the machine.” Similarly, observations of the defendant’s intoxication, while relevant to whether the defendant was impaired, are not probative of the breathalyzer’s accuracy in measuring blood alcohol content. The Court concluded that, lacking any evidence supporting the breathalyzer’s accuracy, the test results were inadmissible, warranting a new trial. The Court explicitly declined to define the exact nature or quantity of proof required, as the record was completely devoid of such evidence.