21 N.Y.2d 239 (1967)

Violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1174(b), requiring school bus drivers to instruct pupils to cross in front of the bus and keep the bus halted with flashing red lights until they reach the other side, imposes absolute liability on the school district, precluding the defense of contributory negligence.

Summary

This case concerns the wrongful death of a 14-year-old boy struck by a car after being discharged from a school bus. The bus driver violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1174(b) by failing to instruct the boy to cross in front of the bus and not activating the flashing red lights. The Court of Appeals held that this violation imposed absolute liability on the school district, meaning the boy’s contributory negligence was not a bar to recovery. The court reasoned the statute was designed to protect children, who are often incapable of avoiding traffic hazards, and the statute imposed a flat, unvarying duty on the bus driver. A new trial was ordered to determine proximate cause between the statutory violation and the accident.

Facts

Michael Van Gaasbeck, 14, was dropped off by a school bus on the east side of Route 22. The bus driver knew Michael lived on the west side of the road and would need to cross. The bus driver did not instruct Michael to cross in front of the bus, nor did she activate the bus’s flashing red signal lights. Michael and a friend walked to an intersection, and as Michael attempted to cross Route 22, he was struck by a car driven by defendant Alvin Huehnel, resulting in his death three days later.

Procedural History

The plaintiff brought a wrongful death action against the bus driver, the school district, and the driver of the car that struck Michael. The trial court charged the jury that violating the statute was negligence per se, allowing a contributory negligence defense, and the jury returned a verdict for all defendants. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ decisions regarding the school district and bus driver, holding that the violation of the statute constituted absolute liability.

Issue(s)

1. Whether a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1174(b) constitutes negligence per se or gives rise to absolute liability?

2. Whether the plaintiff’s complaint stated a cause of action based on the violation of the statute, even if it was framed as a common-law negligence claim?

3. Whether proximate cause must be established between the violation of the statute and the accident for the school district to be held liable?

Holding

1. Yes, a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1174(b) gives rise to absolute liability because the statute is designed to protect a specific class (school children) from a hazard they are incapable of avoiding.

2. Yes, the plaintiff’s complaint was sufficient because it stated the facts making out a cause of action, regardless of whether it was explicitly labeled as a statutory violation claim.

3. Yes, proximate cause must be established because absolute liability does not automatically equate to recovery; there must be a causal link between the statutory violation and the resulting injury.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that the statute was designed to protect school children, a specific class inherently vulnerable to traffic hazards. The statute’s language, using the word “shall,” imposes a “flat and unvarying duty” on bus drivers. The court distinguished between statutes that define a general standard of care (negligence per se) and those that impose a specific duty for the protection of a defined class (absolute liability). The court cited Koenig v. Patrick Constr. Corp., stating, “Only when the statute is designed to protect a definite class from a hazard of definable orbit, which they themselves are incapable of avoiding, is it deemed to create a statutory cause of action and to impose a liability unrelated to questions of negligence.”

Regarding the pleading issue, the court emphasized that modern pleading rules require only that the facts constituting a cause of action be stated, regardless of the label attached to the claim. The complaint’s allegations regarding the driver’s failure to follow the statute were sufficient. However, the Court also stated that the defendant that struck the child was only negligent and the child was contributorily negligent.

The court acknowledged the need to establish proximate cause, stating, “There is no doubt that there is a question of proximate cause in this case. This question, however, is one for the jury…” This means the jury must determine whether the driver’s failure to follow the statute was a direct cause of Michael’s death.

The dissenting opinion argued that not every statute prescribing standards of reasonable care creates absolute liability. The dissent maintained that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1174(b) prescribes standards of care, and violations of such standards constitute negligence, not absolute liability. The dissent felt that since the action was based on tort, contributory negligence should apply.