New York Law Review

Tag: Vacancy

  • Matter of Daul v. Board of Education, 57 N.Y.2d 864 (1982): Defining Vacancy in Teacher Reinstatement Cases

    Matter of Daul v. Board of Education, 57 N.Y.2d 864 (1982)

    A vacancy exists under Education Law § 2510(3) when a teacher on extended sick leave notifies the school district of their inability to return and submits a resignation, entitling those on a preferred eligible list to move up.

    Summary

    This case concerns whether a ‘vacancy’ existed, triggering reinstatement rights for teachers on a preferred eligible list, when a teacher on extended sick leave informed the school district of her inability to return and subsequently resigned. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that under these circumstances, a vacancy did exist, distinguishing it from short-term leave cases. This decision clarifies the application of Education Law § 2510(3) regarding teacher reinstatement rights when a long-term absence transitions into a permanent departure.

    Facts

    Two senior teachers, Daul and Dionisio, were on a “preferred eligible list” in the Mahopac Central School District. A tenured teacher was on sick leave for one and a half years. In June 1981, the sick leave teacher notified the school district that her poor health prevented her from returning to her duties. Shortly thereafter, she submitted her resignation, effective June 1982. The Board of Education appointed a less senior teacher as a substitute for the 1981-1982 school year.

    Procedural History

    Daul and Dionisio initiated Article 78 proceedings challenging the Board’s appointment of the less senior teacher. The Appellate Division ruled in favor of Daul and Dionisio, concluding that a vacancy existed. The Board of Education appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a “vacancy” within the meaning of subdivision 3 of section 2510 of the Education Law was created for the 1981-1982 school year when a teacher who had been on sick leave for one and one-half years notified the respondent in June 1981 that poor health prevented her from fulfilling her duties and shortly thereafter submitted her resignation (effective June 1982), which was accepted by the Board?

    Holding

    Yes, because the teacher’s extended sick leave, coupled with notification of her inability to return and submission of her resignation, created a circumstance different from a short-term leave of absence, thus establishing a “vacancy”.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the circumstances of this case differed significantly from cases involving short-term leaves of absence, such as Brewer v. Board of Educ., 51 N.Y.2d 855. In Brewer, the incumbent teacher had only taken a short-term leave. Here, the teacher’s extended absence of one and a half years, combined with her notification that she could not return due to poor health and her subsequent resignation, indicated a permanent departure from her position. This created a “vacancy” under Education Law § 2510(3), entitling those on the eligible list to be considered for the position. The court deferred to the Appellate Division’s conclusion that a vacancy existed under these specific facts, recognizing the practical impact of a long-term absence coupled with an explicit resignation. The Court’s decision emphasizes the importance of considering the duration and nature of the leave when determining whether a vacancy exists for the purposes of teacher reinstatement rights. The ruling reinforces the protection afforded to teachers on preferred eligible lists when a permanent vacancy arises following a long-term leave of absence.

  • Matter of Brewer v. Board of Educ. of Plainview-Old Bethpage Cent. School Dist., 51 N.Y.2d 855 (1980): Determining When a ‘Vacancy’ Exists for Teacher Reassignment

    Matter of Brewer v. Board of Educ. of Plainview-Old Bethpage Cent. School Dist., 51 N.Y.2d 855 (1980)

    A sabbatical leave for a significant period creates a temporary vacancy that a tenured teacher is entitled to fill under Education Law § 2510(3).

    Summary

    This case concerns the interpretation of Education Law § 2510(3), which governs the reassignment of tenured teachers when positions are abolished. The court addressed whether a sabbatical leave creates a “vacancy” that a tenured teacher is entitled to fill. Justice Jasen, in concurrence, argued that a sabbatical leave of one year constitutes a temporary vacancy within the meaning of the statute. The concurrence disagreed with the majority’s restrictive interpretation, emphasizing the statute’s purpose of ensuring reassignment opportunities for tenured teachers whose positions have been eliminated. It highlights the need to protect teachers and promote flexibility within the education system.

    Facts

    A tenured teacher’s position was abolished. Subsequently, another teacher in the district took a one-year sabbatical leave. The tenured teacher whose position was abolished sought reassignment to the position created by the sabbatical, arguing that the sabbatical created a vacancy under Education Law § 2510(3). The school district denied the reassignment.

    Procedural History

    The case originated in the context of an administrative decision by the school district. The specific procedural history prior to the Court of Appeals is not detailed in this excerpt, but the case reached the New York Court of Appeals, which affirmed the lower court’s decision, albeit with a concurring opinion expressing disagreement with the majority’s reasoning.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a sabbatical leave of one year constitutes a “vacancy” within the meaning of Education Law § 2510(3), entitling a tenured teacher whose position was abolished to be reassigned to that position.

    Holding

    No, according to the majority. However, Justice Jasen in concurrence argued Yes, because the statute was intended to apply to temporary as well as permanent position vacancies.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Justice Jasen, concurring, argued that the majority’s interpretation of “vacancy” was unduly restrictive and contrary to the spirit of Education Law § 2510. He emphasized that the statute aims to ensure that tenured teachers whose positions are terminated will be reassigned to other positions for which they are qualified as vacancies occur. He stated that the statute does not distinguish between temporary and permanent vacancies, and that the duration of the vacancy should not be the determining factor. He reasoned that excluding reassignment to a position merely because the incumbent will return at a later date is an unduly restrictive view. The concurrence draws on the policy consideration of encouraging qualified teachers to seek promotions. The judge quotes Matter of Fitzgibbons, 8 Ed Dept Rep 205, 208, stating that the Commissioner of Education sought to encourage qualified teachers to seek promotions without the fear of losing their tenure in their previous area should they fail to achieve permanent certification in their new positions for reasons unrelated to their ability to teach.

  • Matter of Elias v. Serota, 24 N.Y.2d 68 (1969): Interpreting Corporate By-Laws for Filling Board Vacancies

    Matter of Elias v. Serota, 24 N.Y.2d 68 (1969)

    When a specific corporate by-law addresses filling board vacancies, it takes precedence over general by-laws requiring a supermajority for transacting business, especially when applying the general rule would paralyze corporate functions.

    Summary

    This case concerns a dispute over the validity of an election to fill a vacancy on a corporate board of directors. The petitioner challenged the election, arguing that a supermajority vote was required under the corporation’s general by-laws. The Court of Appeals held that a specific by-law addressing the filling of vacancies controlled over the general quorum and voting requirements. The Court reasoned that applying the general rules would lead to corporate paralysis, and the specific by-law was designed to ensure the corporation’s continued functioning. The court emphasized that the specific by-law complemented statutory provisions regarding filling vacancies, and should prevail over the general by-laws.

    Facts

    The corporation had five authorized directors. Two directors resigned, leaving three directors in office: the petitioner and the respondents, Moskowitz and Barrakette. A meeting was held where respondents Moskowitz and Barrakette voted to elect respondent Brody to fill one of the vacant positions. The petitioner objected, arguing that the election required a unanimous vote of the existing three directors.

    Procedural History

    The petitioner sued under Section 619 of the Business Corporation Law to invalidate the election. Special Term found the election valid and denied the application. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a specific corporate by-law allowing “the directors in office” to fill vacancies on the board takes precedence over general by-laws requiring a 75% quorum and 75% vote for transacting business when those general rules would prevent the filling of vacancies.

    Holding

    Yes, because the specific by-law addressing the filling of vacancies is designed to ensure the continued functioning of the corporation and complements statutory provisions regarding filling vacancies, and thus prevails over general by-laws that, if applied, would paralyze the corporation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized the specific language of by-law 14, which granted “the directors in office” the power to choose successors to fill vacancies. This by-law was authorized by Business Corporation Law § 705(a), which allows directors to fill vacancies even if less than a quorum exists, unless the certificate of incorporation or by-laws provide otherwise. The Court distinguished this specific provision from the general quorum and voting requirements in the certificate of incorporation and by-laws, which required 75% of the directors for any business transaction. The Court reasoned that applying the general rules would make it impossible to fill vacancies when the board was reduced to three members, as 75% of the original five directors would be four, an unattainable number. The Court stated: “Rather, it seems to us, the vitality of the corporation was to be preserved and the paralysis of its functions and its mandatory dissolution were to be avoided by the specific, exclusive and practical procedure enacted as by-law 14, complementing, as it does, section 705 (subd. [a]) of the Business Corporation Law. By-laws 20 and 21 apply to the company’s ‘business’, in general; by-law 14 to its special and vital function of succession.” Therefore, the specific by-law regarding filling vacancies controlled over the general quorum and voting requirements, ensuring the corporation’s continued operation.