New York Law Review

Tag: Urinalysis

  • McKenzie v. Jackson, 76 N.Y.2d 995 (1990): Random Drug Testing of Probationary Correction Officers

    76 N.Y.2d 995 (1990)

    Random urinalysis drug testing of probationary correction officers, under a department policy known to the officer, is constitutionally permissible and does not require reasonable suspicion.

    Summary

    McKenzie, a probationary correction officer, was terminated after testing positive for cannabis in a random urinalysis. The test was part of the Westchester County Department of Correction’s policy for probationary officers. McKenzie was aware of this policy upon accepting the position. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal, finding the random drug testing constitutional, aligning with the established exception for employees in safety-sensitive positions, and consistent with its decision in Seelig v. Koehler regarding tenured correction officers. The court emphasized that the policy was known to the officer when accepting the position.

    Facts

    McKenzie was a probationary correction officer in Westchester County.

    The Westchester County Department of Correction had a policy mandating random urinalysis drug tests for probationary correction officers.

    McKenzie was aware of this policy when he accepted the position.

    During his probationary period, McKenzie tested positive for cannabis in a random urinalysis.

    He was subsequently dismissed from his position.

    Procedural History

    McKenzie challenged his dismissal, arguing the random drug test was unconstitutional.

    The lower court upheld the dismissal.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision.

    The New York Court of Appeals granted review.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the random urinalysis drug testing of a probationary correction officer, without reasonable suspicion, violates the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.

    Holding

    No, because random drug testing of probationary correction officers is permissible under the exception articulated in Matter of Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v Board of Educ., especially when the officer is aware of the policy upon accepting the position.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on its decision in Matter of Seelig v Koehler, which held that random urinalysis testing of tenured correction officers in the New York City Department of Correction, without reasonable suspicion, was constitutionally permissible. The court found the circumstances and procedures in McKenzie’s case nearly identical to those in Seelig.

    The court also cited Matter of Caruso v Ward, further solidifying the permissibility of random drug testing for employees in safety-sensitive positions.

    The court emphasized that McKenzie was aware of the department’s policy requiring random drug tests when he accepted the probationary position. This awareness factored into the court’s determination that his reasonable expectation of privacy was diminished.

    The court reasoned that, given the nature of the position as a correction officer and the known policy of random drug testing, the intrusion on McKenzie’s privacy was outweighed by the government’s interest in maintaining a drug-free workplace, particularly in a correctional facility.

    The court did not provide direct quotes but referenced its previous holdings and applied similar reasoning to the case at hand.

  • Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Education, 70 N.Y.2d 50 (1987): Warrantless Urinalysis Requires Reasonable Suspicion

    Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Education, 70 N.Y.2d 50 (1987)

    A public school district’s policy requiring probationary teachers to submit to mandatory, suspicionless urinalysis for drug testing violates the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the New York Constitution.

    Summary

    The Patchogue-Medford School District required all probationary teachers eligible for tenure to submit to urinalysis to detect potential drug abuse. The teachers’ union challenged the policy, arguing it violated the teachers’ constitutional rights. The New York Court of Appeals held that mandatory, suspicionless drug testing of probationary teachers constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure under both the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the New York State Constitution. The court reasoned that while the school district has a legitimate interest in ensuring teacher fitness, it must have reasonable suspicion before requiring such an intrusive test.

    Facts

    The Patchogue-Medford School District had a collective bargaining agreement with its teachers’ union requiring probationary teachers to undergo a physical examination in their first and final probationary years.

    In May 1985, the school district notified 22 probationary teachers that they must submit to urinalysis to determine illegal drug use as a condition for tenure recommendation.

    There was no resolution by the Board of Education requiring these tests, nor was there a policy statement or directive from either the Board or the Superintendent.

    Teachers were informed that the Superintendent would not recommend for tenure any teacher who refused to provide a urine sample.

    Procedural History

    The teachers’ union commenced a proceeding to prohibit the examination, arguing it was unauthorized and an unreasonable search and seizure.

    The trial court granted the petition, finding the test was not part of the authorized medical examination and required reasonable suspicion.

    The Appellate Division affirmed, holding the test was an investigatory search requiring reasonable suspicion.

    The School District appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a public school district’s policy requiring all probationary teachers to submit to urinalysis to detect potential drug abuse constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the New York Constitution.

    Holding

    No, because mandatory, suspicionless drug testing of probationary teachers constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure under both the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the New York State Constitution, as it infringes upon the teachers’ reasonable expectation of privacy without sufficient justification.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the urinalysis constituted a search and seizure under both the State and Federal Constitutions, emphasizing that these provisions protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted governmental intrusion. The court reasoned that requiring a person to urinate for inspection is inherently private and can reveal personal information. The court acknowledged that while teachers have a diminished expectation of privacy due to their role, the school district’s policy was still unreasonable.

    The court distinguished this case from permissible checkpoint stops, noting that a urinalysis is a greater intrusion on individual privacy than a brief roadside inquiry. It emphasized the absence of evidence indicating drug abuse among teachers in general or within the specific school district, and the lack of a formal policy or regulation from the School Board regarding the tests.

    The court emphasized that random searches without reasonable suspicion are generally only permitted when privacy interests are minimal, the government’s interest is substantial, and safeguards are in place to prevent unregulated discretion. The court found these requirements were not met in this case.

    The court stated, “By restricting the government to reasonable searches, the State and Federal Constitutions recognize that there comes a point at which searches intended to serve the public interest, however effective, may themselves undermine the public’s interest in maintaining the privacy, dignity and security of its members.”

    The court concluded that while the school district has a legitimate interest in ensuring teacher fitness, requiring a urinalysis without reasonable suspicion violated the teachers’ constitutional rights. The previously agreed-upon physical examinations were not considered a waiver of the right to be free from unreasonable searches, as the urinalysis was a new test not contemplated by the original contract.

  • Matter of Perez v. Ward, 69 N.Y.2d 840 (1987): Urinalysis for Public Employees Based on Reasonable Suspicion

    Matter of Perez v. Ward, 69 N.Y.2d 840 (1987)

    A public agency may lawfully order an employee to undergo urinalysis based on reasonable suspicion of drug use, supported by substantial evidence.

    Summary

    This case involves challenges by a police officer (Perez) and correction officers (King) to their dismissals for refusing to comply with orders to submit to urinalysis based on reported drug use. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the dismissals, finding that the urinalysis orders were justified by reasonable suspicion based on information from confidential informants. The court emphasized that a public agency may order urinalysis of an employee when there is reasonable suspicion of drug use, and determined that substantial evidence supported the administrative determinations in both cases. The court found the penalty of dismissal was appropriate and rejected the petitioners’ remaining arguments.

    Facts

    Regarding Perez: A reliable confidential informant, with a history of providing accurate information, reported to the police department that Perez was using heroin. Certain allegations made by the informant were verified. On the day before the urinalysis order, the informant stated that he had just witnessed Perez using heroin.

    Regarding Melvin and Henry King: A confidential informant reported the correction officers’ use of illegal drugs at specific locations. The Inspector General’s office verified certain aspects of the information. Shortly before the urinalysis order, the informant advised the Inspector General that he had observed the officers using narcotics at the specified locations.

    Procedural History

    Perez and King separately challenged their dismissals in Article 78 proceedings. The lower courts upheld the dismissals. The cases were then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the orders for the police and correction officers to submit to urinalysis were lawful, given the standard that a public agency may order an employee to undergo urinalysis on reasonable suspicion of drug use?

    Holding

    Yes, because there was substantial evidence supporting the administrative determinations that reasonable suspicion existed to order the urinalysis in both cases.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on whether the “reasonable suspicion” standard for ordering urinalysis was met in each case. It highlighted the reliability of the informants and the verification of certain details they provided. Regarding Perez, the court emphasized the informant’s history of reliability and the recent sighting of Perez using heroin. Regarding the Kings, the court pointed to the informant’s report of drug use at specified locations and the Inspector General’s verification of some of that information. The court concluded that these facts constituted substantial evidence supporting the administrative determinations.

    The court referenced Pell v Board of Educ., 34 NY2d 222, indicating that the penalty of dismissal was not erroneous under the circumstances. The court explicitly stated that the parties agreed on the applicable standard – reasonable suspicion – and therefore the court did not need to rule on what the proper standard should be, focusing instead on whether that agreed-upon standard was satisfied. The court stated: “these parties have agreed that a public agency may lawfully order an employee to undergo urinalysis on reasonable suspicion of drug use. The central issue is whether, on the facts presented, that standard was satisfied here.”

    The court dismissed the petitioners’ remaining contentions as lacking merit.